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A Problem of Self-Ownership for Reproductive Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2021

ELIZABETH LANPHIER
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Abstract

This paper raises three concerns regarding self-ownership rhetoric to describe autonomy within healthcare in general and reproductive justice in specific. First, private property and the notion of “ownership” embedded in “self-ownership,” rely on and replicate historical injustices related to the initial acquisition of property. Second, not all individuals are recognized as selves with equal access to self-ownership. Third, self-ownership only justifies negative liberties. To fully protect healthcare access and reproductive care in specific, we must also be able to make claims on others to respect, protect, and fulfill our positive rights. As much as nondomination remains an urgent demand for reproductive rights, it does not go far enough to ensure reproductive justice.

Keywords

autonomyself-ownershipreproductive justicereproductive rightsnegative libertypositive rightsnondominationproperty rightshealthcare access
Type
Special Section: Decision Making and Leadership in Crises and Beyond
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , April 2021 , pp. 312 - 327
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Notes

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63. I am only considering safe, evidence-based abortion methods. In the absence of safe and legal medical abortions, pregnant people are forced to identify methods for self-aborting that are often unsafe, unproven, and can lead to harmful complications.

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