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There are no beautiful surfaces without a terrible depth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2023

Joshua M. Tybur Open the ORCID record for Joshua M. Tybur [Opens in a new window]  and
Debra Lieberman Open the ORCID record for Debra Lieberman [Opens in a new window]
Joshua M. Tybur
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands j.m.tybur@vu.nl; http://www.joshtybur.com/
Debra Lieberman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA debra@miami.edu; https://people.miami.edu/profile/debra@miami.edu
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Abstract

Fitouchi et al. persuasively argue against popular disgust-based accounts of puritanical morality. However, they do not consider alternative account of moral condemnation that is also based on the psychology of disgust. We argue that these other disgust-based accounts are more promising than those dismissed in the target article.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e318
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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