Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-qxdb6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T19:35:46.563Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Beyond mechanism and constructivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2008

Boris Kotchoubey
Affiliation:
Institute of Medical Psychology and Behavioral Neurobiology, University of Tübingen, 72074 Tübingen, Germany. boris.kotchoubey@uni-tuebingen.de

Abstract

Neuroconstructivism is a hybrid of two incompatible philosophical traditions: a radical idealism insisting upon the free activity of the Subject; and a radical materialistic anthropomorphism, which ascribes inherent properties of humans (e.g., the ability to construct) to nonhuman objects or body parts (e.g., the brain). The two traditions can be combined only by obscuring or confusing the basic notions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Anokhin, P. K. (1974) Biology and neurophysiology of the conditioned reflex and its role in adaptive behavior, trans. Dartau, R., Epp, J. & Kirilcuk, V.. Pergamon Press.Google Scholar
Bickhard, M. H. (2005) Consciousness and reflective consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 18(2):205–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Järvilehto, T. (2001) Consciousness “within” or “without”? Review of Modeling Consciousness Across The Disciplines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(4):8993.Google Scholar
Jordan, J. S. (2000) The world in the organism: Living systems are knowledge. Psycholoque 11:113.Google Scholar
Mareschal, D., Johnson, M. H., Sirois, S., Spratling, M., Thomas, M. & Westermann, G. (2007a) Neuroconstructivism, vol. I: How the brain constructs cognition. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maturana, H. R. & Varela, F. J. (1980) Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Navon, D. (1981) The forest revisited: More on global precedence. Psychological Bulletin 43:132.Google Scholar
Thelen, E. & Smith, L. B. (1994) A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action. MIT Press.Google Scholar