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Interpreting neuroscience and explaining the mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Ian Gold
Affiliation:
Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australiaiangold@coombs.anu.edu.au www.coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/People/IanGold.html Department of Ophthalmology, Royal Victoria Hospital, Room H414, 687 avenue des Pins ouest, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 1A1 ian@vision.mcgill.ca
Daniel Stoljar
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309 stoljar@colorado.edu Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australiadstoljar@coombs.anu.edu.au www.coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/People/Stoljar.html

Abstract

Although a wide variety of questions were raised about different aspects of the target article, most of them fall into one of five categories each of which deals with a general question. These questions are (1) Is the radical neuron doctrine really radical? (2) Is the trivial neuron doctrine really trivial? (3) Were we sufficiently critical of the radical neuron doctrine? (4) Is there a distinction to be drawn at all between the two doctrines? and (5) How does our argument bear on related issues in the ontology of mind? Our replies to the objections and observations presented are organized around these five questions.

Type
Authors' Response
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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