There was something almost awesome, and perhaps typically American, in Henry Ford's defiance of the N.R.A. Ford staunchly maintained that the company he had founded and still ruled in absolute fashion was adhering to the law and had, in fact, anticipated many of its provisions. Critics focused their attack upon the company's labor practices, which clearly foreshadowed a coming strife, but no case was brought to court and Ford's fiercely individualistic attitude was never successfully constrained. The larger issue is not whether Ford did or did not comply, but rather what, in this period of profound social change, was to be the “fundamental American idea.”

It was one of history's sardonic pranks that the forces deriding business efficiency and clamoring for regulation made Samuel Insull a favorite scapegoat. He had built his early electric system in Chicago with vision, administrative and political skill, and a conspicuously advanced concept of public relations. Insull espoused the “natural monopoly” principle, but he shocked contemporaries by insisting upon the corollary necessity for public control. He fought hard and effectively for state regulation, not as a radical theorist hut as a realist with a record of public service unsurpassed in the infant electric utility industry.

The Age of Electricity was foreshadowed by the “battle of the currents.” This almost forgotten controversy had important technological implications, but it is also a macabre chapter in the history of marketing tactics. Westinghouse's superior alternating current system was ingeniously attacked by proponents of direct current. Exploiting contemporary evidence from the penitentiary, the direct-current adherents declaimed against use by the public of a system employed by the state to rid itself of its most dangerous criminals.

The stock market boom and bust of the late 1920's has been closely associated by scholars and public alike with the great changes in American life that followed closely thereafter. Actually, the interrelationship is far from clear, and a better understanding of the capital market is needed. Historical evidence points to the absence of effective market regulation and to the violation of accepted norms of monetary policy, but the only clear-cut causal connection between levels of economic activity and the stock boom lies in the effect of security inflation on the psychological climate of the business community.

This comparative study deals with objectives, administration, and portfolio policies of two banks that were among the earliest institutional lenders in America. Founded to assist the “frugal poor,” both banks faced the handicaps of provincialism, capital immobility, and regulation in their efforts to enlarge their services to the community. Both contributed much to a growing public understanding of banks and banking.

Durant has been described as “the most picturesque, spectacular, and aggressive figure in the chronicles of American automobiledom” but he was much more than this. His career is a chssic study in the dual abilities, promotional and administrative, that created and nourished big business in America. Ultimate personal disaster grew out of Durant's failure to strike a balance between the two, yet his genius left imperishable marks, and his luster as the symbol of an era is untarnished.

The most vehement and persistent controversy in business history has been that waged by the critics and defenders of the “robber baron” concept of the American businessman. Far from being a pedantic exercise, this controversy has at various times exerted a decisive influence on business itself. The origins, spread, and obsolescence of the concept are traced here, together with the merits and failings of currently predominant historical attitudes.

No definitive comparison of factors contributing to success and failure in business is possible. Yet a look at some of those factors, operative in a number of similar circumstances, helps sharpen the customary vague generalizations. An examination of the elements of prudence, diligence, housekeeping habits, intelligence, foresight, use of agents, degree of control, and teamwork suggests that in commerce of the period luck was probably of less influence than commonly supposed. A by-product of this broad inquiry is a specific and highly illuminating comparative picture of mercantile business practice.

The first fire insurance program of the Hohenzollern was an important phase in the growth of the concept of risk coverage, incorporating many features regarded as standard in modern insurance practice. The Brandenburg-Berlin scheme also reflected the strengths and weaknesses of a benevolent despotism in its attempts to force the citizenry to protect itself against an admitted menace of major proportions.

This study is an attempt to reconstruct the history of a medieval company on the basis of the extant fragments of its account books, the only surviving records. Despite the incompleteness of the data, it was possible to reach important conclusions and to show that the continued existence of a medieval firm depended on the same factors as today: coordination, efficient management, and effective control. The records also shed interesting light on personnel relations, adjustment to new trends, and the attitude of the merchants toward the Church.

Mormon religious and economic self-sufficiency throve best on isolation, yet Brigham Young hailed the coming of the railroad. This practical and very successful adaptation to new circumstances was inspired by a religious goal. Increased profits and growing trade would accelerate the progress of the work of the Lord. Zion flourished, even as Young had foreseen, but the old social and economic institutions were undermined and Mormon dominance in the territory was challenged.

Much of the capital to finance economic growth flowed from East to West in numerous trickling streams, having as their source the middle-income professional class and as their destination the small farmer. Uniting such borrowers and lenders were middlemen like Charles M. Hawkes, whose operations — here described in detail — were characterized by direct cognizance, financial mobility, deliberate restriction, and great prudence in the face of a shifting, hazardous market.

The potential advantages of the South over New England as a textile manufacturing region were recognized early in the nineteenth century, but it remained to be proved whether the disadvantages were insuperable. The success of a few mills like the Augusta Manufacturing Company provided the necessary precedent and inspiration, and precipitated the migration of an entire industry. The process of recording this episode is in itself of interest, for the pertinent company records have long since disappeared.

Development of the North American continent was a halting process, characterized by use and misuse of latent opportunities. The Hudson's Bay Company, giant in fur trade and northern exploration, proved by trial and error experiments that abundant natural assets were not in themselves the magic key to wealth.

The unique features of ownership patterns in the early New England textile industry have long been recognized. Hitherto it has been the interlocking or horizontal relationships that have been studied. This article deals, instead, with the vertical pattern — describing ownership in terms of occupational groupings of all the investors rather than the kinship of the dominant owners. Conclusions are drawn in respect to such important points as the principal sources of textile capital, the rate of mercantile capital reinvestment in manufacturing, the relationship between investment and industry integration, and the increasing importance of nonbusiness and institutional vested interests.

In the years between 1913 and 1928 public accounting evolved from a relatively obscure and limited practice to full maturity as a respected and flourishing profession. The present article deals with these years in some detail, expanding a shorter survey published in the Business History Review in June, 1956. The period from 1928 to 1951 is dealt with in detail in an article in the December, 1956, issue.

For many years Americans engaged in business abroad at their own risk, unaided in any important way by the backing of their government. When confronted with the forces of national self-interest, they faced frustration. Then the policy of the United States, aware of its economic responsibilities and opportunities and dangers, swung to their support. The new diplomacy was not always adept, but it produced remarkable changes. These are exemplified in the thirty-year history of American efforts to gain an entry to the oilfields of the Netherlands East Indies. The files of the Department of State provide an intimate and unique view both of motivations and the mechanisms of change.