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Sense of fairness: Not by itself a moral sense and not a foundation of a lot of morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2013

Nalini Ramlakhan  and
Andrew Brook
Nalini Ramlakhan
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Carleton University, Ottawa K1S 5B6, Canada. nalinielisa.r@gmail.comandrew_brook@carleton.cawww.carleton.ca/~abrook
Andrew Brook
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Carleton University, Ottawa K1S 5B6, Canada. nalinielisa.r@gmail.comandrew_brook@carleton.cawww.carleton.ca/~abrook
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Abstract

Baumard et al. make a good case that a sense of fairness evolved and that showing this requires reciprocity games with choice of partner. However, they oversimplify both morality and the evolution of morality. Where fairness is involved in morality, other things are, too, and fairness is often not involved. In the evolution of morality, other things played a role. Plus, the motive for being fair originally was self-interest, not anything moral.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , February 2013 , pp. 96 - 97
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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References

Nichols, S. (2004) Sentimental rules: On the natural foundations of moral judgment. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rawls, J. (1971) A theory of justice. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar