The positions Ross & Spurrett (R&S) take on issues of information, causality, functionalism, and emergence are actually implicit in the theory and practice of statistical physics, specifically in the way it relates macroscopic collective coordinates to microscopic physics. The reasons for taking macroscopic physical variables like temperature or magnetization to be real apply equally to mental properties like pain.

Several lines of evidence indicate that the on-line control of rapid target-aiming movements can be influenced by the visual context in which the movements are performed. Although this may result in movement error when an illusory context is introduced, there are many situations in which the control system must know about context in order to get the limb to the target rapidly and safely.

In arguing for religion as a side effect of everyday cognition, Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) provide useful analyses of the strengths of the “naturalness-of-religion” position over others; however, experimental shortcomings limit the contributions of their empirical work. A relevant addendum involves considering research on children's orientation to teleological explanations of natural phenomena, which suggests that relatively rich cognitive proclivities might underlie religious thought.

Pickering & Garrod (P&G) argue that language processing in dialogue is in principle easier than in monologue. Although dialogue situations may provide more opportunities for facilitative priming, those priming mechanisms are also available in monologue situations. In both cases, the interactive alignment model calls strict modular accounts of language processing into serious question.

We welcome Soltis' use of evolutionary signaling theory, but question his interpretations of colic as a signal of vigor and his explanation of abnormal high-pitched crying as a signal of poor infant quality. Instead, we suggest that these phenomena may be suboptimal by-products of a generally adaptive learning process by which infants adjust their crying levels in relation to parental responsiveness.

In the study of judgmental errors, surprisingly little thought is spent on what constitutes good and bad judgment. I call this simultaneous focus on errors and lack of analysis of what constitutes an error, the irrationality paradox. I illustrate the paradox by a dozen apparent fallacies; each can be logically deduced from the environmental structure and an unbiased mind.

The relation between micro-objects and macro-objects advocated by Kim is even more problematic than Ross & Spurrett (R&S) argue, for reasons rooted in physics. R&S's own ontological proposals are much more satisfactory from a physicist's viewpoint but may still be problematic. A satisfactory theory of macroscopic ontology must be as independent as possible of the details of microscopic physics.

Atran & Norenzyan (A&N) claim that an appreciation of the evolved inferential machinery underlying supernatural beliefs can greatly aid us in understanding regularities in culturally shared conceptions of religion. I explore how their model provides insight into why culturally shared tales of horror (e.g., horror movies) often combine religious and predatory content.

Colic may allow infants to obtain additional investment from their parents. The lack of clear fitness costs of colic and of differences in condition between colicky and non-colicky infants is inconsistent with the hypotheses that colic is an honest signal of need or vigor. These and other characteristics of colic, however, are consistent with the hypothesis that colic is a manipulative signal.

Pickering & Garrod (P&G) deserve appreciation for their cogent argument that dialogue merits greater scientific consideration. Current models make little contact with behaviors of dialogue, motivating the interactive alignment theory. However, the theory is not truly “mechanistic.” A full account requires both representations and processes bringing those representations into harmony. We suggest that Grossberg's (1980) adaptive resonance theory may naturally conform to the principles of dialogue.

Glover's planning–control model is based on his finding that visual illusions exert a larger effect in early phases than in late phases of a movement. But evidence for this dynamic illusion effect is weak, because: (a) it appears difficult to replicate; (b) Glover overestimates the accuracy of his results; and (c) he seems to underestimate the illusion effect at late phases.

Several of Krueger & Funder's (K&F's) suggestions may promote more balanced social cognition research, but reconsidered null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) is not one of them. Although NHST has primarily supported negative conclusions, this is simply because most conclusions have been negative. NHST can support positive, negative, and even balanced conclusions. Better NHST practices would benefit psychology, but would not alter the balance between positive and negative approaches.

Our response amplifies our case for scientific realism and the unity of science and clarifies our commitments to scientific unity, nonreductionism, behaviorism, and our rejection of talk of “emergence.” We acknowledge support from commentators for our view of physics and, responding to pressure and suggestions from commentators, deny the generality supervenience and explain what this involves. We close by reflecting on the relationship between philosophy and science.

We address three issues that might be important in evaluating the validity of the planning–control model: (1) It could be artificial to distinguish between control and planning when control involves the re-planning of a new corrective submovement that overlaps with the initial response; (2) experiments involving illusions are not totally compelling; (3) selectively implicating the superior parietal lobe in movement control and the basal ganglia in movement planning, appears questionable.

An imbalance is identified in social psychology between controlled experimental studies (which are common) and real-world, ecologically valid studies (which are rare). The preponderance of experimental studies (which provide mere existence proofs and lack realism) helps fuel social psychology's fault-finding focus. Laboratory experiments and ecological studies should be pursued jointly to examine social life in the real world.

The interactive alignment model treats within- and between-individual co-ordination as essentially equivalent. It is argued that this leads to a conservative account of alignment that presupposes high levels of linguistic and conceptual co-ordination. Data from the maze task are used to argue that this approach is not sufficient to account for important co-ordination phenomena.

Our focus has been on the role of early cry as a commanding source of information about infant pain and distress that requires interpretation by an adult caregiver. Its inherent ambiguity may offer an adaptive advantage, as resolution requires adult presence and scrutiny of other behavioral, physical, and contextual factors.

Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) are correct that religion is an evolutionary by-product, not an adaptation, but they do not go far enough. Once supernatural beliefs are enabled by processes they describe, numerous social-cognitive mechanisms related to attachment, social exchange, coalitional psychology, status and dominance, and kinship are crucial for explaining the specific forms religion takes and individual and cultural differences therein.

Krueger & Funder (K&F) overstate the defects of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST), and with it the magnitude of negativity bias within social psychology. We argue that replication matters more than NHST, that the pitfalls of NHST are not always or necessarily realized, and that not all biases are harmless offshoots of adaptive mental abilities.

Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) rightly criticize cognitive theories for failure to explain sacrifice and commitment. But their attempt to reconcile cognitivism with commitment theory is unconvincing. Why should imaginary entities be effective in punishing moral defectors? Heavy costs are entailed in enforcing community-wide social contracts, and behavioural ecology is needed to explain how and why evolving humans could afford these costs.