For all animals, color is an indicator of the substance and state of objects, for which purpose reflectance is just one among many relevant optical properties. This broader meaning of color is confirmed by linguistic evidence. Rather than reducing color to a simple physical property, it is more realistic to embrace its full phenomenology.

If perception is constructed, what keeps perception from becoming mere hallucination unlinked to world events? The visual system has evolved two strategies to anchor itself and correct its errors. One involves completing missing information on the basis of knowledge about what most likely exists in the scene. For example, the visual system fills in information only in cases where it might be responsible for the data loss. The other strategy involves exploiting the physical stability of the environment as a reference frame with respect to which the eyes and body can move.

Evidence from studies of the processing of topographic and classifier constructions in sign language sentences provides a model of how a mental scene description can be represented linguistically, but it also raises questions about how this can be related to spatial linguistic descriptions in spoken languages and their processing. This in turn provides insights into models of the evolution of language.

Jackendoff's position with respect to categories (for lexical items and larger constituents) is unclear. Positing categories is (1) implausible in several respects; (2) it makes the binding problem in language seem more massive than it actually is; and (3) it makes it difficult to explain language acquisition. Waiting for connectionism to fulfill its promise, a different track is sketched which is residually symbolic, exemplarist, and analogy-based.

Where the isocortex comes from is an important question, but even more important is understanding what it leads to – that is, what advantage is afforded by its peculiar organization in layers of distinct neuronal types. A computational hypothesis accounts for granulation and for the differentiation between supra- and infragranular pyramidal layers, as quantitatively advantageous to support fine topography in sensory maps.

Psychological game theory, as defined by Colman, is meant to offer a series of solution concepts that should reduce the indeterminacy of orthodox game theory when applied to a series of situations. My main criticism is that, actually, they introduce a second-order indeterminacy problem rather than offering a viable solution. The reason is that the proposed solution concepts are under-specified in their definition and in their scope.

The model of parallel architecture for language presented by Jackendoff is a kind of stratificational model in the spirit of Sydney Lamb. It differs from the more usual stratificationalism most importantly in its clear commitment to nativism, though the variety of nativism is greatly modified from what is more usual among Chomskyans. The revised model presents a potential for fruitful discussion with proponents of stratificationalism, and the potential for enrichment via a relational implementation.

It is necessary to distinguish among representations caused directly by perception, representations of past perceptions in long-term memory, the representations underlying linguistic utterances, and the surface phonological and grammatical structures of sentences. The target article dealt essentially with predicate-argument structure at the first of these levels of representation. Discussion of the commentaries mainly involves distinguishing among various applications of the term “predicate”; clarifying the assumed relationship between classical FOPL and language; clarifying the status of unique individuals as conceived by humans; and addressing the issues of motion-perception, binding between object-percepts and predicate-percepts, and target-driven versus stimulus-driven attention.

A dorsalization mechanism is a good candidate for the evolutionary origin of the isocortex, producing a radial and tangential expansion of the dorsal pallium (and perhaps other structures that acquired a cortical phenotype). Evidence suggests that a large part of the dorsal ventricular ridge (DVR) of reptiles and birds derives from the embryonic ventral pallium, whereas the isocortex possibly derives mostly from the dorsal pallium. In early mammals, the development of olfactory-hippocampal associative networks may have been pivotal in facilitating the selection of a larger and more complex dorsal pallium which received both collothalamic and lemnothalamic sensory information. Finally, although it is not clear exactly when mammalian brain expansion began, fossil evidence indicates that this was a late event in mammaliaform evolution.

Byrne & Hilbert propose that color can be identified with explicit properties of physical surfaces. I argue that this claim must be qualified to take into account constraints needed to make recovery of surface color information possible. When these constraints are satisfied, then a biological visual system can establish a correspondence between perceived surface color and specific surface properties.

Almost anyone seriously interested in decision theory will name John von Neumann's (1928) Minimax Theorem as its foundation, whereas Utility and Rationality are imagined to be the twin towers on which the theory rests. Yet, experimental results and real-life observations seldom support that expectation. Over two centuries ago, Hume (1739–40/1978) put his finger on the discrepancy. “Reason,” he wrote “is, and ought to be the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” In other words, effective means to reach specific goals can be prescribed, but not the goals. A wide range of experimental results and daily life behavior support this dictum.

Lehar provides useful insights into spatially extended phenomenology that may have major consequences for neuroscience. However, Lehar's biological naturalism leads to counterintuitive conclusions, and he does not give an accurate account of preceding and competing work. This commentary compares Lehar's analysis with that of Velmans, which addresses similar issues but draws opposite conclusions. Lehar argues that the phenomenal world is in the brain and concludes that the physical skull is beyond the phenomenal world. Velmans argues that the brain is in the phenomenal world and concludes that the physical skull is where it seems to be.

Jackendoff's Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution (2002) achieves a major shift in the focus and methods of Generative Linguistics (GL). Yet some of the original restrictive features of GL, cognitivism and Cartesianism in particular, remain intact in the new work and take on a more extreme form with the addition of a phenomenalist ontology.

Byrne & Hilbert are right that it might be an objective fact that a particular tomato is unique red, but wrong that it cannot simultaneously be yellowish-red (not only objectively, but from somebody else's point of view). Sensory categorization varies among organisms, slightly among conspecifics, and sharply across taxa. There is no question of truth or falsity concerning choice of categories, only of utility and disutility. The appropriate framework for color categories is Nominalism and Pluralistic Realism.

Researchers have begun to explore animals' capacities for uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. This exploration could extend the study of animal self-awareness and establish the relationship of self-awareness to other-awareness. It could sharpen descriptions of metacognition in the human literature and suggest the earliest roots of metacognition in human development. We summarize research on uncertainty monitoring by humans, monkeys, and a dolphin within perceptual and metamemory tasks. We extend phylogenetically the search for metacognitive capacities by considering studies that have tested less cognitively sophisticated species. By using the same uncertainty-monitoring paradigms across species, it should be possible to map the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition and illuminate the emergence of mind. We provide a unifying formal description of animals' performances and examine the optimality of their decisional strategies. Finally, we interpret animals' and humans' nearly identical performances psychologically. Low-level, stimulus-based accounts cannot explain the phenomena. The results suggest granting animals a higher-level decision-making process that involves criterion setting using controlled cognitive processes. This conclusion raises the difficult question of animal consciousness. The results show that animals have functional features of or parallels to human conscious cognition. Remaining questions are whether animals also have the phenomenal features that are the feeling/knowing states of human conscious cognition, and whether the present paradigms can be extended to demonstrate that they do. Thus, the comparative study of metacognition potentially grounds the systematic study of animal consciousness.

“Psychology Game Theory” grafts social-process explanations onto classical game theory to explain deviations from instrumental rationality caused by the social properties of cooperation. This leads to confusion between cooperation as a social or individual behavior, and between ultimate and proximate explanations. If game theory models explain the existence of cooperation, different models are needed for understanding the proximate social processes that underlie cooperation in the real world.

Steven Lehar allows too much to his direct realist opponent in using the word “subjective” of the sensory field per se. The latter retains its nonconceptual, nonmental nature even when explored by perceptual judgement. He also needs to stress the evolutionary value of perceptual differences between person and person, a move that enables one to undermine the direct realist's superstitious certainty about the singular object.

Newell (1980; 1990) proposed that cognitive theories be developed in an effort to satisfy multiple criteria and to avoid theoretical myopia. He provided two overlapping lists of 13 criteria that the human cognitive architecture would have to satisfy in order to be functional. We have distilled these into 12 criteria: flexible behavior, real-time performance, adaptive behavior, vast knowledge base, dynamic behavior, knowledge integration, natural language, learning, development, evolution, and brain realization. There would be greater theoretical progress if we evaluated theories by a broad set of criteria such as these and attended to the weaknesses such evaluations revealed. To illustrate how theories can be evaluated we apply these criteria to both classical connectionism (McClelland & Rumelhart 1986; Rumelhart & McClelland 1986b) and the ACT-R theory (Anderson & Lebiere 1998). The strengths of classical connectionism on this test derive from its intense effort in addressing empirical phenomena in such domains as language and cognitive development. Its weaknesses derive from its failure to acknowledge a symbolic level to thought. In contrast, ACT-R includes both symbolic and subsymbolic components. The strengths of the ACT-R theory derive from its tight integration of the symbolic component with the subsymbolic component. Its weaknesses largely derive from its failure, as yet, to adequately engage in intensive analyses of issues related to certain criteria on Newell's list.

“The problem of color realism” as defined in the first section of the target article, is crucial to the argument laid out by Byrne & Hilbert. They claim that the problem of color realism “does not concern, at least in the first instance, color language or color concepts” (sect. 1.1). I argue that this claim is misconceived and that a different characterisation of the problem, and some of their preliminary assumptions makes their positive proposal less appealing.

The nature of the relationship between language and thought has been quite elusive. We believe that its understanding is crucially dependent on the available notions of language and thought. Foundations of Language offers an unusually clear and complete account of both, providing a fruitful and much needed framework for future research. No doubt it will help us think better about these elusive complexities.