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Converging evidence supports fuzzy-trace theory's nested sets hypothesis, but not the frequency hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Valerie F. Reyna  and
Britain Mills
Valerie F. Reyna
Affiliation:
Departments of Human Development, Psychology, and Cognitive Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853
Britain Mills
Affiliation:
Department of Human Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. vr53@cornell.edubam64@cornell.eduhttp://www.human.cornell.edu/che/HD/reyna/index.cfm
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Abstract

Evidence favors the nested sets hypothesis, introduced by fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) in the 1990s to explain “class-inclusion” effects and extended to many tasks, including conjunction fallacy, syllogistic reasoning, and base-rate effects (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna 1990; Reyna 1991; 2004; Reyna & Adam 2003; Reyna & Brainerd 1995). Crucial differences in mechanisms distinguish the FTT and Barbey & Sloman (B&S) accounts, but both contrast with frequency predictions (see Reyna & Brainerd, in press).

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 278 - 280
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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