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Driving support: workers, PACs, and congressional support of the auto industry1)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Ryan T. Moore ,
Eleanor Neff Powell  and
Andrew Reeves
Ryan T. Moore
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, 241 Seigle Hall, Campus Box 1063, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA, http://ryantmoore.com
Andrew Reeves
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, 241 Seigle Hall, Campus Box 1063, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA, http://andrewreeves.org
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Abstract

In 2008 and 2009, the House of Representatives directed billions of dollars to the auto industry by passing a bailout and the “cash for clunkers” program. Moving beyond corporate influence via campaign contributions, we demonstrate that the presence of auto workers in a district strongly predicts legislative support for both bills. In addition to this critical legislation, we also analyze over 250 bills on which the auto industry either lobbied or took a public position. We find no patterns relating a district's workers or corporate campaign contributions to these votes on broader legislation where other groups, such as environmental advocates or labor unions, are at the table. Instead, the auto industry garners consistent support only on quasi-private, particularistic legislation. Thus, we contend that on particularistic legislation the presence of workers (not just campaign contributions) drives legislative support; however, when legislators expand the scope of conflict, the influence of a single industry is attentuated by other interests.

Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , August 2013 , pp. 137 - 162
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2013 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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