1 Feenstra, R., “The Development of the Concept Foundation in Continental Law” [1971]Google ScholarActa Juridica 123. He cites an interesting article, arguing to the contrary, by Beinart, B., “Fideicommissum and Modus” [1968]Google ScholarActa Juridica 157. Reference should also be made to Feenstra, R., “L'histoire des fondations, à propos de quelques études récentes” (1956) 24 Tijdschrift voor RechtsgeschiedenisGoogle Scholar 381; and Feenstra, R., “Le concept de fondation du droit romain classique jusqu'à nos jours: théorie et pratique” [1956] 3 Revue Internationale des Droits de I'antiquitéGoogle Scholar 245.

2 ibid., p. 125.

3 ibid., p. 124.

4 ibid., p. 124.

5 ibid., p. 126.

6 ibid., p. 124.

7 There are cogent reasons for arguing that the English concept of a charitable, or indeed purpose, trust gives implicit recognition to the conception of a personalised purpose. The trust is basically concerned with a “split ownership.” In a private trust the trustee will, as a rule, hold a legal title, and the beneficiary the equitable interest. In a charitable trust, however, there is prima facie no recognisable beneficiary who can be desribed as holding an equitable interest, as the property is to be used in the pursuit of a purpose. If the trustee has no beneficial interest, where does such interest lie? In the purpose? In the Crown as parens patriae In the ultimate factual beneficiaries? (cf. Re Denley's Trust Deed [1968] 1 Ch. 373).Google Scholar

8 There is no logical reason, but overwhelming practical reasons, why this method should not apply also to a natural person who has declared that henceforth all property he holds absolutely (see n. 9 below), or might acquire and hold absolutely in the future, will be dedicated to charitable purposes.

9 “Absolutely” indicates that the corporation will have “ownership” of the property, or “the greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system of law recognises”; see Honoré, A. M., “Ownership,” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961), p. 107.Google Scholar This will include particularly the right to possess, the right to absolute discretionary use (cf. discretion in a limited sense as referring to a choice of methods of use in pursuance of a particular purpose), the right to manage, the right to income, the right to capital, and the right to security.

10 Cf. note 8 above.

11 Any suggestion that such pitfall might be avoided by imposing a legal obligation in the corporation to exhaust existing property/funds on the original charitable purpose would be a denial of absolute ownership (see n. 9 above), and lead to a blurring of the distinction between the three methods of holding property for purposes discussed in this paper. Cf. Charities Act 1960, s. 30 (2).

12 As opposed to an immediate gift of capital.

13 Keeton, G. W. and Sheridan, L. A., The Modern Law of Charities, 1st ed. (1971), p. 1Google Scholar; and 2nd ed. with supplement (1975). See also Jones, G. H., History of the Law of Charity 1532–1827 (1969), pp. 3–9.Google Scholar

14 Southern, R. W., Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages (1970), p. 16.Google Scholar

15 Jones, op. cit., p. 6.

16 Discussed at some length by Keeton and Sheridan, op. cit., pp. 3–9.

17 e.g., building of almshouses and workhouses, marriage subsidies for poor maids, schemes for training of apprentices, etc.

18 e.g., dedication of public parks, gifts to various organisations for public purposes, building of roads, bridges, canals and docks, etc.

19 e.g., founding of schools, establishment of fellowships and scholarships, building of libraries, etc.

20 Keeton and Sheridan, op. cit., p. 9.

21 See generally Jones, op. cit., pp. 16–58.

22 (1804) 9 Ves. 399; on appeal (1805) 10 Ves. 522.

23 (1804) 9 Ves. 399, 405. Cf. modern approaches to this issue: Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society Ltd. v. Glasgow City Corporation [1968]Google Scholar A.C. 138; Incorporated Council of Law Reporting v. Attorney-General [1971]Google Scholar Ch. 626; affd. [1972] Ch. 73 (particularly the judgment of Russell L. J.); and Inland Revenue Commissioners v. McMullen [1978] 1 All E.R. 230, 239.Google Scholar

24 [1891] A.C. 531.

25 See, for example, the length of the discussion on this issue in Picarda, H., The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (1977).Google Scholar

26 See, for example, Inland Revenue Commissioners v. McMullen [1978] 1 All E.R. 230Google Scholar (promotion of playing of sports and games by school pupils and university students not charitable, unless “intermeshed” with the education of such pupils); and Re Niyazi Will Trusts [1978] 1 W.L.R. 910Google Scholar (gift for construction of a working men's hostel in Famagusta, Cyprus).

27 See, for example, Recreational Charities Act 1958, Charities Act 1960, Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Race Relations Act 1976.

28 See, for example, Picarda, op. cit., pp. 11–12; Sheridan, L. A., “Nature of Charity” [1957]Google Scholar Mal.L.Rev. lxxvi: Gravells, N. P., “Public Purpose Trusts” (1977) 40 M.L.Rev. 397Google Scholar; Sheridan, L. A., “Waiting for Goodman” [1976] 4 Anglo-Amer.L.Rev. 153Google Scholar; Brady, J. C., “The Law of Charity and Judicial Responsiveness to Changing Social Need” (1976) 27 N.1. Legal QuarterlyGoogle Scholar 198: Goodman Report on Charity Law and Voluntary Organisations (1976) pp. 7–47.Google Scholar

29 The purposes referred to here as “charitable” can include both legally charitable purposes, and purposes which are not legally charitable, although deemed charitable by laymen. Two other legally recognised methods of dedicating property to purposes can be identified in English law. These are: (1) the establish-ment of trusts for (legally) non-charitable purposes (the so-called trusts— limited in number—of imperfect obligation); and (2) (in an indirect manner) the giving of property to an unincorporated association which exists to pursue a particular purpose (see, especially, Re Recher's Will Trust [1972]Google Scholar Ch. 526, and the discussion therein on gifts to such associations; and Re Lipinski's Will Trust [1976] 3 W.L.R. 522.Google Scholar)

30 It should not be assumed that the need for a definition of legally acceptable purposes arises solely from a need to prevent abuse of the simple and effective trust method. The issue of definition is very closely linked with those legal privileges that charitable trusts automatically attract, particularly fiscal privileges. See especially on this point Cross, G., “Some Recent Developments in the Law of Charity” (1956) 72 L.Q.R. 187Google Scholar; Dingle v. Turner [1972]Google Scholar A.C. 601, particularly the judgment of Lord Cross of Chelsea; and the article by Gravells, op. cit.

31 See, particularly, H. Picarda, op. cit., pp. 311 et seq., to whom the following discussion owes much.

32 R. v. Cambridge (Vice-Chancellor) (1765) 3 Burr. 1647, 1652 and 1656; R. v. Hertford College (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 693, 694.

33 Examples cited by Picarda, op. cit., are Charterhouse and Sutton's Hospitals.

34 Other examples include grammar schools, theological colleges, cathedral schools, college schools, fee schools, etc.

35 Picarda, op. cit., p. 312, lists the many methods: (i) by royal charter; (ii) by royal charter giving authority to the holder of an office to create corporations indefinitely; (iii) by persons acting under royal licence; (iv) by special Acts of Parliament; and (v) under the Companies Acts 1948–67, and by the Charity Commissioners under the Charitable Trustees Incorporation Act 1872.

36 ibid., p. 314.

37 See note 35 above, and the cases discussed hereafter in the text.

38 [1973] Ch. 173.

39 ibid., pp. 186–187 (emphasis supplied).

40 ibid., p. 189 (emphasis supplied).

41 [1951] Ch. 567.

42 ibid., p. 570 (emphasis supplied).

43 [1959] Ch. 220.

44 [1968] 1 All E.R. 448.

45 ibid., p. 450 (emphasis supplied).

46 Cf. a dictum of Fox, J. in Re Freeston's Charity [1978] 1 All E.R. 481Google Scholar, which implies a different view of the property rights of a charitable corporation. He said: “…and (ii) the Freeston trusts so far as they applied to the foundation were trusts for a charitable purpose (namely for the benefit of the schools) and not for a corporation as part of its general funds” (ibid., p. 490). As sole trustee, University College, Oxford, held the Freeston fund on trust as to one moiety of the income thereof for the benefit of Normanton Grammar School, and as to the other moiety for the College beneficially. The implication of the dictum is that on the transfer of this income to the College, as a charitable corporation the latter would then hold it absolutely, and not subject to any further charitable trust.

47 This possibility was recognised by the Nathan Committee Report (Cmd. 8710), para. 573. See also [1971] Charity Commissioners Report, paras. 26–30. Cf. Baldry v. Feintuck [1972] 1 W.L.R. 552, 557Google Scholar, per Brightman J. on the position in relation to an attempted change in the purposes of a charitable trust: “The union is, clearly, an educational charity and the officers of the union who have power to dispose of the union's funds are clearly, trustees of those funds for charitable educational purposes. It is not, therefore, open to the union, by a purported amendment to the union's constitution to authorise the use of the union's funds for the purpose of promoting any object which may happen to interest the members of the union regardless of whether such object is charitable and educational or not.”

48 Note, also, the apparent confusion on this point—the difference between charitable trust and charitable corporation—in A. R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome (1968), pp. 17–18.Google Scholar

49 Chadwick, H., The Early Church (1970), p. 122.Google Scholar

50 See, for example, Mark, X. 43–45 and XII. 31; 1 Corinthians, XIII. 13; and 1 Peter, III. 8–9. This does not imply that there was never any other motivation or reason for giving. Gifts on death were often made to perpetuate the memory of oneself as a good and worthy person, and gifts during one's lifetime often had similar aims. Factors like these are present in many modern cases. See, for example, Re Delius [1957]Google Scholar Ch. 299 (trusts set up by a composer's widow with the purpose of spreading and establishing knowledge and appreciation of the composer's works among the public of the world); Re Pinion [1965]Google Scholar Ch. 85 (attempt to set up by trust a museum or the like to house the testator's “artistic” collection); and Re Bushnell [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1596Google Scholar (attempt by testator to promote by education his own theory of “socialised medicine”).

51 See generally Hands, op. cit., from whom the following discussion draws considerably.

52 De Amicitia, XX. 71.

53 De Beneficiis, II. x. 4.

54 De Beneficiis, II, xxxv. 1. Cf. Seneca, De Beneficiis, I. i. 12–13.

55 De Officiis, I. xv. 48. Cf. Cicero, De Officiis, I. xv. 49.

56 Op. cit., p. 34.

57 See, for example, the constant references in the Epistulae of the Younger Pliny to friendship and giving, such as at Book 1. XIX and XXIV; Book 3. II and VIII; and Book 5.1. A full account of Pliny's financial affairs is to be found in Duncan-Jones, R., The Economy of the Roman Empire: Quantitative Studies (1974)Google Scholar, Chap. I (hereinafter Economy). His generosity to individual friends is discussed at pp. 28–29.

58 De Amicitia, XV. 55.

59 De Officiis, I. xiv. 44.

60 Duncan-Jones, R., Review of Hands' “Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome” (1969) 59 Journal of Roman Studies 287–289, 288.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

61 See, generally, Hands, op. cit., Documents, pp. 175–209 (hereinafter D.) Sometimes, publication of the details of generosity was a legal requirement, e.g., Dig. 50.10.7.1. Considerable reference to gifts of this sort is made in Duncan-Jones, Economy, passim.

62 ibid., p. 186. D. 24.

63 ibid., p. 188. D. 29.

64 ibid., p. 190. D. 35.

65 See Duncan-Jones, Economy, Chap. 1. Pliny says that his giving was much encouraged by the example of the Emperor Nerva, Epistulae, Book 10. VIII. 1.

66 Epistulae, Book 1. VIII. 10; Book 7. XVIII.

67 Epistulae, Book 2. XVIII; Book 3. III; Book 4. XIII. 3–11.

68 Epistulae, Book 3. IV. 2, and VI; Book 4. I; Book 9. XXXIX; Book 10. VIII.

69 Epistulae, Book 5. VII.

70 An inscription referring to Pliny, which probably originally stood over the public baths in Comum, lists his offices and his generosities (Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, V. 5262). See, more conveniently, Pliny, Letters II, No. 59 Loeb Classical Library, by B. Radice at pp. 549–551.

71 See, generally, Hands, op. cit., Documents, pp. 175–209, and Duncan-Jones, Economy, passim.

72 See references cited in notes 65–70 above.

73 Hands, op. cit., p. 189. D. 31.

74 ibid., p. 189. D. 32.

75 Duff, P. W., “The Charitable Foundations of Byzantium” in Cambridge Legal Essays (1926), p. 83Google Scholar, reprinted in Duff, P. W., Personality in Roman Law (1938), p. 168Google Scholar (hereinafter Personality).

76 Buckland, W. W., A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (1963), p. 341.Google Scholar There are examples of the use of a modus at Dig. 35.1.17.4; 35.1.37; 35.1.40.5; 35.1.71.pr.; 35.1.92.

77 Honoré, A. M., The South African Law of Trusts (1966), pp. 50Google Scholaret seq.

78 ibid., p. 51.

79 See, for example, Dig. 28.5.45; 33.1.21.3; Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum IX. 1618, 3160; XIV. 367, 2793, 2795.

80 Dig. 39.5.2.7; Cod. 4.6.3.8. The condictio would be causa data causa non secuta/ob rem dati. Cf. Inst. 2.20.13; Dig. 17.1.45.2; Cod. 8.55.7. In Justinian's time a vindicatio utilis appears to have been granted: Cod. 8.54.1.

81 Dig. 32.19; 27.2.1.3; 40.5.48; 40.5.7.

82 Dig. 33.1.7. Honoré writes (op. cit., p. 51): “In that case the law relied on the moral authority of the testator to secure compliance with his wishes.”

83 See, for example, Dig. 5.3.50.1; 40.4.17.1; 35.1.92; 40.4.44; 40.5.24,12–14.

84 Op. cit., p. 19.

85 See, generally, Jones, A. H. M., The Roman Economy (1974) (ed. Brunt, P. A.)Google Scholar, Chap. 1.

86 Cf. Hands, op. cit., p. 22, who notes that B. Laum, in his work Stiftungen in der griechischen und romischen Antike (1914)Google Scholar cites the case in the second century a.d. of a large endowment of C. Vibius Salutaris of Ephesus to make provision annually for the six tribes of the city; half of this had been used up or diverted to other purposes within a few years.

87 ibid., p. 22.

88 ibid., p. 192. D. 40.

89 ibid., p. 207. D. 74.

90 Epistulae, Book 7. XVIII. 1.

91 Dig. 50.12. See, generally, Thomas, J. A. C., Textbook of Roman Law (1976), p. 265Google Scholar, and references cited therein; and Buckland, op. cit., pp. 457–458, n. 11.

92 Cf. later discussion of the care of sacra privata by descendants.

93 Jones, op. cit., Chaps. 1, 4, 8, 10 and 13.

94 Victor, Aurelius, Epitome ds Caes.Google Scholar, 12.4.

95 Dio Cassius, lxviii. 5.

96 Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, XI. 1147 and IX. 1455.

97 See generally on alimenta: Ashley, A. M., “The Alimenta of Nerva and his Successors” (1921) 36 English Historical ReviewGoogle Scholar 5; Ramsay, H. G., “Government Relief during the Roman Empire” (1936) 31 The Classical JournalGoogle Scholar 479; Bourne, F. C., “The Roman Alimentary Program and Italian Agriculture” (1960) 91 Transactions of the American Philological AssociationGoogle Scholar 47; Jones, R. Duncan, “The Purpose and Organisation of the Alimenta” (1964) 32 Papers of the British School at RomeGoogle Scholar 123; Garnsey, R., “Trajan's Alimenta. Some Problems” (1968) 17 HistoriaGoogle Scholar 367.

98 Duff, Personality, pp. 169–171.

99 Brack, E. F., “The Growth of Foundations in Roman Law and Civilisation” [1948] 6 SeminarGoogle Scholar 1, 5. See also: “Foundations for the Deceased in Roman Law, Religion and Political Thought” [1949]Google ScholarScritti in onore di C. Ferrini (Vol. 4) 1; and “Les facteurs moteurs de I'origine et du developpement des fondations grécques et romaines” [1955]Google Scholar 2 Revue Internationale des Droits de I'antiquité 159.

1 Dig. 32.38.6; Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, XI. 6520 and VIII. 1641.

2 Bruck, “Foundations for the Deceased in Roman Law, Religion and Political Thought,” op. cit., pp. 20–23.

3 The relevant provision of the Edict, quoted by Lactantius, De mortibus per secutorum, 48 reads: “Et quoniam idem Christiani non ea loca tantum ad quae convenire consuerunt, sed alia etiam habuisse noscuntur ad ius corporis eorum id est ecclesiarum, non hominum singulorum, pertinentio, ea omnia lege, qua superius, comprehendimus, citra ullam prorsus ambiguitatem vel controversiam isdem Christianis id est corpori et conventiculis eorum reddi iubebis.”

4 See, generally, Duff, Personality, pp. 175–177.

5 Cod. 1.2.24.1; N. 120.6.3; N. 120.5.pr.

6 Cod. 1.2.14.9; Cod. 1.2.24.5–15; N.7.3.pr., 2; N. 55.2; N. 120.1.pr., 2; N. 120.6.1.

7 Cod. 1.2.15.2; Cod. 1.2.21; N. 120.7.1.

8 N. 65.1; N. 40; Cod. 1.2.17.2; N. 54.2; N. 119.10; N. 120.1.pr.; N. 120.7.pr., 1.

9 Cod. 1.2.21; N. 7.8.; N. 120.10.

10 See texts cited at notes 8 and 9 above, and Cod. 1.2.14.pr.; N. 7. 1; Cod. 11. 23, 24, 25, 28.

11 Personality, pp. 176–177.

12 Cod. 1.3.48.

13 See Duff, Personality, pp. 203–205, for a discussion of this term.

14 Cod. 1.3.39; Cod. 1.3.41.20, 23; Cod. 1.2.17.2; N. 120.5.6.

15 N. 120.6.2; Cod. 1.2.17.2.

16 See Duff, Personality, pp. 181–183.

17 N. 7; N. 120; N. 131. See Duff, Personality, pp. 183–185. Cf. Saleilles, M., “Les Piae Causae dans le droit de Justinien,” Mélanges Gérardin (1907), p. 513.Google Scholar

18 Cod. 1.3.45; N. 131; Cod. 1.3.28.pr, 1; Cod. 1.2.17.2.

19 Cod. 1.3.45.pr., 3, 3a, 7, 8; N. 131. 10, 11, 12.

20 N. 131.11.2.

21 He actually claims to identify three: see Personality, p. 185. I have discounted the first, foundations where the staff and beneficiaries coincide, because I can think only of religious foundations where this would be the case, and these are covered under my first category of foundation closely linked to the Church (Duff himself cites a monastery as an example).

22 Cod. 1.3.48.pr.; Cod. 1.3.24.

23 See further Duff, Personality, pp. 189–190.

24 ibid., p. 194.

25 Cod. 1.3.41.11–18.

26 N. 123.23.

27 N. 7.6.1.

28 N. 120.4.

29 N. 120.1.2.

30 N. 7.3.2.

31 Cod. 1.3.48.4.

32 Cod. 1.3.45.11–14.

33 N. 7.6; N. 7.12.

34 Cod. 1.2.13, 15, 19, 22; Cod. 1.2.23.2.

35 Cod. 1.2.22.pr.; Cod. 1.3.55.1; Cod. 1.3.45.9; N. 7.2.1; N. 7.9; N. 7.10.6. epil.; N. 43.1.pr., 1.