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The Principles Governing the Recovery of Damages for Negligently Caused Nervous Shock

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

F. A. Trindade
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Extract

Two “landmark” decisions on the recovery of damages for negligently caused nervous shock have now been delivered in two years by the highest courts in Britain and Australia—McLoughlin v. O'Brian by the House of Lords in 1983 and Jaensch v. Coffey by the High Court of Australia in 1984. Despite these decisions, it is difficult to say that the principles of law to be applied in such a case can be stated with absolute clarity and one tends rather to sympathise with the view of Comyn J. in Whitmore v. Euroways Express Coaches Ltd. that “no absolutely clear picture emerges and many of the judgments speak with different voices.” Nevertheless, certain principles in this area are clear and others are becoming clearer, and a statement of these principles now might be of assistance in allowing an absolutely clear picture to emerge.

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Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , November 1986 , pp. 476 - 500
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1986

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References

1 It should be noted at the outset that the decisions in McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] I A.C.410 and Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417 are concerned with the principles to be applied in cases of negligently caused nervous shock in road accidents. Those principles arguably apply also to industrial accidents, in view of the authorities discussed and relied upon in those two decisions. However, as Deane J. pointed out in Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417.465. those principles may prove to be inapplicable to, or may require modification in their application to, other situations.

2 [1983] 1 A.C. 410.

3 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417.

4 The Times, 4 May 1984.

5 See Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 424 per Brennan J.

6 This was the description used by Denning M.R. in Him v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, 42. The description seems to have the approval of Windeyer J. in Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey (1970) 125 C.L.R. 383, 394 and of Brennan J. in Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 424–5.

7 See McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 431 per Lord Bridge of Harwich. See also Lord Wilberforce in McLoughlin [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 418; Windeyer J. in Mount Isa Mines v. Pusey (1970) 125 C.L.R. 383. 394 and Deane J. in Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417. 446.

8 The Times, 4 May 1984.

9 See, e.g., Deane J. in Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 451.

10 Ibid., at 450–451.

11 Ibid.

12 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 429.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid. Deane J. (at p. 461) seems to share Brennan J.'s view when he says that “it would seem reasonably clear that the requisite duty relationship will not, on the present state of the law. Exist in a case where mere psychiatric injury results from subsequent contact, away from the scene of the accident and its aftermath, with a person suffering from the effects of the accident. An example of psychiatric injury suffered as a result of such post-accident contact is that which may result from the contact involved in the nursing or care of a close relative during a period subsequent to immediate post-accident treatment.”

15 (1984)54 A.L.R. 417, 430.

16 Ibid.

17 [1975] V.R. 378.

18 Ibid., at 382.

19 See Chapman v. Hearse (1961) 106 C.L.R. 112, 122.

20 See McKew v. Holland & Hannen & Cubitts [1969] 3 All E.R. 1621, 1623.

21 See Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 425 per Brennan J.

22 See McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 432 per Lord Bridge of Harwich.

23 See Brice v. Brown [1984] 1 All E.R. 997, 1006.

24 (1961) 106 C.L.R. 112.

25 (1970) 125 C.L.R. 383.

26 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 912.

27 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417,432.

28 Ibid., at 432–433.

29 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 460.

30 This would be the result in a modern equivalent to the situation in Dulieu v. White [1901] 2 K.B. 669.

31 [1939] 1 K.B. 394, 400.

32 Ibid., at 399. See also P. G. Heffey, “The Negligent Infliction of Nervous Shock in Road and Industrial Accidents” (1974) A.L.J. 196,204. The decision in Davies v. Bennison [1927] Tas. L.R. 52 must now be regarded as of doubtful authority.

33 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 460.

34 Ibid., at 430.

35 Ibid., at 427.

36 Ibid, (emphasis added).

37 See McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410. 432 per Lord Bridge of Harwich.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 459 per Deane J.

44 Ibid., at 458.

45 The example is taken from the opinion of Lord Robertson in Bourhill v. Young's Executor [1941] S.C. 395, 399. See also Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 458 and 466.

46 See McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 422–423 and Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417,466.

47 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 463.

48 Ibid., at 459.

49 Ibid., at 466 per Dawson J.

50 [1983] 1 A C. 410, 420–422.

51 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 456.

52 Ibid., at 450–451.

53 Ibid., at 451.

54 Ibid., at 421.

55 See Him v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, 42.

56 See s.4(l), Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (N.S.W.); s.24, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance 1955 (A.C.T.) and s.25, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance 1956 (N.T.).

57 .(1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 463: see text at note 47 above.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 See pp. 490–493 below.

61 (1984) 54 A.L.J. 417, 457, per Deane J. See also Leibson, D. J., “Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to Another” (1976–1977) 15 Journal of Family Law 163, 196.Google Scholar

62 See McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 422 and Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. [1925] 1 K.B.141, 158–159 per Atkin L.J.

63 See McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1981] 1 Q.B. 599, 606. See also Kohn v. Slate Government Insurance Commission (1976) 15 S.A.S.R. 255.

64 See Chadwick v. British Railways Board [1967] 1 W.L.R. 912 and Mount Isa Mines v. Pusey (1970) 125 C.L.R. 383.

65 See, Mount Isa Mines v. Pusey (1970) 125 C.L.R. 383 and Dooley v. Cammell Laird [1951] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 271.

66 [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 422.

67 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 434.

68 [1925] 1 K.B. 141, 157–158.

69 [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 422.

70 See Teff, “Liability for Negligently Inflicted Nervous Shock” (1983) 99 L.Q R. 100, 104–105.

71 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 434.

72 See Heffey, op. cit., note 32 above, at pp. 204–211.

73 [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, 441.

74 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 463. Deane J. referred to Schneider v. Eisovitch [1960] 2 Q.B. 430 and Andrews v. Williams [1967] V.R. 831.

75 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 463.

76 [1953] 1 Q.B.429, 441.

77 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 912.

78 See Benson v. Lee [1972] V.R. 879. See also Storm v. Geeves [1965] Tas. S.R. 252.

79 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 439.

80 Note that in Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 462–463, Deane J. said that “in the present case, as in McLoughlin, the aftermath extended to the hospital to which the injured person was taken and persisted for so long as he remained in the state produced by the accident up to and including immediate post-accident treatment.”

81 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 449.

82 Ibid., at 463.

83 [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 423.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., at 442.

86 The question raised by counsel in McLoughlin [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 415.

87 [1981] 1 Q.B. 599, 606.

88 In Bourhill v. Young [1943] A C. 92, 110 Lord Wright said that “a reasonably normal condition, if medical evidence is capable of defining it, would be the standard. The test of the plaintiff's extraordinary susceptibility, if unknown to the defendant, would in effect make the defendant an insurer.”

89 [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 429.

90 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 421.

91 (1970) 125 C.L.R. 383, 405.

92 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 912, 922.

93 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 427.

94 See Stuart-Smith J. in Brice v. Brown [1984] 1 All E.R. 997, 1006 and Lord Russell of Killowen in McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 429. See also Lord Wright in Bourhill v. Young [1943] A.C. 92, 100.

95 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 431.

96 Ibid., at 431–432.

97 Ibid., at 427.

98 [1984] 1 All E.R. 997, 1007.

99 Ibid., at 1006–1007.

page 497 note 1 See (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 464 and the references there cited.

page 497 note 2 [1970] S.A.S.R. 508, 514.

page 497 note 3 [1984] 1 All E.R. 997.

page 497 note 4 (1984) 54 A.L.R. 417, 464.

page 497 note 5 [1972] V.R. 879, 881.