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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 December 2015
The United Mexican States are the advance sentinels of Latin America and guard their northern frontier, the plow in one hand and the rifle in the other.
Mexican diplomat José Manuel Gutiérrez Zamora, 1909
Mexico has long been the principal rival of the United States in Central America. Throughout the past century, the country has, to the measure of its ability, steadfastly resisted U.S. interference in the area. Because of Mexico's geographical location and its experience with U.S. intervention, the strengthening of nationalist forces in Central America has always been a subject of paramount importance for any Mexican regime. Both before and after the Revolution of 1910, Mexico frequently resorted to intervention of its own in attempts to create or maintain a counterweight to U.S. influence. The country has pursued its goals mainly by providing encouragement, diplomatic protection, money, and sometimes arms to Central American governments and factions that have portrayed themselves as opponents of U.S. hegemony.
1 Quoted in Philip Brown to Secretary, Tegucigalpa, Jan. 12, 1910, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as DS], Numerical File 6775/720 [hereafter cited as NF],
2 There is a large body of literature discussing and comparing these cases. For the 1917 case, see Richmond, Douglas W., Venustiano Carranza’s Nationalist Struggle, 1893–1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 211–17.Google Scholar For Mexican intervention on behalf of Sacasa, see my essay “Calles y el movimiento liberal en Nicaragua,” Boletín, 9 (Mexico City: Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco E. Calles y Femando Torreblanca, 1992); and Salisbury, Richard V., Anti-Imperialism and International Competition in Central America, 1920–1929 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1989),Google Scholar esp. chap. 5.
For Mexico’s attempts at staving off U.S. intervention in the early 1980s, see Bagley, Bruce M., “Mexico in Central America: The Limits of Regional Power,” in Grabendorff, Wolf, Krumwiede, Heinrich-W., and Todt, Jörg, eds., Political Change in Central America: Internal and External Dimensions (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 261–84;Google Scholar Zúñiga, René Herrera and Ojeda, Mario, “La Política de Mexico en la región de Centroamérica,” Foro Internacional, 23:4 (April 1983), 423–40Google Scholar; Fagen, Richard R. and De Brody, Olga Pellicer, eds., The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the United States and Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), pp. 119–60Google Scholar; and Ojeda, Mario, ed., Las relaciones de México con los países de América Central (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1985).Google Scholar
For comparative approaches reviewing the existing literature, see Mares, David, “Mexico’s Foreign Policy as a Middle Power: The Nicaragua Connection, 1884–1986,” Latin American Research Review (Fall 1988);Google Scholar and Campbell, Hugh G., “Mexico: The Continuity of Policy,” in Central America/ Historical Perspectives on the Contemporary Crises, Woodward, Ralph L., ed. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 219–40.Google Scholar
3 As examples of works that portray Mexico’s Revolutionary foreign policy as a sharp break with the past, see Smith, Robert F., The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916–1932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972);Google Scholar and Richmond, Venustiano Carranza. This viewpoint is also the official position of Mexico’s ruling party, the PRI. Insofar as “revisionist” views have been propounded, they have usually sought to qualify the notion that the Revolution fundamentally altered foreign policy concepts. See, for instance, Córdova, Arnaldo, La ideología de la Revolución mexicana (Mexico City: Ediciones ERA, 1973).Google Scholar Apart from the ongoing project of which a part is presented in this paper, there is to date no empirical study of the continuities and discontinuities in Mexico’s Central American policy before and after the Revolution.
4 Researchers who have attempted to understand Díaz’s actions in Central America have generally overemphasized the events surrounding Zelaya’s fall rather than studying the alliance with Mexico as it evolved over many years. Villegas, Daniel Cosío, Historia Moderna de México: El Porfiriato. Vida Política Exterior: Primera Parte (Mexico City: Editorial Hermes, 1960), pp. 692–732 Google Scholar; and Scholes, Walter V. and Scholes, Marie V., The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966), pp. 52–57.Google Scholar
5 Campbell, , “Mexico and Central America,” p. 229;Google Scholar Bender, Lynn D., “Contained Nationalism: The Mexican Foreign-Policy Example,” RevistalReview Interamericana, 5:1 (Spring 1975), 3.Google Scholar
6 See Karnes, Thomas L., The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824–1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 126–74.Google Scholar
7 Villegas, Cosío, Vida Política Exterior: Primera Parte, passim; Luis Zorrilla, Relaciones de México con la República de Centro América y con Guatemala (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1984).Google Scholar
8 Katz, Friedrich, “The Liberal Republic and the Porfiriato, c. 1867–1910,” in Mexico Since Independence, ed., Bethell, Leslie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 68.Google Scholar
9 Turner, Frederick C., The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), p. 22.Google Scholar
10 See also Deger, Robert J., “Porfirian Foreign Policy and Mexican Nationalism: A Study of Cooperation and Conflict in Mexican-American Relations, 1884–1904” (Ph.D. diss., University of Indiana, 1979).Google Scholar
11 See the epigraph to this essay which is representative of the sentiments of many Porfirian diplomats. For a framework which similarly distinguishes among various “types” of nationalism, see Knight, Alan, U.S.-Mexican Relations, 1910–1940: An Interpretation (San Diego: University of California, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1987), pp. 27–29 and passim.Google Scholar
12 For a good portrait of the Zelaya Regime, see Stansifer, Charles L., “José Santos Zelaya: A New Look at Nicaragua’s Liberal Dictator,”.RevistalReview Interamericana, 7:3 (Fall 1977), 468–85.Google Scholar
13 Gamboa to Secretary of State, Managua, Feb. 19, 1900, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City [hereafter cited as AHSRE], 6–13–107.
14 Merry to Hay, San José, Jan. 25, 1902, DS, Diplomatic Despatches, Costa Rica and Nicaragua.
15 Memorandum of a meeting of the Mexican delegates to the conference by Genaro Raigosa, Mexico, July 1, 1901, AHSRE, L-E145-A, pp. 19–21.
16 The United States and Mexico both recognized the validity of the Corinto accords and the court of arbitration established in it. See Woodward, Ralph L., Central America: A Nation Divided (2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 191.Google Scholar
17 Findling, John E., “The United States and Zelaya: A Study in the Diplomacy of Expediency” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1971), p. 106.Google Scholar
18 Schoonover, Thomas, The United States in Central America, 1860–1911: Episodes of Social Imperialism and Imperial Rivalry in the World System (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 136–37, 151–52.Google Scholar
19 Findling, “The United States and Zelaya,” p. 191.
20 As late as 1913 these investments exceeded those of the United States. See Schoonover, , The United States in Central America, pp. 137–38.Google Scholar
21 Zelaya to Díaz, Managua, May 7, 1903 and March 15, 1904, Colección General Porfirio Díaz, Universidad Ibero-Americana, Mexico City [hereafter cited as CPD], 28:24/9370 and 29:14/529091. Díaz often scribbled his answers or notes on the letters he received.
22 Creel to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Dec. 25, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1015, pp. 84–87.
23 To justify North American intervention in the Caribbean, Roosevelt claimed that the United States might need to intervene in the internal affairs of the Central American states in order to forestall European intervention.
24 Munro, Dana G., Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 145;Google Scholar Thompson to Secretary of State, June 5, 7, and 8, 1906, DS, Diplomatic Despatches, Mexico.
25 Bacon to Thompson, Washington, D.C., July 17, 1906, CPD 31:21/8328–29; and Thompson to Díaz, Mexico City, July 17, 1906, CPD 31:21/8332–39.
26 Gamboa to Secretary of State, Guatemala, July 27, 1906, AHSRE, L-E-1391, pp. 62–65.
27 Merry to Secretary of State, San José, Jan. 10, 1907, DS, NF 3691/16; Chargé d’Affaires Bailey to Secretary of State, San José, Jan. 9, 1907, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter cited as FRUS], I (1907), p. 606.
28 Ordoñez to Zelaya, Tegucigalpa, Jan. 5, 1907; Zelaya to Ordoñez, Managua, Jan. 5, 1907; Bonilla to Zelaya, Tegucigalpa, Jan. 5, 1907; and Zelaya to Bonilla, Managua, Jan. 9, 1907, FRUS, I (1907), pp. 609–12.
29 Zelaya to Roosevelt, Managua, Feb. 12–13, 1907, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Documents housed in the Library of Congress will hereafter be referenced as LCMSS with the name of the collection. For the Nicaraguan view of the crisis, see Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Documentos oficiales referentes á la guerra entre Nicaragua y Honduras y ala participación de El Salvador como aliado de la última (Managua, n.p., 1907).
30 Memorandum of conversation, Enrique C. Creel, Washington, D.C., Feb. 6, 1907, AHSRE, Archivo de la Embajada de México en Washington [hereafter cited as AEMW], CXC, pp. 383–84; Root to Thompson, Washington, D.C., Feb. 2, 1907, and Thompson to Secretary of State, Mexico City, Feb. 12, 1907, DS, NF 3691/25A and unnumbered; Díaz to Mariscal, Mexico City, Feb. 7, 1907, CPD 32:4/1301–02.
31 Thompson to Roosevelt, Mexico, March 7, 1907, LCMSS, Roosevelt Papers.
32 FRUS, I (1907), p. 616.
33 Schoonover, , The United States in Central America, p. 152.Google Scholar
34 Fenton McCreery to Secretary of State, Mexico City, Feb. 13, 1907, DS, NF 3691/51; Zelaya to Díaz, Managua, March 7 and 9, 1907, and Díaz to Zelaya, Mexico City, March 9, AHSRE, L-E-1392-II, pp. 3–9; Telésforo García to Díaz, Madrid, April 3, 1907, Díaz to García, Mexico City, April 22, 1907, CPD 32:11/4386–88.
35 Munro, , Dollar Diplomacy, p. 149.Google Scholar
36 Zelaya to Díaz, Managua, May 25, 1907, Díaz to Zelaya, Mexico City, July 12, 1907, CPD 32:20/7822–23.
37 Creel to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1907, AHSRE, AEMW, CXC, pp. 457–58; Merry to Root, San José, July 20, 1907, DS, NF 6775/42.
38 Wangenheim to Blow, Mexico City, June 14 and 20, 1907, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Abteilung IA, Bonn, Germany [hereafter cited as AAB], R 16348; Sánchez to Mariscal, Managua, Aug. 28, 1907, Mariscal to Sánchez, Mexico City, Sept. 2, 1907, AHSRE, L-E-1394, pp. 101–07.
39 For a detailed report on Mexico’s role in the Washington Conventions, see Creel to Díaz, Washington, D.C., Dec. 17, 1907, CPD 32:39/15383.
40 Ibid.
41 Frederick Ryder to Assistant Secretary of State, San Juan del Norte, Nicaragua, Jan. 25, 1908, DS, NF 6775/304.
42 Findling, “The United States and Zelaya,” pp. 182–91.
43 The fact that Knox’s own law firm represented a mining company that had claims against the Nicaraguan government explains further why the Secretary of State desired Zelaya’s overthrow from the very outset of his term. Bermann, Karl, Under the Big Stick: Nicaragua and the United States Since 1848 (New York, 1983), p. 143.Google Scholar
44 Knox, Memoranda, March 12 and 13, 1909, Heimké to Secretary of State, Guatemala, March 17, 1909, DS, NF 18432/22, 23, and 61.
45 Knox to de la Barra, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1909, AHSRE, AEMW, CXCI, pp. 685–86.
46 De la Barra to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., March 20, 1909, ibid., pp. 680–81; Thompson to Secretary of State, Mexico, April 26, 1909, DS, NF 18432/24.
47 El Imparcial, April 1, 1909.
48 Mariscal to de la Barra, Mexico City, de la Barra to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., April 2 and 12, 1909, AHSRE, AEMW, CXCI, pp. 703, 710–14.
49 Knox, Memorandum, April 17, 1909, LCMSS, Knox Papers, box 27, fol. 7.
50 C.B.J. Moore to Secretary of the Navy, Amapala, Honduras, April 24, 1909, Thompson to Mariscal, Mexico City, May 2, 1909, DS, NF 18432/127 and 129.
51 Thompson to Knox, Mexico City, April 15, 1909, LCMSS, Knox Papers, box 7, fol. 27.
52 Mariscal to de Alvarez, México, April 21, 1909, AHSRE, AEMW, CXCI, pp. 753–54.
53 Memorandum, July 26, 1909, LCMSS, Knox Papers, VII, pp. 1125–27.
54 Carbajal to Díaz, San José, July 10, 1909, CPD 34:28/13767; W.S. Benson to Secretary of the Navy, U.S.S. Albany, Corinto, June 21, 1909, DS, NF 6369/128.
55 Zelaya to Díaz, Managua, June 28, 1909, CPD 34:25/12353–54.
56 Díaz to Zelaya, Mexico City, March 31 and June 11, 1909, CPD 34:22/10650 and 34:42/20815.
57 See the correspondence in DS, NF 22372.
58 For Zelaya’s own account of the executions and the U.S. role in the rebellion, see Zelaya, José S., La Revolución de Nicaragua y los Estados Unidos (Madrid: Imprenta de Bernardo Rodríguez, 1910).Google Scholar
59 Knox to Rodríguez, Washington, D.C., Nov. 18, 1909, DS, NF 22372/1.
60 Chaparro to Díaz, Managua, Nov. 22, 1909, AHSRE L-E-1013, p. 24; Zelaya to Díaz, Managua, Nov. 22, 1909, printed in Zelaya, La Revolución de Nicaragua, pp. 109–10; Mariscal to de la Barra, Mexico City, Nov. 24, 1909, AHSRE, AEMW, CXCIII, pp. 143–46.
61 Accord of Díaz Cabinet, Mexico City, Nov. 1909, Díaz to Chaparro, Nov. 25, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1013, pp. 54, 89.
62 Mariscal to Carbajal, Mexico City, Dec. 6, 1909, Carbajal to Secretary of State, Managua, Dec. 7, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1013, pp. 106, 109, and 127.
63 Carbajal to Secretary of State, Managua, Dec. 12 and 22, 1909, ibid., p. 144; and AHSRE, L-E-1015, pp. 111–29.
64 Díaz to Taft, Mexico City, Nov. 24/25, 1909, Taft to Díaz, Washington, D.C., Nov. 29, 1909, memorandum by the Mexican Chargé d’Affaires, Nov. 29, 1909, DS, NF 6369/323, 320, and 326; Dávalos to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Nov. 25, 1909, AHSRE, AEMW, CXCIII, pp. 143–46.
65 Díaz to Creel, Mexico City, Nov. 25, 1909, ibid., p. 57.
66 Taft to Díaz, Washington, D.C., Nov. 29, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1013, pp. 67–68.
67 Huntington Wilson to Adee, Washington, D.C., Nov. 26, 1909, DS, NF 6369/334. Draft of note to the Mexican Chargé d’Affaires, Doyle, n.d., DS, NF 6369/359a.
68 Knox to Rodríguez, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 1909, DS, NF 6369/346. Even before the note, the Mexican Chargé d’Affaires in Washington had reported growing uneasiness among the Central American ministers there regarding Knox’s unusual and discourteous tone when dealing with isthmian representatives. Dávalos to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Nov. 24, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1014, pp. 66–68.
69 For that eventuality, Mariscal instructed Creel to suspend the negotiations in Washington and to state publicly that the United States acted alone in the isthmus. Mariscal to Creel, Mexico City, Dec. 17, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1014, p. 55.
70 The Mexican Herald, Dec. 3, 1909. As Undersecretary Federico Gamboa told an official of the German legation in Mexico City, Mariscal was deeply offended about Knox’s unilateral step. Richthofen to Bethmann-Hollweg, Mexico City, Dec. 9, 1909, A AB, R 16928.
71 Merry to Secretary of State, San José, Nov. 27, 1909, and Moffat to Secretary of State, Bluefields, Dec. 12, 1909, DS, NF 6369/378 and 411.
72 The Mexican Herald, Nov. 14, 23, and 30, Dec. 18, 1909; El Diario del Hogar, Dec. 3 and 14, 1909; El Tiempo, Dec. 14 and 16, 1909.
73 Knox, Memoranda, Dec. 14, 1909 and n.d., DS, NF 6369/400 2/9. In a similar vein, Reagan would later deprecate Mexico’s assumption of leadership in the Contadora initiative.
74 Creel to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Dec. 16, 1909, AHSRE, L-E1015, pp. 181–84.
75 Greigueil to Pichon, Mexico City, Dec. 8, 1909, Archive du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Nouvelle Série [hereafter cited as AMAE], Nicaragua, politique étrangère, II, p. 33.
76 Creel to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Dec. 14, 1909, AHSRE, L-E1015, pp. 162–69; Knox, Memorandum, Dec. 15, 1909, LCMSS, Knox Papers, box 28, fol. 2; Adee to H. Wilson, Dec. 12 and 15, 1909, Adee, Memorandum, n.d., DS, NF 6369/400 2/9.
77 Creel to Root, Washington, D.C., Dec. 20, 1909, LCMSS, Elihu Root Papers, box 59; Creel to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Dec. 17, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1015, pp. 187–89; Doyle, memorandum of conversation between Taft and Creel, Dec. 17, 1909, DS, NF 6369/480.
78 Creel to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Dec. 23, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1015, pp. 10–12. Creel summarizes earlier telegrams.
79 Washington Post, Dec. 14 and 16, 1909. In Creel’s view, the press “tried to bring [our government] into disrepute, presenting Mexico as a barbarian country and its government as on the level of that of Nicaragua.” Creel to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Dec. 24, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1015, pp. 28–29.
80 Creel to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Dec. 18, 19, 20, 22, and 25, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1014, pp. 64, 77, and 83; L-E-1015, pp. 1–7, 89–90, and 190–92; Creel to Díaz, Washington, D.C., Dec. 16, 17, 18, and 21, 1909, CPD 68:9/4423, 4431, 4434, and 4457. For Taft’s initial position on asylum, see Villegas, Cosío, Vida Política Exterior: Primera Parte, p. 722.Google Scholar
81 Díaz to Creel, Mexico City, Dec. 21, 1909, CPD 68:9/4461.
82 Taft to Knox, Washington, D.C., Dec. 21, 1909, DS, NF 6369/400 5/9.
83 Knox to Taft, Washington, D.C., Dec. 21, 1909, ibid.; Creel to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Jan. 12, 1910, AHSRE, L-E-1017, pp. 24–39. Taft then issued a stern reminder of his government’s hard-line stance toward the isthmian leaders: he said “someone ought to have the right to knock their heads together until they should maintain peace between them.” Taft to Knox, Washington, D.C., Dec. 22, 1909, LCMSS, William H. Taft Papers, ser. 5, case 1874. Also see AHSRE, file 15–14–60.
84 Zelaya to Díaz, Salina Cruz, Dec. 27, 1909, CPD 68:9/4499.
85 Bailey to Secretary of State, Mexico City, Jan. 31, 1910, DS, NF 6269/712.
86 El Diario del Hogar, Dec. 28, 1909; El País, Dec. 29, 1909; The Mexican Herald, Dec. 27, 1909.
87 French diplomats, always skeptical of Mexican moves against the United States, concurred with this assessment. See Jusserand to Pichón, Washington, D.C., Dec. 24, 1909 and Jan. 4, 1910, AMAE, Mexique, politique étrangère, XVIII, pp. 148, 150–51; and Lefaivre to Pichón, Mexico City, Jan. 18, 1910, AMAE, Nicaragua, politique étrangère, II, p. 44.
88 Lefaivre to Pichon, Mexico, Jan. 18, 1910, AMAE, Nicaragua, politique étrangère, II, p. 41.
89 Pardo to Secretary of State, Guatemala, Dec. 30, 1909, AHSRE, Archivo de la Embajada Mexicana en Guatemala, box 9, file 1.
90 The New York Times bluntly declared the mission a complete failure. New York Times, Dec. 30, 1909.
91 Heriberto Barrón to Knox, New York, Dec. 13, 1909, LCMSS, Knox Papers, box 28, fol. 1; see also Barrón to Taft, New York, Jan. 22, 1910, DS, NF 6369/710.
92 Huntington Wilson, Memorandum, Washington, D.C., filed April 23, 1910, DS Decimal File [hereafter cited as DF] 813.00/737.
93 Creel, Memorandum for the press, Dec. 30, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1016, p. 58.
94 Carbajal to Secretary of State, Managua, Dec. 19 and 21, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1014, pp. 72, 93.
95 Creel to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Jan. 4, 1910, Carbajal to Secretary of State, Managua, Jan. 12, 1910, Mariscal to Carbajal, Mexico City, Jan. 15, 1910, AHSRE, L-E-1017, pp. 110–11, 122–23; Merry to Secretary of State, San José, Jan. 19, 1910, DS, NF 6369/466; Olivares to Secretary of State, Managua, Jan. 23, 1910, ibid., 6369/687; Moffat to Secretary of State, Bluefields, Dec. 19, 1910, ibid., 6369/723; Merry to Secretary of State, San José, Feb. 12, 1910, DS, DF 817.00/776; Bünz to Bethmann-Hollweg, Mexico City, Feb. 24, 1910, AAB, R 16928.
96 Luis Corea, Memorandum for Huntington Wilson, Jan. 5, 1910, DS, NF 6369/724; Carbajal to Mariscal, Managua, Jan. 31, 1910, AHSRE, L-E-1019, pp. 106–11.
97 Carbajal to Secretary of State, Managua, Jan. 12, 1910, AHSRE, L-E-1016, p. 122; and de la Barra to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1910, ibid., L-E-1018, pp. 6–7.
98 Carbajal to Secretary of State, Managua, May 16, 1910, de la Barra to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., May 12, 1910, AHSRE, L-E-1018, pp. 208 and 228-29; Dávalos to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Jan. 14, 1910, AHSRE, AEMW, CXCIII, pp. 203–04. On Britain’s initiative to assure U.S. recognition of Madriz, see Reid to Secretary of State, London, June 16, 1910, DS, DF 817.00/1037. On Costa Rica’s position, see Domingo Nájera y de Pindter to Secretary of State, San José, Dec. 16, 1909, AHSRE, L-E-1016, p. 66. The German government even considered selling a gunboat to Madriz. See von Buch to Bethmann-Hollweg, Managua, March 23, 1910, A AB, R 16928.
99 Carbajal to Creel, Managua, June 15, 1910, AHSRE, L-E-1020, p. 105. For an alternative view, see Munro, , Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 184–85.Google Scholar Munro maintains that the United States intended to remain neutral.
100 Díaz to Taft, Mexico City, June 16, 1910, Taft to Díaz, June 19, 1910, AHSRE, L-E-1020, pp. 112-13, 116–24; Lefaivre to Pichon, Mexico City, July 12, 1910, AMAE, Nicaragua, Politique étrangère, II, pp. 61–65.
101 Madriz to Díaz, Managua, Aug. 10, 1910, Díaz to Madriz, Mexico City, Aug. 13, 1910, Chaparro to Secretary of State, Managua, Aug. 29, 1910, AHSRE, L-E-1021, pp. 25, 34–35, and 37–45; Creel to Nájera y de Pindter, Mexico City, Aug. 25, 1910, AHSRE, L-E-1022, p. 171.
102 Villegas, Cosío, Vida Política Exterior: Primera Parte, pp. 731–32.Google Scholar
103 See the author’s dissertation “In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico’s Central American Policy, 1898–1930” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1993), chap. 6; and Salisbury, Anti-Imperialism and International Competition, chap. 5.
104 The author will explore this issue in greater depth in a manuscript in preparation. Katz, Friedrich, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 38,Google Scholar argues that U.S. opposition to Díaz may have played a significant role in his fall.