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Vanguards of globalization: Organization and political action among America's pro-trade firms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2019

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Abstract

This paper identifies recurrent patterns in the political activity of American corporations that support trade. These firms have made public coalitions a central element of their pro-trade activities, and their collective efforts vastly outstrip those of trade's corporate opponents. This superiority in organization is paired with dramatically greater volumes of lobbying and campaign contributions. I explain these striking divergences by integrating collective action theory into a firm-centred model of trade politics: the heavy concentration of gains from trade among a small number of firms makes both individual and collective political action easier for pro-trade firms than for producers opposed to trade. This explanation is supported in panel analysis of firms’ participation in pro-trade coalitions, which shows that size, multinationality, and heterogeneity in global networks of production and sales drive participation in pro-trade groups. Globally engaged firms have supported trade by matching pro-trade preferences with highly organized political action.

Keywords

trade politicsfirmscollective actioncorporate lobbyingtrade policymultinational corporations
Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 1 - 35
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2019 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

†

The author wishes to thank Kristi Begonja, Timm Betz, Ryan Brutger, Jeffry Frieden, Julia Gray, Robert Gulotty, Tobias Hofmann, In Song Kim, Cara Laskowksi, Ed Mansfield, Heather Elko McKibben, Helen Milner, Krzysztof Pelc, Ken Shepsle, Beth Simmons, Dustin Tingley, Stefanie Walter, and Stephen Weymouth.

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