We consider the holder of an individual tontine retirement account, with maximum and minimum withdrawal amounts (per year) specified. The tontine account holder initiates the account at age 65 and earns mortality credits while alive, but forfeits all wealth in the account upon death. The holder wants to maximize total withdrawals and minimize expected shortfall at the end of the retirement horizon of 30 years (i.e., it is assumed that the holder survives to age 95). The holder controls the amount withdrawn each year and the fraction of the retirement portfolio invested in stocks and bonds. The optimal controls are determined based on a parametric model fitted to almost a century of market data. The optimal control algorithm is based on dynamic programming and the solution of a partial integro differential equation (PIDE) using Fourier methods. The optimal strategy (based on the parametric model) is tested out of sample using stationary block bootstrap resampling of the historical data. In terms of an expected total withdrawal, expected shortfall (EW-ES) efficient frontier, the tontine overlay dramatically outperforms an optimal strategy (without the tontine overlay), which in turn outperforms a constant weight strategy with withdrawals based on the ubiquitous four per cent rule.

We focus on modelling categorical features and improving predictive power of neural networks with mixed categorical and numerical features in supervised learning tasks. The goal of this paper is to challenge the current dominant approach in actuarial data science with a new architecture of a neural network and a new training algorithm. The key proposal is to use a joint embedding for all categorical features, instead of separate entity embeddings, to determine the numerical representation of the categorical features which is fed, together with all other numerical features, into hidden layers of a neural network with a target response. In addition, we postulate that we should initialize the numerical representation of the categorical features and other parameters of the hidden layers of the neural network with parameters trained with (denoising) autoencoders in unsupervised learning tasks, instead of using random initialization of parameters. Since autoencoders for categorical data play an important role in this research, they are investigated in more depth in the paper. We illustrate our ideas with experiments on a real data set with claim numbers, and we demonstrate that we can achieve a higher predictive power of the network.

We consider the following question: given information on individual policyholder characteristics, how can we ensure that insurance prices do not discriminate with respect to protected characteristics, such as gender? We address the issues of direct and indirect discrimination, the latter resulting from implicit learning of protected characteristics from nonprotected ones. We provide rigorous mathematical definitions for direct and indirect discrimination, and we introduce a simple formula for discrimination-free pricing, that avoids both direct and indirect discrimination. Our formula works in any statistical model. We demonstrate its application on a health insurance example, using a state-of-the-art generalized linear model and a neural network regression model. An important conclusion is that discrimination-free pricing in general requires collection of policyholders’ discriminatory characteristics, posing potential challenges in relation to policyholder’s privacy concerns.

We investigate the feasibility of cyber risk transfer through insurance-linked securities (ILS). On the investor side, we elicit the preferred characteristics of cyber ILS and the corresponding return expectations. We then estimate the cost of equity of insurers and compare it to the Rate on Line expected by investors to match demand and supply in the cyber ILS market. Our results show that cyber ILS will work for both cedents and investors if the cyber risk is sufficiently well understood. Thus, challenges related to cyber risk modeling need to be overcome before a meaningful cyber ILS market may emerge.

Longevity risk is putting more and more financial pressure on governments and pension plans worldwide due to pensioners’ increasing trend of life expectancy and the growing numbers of people reaching retirement age. Lee and Carter (1992, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 87(419), 659–671.) applied a one-factor dynamic factor model to forecast the trend of mortality improvement, and the model has since become the field’s workhorse. It is, however, well known that their model is subject to the limitation of overlooking cross-dependence between different age groups. We introduce Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) models to the mortality modelling literature. The model, obtained by adding an unobserved factor process to a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) process, nests VAR and Lee–Carter models as special cases and inherits both frameworks’ advantages. A Bayesian estimation approach, adapted from the Minnesota prior, is proposed. The empirical application to the US and French mortality data demonstrates our proposed method’s efficacy in both in-sample and out-of-sample performance.

We study a distributionally robust reinsurance problem with the risk measure being an expectile and under expected value premium principle. The mean and variance of the ground-up loss are known, but the loss distribution is otherwise unspecified. A minimax problem is formulated with its inner problem being a maximization problem over all distributions with known mean and variance. We show that the inner problem is equivalent to maximizing the problem over three-point distributions, reducing the infinite-dimensional optimization problem to a finite-dimensional optimization problem. The finite-dimensional optimization problem can be solved numerically. Numerical examples are given to study the impacts of the parameters involved.

The ratemaking process is a key issue in insurance pricing. It consists in pooling together policyholders with similar risk profiles into rating classes and assigning the same premium for policyholders in the same class. In actuarial practice, rating systems are typically not based on all risk factors but rather only some of factors are selected to construct the rating classes. The objective of this study is to investigate the selection of risk factors in order to construct rating classes that exhibit maximum internal homogeneity. For this selection, we adopt the Shapley effects from global sensitivity analysis. While these sensitivity indices are used for model interpretability, we apply them to construct rating classes. We provide a new strategy to estimate them, and we connect them to the intra-class variability and heterogeneity of the rating classes. To verify the appropriateness of our procedure, we introduce a measure of heterogeneity specifically designed to compare rating systems with a different number of classes. Using a well-known car insurance dataset, we show that the rating system constructed with the Shapley effects is the one minimizing this heterogeneity measure.

We study the optimal investment-reinsurance problem in the context of equity-linked insurance products. Such products often have a capital guarantee, which can motivate insurers to purchase reinsurance. Since a reinsurance contract implies an interaction between the insurer and the reinsurer, we model the optimization problem as a Stackelberg game. The reinsurer is the leader in the game and maximizes its expected utility by selecting its optimal investment strategy and a safety loading in the reinsurance contract it offers to the insurer. The reinsurer can assess how the insurer will rationally react on each action of the reinsurer. The insurance company is the follower and maximizes its expected utility by choosing its investment strategy and the amount of reinsurance the company purchases at the price offered by the reinsurer. In this game, we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for general utility functions. For power utility functions, we calculate the equilibrium explicitly and find that the reinsurer selects the largest reinsurance premium such that the insurer may still buy the maximal amount of reinsurance. Since in the equilibrium the insurer is indifferent in the amount of reinsurance, in practice, the reinsurer should consider charging a smaller reinsurance premium than the equilibrium one. Therefore, we propose several criteria for choosing such a discount rate and investigate its wealth-equivalent impact on the expected utility of each party.