^{page 550 note 1} Fortune Magazine (Editors of), The U.S.A.: The Permanent Revolution (New York, 1951)Google ScholarPubMed.

^{page 550 note 2} Research for this study was done at the University of Washington. The author is especially grateful to Professor Dean A. Worcester, Jr., of the University of Washington for his helpful criticisms of earlier drafts of this article.

^{page 550 note 3} Marx, Karl, Capital (Engels, Frederic, Ed.; New York, n.d.), p. 205Google ScholarPubMed.

The work of directing, superintending, and adjusting, becomes one of the functions of capital, from the moment that the labor under the control of capital becomes cooperative…. The cooperation of wage laborers is entirely brought about by the capital that employs them. Their union into one single productive body and the establishment of a connection between their individual functions, are matters foreign and external to them, are not their own act but that act of the capital that brings them together…. If, then, the control of the capitalist is in substance two fold by reason of the two fold nature of the process of production itself, — which on the one hand is a social process for producing use-values, on the other a process for creating surplus-values — in form that control is despotic. As cooperation extends its scale, this despotism takes forms peculiar to itself. Just as at first the capitalist is relieved from actual labor so soon as his capital has reached that minimum amount with which capitalist production, as such begins, so now he hands over the work of direct and constant supervision of the individual workmen, and groups of workmen, under the command of a capitalist, requires like a real army, officers (managers), and sergeants (foremen, overlookers), who, while the work is being done, command in the name of the capitalist. The work of supervision becomes their established and exclusive function.”

^{page 552 note 4} “Wanted: A New Name for Capitalism,” This Week, March 4, 1951.

^{page 552 note 5} G. Burck, “The Jersey Company: Story of the Standard Oil Co. (N.J.) as a Case Illustrating the Transformation of American Capitalism,” Fortune (Oct., 1951), p. 98.

^{page 553 note 6} Ibid., p. 99.

^{page 553 note 7} Nevins, Allan, John D. Rockefeller: The Heroic Age of American Capitalism (2 vols.; New York, 1940), Vol. I, p. 647Google Scholar.

^{page 553 note 8} Flynn, John T., God's Gold: The Story of Rockefeller and His Times (New York, 1933), p. 401Google Scholar.

^{page 553 note 9} Sr.Rockefeller, John D., Random Reminiscences (New York, 1933), pp. 75 and 141Google Scholar.

^{page 554 note 10} Nevins, , op. cit., Vol. I, p. 340Google Scholar. Also see Dictionary of American Biography.

^{page 554 note 11} Nevins, , op. cit., Vol. I, p. 511Google Scholar.

^{page 554 note 12} Ibid., Vol. II, p. 434.

^{page 554 note 13} U.S. Congress, House, Preliminary Report on Trusts and Industrial Combinations, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900. House Document 177, I, p. 596.

^{page 554 note 14} U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Manufactures, Report in Relation to the Standard Oil Trust, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 1888, House Report 3112, p. 332.

Archbold's view of the cause for business success appears to have been widely held at the turn of the century. Take for example the analyses of business failures which were made by the firm of Dun and Bradstreet. These were made in terms of the personal and impersonal factors involved in the failures. Invariably, the greater number of failures were explained by such categories as incompetence, inexperience, extravagance, fraud, and neglect. One self-help theorist surveyed the causes of failures reported in Dun and Bradstreet from 1902 to 1910 and concluded that: “Long years of experience have demonstrated to the seekers after the underlying causes of business failure the fact that, generally speaking, four-fifths of all failures are due to faults inherent in the person, while about one-fifth are due to causes outside and beyond his control…. In other words, the cool disinterested judgment of thousands of investigators shows that success or failure lie largely within the person himself rather than with outside conditions.” (Wyllie, Irvin G., The Self-Made Man in America [New Brunswick, N.J., 1954], p. 32.)Google Scholar

^{page 554 note 15} “At Thirty Nine He Becomes a Great Captain of Industry,” Current Opinion (Jan., 1918), p. 21.

^{page 555 note 16} “Standard Oil Co. (N.J.),” Fortune (April, 1940), pp. 149 and 160.

^{page 555 note 17} “Teagle on Big Business Policy,” Business Week (June 13, 1936), p. 17.

¹⁸ All information on Mr. Holman is taken from “Big Business Manager: Eugene Holman,” by C. Hartley Grattan in Harpers (June, 1951).

^{page 555 note 19} C. M. Keys, “How the Standard Oil Co. Does Its Business,” World's Week (Sept., 1908), p. 10702.

^{page 556 note 20} Maurer, Herryman, Great Enterprise (New York, 1952), p. 129Google Scholar.

^{page 556 note 21} “Standard Oil Co. (N.J.): III,” Fortune (June, 1940), p. 62.

^{page 556 note 22} John D. Rockefeller, op. cit., pp. 132–133.

^{page 556 note 23} Ibid., pp. 74–75.

^{page 556 note 24} Burck, op. cit., p. 184.

^{page 557 note 25} Committee on Manufactures, Report in Relation to the Standard Oil Trust, p. 317.

^{page 557 note 26} Rockefeller, op. cit., pp. 143–144.

^{page 557 note 27} “The Public Responsibilities of Big Companies,” an address by Eugene Holman, President, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), given at the Economic Club of Detroit, Nov. 8, 1948, p. 8.

^{page 557 note 28} Riesman, David and others, The Lonely Crowd (New York, 1956), p. 151Google Scholar.

^{page 557 note 29} Slichter, Sumner, The American Economy (New York, 1948), p. 11Google Scholar.

^{page 558 note 30} A. S. Wheeler, “The Labor Question,” Andover Review (Nov., 1886), p. 476.

Fine, Sidney (Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State [Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1956], pp. 97–107Google Scholar) would appear to support the case that Wheeler's statement is “typical” of businessmen's thinking about labor in the 1880's. The degree of “representativeness” of Wheeler's statement, however, must await further study of nineteenth-century business attitudes. As yet, no analysis of the full range of businessmen's thinking about labor has been made for this period.

^{page 558 note 31} Wheeler, op. cit., p. 478.

^{page 558 note 32} Rockefeller, op. cit., p. 74.

^{page 558 note 33} Ralph, and Muriel, Hidy, , Pioneering in Big Business, 1882–1911 (New York, 1955), p. 590Google Scholar.

Also, see Gibb, G. and Knowlton, E.Resurgent Years, 1911–1927 (New York, 1956), pp. 135, 139Google Scholar.

^{page 559 note 34} Hidy, op. cit., p. 600.

^{page 559 note 35} Gibb and Knowlton, op. cit., p. 575.

^{page 559 note 36} “Enlightened Industrial Policy,” Banker's Magazine (June, 1921).

³⁷ “Thirty Years of Labor Peace,” Fortune (Nov., 1946), p. 169.

^{page 559 note 38} Chase, Stuart, A Generation of Industrial Peace (pamphlet written for the Standard Oil Co. [N.J.], 1956), p. 27Google Scholar. The number of Jersey Standard workers in various unions was as follows: of a total of 36,722 eligibles, 35,884 were members in fifty-five independent unions; 353 were members of six CIO locals; 455 were members of four AFL locals; and 30 were members in one Railroad Brotherhood local.

^{page 559 note 39} Standard's “prevailing wage” policy is referred to in the following:

(a.) “Thirty Years of Labor Peace,” Fortune (Nov., 1946), p. 168.

(b.) Your Job (pamphlet published by Employee Relations Dept., Standard Oil Co., [N.J.], 1955), p. 10.

(c.) Chase, op. cit., p. 17.

^{page 559 note 40} Chase, op. cit., p. 28.

^{page 560 note 41} Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, C.I.O., “Survey of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, E. I. Dupont de Nemours and Company, Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, Atlantic Refining Company, Sun Oil Company, and Dow Chemical Company,” May, 1955, p. 5. The full quote reads: “Standard perpetuates these independent unions by providing the highest wages and fringe benefits that can be found in the oil industry. Its policy of extreme paternalism has been an obstacle to legitimate union organization.”

^{page 560 note 42} Hidy, op. cit., p. 666.

^{page 560 note 43} Foraker, Joseph B., Notes on a Busy Life (Cincinnati, 1916), Vol. II, pp. 328–354Google Scholar.

^{page 560 note 44} This can be viewed as a part of the “face-lifting” process which American big business underwent in the twentieth century as a response to the antitrust acts.

In The Folklore of Capitalism (Yale University Press, 1937)Google Scholar, Mr. Thurman Arnold discusses how the inherent assumptions of the antitrust laws influenced the character of Big Business:

“One great change, however, did come over corporate activity because of the philosophy which produced the antitrust laws. Since everyone thought of these great enterprises as individuals which should be moral and gentlemanly in their dealings, they came gradually to conform to those standards. This is in accordance with the principle of political dynamics which makes it inevitable that an institution will, in the long-run, conform to the character which men give it. The antitrust laws were based on a popular conception that great corporations could be made respectable. Following that ideal, great corporations did become respectable.” (P. 221.)

Arnold was not obscure as to how he thought this transformation or “face lifting” came about. He writes (Folklore, p. 216):

“Within the organizations themselves, men were not theoretical but intensely practical. They did not follow economists and lawyers. They used them. Realizing the advantages of a respectable position in society, they employed public relations counsel, skilled in the use of propaganda. After the war cartoons showing corporations to be great, greedy men became fewer and fewer. Gradually they changed themselves from bad to good men in the public eye. They took the role of the sinner who had repented and become a saint. Men reading Josephson's Robber Barons, The Great American Capitalists, 1861–1901, were able to say: ‘Once unenlightened corporations used to do these bad things but now they have reformed and do not do them any more.’ The era of trust busting disappeared. It was still good for an occasional battle cry, but as the industrial empires grew in power their symbols became more and more respectable. Theodore Roosevelt, with his big stick that never hit anybody, accomplished two things. First, he convinced the public that if we would only drive politics out of the Department of Justice the laws were sufficient to make these big corporate individuals really compete. Second, he convinced corporate executives that it was a good thing to hire public relations counsel and show that they also were followers of the true religion.”

^{page 561 note 45} (a.)“Investigation of the National Defense Program,” Senate Hearings on S. Res. 71, Pts. 11–14, Mar.–Aug., 1942, pp. 4307–4497.

(b.) “Consent Decree in Suits Against the Standard Oil Co. (NJ.) et al.,” 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Miscellaneous Documents, 152, Pt. 2, 156–292, No. 197.

(c.) Also see: “Arnold vs. Standard Oil,” Newsweek (June 8, 1942), p. 46; “Standard's Rebuttal,” Newsweek (June 15, 1942), p. 46; “Standard's Day,” Time (Aug. 31, 1942), p. 83.

^{page 561 note 46} “Investigation of the National Defense Program,” Senate Hearings on S. Res. 71, Pts. 11–14, Mar.—Aug., 1942, pp. 4499–4527.

^{page 561 note 47} Wood, R., “The Corporation Goes into Polities,” Harvard Business Beview, Vol. XXI (Autumn, 1942), pp. 64–65Google Scholar.

^{page 561 note 48} Burck, op. cit., p. 182.

^{page 562 note 49} Standard Oil Co. (N.J.),” Fortune (June, 1940), p. 108.

^{page 562 note 50} Hidy, op. cit., p. 214.

^{page 562 note 51} Ibid.

^{page 562 note 52} Committee on Manufactures, Report in Relation to the Standard Oil Trust, p. 317.

^{page 562 note 53} Hidy, op. cit., p. 211.

It should perhaps be mentioned that Welch was regarded as a spokesman for the small producers — opponents of Standard Oil of New Jersey. Ironically enough, in view of Welch's statement, the Industrial Commission and Congressional Hearings were to provide the public with more complete information on the Jersey Company than it had or has on any other firm of the period.

^{page 563 note 54} Probably the first public-relations man to gain fame for his profession and fortune for himself as a practitioner of that delicate art was Ivy Lee. Lee was known as the “minnesinger to millionaires” and as the “king of the press agents” (Silas Bent, “Ivy Lee, Minnesinger to Millionaires,” New Republic [Nov. 20, 1929], p. 369).

Lee was hired by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., for the apparent purpose of molding public sentiment in favor of the founder of the Jersey Company who had borne the brunt of so much of the muckrakers' attack and who had become the symbol of Standard Oil. Because of the close association of the name of John D. Rockefeller, Sr., and the Standard Oil Company chartered by the State of New Jersey, it seems reasonable to impute some of the gains in the company's popularity to Ivy Lee's “public relations” work for John D. Rockefeller, Sr.

^{page 563 note 55} Gibb and Knowlton, op. cit., p. 253. This was especially true after 1911 when the company was smarting under the dissolution decree (1911).

^{page 563 note 56} Ibid., p. 258.

^{page 563 note 57} The speeches, identified by their dates in the text, are the following:

(a.) George H. Freyermuth (Manager, Public Relations Department, Jersey Standard), “The Purpose of Public Relations in Modern Business” (a speech given at the Marketing Cost and Sales Meetings, Caracas, Lausanne, Stockholm), 1954.

(b.) Stewart Schackne (Manager, Public Relations Department, Jersey Standard), “The Part Public Relations Plays” (a talk delivered at Sales and Cost Meetings, Cannes, France), April 20, 1955.

(c.) Stewart Schackne (Manager, Public Relations Department, Jersey Standard), “Bigness and Public Relations” (a speech delivered at Esso Standard Public Relations Annual Meeting, Sedgefield, N.C.), Oct. 1–3, 1956.

^{page 565 note 58} Burck, op. cit., p. 174.

^{page 565 note 59} Burnham, James, The Managerial Revolution (New York, 1941), p. 89Google Scholar.

^{page 565 note 60} Ibid., p. 110.

^{page 565 note 61} Gordon, Robert A., Leadership in the Large Corporation (Washington, D.C., 1945), p. 336Google Scholar.

^{page 566 note 62} Stolper, Gustav, This Age of Fable (New York, 1942), p. 63Google Scholar. Stolper aptly sums up the point of view that capitalism is characterized by change in the following passage:

“What makes capitalism such a ready object of fable is the fact that it is a perennially changing, undefinable social system. The capitalism of 1941 is as different in almost all essential respects from the capitalism of 1914 as this was different from the capitalism of the 1890's, and so on back to its remotest origins in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But capitalism changes not only in time; it also varies from country to country. In the United States, in Great Britain, in France, in pre-Hitler Germany, in Scandinavia, it is a different system with different problems, achievements, and shortcomings. And therefore the fable of capitalism is rife in as many versions as there are countries. This is why for decades we have heard in all languages of the world the gloomy or triumphant prophecies (according to the political creeds of the prophets) of the ‘imminent’ end of capitalism. It dies every day, to be reborn — where and as long as its fundamental moral philosophy is the freedom and supremacy of the individual. It will not be reborn on the day that this moral principle dies.”

^{page 569 note 1} Shiff, Robert A. and Barcan, Arthur, “The New Science of Records Management,” Harvard Business Review (Sept.-Oct., 1954), pp. 54–62Google Scholar.

^{page 569 note 2} Lovett, Robert W., “Business Records in Libraries,” The American Archivist (July, 1957), pp. 253–261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 571 note 3} Overman, William D., “The Pendulum Swings,” The American Archivist (Jan., 1959), pp. 3–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 575 note 1} Business History Review (Summer, 1959), pp. 204–215; “Conference on the History of American Business,” by Arthur M. Johnson; “An Approach to the Teaching and Writing of American Business History,” by Stuart Bruchey; “Business History in Schools of Business Administration,” by A. K. Steigerwalt; and “Blending Business History and Economic History,” by Charles J. Kennedy.