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Law and Philosophy: The Contribution of Mr. Roy Stone*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 January 2009
Extract
The recent trend towards the socialisation of legal studies has not unnaturally caused a good deal of confusion and disagreement on the role of jurisprudence. However, since the law is centred on dispute and argument, there can be little real objection to the extension of the process to the philosophy of law. Still it would be difficult to devise a less immediately appealing way of re-establishing and reviving the subject of jurisprudence than another dose of the schools, or another tendentious review of contemporary exponents. My excuses for doing just that are not even particularly novel—an appreciation of the importance of the pressures towards an empirical approach to law and legal studies, and the usual desire to get some of the more distracting flies safely corked back again into their bottles. However, the total failure of the recent Cambridge Committee on the Organisation of the Social Sciences to produce even the outline of an overall structure for the integrated study of the law as an important means of social control does at least provide a suitable opportunity for the re-examination of the role of jurisprudence.
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- Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1968
References
1 Report to the General Board of the Committee appointed to review the organisation of the Social Sciences, Cambridge University Reporter, Vol. XCVIII, p. 664, 29 November 1967.Google Scholar
2 Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” (1935) 35 Col.L.R. 809.
3 See, for example, Dias, “The Value of a Value-Study of Law” (1965) 28 M.L.R. 397.
4 See, for example, King, “The Concept, The Idea and the Morality of Law” [1966] C.L.J. 106. Compare the work of Weber, which can be conveniently consulted in Law in Economy and Society, ed. by Rheinstein, M. and Shils, E. (1954).Google Scholar
5 See, for example, Williams, “Language and the Law” (1945) 61 L.Q.R. 71, 179, 293, 384; (1946) 62 L.Q.R. 387, and Wisdom's comments in “Philosophy, Metaphysics and Psychoanalysis,” reprinted in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (1953).
6 See, for example, the dialogue between White and Williams on the various concepts of recklessness, carelessness and intention (1962) M.L.R. passim: see also Hart's account of language and law in his review of Dias & Hughes’ Jurisprudence (1958) J.S.P.T.L. 143.
7 Hart, The Concept of Law (1961): see also “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” (1954) 70 L.Q.R. 37.
8 Except for “Affinities and Antinomies in Jurisprudence” [1964] C.L.J. 266, Mr. Stone's work has not appeared in the standard legal journals in this country. Perhaps the best account of his views is to be found in the following articles from which the quotations which follow have been taken: “Ratiocination Not Rationalisation” Mind, Vol. LXXIV, p. 463 (1965); “The Compleat Wrangler” (1966) 50 Minnesota Law Review 1001: “Logic and the Law: The Precedence of Precedents” (1967) 51 Ibid. 655. See also “An Analysis of Hohfeld” (1963) 48 Minnesota Law Review 313; “The British Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty” (1966) 26 Louisiana Law Review 753; and “Logical Translations in the Law” (1965) 49 Minnesota Law Review 447.
9 50 Minnesota Law Review 1019–1020.
10 An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949).
11 Mind, Vol. LXXIV, p. 465. Mr. Stone has subsequently added preferring and explaining to this list.
12 50 Minnesota Law Review 1011.
13 Mind, ibid. pp. 479–480.
14 Ibid. p. 470.
15 Ibid. p. 473.
16 Ibid. p. 472.
17 See generally “The Compleat Wrangler,” 50 Minnesota Law Review 1009, and “Logical Translations,” 49 ibid. 447.
18 Mind, ibid. p. 481.
19 50 Minnesota Law Review, 1021–1022. Mathematical mistakes, of course, unlike legal mistakes, are necessarily false.
20 [1898] A.C. 375.
21 [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234.
22 51 Minnesota Law Review 673.