1 The problem of the CPY in this period has been treated by Fred Warner Neal and Alex Dragnich in the American Political Science Review, No. 1 (March, 1957). Professor Neal (“The Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” pp. 88-111) thinks the changes in the CPY significant, but questions “whether the Party can continue indefinitely in this ambiguous position without returning to the position of a dominant Communist Party or without losing its hold on Yugoslav society.” Professor Dragnich argues (“How Different is Tito's Communism?” pp. 112-50) that there have been no real changes in party practices. Although not prepared with this intention, our article may suggest some of the answers to the questions raised in their discussion.

2 A detailed description of the reforms carried out before the Sixth Congress may be found in Professor Neal's article.

3 Reform of higher levels of the party at the Sixth Congress was limited to changes of the organizational chart of no immediate importance. The Politburo became the Executive Committee, and the Secretariat was made responsible to the Executive Committee instead of the Central Committee. The subsidiary organs of the Central Committee as they exist today can be seen in a directive issued by the Central Committee published in Borba June 6, 1958, p. 1.

4 VI Kongres Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije (Savez Komunista Jugoslavije), “Rezolucije VI Kongres KPJ o zadacima i ulozi Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije,” p. 427.

5 A. Ranković, “O predlogu novog statuta KPJ,” Komunist, No. 5-6 (Sept.-Dec, 1952) p. 104.

6 VI Kongres Komunisticke Partije Jugoslavije, op. cit., p. 427. Persuasion was not new, as a slogan, of course, nor was the goal of winning over the masses. See Komunist, No. 2 (March, 1949), p. 117, on how to persuade, and a reference to Stalin on the subject.

7 In the factory, to give an example, one extreme consisted of concerning oneself with organizational problems of the party alone and ignoring the enterprise. The happy medium was (1) mobilizing the party and the workers against anti-socialist occurrences in general, (2) [concern with such problems as] advancing safety and health, (3) raising the level of technical skills of the workers. The other extreme was to interfere directly in the work of the enterprise. Ibid., p. 272. 8 Isa Jovanović, speaking at the Fourth Plenum of March, 1954. Komunist, No. 4 (April, 1954), p. 328.

9 Immediately following the Sixth Congress a number of new reforms were introduced. The post of political commissar in the armed forces was abolished in June, 1953, and his place was taken by an Assistant to the Commander for Political-Educational Affairs. Party schools at the Union and Republic level were closed. The social composition of the party was now measured by the current position of party members, not the post they held when entering the party. This new procedure reduced the number of workers, but gave a truer picture of the non-party status of party members.

10 Komunist, No. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb., 1954), pp. 85-86.

11 Komunist, No. 4 (April, 1954), pp. 279-80.

12 In Slovenia, it was reported that the number in the party apparatus had dropped from 660 in the summer of 1950 to 16 in the summer of 1954; in Macedonia the number of “party workers” fell from 643 in 1949 to 42 in 1953.

13 In Belgrade the greatest shift of party members took place. Figures given in December 1, 1952, indicated that 28,000 or two-thirds of the party members residing in the city were transferred. Scattered accounts from other areas were also reported but do not provide a basis for calculating the over-all numbers affected.

14 Komunist, op. cit., p. 276.

15 At the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee in March, 1956, Rankovic reported that many actives formed in educational and scientific institutions, sports associations, and other cultural organizations had not held a single meeting. He again urged that they be established, but warned that their role was “not to administer the institutions, but insure a common line in the work of Communists and their ideological unity.” At this meeting it was also recommended that party cells be re-introduced in the Union and Republic ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs. See Komunist, No. 3-4 (March-April, 1956), p. 171.

16 They were originally made to correspond in size to the electoral district, or district of the Socialist Alliance. This might give a large city such as Belgrade as many as 200-400 members in a single basic party group. Setting a maximum number of members was suggested as another method. In the end, both these solutions were rejected; the criterion suggested at the Fourth Plenum was “one normal whole.” For criticisms of these or ganizations see Rankovic's remarks at the Fourth Plenum, or Komunist, No. 10 (Oct., 1953), which gives complaints of their functioning made at the October 1953 Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia.

17 The Yugoslavs now speak of “institutions” (ustanova) when describing the area where cells are being re-introduced. This is an ill-defined term which can apply to most organizations outside of industry and the state administration and is roughly equivalent to the “social organizations” and “associations” mentioned earlier. The general principle is that cells are to be formed in institutions partially or wholly supported by funds originating outside the state budget. Banks, public health establishments and theatres are examples of such groups. On the other hand, cells exist in schools and universities, which are entirely state financed. The Seventh Congress gave the total number of cells in institutions as 1,097. Meanwhile, the introduction of cells in institutions does seem to represent a violation of the principles of the Sixth Congress. This has been partly taken care of by a provision in the new statute that basic party organizations can be formed in smaller economic enterprises, in individual establishments and associations with permission of the Central Committee (Article 18).

18 The new statute did not change the rules which determined where actives were to be formed. It did make a distinction between permanent and temporary actives, however; the former have, at times, taken on the form of basic party organizations in everything but name. But their number is probably not large. Meanwhile, actives can only be formed with Republic approval. This provision was added to the draft statute upon the request of the Republic party organizations.

The number of territorial organizations in all of Yugoslavia was revealed for the first time as 3,999 out of a total of 26,809 basic party organizations.

19 For an example of such a meeting, see Komunist, No. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb., 1954), p. 277.

20 See Komunist, No. 7 (July, 1953), p. 474 for a vivid description of what occurred in some party groups during this period. Borba, July 28, gives the example of one organization which, thinking that it was freed of all responsibilities, decided that it would no longer meet and that everything would be settled in the Socialist Alliance. Another basic organization tested its freedom of accepting members into the party by approving an application despite the protests of the district committee. Their decision was later reversed.

21 Komunist, No. 5-6 (Sept.-Dec, 1952), p. 309.

22 For concrete examples of how this problem arose, see M., “Nesto o sastancima u organizacijama Saveza Komunista,” Komunist, No. 10 (Oct., 1953), pp. 741-48.

23 The number of those finally expelled, Rankovid reported at the Fourth Plenum, was 70,000 (or roughly 10% of the party). There were complaints afterwards that many were not expelled because they paid their dues and fulfilled their minimum obligations to the party, although they were otherwise opportunists or careerists. Figures at the Fourth Plenum also showed a greater percentage of workers expelled than officials; Rankovic claimed this showed the greater strictness of the cells in the plants, but specific instances, where for instance out of 360 workers and 70 officials only 3 officials were expelled while 135 workers were removed from the party, indicates that the officials were probably more successful in protecting themselves.

24 “Svim organizacijama Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije,” Komunist, No. 7 (July, 1953), pp. 430-31.

25 See Komunist No. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb., 1954) for the proceedings of the Third Plenum.

26 See Kardelj's speech at the Third Plenum, “O suštini jednog poziva na ideološku borbu,” Komunist, ibid., pp. 21-23. Kardelj argued that there could not be a bureaucratic class without a bureaucratic, i.e., state capitalist, system. Since Yugoslavia did not have the latter, she did not have the former, he claimed.

27 Ibid., pp. 62-64.

28 Ibid., p. 9 and p. 5.

29 Almost all the party leaders at the Third Plenum lamely admitted that they had not bothered to read the Djilas articles.

30 It should always be kept in mind—as we point out below—that a small clique of Communists remains in control of every Yugoslav institution or enterprise. However, they no longer receive regular instructions from the party on how the institution is to be run.

31 Komunist, Feb. 28, 1958, pp. 1-2.

32 For two recent Yugoslav articles on the problems of bureaucracy, see Nasa Stvarnost, No. 5 (May, 1958); Radoslav Ratković, “Suština i Oblici birokratizma,” and No. 7-8 (July-Aug., 1958); Najdan Paštć, “Birokratija i savremeno društvo,” p. 22. They indicate a renewed interest in the problem in Yugoslavia, but do not discuss the possibilities of bureaucracy arising under present-day conditions in Yugoslavia itself.