^{page 86 note 1} B.M., Add. 32768, ff. 279–89.

^{page 88 note 1} To make clear that the cause of war would be a refusal to admit the Spanish garrisons (B.M., Add. 32769, fo. 117v. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, Windsor Castle, 17 Aug. 1730).

^{page 95 note 1} For providing by France 110,000 men ; by Great Britain, 12,000 English, 12,000 Hessians, 20,000 Hanoverians, 12,000 Danes in lieu of subsidy to Sardinia, 4,000 others ; by Holland 30,000, to be used as to 100,000 in Germany and 80,000 in Italy (Add. MS. 32770, fo. 256).

^{page 97 note 1} See Rousset, , Recueil, Vol. VI, p. 8.Google Scholar

^{page 103 note 1–1} Added in George II's hand.

^{page 103 note 1} Cf. Aff. Etr. Angl. 375, fo. 95, Fleury to H. Walpole, Versailles 14 March N.S. 1731, for the comments of Louis XV and Fleury on this draft treaty, viz. that it did not say what the Austrian reply to it was, it said nothing about Mecklenburg and East Friesland nor about the marriage of Don Carlos with an archduchess. Finally as to the Pragmatic Sanction, Vous vous souviendrés s.v.p. aussi bien que mylord Harrington que nous convinmes verbalement à Compiègne en donnant à Mo^r de Kinigsegg notre ultimatum que nous ne pouvions ni ne devions jamais consentir á donner cette garantie.

^{page 105 note 1} Pribram, , Oesterr. Staatsverträge, England, Vol. I, p. 517.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 1} The Queen was acting as Guardian of the Kingdom during the King's absence in Hanover.

^{page 112 note 1} Brother-in-law to Chauvelin.

^{page 115 note 1} Containing news of a demand from Chavigny as to British intentions in the event of Austria and Russia violating the freedom of the Polish diet, and the King's answer.

^{page 121 note 1} The defect in construction is in the original.

^{page 121 note 2} The Russians.

^{page 122 note 1} The Treaty of Turin.

^{page 123 note 1} See Vaucher, Robert Walpole et … Fleury, pp. 64–74.

^{page 125 note 1} France, Spain and Sardinia.

^{page 126 note 1} For the text, see de Cantillo, A., Tratados de paz y de comercio, Madrid, 1843, p. 277.Google Scholar

^{page 128 note 1} Cf. Horace Walpole to Waldegrave, 28 March 1734 in Coxe, , Sir Robert Walpole, III, p. 157.Google Scholar

^{page 132 note 1} The Dutch paper appears not to have given the date of the French answer.

^{page 134 note 1} Cf. Réponse de la Cour impériale aux représentations de MM. Robinson et Bruining, 30 juin 1734 [N.S.], and the Emperor's letter to Kinski of 31 July N.S. 1734, in Coxe, , Sir Robert Walpole, III, p. 170.Google Scholar

^{page 134 note 2} Harrington, Sir Robert Walpole and Newcastle.

^{page 137 note 1} The Jeannel negociation may be followed in Vaucher, op. cit., pp. 99–123.

^{page 155 note 1} See Coxe, , Sir Robert Walpole, III, 234.Google Scholar

^{page 157 note 1} Of 24 November N.S. 1733 (Rousset, , Recueil, Vol. IX, pp. 461–464).Google Scholar

^{page 162 note 1} See Rousset, , Recueil, Vol. X, p. 463.Google Scholar

^{page 164 note 1} On 7 June, N.S.

^{page 167 note 1} Newcastle's own opinions are set out in a letter to Waldegrave marked “Private and particular, and to be opened by himself,” and dated the same day:—“… The conduct of Holland makes it almost impracticable to engage in the war, and upon this, I am persuaded, is the Cardinal's chief dependence. Could the Dutch be brought to shew some appearance of vigour, it might facilitate a general or particular pacification. The indefatigable pains of M^r. Walpole give now and then some glimmering hopes that this might be done.

As to a general pacification, I must freely own to you that the late answer of the Allies puts almost an end to all hopes of it at present. If the Pensionary and Mo^r. Bassecour can have nothing to say in defence of it, sure it must be a bad one indeed and since it is not a good one, perhaps the worse it is, the better. For I am apt to hope and believe that the reception it has met with in Holland (tho' not attended with the vigour and spirit that one could wish) will however begin to alarm the Cardinal. It is amazing how His Eminency could have the weakness, or (to use an harsh expression) the impudenee to talk of it as he did. One would have imagin'd that it had contain'd an absolute consent to an armistice, with indications of the Allies being come to a more reasonable disposition for a general pacification, whereas, if you examine it, it differs from the last only in explanations that must clogg and disappoint both armistice and pacification.

Tho' I must own I never had any great notion that the bare exchange of Tuscany for Lorrain would make the Cardinal accept the plan of pacification, yet it is now evident, by his declining to enter into that affair when you put him upon it, that it is very far from his present intention; and indeed if you consider that his fear of disobliging Spain was one of the chief reasons that made him reject his own plan of pacification, it is not to be imagin'd that he would expose himself to the hatred and reproach of that Crown by accepting the plan of pacification which the Cardinal out of complaisance to Spain had so much exclaim'd against, with only this alteration in favour of France. … The jealousies and differences between Spain and Savoy, relating to the distribution of the conquests in Italy may be a roal foundation for dividing the Allies, and the difficulties that actually attend the undertaking of the siege of Mantua, together with the late discourses of Mo^r. Patino to M^r. Keene, do give reason to beleive that the Emperor might (if he does not let slip this favourable opportunity) by a marriage of his second daughter with Don Carlos, detach Spain effectually from the alliance and recover almost all his dominions in Italy except Naples and Sicily, which might in that case go as a portion to his second daughter.

I do admit that great and real objections may be made to this scheme, but great advantages may come from it also, if it divides the house of Bourbon, as for the present, it undoubtedly will … but I own freely to you, if the Emperor and Spain come to such a reconciliation as we can agree to, I have no notion that we can avoid supporting it. But this is only between you and I (sic).

You will see by my other letter the accounts we have had about the Elector of Bavaria. Should they prove true and this resolution not taken in concert with France or by their consent, sure it must create a great change in their councils, and Mo^r Chauvelin's favourite scheme of reducing, as he calls it, the exorbitant power of the house of Austria, not so glib as he thinks. …

There are private letters from France which say that the general talk in Paris is the getting Flanders for Don Philip of Spain, and that Cardinal Richelieu is the pattern that Chauvelin has set himself and is determin'd to pursue ; and that Spain is the power from whence he expects the greatest opposition to his vast projects. And by the way, this agrees perfectly with what Mo^r. Montijo said to Sir R. Walpole and me, and with the late discourses of Mo^r. Patino and M^r. Keene, and therefore makes the reconciliatio between the Emperor and Spain both more necessary and more practicable. …” (B.M. Add. MS. 32788, fo. 221v.)

^{page 168 note 1} See the despatch from Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris 2 Aug. 1735, N.S., in Coxe, , Sir Robert Walpole, Vol. III, p. 265.Google Scholar

^{page 171 note 1} Robinson's despatches.

^{page 172 note 1} See above, p. 164.

^{page 172 note 2} —² Cypher.

^{page 173 note 1} Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 21 Sept. 1735 N.S. most secret (Coxe, , Sir Robert Walpole, III, p. 276).Google Scholar

^{page 176 note 1} For the text of the preliminaries see Rousset, , Recueil, Vol. X, p. 519.Google Scholar

^{page 178 note 1} For the Spanish-Portuguese dispute see Vaucher, Robert Walpole, pp. 136, 178–84.

^{page 179 note 1} A suggested alliance between France and Spain.

^{page 179 note 2} —² Cypher.

^{page 179 note 3} From de Bussy.

^{page 180 note 1} Of Chauvelin's. See Vaucher, Robert Walpole, p. 180.

^{page 190 note 1} —¹ In the King's hand in m.

^{page 190 note 2} I send you inclos'd two resolutions of the States of the 26^th past, and of the 2^nd inst. As to the former which …is for pressing the Elector Palatine to explain himself upon the offers and proposals made by the King of Prussia, His Majesty would have you concur with M^r. Van Hoey in any instances he may make at the Court of France to that effect. But with regard to the latter … which was occasion'd by the King of Prussia's having represented that the Elector Palatine was about to exact an eventual oath of fidelity from the inhabitants of Berg and Juliers to the Prince of Sultzbach, … I have as yet no orders from His Majesty to send you … (P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 214, fo. 194, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall 8 March 1736/7.)

^{page 191 note 1} In a despatch dated Whitehall April 1st (4th in the endorsement) 1737 Newcastle had commented on Bussy's draft as follows:— “The separate article relating to commerce, by which it is to be agreed that the French not only in the Milanese but in all the hereditary countries of the Emperor shall, with regard to their trade, be put upon the foot of the most favoured nation is very material, and may if concluded be extremely prejudicial to the commerce of His Majesty's subjects. I do not perfectly know what duties the English pay in the Emperor's dominions, but I have been informed that the duties upon the French commodities in those countries are much higher than upon the English. And as this article will extend to Flanders and the Low Countries, it must in all probability greatly affect the English and Dutch merchants, and is contrary to the treaties subsisting between the Emperor and the Maritime Powers. But this is too nice a point for you to touch to the Cardinal, since it has the appearance only of putting the trade of France upon the same foot with that of other nations, tho', with regard to the Emperor it is very injurious to the Maritime Powers, and some means should be found to prevent it, if possible.” (To Waldegrave, private and particular, in cypher, to be opened by himself, B.M. Add. 32794, fo. 295.)

^{page 192 note 1} Belonging to the house of Farnese in Naples. (Rousset, , Recueil, Vol. IX, pp. 1–129.)Google Scholar

^{page 197 note 1} I have not found this edict quoted with a precise date.

^{page 197 note 2} Acts of Assembly, passed in … Montserrat, London, 1740, p. 107.

^{page 197 note 3} Dumont, , Corps diplomatique, Vol. VII, pt. ii, p. 141.Google Scholar

^{page 199 note 1} See Rousset, , Recueil, Vol. IX, pp. 265et seqq.Google Scholar

^{page 199 note 2} See below, pp. 244–5.

^{page 200 note 1} See Introduction, p. xxxii, and P.B.O., S.P. 78, no. 217, ff. 126 and 194.

^{page 203 note 1} These syndics of Geneva had issued a libel on Marsay in 1734 and negociations for satisfaction to Marsay had been in progress ever since.

^{page 204 note 1} The Young Pretender had been received with Royal honours in the Great Council on 2 June N.S. 1737.

^{page 206 note 1} II Geo. II, c. 7. See Introduction, p. xxxiv.

^{page 212 note 1} The apposite articles are the 6^th, 7^th and 8^th (Dumont, , Corps diplomatique, Vol. VII, pt. ii., p. 142).Google Scholar

^{page 217 note 1–1} Cypher.

^{page 217 note 2} See Vaucher, Robert Walpole, p. 226.

^{page 218 note 1} For the question at large see H. W. V. Temperley, The causes of the war of Jenkins' ear, 1739, in Transactions E. Hist. S., 3rd series, Vol. III.

^{page 220 note 1} In point of fact, negociations for a treaty between France and Spain broke down.

^{page 220 note 2} —² In m. in George II.'s hand.

^{page 223 note 1} Cypher begins.

^{page 225 note 1} Cypher ends.

^{page 226 note 1} The restraining orders to Haddock were issued on 10/21 March.

^{page 226 note 2} —²In cypher.

^{page 227 note 1} The remainder from here is in cypher.

^{page 227 note 2} See above, p. 220.

^{page 234 note 1} —¹ Cypher.

^{page 235 note 1} —¹ Cypher.

^{page 237 note 1} For the reason, see Introduction, p. xxxix.

^{page 241 note 1} Calling for the expulsion of the Young Pretender in accordance with the treaties.