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Vigor and aspiration levels in neuroeconomics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2021

Antonio Mastrogiorgio Open the ORCID record for Antonio Mastrogiorgio [Opens in a new window]
Antonio Mastrogiorgio*
Affiliation:
Laboratory for the Analysis of Complex Economic Systems (AXES), IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca (Italy), Scuola IMT Alti Studi Lucca, 55100, Lucca, Lu, Italy. a.mastrogiorgio@imtlucca.it; www.imtlucca.it
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Abstract

In this contribution, we criticize the demanding assumption of vigor that economic agents are maximizers. We discuss the link between vigor and subjective value through the alternative notion of aspiration levels, arguing that vigor can help articulate the ecological balance – central in bounded and ecological rationality – between minimum expected reward (aspiration level) and the efforts made for its attainment.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e129
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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