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Third parties belief in a just world and secondary victimization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2012

Farzaneh Pahlavan*
Affiliation:
Laboratoire de Psychologie des Menaces sociales et environnementales, EA 4471, Institut de Psychologie, UniversitéParis Descartes, 92774 Boulogne-Billancourt Cedex, France. farzaneh.pahlavan@parisdescartes.fr

Abstract

This commentary focuses on how third parties impact the course of acts of revenge based on their world views, such as belief in a just world. Assuming this belief to be true, the following questions could be asked: (a) What are the consequences of a third party's worldview in terms of secondary victimization? (b) Are bystanders actually aware of these consequences? (c) If so, then why do they let it happens?

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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