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Self-sacrifice as a social signal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Jean-Louis Dessalles*
Affiliation:
LTCI Telecom ParisTech, Université Paris-Saclay, Paris 75013, France. jean-louis.dessalles@telecom-paritech.frhttp://www.dessalles.fr

Abstract

Self-sacrifice can be modeled as a costly social signal carried to the ultimate extreme. Such signaling may be evolutionarily stable if social status is, in part, inherited.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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References

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