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Proxies, heuristics, and goal alignment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 May 2024

Bruce D. Burns Open the ORCID record for Bruce D. Burns [Opens in a new window]
Bruce D. Burns*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia http://sydney.edu.au/science/people/bruce.burns.php
*
Corresponding author: Bruce D. Burns; Email: bruce.burns@sydney.edu.au
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Abstract

Decision-making heuristics rely on proxies so the elements of heuristics appear to map well to the elements of proxies identified by John et al. However, unlike proxy failure, heuristics do not fail because of feedback. This may be because for successful heuristics the goals of regulators and agents are aligned, but this is not the case for proxy failure.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e71
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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