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Concepts are not beliefs, but having concepts is having beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Fei Xu ,
Joshua B. Tenenbaum  and
Cristina M. Sorrentino
Fei Xu
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 fei@psyche.mit.edujbt@psyche.mit.educristina@psyche.mit.edu
Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 fei@psyche.mit.edujbt@psyche.mit.educristina@psyche.mit.edu
Cristina M. Sorrentino
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 fei@psyche.mit.edujbt@psyche.mit.educristina@psyche.mit.edu
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Abstract

We applaud Millikan's psychologically plausible version of the causal theory of reference. Her proposal offers a significant clarification of the much-debated relation between concepts and beliefs, and suggests positive directions for future empirical studies of conceptual development. However, Millikan's revision of the causal theory may leave us with no generally satisfying account of concept individuation in the mind.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 89
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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