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Planning and Building the British Bomber Force, 1934–1939

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2012

Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith
Affiliation:
Lecturer in History, St. David's University College, Wales
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Abstract

Students of planning may profitably ponder the myriad difficulties faced by the British aircraft industry in the decade before the outbreak of World War II. On a small civilian aircraft industry, provided with hardly any opportunity to gain military aircraft experience between World War I and the early 1930s, the Air Ministry tried to impose a nearly anarchic system of strategic military planning in which the very philosophy of the use of aircraft in war was at issue. Forced to work under conditions that included a “shadow industry” of civilian plant space that was theoretically capable of quick conversion to military aircraft production and that in the meantime turned out automobiles, the aircraft industry somehow ended up with two superb heavy bombers, the Halifax and the Lancaster, and a highly dependable prime contractor, A. V. Roe. Basing his narrative on both government and industry sources, Dr. Smith concludes that this was an outstanding example of British wartime “muddling through.”

Type
Research Article
Information
Business History Review , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , Spring 1980 , pp. 35 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1980

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References

1 For discussion of the RAF theory of strategic air war, see: Brodie, B., Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, N.J., 1965)Google Scholar; Frankland, N., The Bomber Offensive Against Germany: Outlines and Perspectives (London, 1965)Google Scholar; Higham, R., The Military Intellectuals in Britain (London, 1962)Google Scholar; Possony, S., Strategic Air Power: The Pattern of Dynamic Security (Washington, D.C., 1949)Google Scholar. Quester, G. H., Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New York, 1966)Google Scholar; SirWebster, C. and Frankland, N., The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, vol. 1 (London, 1961)Google Scholar; and Smith, M., “The RAF and Counter-Force Strategy Before World War II,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (1976).Google Scholar

2 Postan, M. M., Hay, D., and Scott, J. D., Design and Development of Weapons (London, 1964).Google ScholarHigham, R., “Government, Companies, and National Defence: British Aeronautical Experience, 1918–1945 as the Basis for a Broad Hypothesis,” Business History Review, XXXIX (Autumn, 1965)Google Scholar, and “Quantity vs. Quality: the Impact of Changing Demand on the British Aircraft Industry, 1900–1960, Business History Review, XLII (Winter, 1968). Higham, R., Britain's Imperial Air Routes (London, 1960)Google Scholar and Armed Forces in Peacetime (London, 1962). Fearon, P., “The Formative Years in the British Aircraft Industry, 1913–1924,” Business History Review, XLIII (Winter, 1969)Google Scholar and “The British Airframe Industry and the State, 1918–1935,” Economic History Review (1974).

3 See Gibbs, N., Grand Strategy, vol. 1 (London, 1976)Google Scholar; Hyde, H. M., British Air Policy Between the Wars (London, 1976)Google Scholar; Bialer, U., “Some Aspects of the Fear of Air Bombardment and its Effects on British Foreign and Defence Policy, 1933–1939” (Doctoral dissertation, University of London, 1974)Google Scholar and Smith, M., “The RAF, Air Power and British Foreign Policy”, Journal of Contemporary History (1977)Google Scholar.

Aide-Memoire by Sir T. Inskip, December 9, 1937, Air Ministry (hereafter AIR) 8/266; “Defence Expenditure in Future Years,” Report by Sir T. Inskip, December 15, 1937, Cabinet paper (hereafter, CP) 316/37, AIR 8/226. See, for examole, “Comments for the King on the Sunday Times article,” October 3, 1933, Cabinet Office (hereafter, CAB) 64/46; “Role of the British Army,” January 13, 1937, CAB 64/52; see, also, Roskill, S., Hankey, Man of Secrets, vol. III (London, 1974)Google Scholar, passim.

4 For details of the Treasury review, see Gibbs, Grand Strategy and Middlemas, K.Diplomacy of Illusion (London, 1972)Google Scholar; see especially Shay, R. P., British Rearmament in the 1930s (Princeton, N.J., 1977)Google Scholar; also Swinton, Ld., I Remember (London, 1948)Google Scholar; see also Air Ministry reply to Aide-Memoire of Sir T. Inskip, December 11, 1937, AIR 8/226.

5 Gibbs, Grand Strategy; Smith, “The RAF,” Journal of Contemporary History.

6 Higham, “Quantity vs. Quality”, Business History Review.

7 For the debate on aircraft types, see especially AIR 9/37, AIR 8/237, and AIR 8/244; “The March 1937 Programme and the Strategical and Tactical Basis on which its Material is Founded,” Note by Lord Weir, July 17, 1935, AIR 6/43; “The Possibility of Dispensing with Armaments in Light Bombers,” Note by Air Staff, June 22, 1935, AIR 6/43; for the specifications B 12/36 and P 13/36, see AIR 9/77.

“Considerations Affecting the Design of the Ideal Bomber Aircraft for the RAF,” Air Staff, March 1938, AIR 8/237.

Commander in Chief Fighter Command to Under Secretary of State, Air Ministry, April 1938, AIR 14/433. See Air Staff “Note on the Size of Bomber Aircraft,” December 22, 1938, AIR 8/244.

8 See Commander in Chief Bomber Command to Air Ministry, June 30, 1938 and July 14, 1938, AIR 14/198; Commander in Chief to Air Ministry, September 30, 1939, AIR 14/39.

9 See Morpurgo, J., Barnes Wallis (London, 1972)Google Scholar; Irving, D., The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe (London, 1973).Google Scholar See McLean to Yapp, August 26, 1937, VICKERS 26.

10 Memo by Air Staff, “German Aviation,” May 31, 1934, AIR 9/24; Committee of Imperial Defence (hereafter, CID), Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries, “Report on German Aircraft Industry,” July 22, 1936, CAB 64/15; Defence Policy (Requirements) Committee (hereafter, DPR) Programmes of the Defence Services, 3rd Progress Report by the Air Ministry, June 1936, AIR 6/46; CID, Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries, “German Aircraft Industry,” February 25, 1938, CAB 64/6; DPR (draft), Programmes of the Defence Services, 18th Progress Report by the Air Ministry, December 1937, AIR 6/51.

11 Fearon, “The British Airframe Industry,” Economic History Review; Command Paper 5685, “Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Civil Aviation,” March 1938, House of Commons Accounts and Papers, 1938.

12 Command Paper 5295, “Note on the Policy of His Maiesty's Government in Relation to the Production of Aero-Engines,” House of Commons Accounts and Papers, 1936. See also Overy, R. J., William Morris, Viscount Nuffield (London, 1976).Google Scholar

13 Interview with Sir R. McLean, Lords Weir and Swinton, February 6, 1936, AIR 6/44. On the delicate question of how far armorers should risk expanding for what might only be a short-term demand, Vickers was in something of a dilemma. Sir Noel Birch, a director with special responsibility for foreign sales, argued that the company should be very wary, otherwise it would find itself “when this risk is over … competing for work that would not keep a cat, and our foreign sales gone!” On the other hand, McLean later recollected that by 1934 he thought war with Germany inevitable and that the majority of the aircraft industry shared this view. See Birch to Nielson, March 14, 1936 and Birch to Craven, March 12, 1936, VICKERS 24; J. D. Scott's “Notes of Interview with Sir Robert McLean,” November 8/9, 1959, VICKERS 252.

“Note on the Air Ministry Shadow Factories,” Swinton, nd, AIR 19/10.

Secretary of State's Meeting of the Air Council to Consider the Progress of Expansion (hereafter, SofS EPM), Meeting 21, Item 3, January 7, 1936, AIR 6/24.

Sofs EPM, 104/5, December 7, 1937, AIR 6/32.

14 Fairey, C. R., “The Future of Aeroplane Design for the Service,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (1931).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 SofS EPM, 107/7, January 11, 1938, AIR 6/32. SofS EPM, 51/2, September 23, 1936, AIR 6/27.

16 See Reader, W. J., Architect of Air Power (London, 1968).Google Scholar SofS EPM, 26/5, February 11, 1936, AIR 6/24. See also Swinton, Lord, I Remember (London, 1948).Google Scholar

17 R. Fedden, “Memo on Reorganisation of the Aircraft Industry,” nd, CAB 64/11; See also McLean to Jamieson, October 25, 1937, VICKERS 26, for the German visit of Fedden and Summers. Bruce Gardner to Lord Swinton, April 29, 1938, AIR 6/53.

18 See especially speech of Sir H. Seely MP, HofC Debs., 5th Series, vol. 335, May 12, 1938. For the organization of the Air Ministry, see, Grey, C. G., History of the Air Ministry (London, 1940).Google Scholar

19 Weybridge Quarterly Reports, VICKERS 447.

20 Extract from Cabinet Meeting of March 14, 1938, AIR 8/237; SofS EPM, “Survey of Aircraft Production for Scheme L,” Memo by DGP, September 5, 1938, AIR 6/54; SofS EPM, 168/ld, May 15, 1939, AIR 6/38.

21 Ministerial Committee on Defence Requirements, 2nd Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on Air Parity, May 17, 1935, AIR 8/196; “Acceleration of; Design and Development of Service Aircraft,” Memo by Lord Weir, November 21, 1935, AIR 6/43; Air Member for Research and Development, Notes on Memo by Lord Weir, November 1935, AIR 6/43.

22 SofS EPM, Minutes of 43rd meeting. Agendum 7 (hereafter shown only by two numbers: e.g., 43/7), June 22, 1936, AIR 6/26.

23 SofS EPM, 25/2, February 6, 1936, AIR 6/24; SofS EPM, 11/10, October 22, 1935, AIR 6/23.

24 SofS EPM, 22/11, January 14, 1936, AIR 6/24; SofS EPM, 30/5, March 3, 1936, AIR 6/24.

25 SofS EPM, 56/4, October 20, 1936, AIR 6/27; SofS EPM, 60/12, November 24, 1936, AIR 6/27.

26 SofS EPM, 66/5, January 19, 1937, AIR 6/28; SofS EPM, 70/11, February 16, 1937, AIR 6/28.

27 SofS EPM, 84, June 8, 1937, AIR 6/30; SofS EPM, 87/1, June 30, 1937, AIR 6/30.

28 “Estimated Strength at 31 March 1939,” Note by Director of Operations: July 20, 1937, AIR 6/50; SofS EPM, 112/6a, February 8, 1938, AIR 6/33.

29 SofS EPM, 121/2h, April 12, 1938, AIR 6/34; SofS EPM, 167/8b, May 9, 1939, AIR 6/38; SofS EPM, 170/1, June 6, 1939, AIR 6/38; See Postan, Hay, and Scott, Design and Development of Weapons, 489–491.

30 SofS EPM, 47/1, July 21, 1936, AIR 6/26; Postan, Hay, and Scott, Design and Development of Weapons, 491–494.

31 SofS EPM, 55/6, October 13, 1936, AIR 6/27; SofS EPM, 58/2, November 5, 1936, AIR 6/27.

32 “Turret Position as at 15 January, 1939,” Report by Director of Technical Development AIR 6/56. The problem of liaison between the aircraft producers and Fraser Nash certainly contributed to the friction apparent between the industry and the Air Ministry. Air Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman was under the impression that Vickers was to blame, for instance, for the delay in Wellington turrets by failing to provide the necessary drawings, which he called “a disgrace to a firm of the status of Vickers.” McLean was able to show that Freeman was not aware of the details of a very complex story of co-ordination difficulties with Fraser Nash. McLean was drawn to the conclusion that the problem had arisen from a decision to standardize equipment that was technically undeveloped and for which adequate industrial preparation had not been made. Freeman to Craven, January 31, 1938 and McLean Note, February 8, 1938, VICKERS 25.

33 Extrapolation from Note by Director of Operations, Air Ministry; “Estimated Strength at 31 March 1939,” July 20, 1937, AIR 6/50.

34 See Morpurgo, Barnes Wallis, chapters 9–11; SofS EPM, 13/7, November 5, 1935, AIR 6/23.

35 Cf. J. D. Scott's Interview with Wallis, September 28, 1959 and Interview with J. C. L. Westbrook, October 15, 1959, VICKERS 24; SofS EPM, 28/4, February 25, 1936, and 30/5, March 3, 1936, AIR 6/25; Interview with Sir R. McLean, February 6, 1936, AIR 6/44.

36 SofS EPM, 50/1, September 15, 1936, AIR 6/26; There were worries about the reliability of the boom tail of the aircraft, for example, and in November 1936 an undercarriage failure grounded all Handley Page aircraft for investigation: SofS EPM, 43/6, June 22, 1936; 51/8, September 23, 1936, and 59/7, November 10, 1936, AIR 6/27.

37 Air Member for Supply and Organization (hereafter, AMSO) to Secretary of State, August 26, 1936, and AMSO to Secretary, Air Ministry, September 9, 1936, AIR 6/46.

38 SofS EPM, 64/4, January 5, 1937, AIR 6/28. It seems that Vickers figures actually referred not to the “Wellington but to specification B 1/35, which, according to McLean, had originally been “80% like the Wellington” but, owing to Air Ministry changes, had become “100% dissimilar.” McLean to Craven, August 1938, VICKERS 124; In January 1938 McLean noted that the Wellesley contract would be complete within three to four months of the original completion date, “an illuminating comment on the state of panic in which the Air Ministry found itself a year ago.” McLean to Craven, January 31, 1938. VICKERS 26.

39 See Scott, J. D., Vickers (London, 1962), 209–215.Google Scholar

40 For instance, the wing had to be taken off to get at the fuel tanks. “It is deplorable,” wrote Newall to the Commander in Chief of Bomber Command, “but it is one of the prices we have had to pay for the geodetic principle. Whether geodetics were worth these and other drawbacks is a moot question.” AMSO to Commander in Chief, Bomber Command, April 13, 1939, AIR 14/480.

41 McLean accepted the decision not to order either a B 12/36 or P 13/36 from Vickers Aviation without recrimination: the company was so committed to existing types that Wallis would not have had the time. Nevertheless, Wallis went ahead with a long-term project for a six-engined geodetic bomber with the range to bomb Moscow. J. D. Scott's Notes on Interview with Sir R. McLean, November 8/9, 1959, VICKERS 252; Notes on Interview with Dr. B. Wallis, Major Teed, and Mr. Clifton, February 1, 1960, VICKERS 439.

42 SofS EPM, 63/7, December 22, 1936, AIR 6/28. SofS EPM, 64/4, January 5, 1937, AIR 6/28. Sofs EPM, 84/7, June 8, 1937, AIR 6/30. SofS EPM, 85/1, June 15, 1937, AIR 6/30.

43 SofS EPM, 86/7, June 22, 1937, AIR 6/30.

44 SofS EPM, 86/7, June 22, 1937, AIR 6/30.

45 “Bomber Command Annual Report,” March 8, 1938, AIR 14/296.