Veissière et al. disrupt current debates over the nature of mindreading by bringing multiple positions under the umbrella of free-energy. However, it is not clear whether integrating the opposing sides under a common formal framework will yield new insights into how mindreading is achieved, rather than offering a mere redescription of the target phenomenon.

Thinking through other minds (TTOM) encompasses new dimensions in computational psychiatry: social interaction and mutual sense-making. It questions the nature of psychiatric manifestations (semiology) in light of recent data on social interaction in neuroscience. We propose the concept of “social physiology” in response to the call by the conceivers of TTOM for the renewal of computational psychiatry.

First, I discuss cross-cultural evidence showing that a good deal of enculturation takes place outside of thinking through other minds. Second, I review evidence challenging the claim that humans seek to minimize entropy. Finally, I argue that optimality claims should be avoided, and that descriptive Bayesianism offers a more promising avenue for the development of a Bayesian theory of culture.

Veissière et al.'s proposal aims to explain how cognition enables cultural learning, but fails to acknowledge a distinctively human behavior critical to this process: communication. Recent advances in developmental and computational cognitive science suggest that the social-cognitive capacities central to TTOM also support sophisticated yet remarkably early-emerging inferences and communicative behaviors that allow us to learn and share abstract knowledge.

This commentary raises a question about the target article's proposed explanation of what goes on when we think through other minds. It highlights a tension between non-mindreading characterizations of everyday social cognition and the individualist, cognitivist assumptions that target article's explanatory proposal inherits from the predictive processing framework it favours.

Veissière and colleagues make a valiant attempt at reconciling an internalist account of implicit cultural learning with an externalist account that understands social behaviour in terms of its environment-involving dynamics. However, unfortunately the author's attempt to forge a middle way between internalism and externalism fails. We argue their failure stems from the overly individualistic understanding of the perception of cultural affordances they propose.

Culture shapes our basic sensory experience of the world. This is particularly striking in the study of religion and psychosis, where we and others have shown that cultural context determines both the structure and content of hallucination-like events. The cultural shaping of hallucinations may provide a rich case-study for linking cultural learning with emerging prediction-based models of perception.

Other people in our culture actively transform our behavioral dispositions and mental states by shaping them in various ways. In the following, we highlight three points which Veissière et al. may consider in leveraging their account to illuminate the dynamics by which this occurs, and in particular, to shed light on how social cognition supports, and is supported by, enculturation.

There are serious theoretical problems with the free-energy principle model, which are shown in the current article. We discuss the proposed model's inability to account for culturally emergent normativities, and point out the foundational issues that we claim this inability stems from.

We wanted to gather recent results supporting the idea of the central role of sharing agency in socioaffective and motivational information processing. Here, we want to support the idea that this process is quite arbitrary, early in the temporal chain of processes and not only influence the psychological, but also the motor correlates of socioaffective information processes.

“Thinking through other minds,” or TTOM, is defined in two different ways. On the one hand, it refers to something people do – for example, inferences they make about others’ expectations. On the other hand, it refers to a particular theoretical model of those things that people do. If the concept of TTOM is to have any future, this ambiguity must be redressed.

This commentary focuses upon the relationship between two themes in the target article: the ways in which a Markov blanket may be defined and the role of precision and salience in mediating the interactions between what is internal and external to a system. These each rest upon the different perspectives we might take while “choosing” a Markov blanket.

We consider the ways humans engage in social epistemic actions, to guide each other's attention, prediction, and learning processes towards salient information, at the timescale of online social interaction and joint action. This parallels the active guidance of other's attention, prediction, and learning processes at the longer timescale of niche construction and cultural practices, as discussed in the target article.

The active inference framework offers an attractive starting point for understanding cultural cognition. Here, we argue that affective dynamics are essential to include when constructing this type of theory. We highlight ways in which interactions between emotional responses and the perception of those responses, both within and between individuals, can play central roles in both motivating and constraining sociocultural practices.

The target article does not address the neural mediation of complex social behavior. I review evidence that such mediation may be compatible with proposed Bayesian information-processing principles. Notably, however, such mediation occurs subcortically as well as cortically, concerns reward uncertainty and information uncertainty, and impacts culture via group-level payoff structures that define individualism and collectivism.

We show that TTOM has a lot to offer for the study of the evolution of cultures, but that this also brings to the fore the dark implications of TTOM, unexposed in Veissière et al. Those implications lead us to move beyond meme-centered or an organism-centered concept of fitness based on free-energy minimization, toward a social system-centered view.

Do we acquire culture through other minds, or do we get access to other minds through culture? Music culture is a practice as well as the people involved. Sounding music works as a script guiding action, as do, to varying degrees, many rituals and customs. Collective co-performance of the script enables inter-subjectivity, which arguably contributes to the formation of subcultures. Shared-emotional experiences give material to the narrative of who we are.

Discoveries about social learning and culture in non-human animals have burgeoned this century, yet despite aspiring to offer a unified account of culture, the target article neglects these discoveries almost totally. I offer an overview of principal findings in this field including phylogenetic reach, intraspecies pervasiveness, stability, fidelity, and attentional funnelling in social learning. Can the authors’ approach accommodate these?

We support the goal to integrate models of culture and cognition. However, we are not convinced that the free energy principle and Thinking Through Other Minds will be useful in achieving it. There are long traditions of modeling both cultural evolution and cognition. Demonstrating that FEP or TTOM can integrate these models will require a bit more math.

The target article “Thinking Through Other Minds” (TTOM) offered an account of the distinctively human capacity to acquire cultural knowledge, norms, and practices. To this end, we leveraged recent ideas from theoretical neurobiology to understand the human mind in social and cultural contexts. Our aim was both synthetic – building an integrative model adequate to account for key features of cultural learning and adaptation; and prescriptive – showing how the tools developed to explain brain dynamics can be applied to the emergence of social and cultural ecologies of mind. In this reply to commentators, we address key issues, including: (1) refining the concept of culture to show how TTOM and the free-energy principle (FEP) can capture essential elements of human adaptation and functioning; (2) addressing cognition as an embodied, enactive, affective process involving cultural affordances; (3) clarifying the significance of the FEP formalism related to entropy minimization, Bayesian inference, Markov blankets, and enactivist views; (4) developing empirical tests and applications of the TTOM model; (5) incorporating cultural diversity and context at the level of intra-cultural variation, individual differences, and the transition to digital niches; and (6) considering some implications for psychiatry. The commentators’ critiques and suggestions point to useful refinements and applications of the model. In ongoing collaborations, we are exploring how to augment the theory with affective valence, take into account individual differences and historicity, and apply the model to specific domains including epistemic bias.