It is an honour to be invited to give this year’s Mackenzie Stuart Lecture. Jack Mackenzie Stuart was a distinguished graduate of this University and of ours in Edinburgh. As a member, and subsequently the President, of the Court of Justice of the European Communities he made a great contribution to the cause of European integration through implementing the laws of the Communities, subsequently the ‘European Union’. As well as performing the ordinary tasks of judging and also latterly of presiding over the Court’s business, he was an apparently tireless publicist for that cause throughout Europe, but most particularly at home in the UK. By seeking to make the work of his Court and the law it administered less mystifying to the ordinary citizen and to the lawyerly public, he made it also less threatening.

Membership is central to the EU, as it is to any other international organisation. Withdrawal has assumed centre-stage through Brexit. While there is literature that is relevant to membership, most notably through academic discourse on differentiated integration, there is little more general inquiry concerning membership, the concept of which has importance and implications over and beyond more particular avenues of scholarship. This article examines the formal and substantive dimensions of membership and withdrawal in the EU.

In the classical narratives of the story called European integration, national judges are said to have a ‘mandate’ under European law: they are ‘empowered’ by EC law or, in the less thrilling versions of the story, they simply become ‘Community judges’. Not only are national judges obliged to apply substantive EC law, they are also requested to apply it in the way required by the Court of Justice. How, precisely, national judges are asked to apply EC law in domestic courts has traditionally been portrayed through the case law of the Court of Justice; not much attention has been paid to the reality in national courts. Over the years, the case law of the Court of Justice has created an image of a veritable European judicial Hercules: a judge who reads in many of the official languages of the European Union; who knows not only all the relevant national and European law, which he or she applies ex officio, but also engages in comparative interpretation of the law; who identifies him- or herself with the European telos which he or she is applying on the national level; and so on.

I am delighted and truly honoured to be able to speak to you tonight to deliver the 2014 Mackenzie-Stuart lecture. President Barroso was speaking in London last Friday where he said: ‘The European Union would not have become what it is today if it weren’t for British politicians and entrepreneurs, British thinkers and British ideas’. Scholars from this University and from its Centre for European Legal Studies have contributed enormously. Looking just to the Union’s Courts, Judges Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, David Edward, Konrad Schiemann, Christopher Vajda and Nicholas Forewood, Advocates-General Francis Jacobs and Eleanor Sharpston are true architects of our Union.

This article tackles questions relating to the interrelationship between the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as the roles of the two European courts charged with their interpretation and application, by way of two case studies. The cases chosen address two very different issues—surrogacy and the right to privacy and family life on the one hand, and religious freedom and the wearing of religious symbols in the workplace on the other. On the surrogacy issue the article refers to an Irish Supreme Court case as well as case law from the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts to illustrate how limits to the jurisdiction of the two European courts is, or is not, clearly articulated and the legal tools used when addressing sensitive legal questions of this nature. As regards the wearing of religious symbols in the workplace, the article concentrates on cases originating in the United Kingdom and France which have been examined by the Strasbourg court and highlights the similarities and differences between that case law and recent judgments of the Luxembourg court, called on, for the first time, to tackle questions of discrimination on grounds of religion with reference to EU anti-discrimination directives and the provisions of the Charter on both equality and religious freedom.

The creation of an economically integrated Europe, based on free circulation across open borders, has probably facilitated an increase in transnational crime. One response to this phenomenon has been to try to create an integrated European criminal law. But legal integration will not magically solve all the problems related to transnational crime. Indeed, it may create problems of its own. By favouring efficiency (that is, repression) over legitimacy (the protection of fundamental rights), it favours a criminal justice policy oriented towards ‘security’. By imposing the same rules throughout Europe, it disturbs the internal consistency of national legal systems. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of legal integration, facilitated by new legal instruments such as framework decisions, continues to develop. We might therefore ask ourselves, as an introduction, why this is so.

We, human beings and human societies, become what we think we are. If we have conflicting ideas of what we are, we become a puzzle to ourselves and to others. If we have no clear idea of what we are, we become what circumstances make us. Conceptual dissonance and conceptual drift have been characteristics of the life-story of the three societies (called European Communities) which are now contained in a society called the European Union. A member of a select but ominous class of international social systems which also includes the Holy Roman Empire and the League of Nations, the European Union is a paradoxical social form, namely, an unimagined community.

In this article, I argue that apparently common values, such as ‘judicial independence’ have significantly different meanings in different judicial cultures. As an illustration, I take Sweden and Spain, countries with very different histories and institutional arrangements. It is my contention that basic values are understood and implemented in the light of historical and institutional settings. These have given rise to issues which a nation’s judiciary feel it has to address and set the context in which the contemporary judiciary has to operate. The purpose is to examine how far national histories and traditions colour the understanding of common values, such as judicial independence and democracy in the judicial process.

The EU’s ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ is a hugely important area covering criminal law, terrorism, immigration, visa control and civil justice, as well as the massive area of free movement of persons. What is clear, however, is that measures which fall within its scope have the capacity to alienate EU citizens rather than making them feel aware of their European identity in a positive sense. This chapter examines some of the measures taken by the EU in this broad field which cause particular concern, namely a lack of democratic and legal accountability as well as inadequate regard to human rights. It focuses in particular on two areas in which human rights protection in the EU has been undermined. The first is in the field of data protection. The second is in the field of suspects’ rights, particularly in the context of the European arrest warrant. The chapter concludes by considering why so many restrictions on freedom have been allowed to come about and suggests some possible solutions.

Proposals from the European Commission to work towards greater harmonisation of contract law, and indeed private law more generally, have been described in terms that apparently distance these plans from the introduction of a code civil europa. Nevertheless, the programme for developing ‘non-sector-specific measures’ into a ‘common frame of reference’ constitutes in its fundamentals and aspirations the ambition to create a European law of contract. And the method for the construction of this code replicates the process devising the great European codes of the nineteenth century: a painstaking scholarly endeavour to find consistency and coherence in the divergent national private law systems, except that no legislative process is foreseen.

It is increasingly common for the EU to include extraterritorial greenhouse gas emissions within the scope of its climate change laws. These measures have proved to be fiercely controversial and on more than one occasion the EU has been forced to back down. With this in mind, this paper asks how far the EU’s climate change responsibilities ought to extend geographically. In answering this question, the paper draws a distinction between first-order and second-order climate responsibilities, acknowledges the importance of the internationally agreed ‘system boundary’ guidelines adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and seeks to learn lessons from the consequentialist approach that was favoured by the EU in giving broad geographical scope to its decision to include extraterritorial aviation emissions within the scope of its emissions trading scheme.

The European Pillar of Social Rights is a high-profile political reaffirmation of twenty social rights and principles. Its implementation deploys the full EU governance arsenal: regulations, directives, recommendations, communications, new institutions, funding actions, and country-specific recommendations. As such, the static imagery evoked by a ‘pillar’ does not capture the true nature of the initiative, which is dynamic and fluid, wide-ranging, and permeating. An equation of the Pillar with the set of twenty rights and principles it proclaims similarly fails to capture its true significance, which lies in its programmatic nature. Several important measures have already been proposed as part of this new social action plan for Europe, some of which are close to adoption. This Article analyses the meaning of the Pillar and its potential significance, by considering its content sensu largo, and its broader context. It argues that even if the Pillar cannot address all the EU's social failings, it has put a surprising social spin on the Better Regulation Agenda that was threatening to erode the social acquis, it has rekindled the EU's relationship with the International Labour Organization and Council of Europe, and it helps rebalance the EU's output by reviving the use of the Treaty's Social Title.

The opt-ins and opt-outs, which appear at different places in the Amsterdam Treaty where the policy related to movement of persons is concerned, are the result of difficult negotiations concerning the future of the Third Pillar, which was introduced by the Treaty on European Union. More particularly, these arrangements are the result of the discussions on “communautarisation” and the integration of Schengen co-operation in the framework of the European Union. “Communautarisation” concerns the process of transferring substantive matters from the Third Pillar area to the First Pillar area. This process implies, as a result, that proper Community procedures become applicable in these new policy fields.

This chapter discusses the need for a good-faith test for assessing the legitimacy of ongoing and future EU initiatives aimed at contributing to the development and implementation of international environmental law. A test that is based on the international legal principle of good faith may serve to better understand when the EU is effectively supporting environmental multilateralism to the benefit of the international community, rather than seeking to unduly influence it purely for its own advantage. The test is developed mostly on the basis of EU efforts of contributing to climate change multilateralism, and is applied to a much less studied case: the adoption and implementation of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing under the Convention on Biological Diversity.

The movement towards common principles of European contract law has been described as inevitable. In the words of one of its foremost proponents, ‘it is a historic law that this unification is going to happen sooner or later’. It has been difficult to ignore in recent years the volume of work discussing developments in this area of law. One might note, in particular, the Private Law in European Context series published by Kluwer Law International and the Cambridge University Press Common Core of European Private Law project. Further, the publication of Communications by the EC Commission in 2001, 2003 and 2004 has served to promote an ongoing discussion on the nature and quality of the acquis communautaire and the ‘opportuneness’ of any form of non-sector-specific instrument in the area of European contract law. Such intervention, it has been said, forms ‘the riggings of a ship which is about to set sail’.

Youssef nada is a 77-year-old man, who lives in the tiny commune of Campione in Switzerland. He is not allowed to leave this commune. Nor can he access his financial accounts, despite being a senior figure in the world of banking. The problem Mr Nada faces is that his bank, the Al Taqwa bank, is associated with the Moslem Brotherhood and that Mr Nada—an Egyptian by birth—is also connected with this organisation. Among his adversaries is the Egyptian Government of Hosni Mubarak, which desires to get him back to Cairo, where it is clear his safety could by no means be guaranteed. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, Mr Nada also incurred the enmity of the US Government. He found himself placed on a UN sanctions black-list—hence the restrictions on his movement and financial dealings.

The admission, reception and treatment of asylum seekers in the European Union has been an issue of continuing political and legal concern throughout the 1990’s. The rising numbers of persons seeking protection at the beginning of the period coupled with a rapidly developing regional jurisprudence on the right to protection from the European Court of Human Rights in particular, changed the nature of the debate. The Member States began to search for common policies and practices as regards asylum through intergovernmental measures. With the Amsterdam Treaty, the most important aspects of asylum have been transferred to the EC Treaty: criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum; minimum standards on reception of asylum seekers; minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries as refugees; minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status amongst others.

This article explores the justifications for, and objections to, the proposed European Union ‘women on company boards’ Directive. It notes that Member State opposition to the measure had different emphases. The new, post-socialist Member States that intervened prominently questioned the Commission's understanding of the underlying social reality of gender inequality and the measure's focus on results, while the old Member States that intervened raised mainly the issue of subsidiarity and challenged the need for legislative action, and/or particularly the need for legislative action at EU level. The article further argues that the Commission weakened its case by emphasising economic rationales for the measure, and submits that a principled justification fits the proposal better. Finally, the article argues that subsidiarity-related arguments are available also to justify non-cross-border, non-economic projects, such as that of gender equality.

This article analyses the main debates over the application of the Charter to disputes between private parties and assesses the ways in which the case law over the last ten years has responded to them. The article goes on to propose an alternative schema, whereby horizontality can be understood as a structural principle of EU fundamental rights adjudication on its own terms, rather than as an extension of the direct effect doctrine. It is argued that a self-standing principle of horizontality with equally valuable—yet operationally distinct—direct, indirect, and state-mediated manifestations, could respond more coherently to the conceptual, procedural, and remedial challenges displayed in the case law.