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Sue Ned Block!: Making a better case for P-consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Victor A. F. Lamme
Victor A. F. Lamme
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. The Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, part of the Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), 1105 BA Amsterdam, TheNetherlandsv.a.f.lamme@uva.nlwww.cognitiveneuroscience.nl
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Abstract

Block makes a case for the existence of conscious experience without access. His case would have been much stronger, however, if he had woven fully unconscious processing into the “mesh argument,” and considered arguments that are intrinsic to neuroscience.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 511 - 512
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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