The Mental Capacity Act 2005 governs personal decision-making for adults. It incorporates five overarching principles, including that incapacity may not be inferred merely from a person's unwise decisions and that where a person lacks capacity decisions must be made in her best interests. Through analysis of judicial treatment of unwisdom, best interests, subjectivity and objectivity, considered against parliamentary debates on the Mental Capacity Bill and philosophical critique of ideas of (un)wisdom, we argue that these principles are problematically irreconcilable. The Act's radical under-specificity means, paradoxically, that this comes to be resolved through abstracted values, rather than the centricity of the person herself.

This article proposes a new model for the regulation of no oral modification (NOM) clauses. First, the article seeks to offer a deeper understanding of the wishes of the parties in contracts from the perspective of parties' autonomy, distinguishing between intentions focused on the legal relationships and those focused on extra-contractual relations. Second, we explain how enforcement of NOM clauses may influence the parties' relations. Third, the article includes an economic analysis clarifying the roles of efficiency and institutional considerations in the NOM phenomenon. Applying the results of our analysis, we propose a comprehensive model for regulating NOM clauses. The key innovation of the model is context-dependent regulation differentiating among sophisticated and equally powerful parties, unsophisticated parties of equal power, and relationships with power disparities. Our model also offers an auxiliary test to help distinguish between parties' legal relationships and their extra-contractual relations.

This article explores the process and impact of liberalisation on the legal profession in England and Wales. Liberalisation brings a tendency to consider the profession in market-focused terms, with the professional–client relationship reconfigured in overtly economic fashion as constituting the interaction of supply and demand. The article examines the past and present structure of the profession, arguments for liberalisation and manifestations of liberalisation efforts. Having identified the distinctive dynamics of supply and demand within legal services markets, the article considers the potential implications, both immediate and in broader societal terms, of reconceptualising the legal profession in this manner.

A popular way to try to justify holding defendants criminally responsible for inadvertent negligence is via an indirect or “tracing” approach, namely an approach which traces the inadvertence back to prior culpable action. I argue that this indirect approach to criminal negligence fails because it cannot account for a key feature of how criminal negligence should be (and sometimes is) assessed. Specifically, it cannot account for why, when considering whether a defendant is negligent, what counts as a risk should be assessed relative to the defendant's evidence.

This article examines the growth of algorithmic credit scoring and its implications for the regulation of consumer credit markets in the UK. It constructs a frame of analysis for the regulation of algorithmic credit scoring, bound by the core norms underpinning UK consumer credit and data protection regulation: allocative efficiency, distributional fairness and consumer privacy (as autonomy). Examining the normative trade-offs that arise within this frame, the article argues that existing data protection and consumer credit frameworks do not achieve an appropriate normative balance in the regulation of algorithmic credit scoring. In particular, the growing reliance on consumers’ personal data by lenders due to algorithmic credit scoring, coupled with the ineffectiveness of existing data protection remedies has created a data protection gap in consumer credit markets that presents a significant threat to consumer privacy and autonomy. The article makes recommendations for filling this gap through institutional and substantive regulatory reforms.

The anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty, introduced by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and now found in the Equality Act 2010, has been hailed as an innovative and proactive tool for embedding disability equality in services and public functions. Despite important successes, the duty has had a surprisingly low profile in academic scholarship and has struggled to fulfil its practical potential. We seek to understand how this has happened, identifying a range of factors that may operate as blockages to the success of the duty. Whilst these factors are interrelated, we group them under three main headings – visibility, uncertainty and enforcement. We reflect critically on whether, and if so how, relevant blockages can be tackled to enable the duty to embed disability equality more effectively within services and public functions and whether new supplementary measures (particularly concerning accessibility) are also needed.

The headline recommendation of Jonathan Hill's 2021 UK Listing Review was that dual-class shares structures be permitted on the London Stock Exchange's premium tier. The aspiration was to encourage more high-quality UK equity listings, particularly of high-growth tech-companies, for which dual-class shares are especially beneficial. Dual-class shares allow founders to list their companies, and retain majority-control, while holding significantly less of the cash-flow rights in the company. However, in the UK, dual-class shares are usually discussed in qualified terms, in an attempt to placate sceptical institutional shareholders. Using the UK Listing Review as a platform, this article explores the constraints commonly proposed to be attached to dual-class shares, and argues that, although it is important to protect public shareholders, constraints must not be too severe. A balance must be respected, otherwise UK initiatives to relax rules on dual-class shares could deter the very companies they are intended to attract.

The transnational governance of bank resolution must be well-designed to provide credible solutions to financial crisis management. While at policy level, there is a broad consensus on best practice, the implementation stage often leaves something to be desired. Focusing on the implementation of the relevant Financial Stability Board (FSB) recommendations in the EU, this article explores this issue and proposes certain reforms. It argues for closer EU control and scrutiny over national decision-making without, however advocating a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Its main insight is that the promotion of transnational convergence need not come at the expense of the distinctive attentiveness of EU law to local conditions nor indeed involve a massive shake-up of the existing EU architecture. Its aim is to contribute to scholarly and public policy debates in this field in anticipation of the EU response to the final conclusions of the post-implementation evaluation of the FSB recommendations, which is currently in progress.

This is the second of two articles about cases in which awards of “mesne profits” have been made against defendants who have occupied claimants’ land. The first article argues that the facts of cases where such awards have been made variously support claims in tort, contract or unjust enrichment and that practical consequences can flow from categorising the cases in one way or another. One is that different rules affect the assessment of remedies awarded to claimants depending on the claim that was made and the remedy that was awarded. The present article develops this point by examining the assessment principles governing “mesne profits” awards, according to whether these are classified as compensatory damages in tort, restitutionary damages in tort, orders that a defendant perform a contractual duty to pay a debt, compensatory damages for breach of contract, or orders that a defendant make restitution of an unjust enrichment.

This article uses the advancements in artificial intelligence as the starting point for consideration of the role of human inventorship in European patent law. It argues that human inventorship is a necessary condition for the existence of an invention and inventive step, with the result that only products of human inventorship merit European patents. It identifies failings of European authorities to reflect this adequately in their approaches to determining patentability. Finally, it recommends recognising human inventorship as an implicit patentability requirement being an aspect of the statutory requirements for an invention and inventive step and extending applicant's disclosure duties correspondingly.

The case law and literature to date have struggled to locate the rationale for the assignability of arbitration agreements. While different justifications have been proffered, each of them rests on questionable premises. This has given rise to a host of uncertainties over the rules which apply in practice. This paper proposes that a satisfactory rationale can be found in the “acceptance principle”. This principle indicates, first, that arbitration agreements which are not actual burdens can be assigned, and second, that the assignability of arbitration agreements is grounded in the assignee's acceptance in the form of non-disclaimer of the assignment. Bringing the acceptance principle to the fore not only provides a theoretically sound justification for the assignability of arbitration agreements; it also suggests how the practical uncertainties in this area of law can be resolved satisfactorily.

Standard accounts of analogy in law picture it as reasoning from the past case (source) to a solution in the case at hand (target). This article argues that the normatively constraining invocations of similarity or likeness presupposed by standard accounts do not obtain. It then sketches an alternative account based on Michael Polanyi's idea of polycentricity (not Lon Fuller's) on which the orientation of analogical reasoning is reversed. A past case (here “target”) is picked and framed in certain ways to persuade the interlocutor about the decision independently reached in the present case (here “source”) through the guidance of tacit knowledge (involving anticipation of what is likely to pass muster with the legal community) which normatively constrains the process.

Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc presages more liberal criteria for determining when a parent company owes a duty of care to third parties injured by subsidiary activities. It invokes systems language and points to potential parent company liability for omissions in managing the group. This article develops these ideas. It portrays the corporate group in systems-managerial terms. The parent creates group-wide structures and deploys management strategies and integrating mechanisms that facilitate achievement of its purposes. It has a substantial causal influence upon subsidiary acts and omissions. Prima facie the parent cannot avoid extended liability claims by hiding behind the “pure omissions” rule.

The article examines a series of cases spanning a 250-year period in which the courts have awarded “mesne profits” against defendants who have occupied claimants’ land. The article argues (1) that various causes of action are disclosed by the facts of cases in which such awards have been made, (2) that these causes of action have changed as the law of obligations has evolved, (3) that modern courts often do not consider what causes of action are disclosed by the facts of “mesne profits cases”, (4) that this is unfortunate because practical consequences can flow from categorising the cases in one way or another and (5) that the resolution of future “mesne profits cases” will become more just and more transparent when it is understood that their facts may variously disclose causes of action in tort, contract or unjust enrichment.