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Germans in the Ukraine, 1918

Excerpts from Unpublished Letters1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2017

Henry Cord Meyer
Henry Cord Meyer*
Affiliation:
Pomona College
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Extract

Relatively little primary source material has been published about the German occupation of the Ukraine in 1918 and the uncanny political relationship between Berlin and the “independent” Ukraine recognised at Brest-Litovsk. The volume of secret German documents, which appeared as a Soviet publication in 1936, has every indication of authenticity. But since the work was primarily published as a weapon in the Nazi-Soviet propaganda war at a time when Hitler was obviously eyeing the Ukraine, it is apparent that the documents were selected (1) to emphasize particularly German military domination and interference in civilian life, requisitioning of food and raw materials, and commercial rapacity, and (2) to castigate all those Ukrainians who did not resist the Central Powers or who participated in non-Communist activity for Ukrainian independence.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Slavic and East European Review , Volume 9 , Issue 2 , April 1950 , pp. 105 - 115
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies 1950

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Footnotes

1

These nine letters to, or from, Dr. Paul Rohrbach were given to me during an interview with that German publicist at Langenburg-Jagst, Wurttemberg, Germany on August 1, 1948. This article is a by-product of research in Europe during the summer of 1948, on the Mitteleuropa idea in Germany and Austria-Hungary during the First World War. I gratefully acknowledge aid from the Claremont Graduate School, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Pacific Coast Committee for the Humanities (A.C.L.S.).

References

2 I am indebted to Dr. F. T. Epstein of the Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University, for a bibliography (mostly Russian titles) on this topic. The best English accounts are Xenia Eudin, Joukoff, “The German Occupation of the Ukraine in 1918,“ Russian Review, I, No. 1 (November, 1941), 90–105 Google Scholar and Allen, W. E. D., The Ukraine— a History (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 269–300 Google Scholar. See also Bunyan, James and Fisher, H. H., The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1918. Documents and Materials (Stanford University, Calif., 1934)Google Scholar, passim; and Bunyan, James, Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April-December 1918. Documents and Materials (Baltimore, 1936), pp. 1–60.Google Scholar

3 Krakh germanskoj okkupacii na Ukraine (po dokumentam okkupantov) (Moscow, 1936), published in translation as Die deutsche Okkupation der Ukraine: Geheimdokumente (Strasbourg, 1937); as will be indicated below, some of the Rohrbach correspondence has direct relation to items in this work, hereafter referred to as Geheimdokumente.

4 Initially Mumm was stationed in Kiev as representative of the Foreign Ministry at the German military headquarters; after German recognition of the Ukrainian Republic, June 2, 1918, he became ambassador to Kiev.

5 Mumm to Bussche, April 5, 1918, Geheimdokwmente, pp. 42–43. Mumm expressed the hope that such a trip would cure Rohrbach's extremist views in favor of Ukrainian independence!

6 Mumm and Bussche did not distinguish between the various gradations of left-wing political movements and their programs.

7 Note his Russland und Wir (Stuttgart, 1915), and “Ukrainischer Frieden und Auflösung Russlands,” Deutsche Politik, III, Part I (1918), 195–200. His many books and articles on Russian-German relations prior to, and during, the first World War gave the impression in Entente nations that he was extremely influential in the formulation of Germany's Russian policies. For a discussion of his views see my article, “Rohrbach and his Osteuropa,” Russian Review, II, No. 1 (Autumn, 1942), 60–69.

8 Rohrbach's unpublished memoirs, Wie Alles anders kam: Lebenserinnerungen (written 1945–48), typescript pp. 249–50.

9 Rohrbach asked his close friend and fellow journalist, Axel Schmidt, to accompany him; note Schmidt's article, “Die Ukrainischen Parteien,” Deutsche Politik, III, Part 1 (1918), 781–85.

10 Rohrbach reported on his visit in “Ukrainische Eindrücke,” Deutsche Politik, III, Part 1 (1918), 675–80. Among Rohrbach's letters is a copy of the Ukrainian journalist's story in the Kiev Raboဝaja Šizri of May 10, 1918.

11 Rohrbach, Schmidt, and Thiel were all employed at one time in the Press Division of the German Foreign Office; in early 1917 Rohrbach and Schmidt resigned when Schmidt was accused of being pro-Russian.

12 Other editors were Ernst Jackh and Philipp Stein. The periodical had a circulation of about 11,000 and was widely read by members of the German democratic splinter parties and right-of-center groups.

13 Thiel to Rohrbach, June 21, 1918.

14 “Was wir konnten—!,” Deutsche Politik, III, Part 1 (1918), 803–8. Rohrbach was soon informed by a friend in the Foreign Office that the article had delighted Radek and alarmed German diplomats in Moscow, who considered that it was “ ‘grist for the Bolshevik mills and will not be overlooked by the alert Entente propagandists…'.“ Geer to Rohrbach, August 20, 1918.

15 D. I. Dorošenko of the Socialist-Federalist Party. Note his Istorija Ukraini 1917–1923 gg (Užgorod, 1930–32); also Die Ukraine und das Reich. Neun Jahrhunderte deutschukrainischer Beziehungen im Spiegel der deutschen Wissenschaft (Leipzig, 1942).

16 Thiel to Rohrbach, July 26, 1918.

17 Between 1890 and 1914 Thiel served as interpreter and in several consular grades in Kobe, Nagasaki, Yokohama, and Tokyo; Wer Its's (9th ed.; Leipzig, 1928).

18 Such views were also held by some members of Ludendorff's entourage. There exist two controversial documents of Autumn 1918, relating to a proposed German-Japanese division of Russia and China into spheres of influence; I intend to analyse this material in a forthcoming article.

19 This effort is confirmed in the Geheimdokumente, pp. 68, 84. Thiel's sentiments, though naive, were at least more genuine than those of Mumm, who wrote to Berlin about the great importance of maintaining the fiction that Germany was dealing with an independent, friendly state. Ibid., pp. 72–73.

20 Previously (letter of July 26, 1918) Thiel wrote of Igor A. Kistjakovskij as “a pure Pan-Russian with the worst kind of past“; subsequently (letter of December 22, 1918) Thiel characterised the appointment as one of the worst errors the Hetman made. Kistjakovskij is identified as a Kadet by the editors of the Geheimdokumente, p. 241. Note G. Blakitny, Les fautes fatales du gouvernement hetmanien en Ukraine (Constantinople, 1922).

21 Thiel is referring to anti-Ukrainian, Great-Russian influences on Mumm. He might also have mentioned friction with the Austrians; see Gehcimdokumcnte, pp. 34–36, 79–82,134,175–91.

22 Reference here is probably to the same von Lindequist who succeeded Dernburg as State Secretary of Colonies in 1910 and resigned in anger at the meager fruits of the Agadir crisis of 1911. Bussche wrote Mumm, April 30, 1918, that Germany was considering appointing a special minister or commissar to maintain contact with the German settlers of South Russia and to protect their interests. See Gehcimdokumcnte, p. 103. Note Eugen Meller, “Das deutsche Element der Süd-Ukraine…,” Nord und Süd, CLXVI (July 1918), 20–24.

23 Thiel is referring to the decision to conscript the German settlers of military age for service in the German army and is recalling the German recruitment fiasco of November, 1916 in Poland.

24 See note 14 above.

25 Thiel to Rohrbach, August 1, 1918.

26 Lukačevskij was en route to set up the legation in Switzerland.

27 Max Sering desired a clear subordination of the Ukraine to Germany. Note his Westrussland in seiner Bedcutung für die Entwicklung Mitteleuropas (Berlin, 1917).

28 Both men were slated for recall in October, 1918; Thiel referred to them as the “betes noires of the Ukraine.” Gehcimdokumente, pp. 160–62.

29 Rohrbach was also unpopular in other circles, notably in the Pan-German League. His articles in the Deutsche Politik were denounced by Professor Theodor Schiemann as a national danger harming Germany in her most critical hour (Deutsche Politik, III, Part 2, [1918], 1118). H e was also attacked by t h e powerful Vossische Zeitung and others who sought German cooperation with a restored, conservative, united Russia.

30 Either Thiel did not comprehend the scope of Mumm's “honest effort,” or he failed to share all the facts with Rohrbach. Considering the intimacy of this correspondence and t h e finality of the times, the former explanation seems the more probable.

31 V. Vinničenko has left his own record in Vidrodšennija nacii (Kiev, 1920). A. Nikovskij, editor of the Nova Rada, stood close to the Socialist-Federalist Party. Early in November Thiel tried to persuade Senator Margolin to bring Vinničenko and Nokovskij into the Ukrainian government as persons acceptable to the Entente yet not anti-German. See Geheimdokumente, pp. 219–20; also Margolin, Arnold D., From a Political Diary: Russia, the Ukraine, and America, 1905–1945 (New York, 1946), pp. 22–36.Google Scholar

32 A union of Ukrainian political parties opposed to Skoropadskij's regime, formed in July, 1918. Geheimdokumente, p. 235.

33 The Austrians specifically encouraged the Ukrainians in this direction. Geheimdokumente, p. 213.

34 In an effort to please the Entente (mid-November, 1918) Skoropadskij abandoned his independent Ukrainian program, formed a new cabinet of Russian monarchists, and proclaimed the Ukraine an integral part of Russia. Three Ukrainian parties agreed on November 14 to oppose this regime and within a month brought about his resignation and flight to Germany, where he continued to be a center of agitation as late as 1940. Bunyan, op. cit., pp. 29–32; Margolin, op. cit., pp. 33–34; U. S. Dep't. of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941 (Washington, D. C., 1948), p. 145.Google Scholar

35 In contrast to the Germans, the Austrian occupation forces disintegrated rapidly and with violence. Geheimdokumente, pp. 210, 216, 221–27.

36 Simon V. Petljura, leader of the Ukrainian army, 1918–20; also identified with the establishment of a Polish-Ukrainian condominium briefly during 1920; assassinated in Paris in 1926.

37 Ukrainskij sičovi strilcy, a military unit of the Austrian army composed of Galician Ukrainians (Ruthenians). After establishment of the Ukrainian National-Republic the U.s.s. became the nucleus of the Ukrainian national army.

38 The French representative in Odessa, Consul Emile Henno, ordered the German High Command and the Soldiers’ Council to keep order in Kiev, fight the Communists, and maintain the status quo until Entente troops had arrived. Geheimdokumente, pp. 226–27. This Allied desire to remove German influence from Russia and yet not leave a vacuum for bolshevism to occupy led to a particularly awkward situation in the Baltic area. See Zitelmann, F. C., Russland im Friedensvertrag von Versailles… (Berlin, 1920), pp. 95–117.Google Scholar

39 Dmitro Doncov, one of the founders and theoreticians of modern Ukrainian nationalism, participated with Dorošenko in the Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraine, founded in Lvov in August, 1914, under Austrian auspices. H e wrote numerous articles during the war years; note his Die Ukrainische Staatsidee und der Krieg gegen Russland (Berlin, 1915) and Gross-Polen und die Zentralmdchte (Berlin, 1916).

40 Thiel to Rohrbach, November 20, 1918.

41 Thiel to Rohrbach, December 22, 1918.

42 Ludendorff and the militarists were in virtual control of German foreign policy from January, 1917 onwards; Foreign Secretary von Kühlmann's effort to emancipate his nation from that control in June, 1918, resulted in his dismissal. Reflection of this situation on German officials in the Ukraine is seen in Geheimdokumente, pp. 28–29, 50–51, 60–65, 104–106.