There have been several different and even opposed conceptions of the problem of logical constants, i.e., of the requirements that a good theory of logical constants ought to satisfy. This paper is in the first place a survey of these conceptions and a critique of the theories they have given rise to. A second aim of the paper is to sketch some ideas about what a good theory would look like. A third aim is to draw from these ideas and from the preceding survey the conclusion that most conceptions of the problem of logical constants involve requirements of a philosophically demanding nature which are probably not satisfiable by any minimally adequate theory.

There are two principles that lend Brouwer's mathematics the extra power beyond arithmetic. Both are presented in Brouwer's writings with little or no argument. One, the principle of bar induction, will not concern us here. The other, the continuity principle for numbers, occurs for the first time in print in [4]. It is formulated and immediately applied to show that the set of numerical choice sequences is not enumerable. In fact, the idea of the continuity property can be dated fairly precisely, it is to be found in the margin of Brouwer's notes for his course on Pointset Theory of 1915/16. The course was repeated in 1916/17 and he must have inserted his first formulation of the continuity principle in the fall of 1916 as new material right at the beginning of the course.

In modern language, the principle reads

where α and β range over choice sequences of natural numbers, m and x over natural numbers, and stands for ⟨α(0), α(1), …, α(m − 1)⟩, the initial segment of α of length m.

An immediate consequence of WC-N is that all full functions are continuous, and, as a corollary, that the continuum is unsplittable [28]. Note that WC-N is incompatible with Church's thesis, [22], section 4.6.

After Brouwer asserted WC-N, Troelstra was the first to ask in print for a conceptual motivation, but he remained an exception; most authors followed Brouwer by simply asserting it, cf. [18].

Let us note first that in one particular case the principle is obvious indeed, namely in the case of the lawless sequences. The notion of lawless sequence surfaced fairly late in the history of intuitionism. Kreisel introduced it in [17] for metamathematical purposes. There is a letter from Brouwer to Heyting in which the phenomenon also occurs [7]. This is an important and interesting fact since it is (probably) the only time that Brouwer made use of a possibility expressly stipulated in, e.g., [5], see below.

In this article, we study the prehistory of type theory up to 1910 and its development between Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica ([71], 1910–1912) and Church's simply typed λ-calculus of 1940. We first argue that the concept of types has always been present in mathematics, though nobody was incorporating them explicitly as such, before the end of the 19th century. Then we proceed by describing how the logical paradoxes entered the formal systems of Frege, Cantor and Peano concentrating on Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik for which Russell applied his famous paradox and this led him to introduce the first theory of types, the Ramified Type Theory (RTT). We present RTT formally using the modern notation for type theory and we discuss how Ramsey, Hilbert and Ackermann removed the orders from RTT leading to the simple theory of types STT. We present STT and Church's own simply typed λ-calculus (λ→C) and we finish by comparing RTT, STT and λ→C.

Computable model theory, also called effective or recursive model theory, studies algorithmic properties of mathematical structures, their relations, and isomorphisms. These properties can be described syntactically or semantically. One of the major tasks of computable model theory is to obtain, whenever possible, computability-theoretic versions of various classical model-theoretic notions and results. For example, in the 1950's, Fröhlich and Shepherdson realized that the concept of a computable function can make van der Waerden's intuitive notion of an explicit field precise. This led to the notion of a computable structure. In 1960, Rabin proved that every computable field has a computable algebraic closure. However, not every classical result “effectivizes”. Unlike Vaught's theorem that no complete theory has exactly two nonisomorphic countable models, Millar's and Kudaibergenov's result establishes that there is a complete decidable theory that has exactly two nonisomorphic countable models with computable elementary diagrams. In the 1970's, Metakides and Nerode [58], [59] and Remmel [71], [72], [73] used more advanced methods of computability theory to investigate algorithmic properties of fields, vector spaces, and other mathematical structures.

In 1941, Tarski published an abstract, finitely axiomatized version of the theory of binary relations, called the theory of relation algebras. He asked whether every model of his abstract theory could be represented as a concrete algebra of binary relations. He and Jónsson obtained some initial, positive results for special classes of abstract relation algebras. But Lyndon showed, in 1950, that in general the answer to Tarski's question is negative. Monk proved later that the answer remains negative even if one adjoins finitely many new axioms to Tarski's system. In this paper we describe a far-reaching generalization of the positive results of Jónsson and Tarski, as well as of some later, related results of Maddux. We construct a class of concrete models of Tarski's axioms—called coset relation algebras—that are very close in spirit to algebras of binary relations, but are built using systems of groups and cosets instead of elements of a base set. The models include all algebras of binary relations, and many non-representable relation algebras as well. We prove that every atomic relation algebra satisfying a certain measurability condition—a condition generalizing the conditions imposed by Jónsson and Tarski—is essentially isomorphic to a coset relation algebra. The theorem raises the possibility of providing a positive solution to Tarski's problem by using coset relation algebras instead of the standard algebras of binary relations.

For every finite n ≥ 4 there is a logically valid sentence φn with the following properties: φn contains only 3 variables (each of which occurs many times); φn contains exactly one nonlogical binary relation symbol (no function symbols, no constants, and no equality symbol); φn has a proof in first-order logic with equality that contains exactly n variables, but no proof containing only n − 1 variables. This result was first proved using the machinery of algebraic logic developed in several research monographs and papers. Here we replicate the result and its proof entirely within the realm of (elementary) first-order binary predicate logic with equality. We need the usual syntax, axioms, and rules of inference to show that φn has a proof with only n variables. To show that φn has no proof with only n − 1 variables we use alternative semantics in place of the usual, standard, set-theoretical semantics of first-order logic.

In the 1920s, Paul Hertz (1881–1940) developed certain calculi based on structural rules only and established normal form results for proofs. It is shown that he anticipated important techniques and results of general proof theory as well as of resolution theory, if the latter is regarded as a part of structural proof theory. Furthermore, it is shown that Gentzen, in his first paper of 1933, which heavily draws on Hertz, proves a normal form result which corresponds to the completeness of propositional SLD-resolution in logic programming.

In papers published between 1930 and 1935, Zermelo outlines a foundational program, with infinitary logic at its heart, that is intended to (1) secure axiomatic set theory as a foundation for arithmetic and analysis and (2) show that all mathematical propositions are decidable. Zermelo's theory of systems of infinitely long propositions may be termed “Cantorian” in that a logical distinction between open and closed domains plays a signal role. Well-foundedness and strong inaccessibility are used to systematically integrate highly transfinite concepts of demonstrability and existence. Zermelo incompleteness is then the analogue of the Problem of Proper Classes, and the resolution of these two anomalies is similarly analogous.

We present a general notion of realizability encompassing both standard Kleene style realizability over partial combinatory algebras and Kleene style realizability over more general structures, including all partial cartesian closed categories. We show how the general notion of realizability can be used to get models of dependent predicate logic, thus obtaining as a corollary (the known result) that the category Equ of equilogical spaces models dependent predicate logic. Moreover, we characterize when the general notion of realizability gives rise to a topos, i.e., a model of impredicative intuitionistic higher-order logic.

Model theory is concerned mainly, although not exclusively, with infinite structures. In recent years, finite structures have risen to greater prominence, both within the context of mainstream model theory, e.g., in work of Lachlan, Cherlin, Hrushovski, and others, and with the advent of finite model theory, which incorporates elements of classical model theory, combinatorics, and complexity theory. The purpose of this survey is to provide an overview of what might be called the model theory of finite structures. Some topics in finite model theory have strong connections to theoretical computer science, especially descriptive complexity theory (see [26, 46]). In fact, it has been suggested that finite model theory really is, or should be, logic for computer science. These connections with computer science will, however, not be treated here.

It is well-known that many classical results of ‘infinite model theory’ fail over the class of finite structures, including the compactness and completeness theorems, as well as many preservation and interpolation theorems (see [35, 26]). The failure of compactness in the finite, in particular, means that the standard proofs of many theorems are no longer valid in this context. At present, there is no known example of a classical theorem that remains true over finite structures, yet must be proved by substantially different methods. It is generally concluded that first-order logic is ‘badly behaved’ over finite structures.

From the perspective of expressive power, first-order logic also behaves badly: it is both too weak and too strong. Too weak because many natural properties, such as the size of a structure being even or a graph being connected, cannot be defined by a single sentence. Too strong, because every class of finite structures with a finite signature can be defined by an infinite set of sentences. Even worse, every finite structure is defined up to isomorphism by a single sentence. In fact, it is perhaps because of this last point more than anything else that model theorists have not been very interested in finite structures. Modern model theory is concerned largely with complete first-order theories, which are completely trivial here.

We consider fixed point logics, i.e., extensions of first order predicate logic with operators defining fixed points. A number of such operators, generalizing inductive definitions, have been studied in the context of finite model theory, including nondeterministic and alternating operators. We review results established in finite model theory, and also consider the expressive power of the resulting logics on infinite structures. In particular, we establish the relationship between inflationary and nondeterministic fixed point logics and second order logic, and we consider questions related to the determinacy of games associated with alternating fixed points.

In recent work, the authors have established the group configuration theorem for simple theories, as well as some of its main applications from geometric stability theory, such as the binding group theorem, or, in the ω-categorical case, the characterization of the forking geometry of a finitely based non-trivial locally modular regular type as projective geometry over a finite field and the equivalence of pseudolinearity and local modularity.

The proof necessitated an extension of the model-theoretic framework to include almost hyperimaginaries, and the study of polygroups.

Let us assume that you are entrusted by UNESCO with an important task. You are asked to devise a universal logical language, a Begriffsschrift in Frege's sense, which is to serve the purposes of science, business and everyday life. What requirements should such a “conceptual notation” satisfy? There are undoubtedly many relevant desiderata, but here I am focusing on one unmistakable one. In order to be a viable lingua universalis, your language must in any case be capable of representing any possible configuration of dependence and independence between different variables. For if such a configuration is possible in principle, there is no guarantee that it might not one day show up among the natural, human or social phenomena we have to study.

But how are dependencies and independencies between variables expressed in our familiar logical notation? Every logician worth his or her truth-table knows the answer. Dependencies between two variables are expressed by dependencies between the quantifiers to which they are bound. For instance, in

the variable y depends on x, while in

z depends on x but not on y, while u depends on both x and y.

But how is the dependence of a quantifier on another one expressed in familiar logical languages? Obviously by occurring in its scope, indicated by the pair of parentheses following it (cf. here Hintikka [1997]). But the nesting of scopes is a transitive and antisymmetrical relation which allows branching only in one direction. Hence other kinds of structures of dependence and independence between variables are not representable in the received logical notation. Such previously inexpressible structures form the subject matter of what has been referred to as independence-friendly (IF) logic.