¹ On the merits of this question see the present writer's “The Spending Power of Congress—Apropos the Maternity Act,” in 36 Harvard Law Review, 548–582; also the admirable brief in the Maternity Act cases by Solicitor General Beck and the Attorney General's Assistant, Mr. Robert P. Reeder.

² 42 Stat. L. 224.

³ 262 U. S. 447.

⁴ 262 U. S. 1.

⁵ 42 Stat. L. 998.

⁶ 259 U. S. 44. For comment see the present writer in this Review, vol. 16, at page 617.

⁷ 258 U. S. 495; and this Review, loc. cit. pp. 619–620.

⁸ 196 U. S. 375.

⁹ 37 Harvard Law Review, pp. 136–140.

¹⁰ 9 Wheat. 1.

¹¹ United States vs. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. In this case the Court says that “Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among the several states, the transportation and its instrumentalities,” etc. “may be regulated, but this is because they form part of interstate trade or commerce.” It then proceeds to hold, on the authority of Coe vs. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, that the power of Congress does not begin to operate until the commodity commences its “final movement” from the state of origin to that of destination. All that Coe vs. Errol really stands for is that the state may tax until this final movement begins but not afterward. It has been held repeatedly since that case that the line which limits the power of the state in relation to interstate commerce from one side does not limit Congress' power from the other. This follows from the fact that Congress may pass all laws “necessary and proper” to make its enumerated powers effective and that such laws are supreme over any conflicting state laws. See especially the Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342.

¹² Justices McReynolds and Sutherland dissented, without opinion. In Russell Motor Car Co. vs. U. S. note 30 infra, which was decided a week earlier, Justice Sutherland seized the opportunity to state obiter that, although “the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is found in the same clause and conferred by the same words,” “the scope of the power, when applied to the former may be narrower than when applied to the latter.” For this rather dark saying is cited Groves vs. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449, 505, which was decided before the Civil War and by a bench anxious to throw all possible safeguards around slavery; and it has been repeatedly contradicted since. See, e.g., Brown vs. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; and Bowman vs. Chic. & N. W. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465. The idea, however, was a favorite one with the late Chief Justice White (see, e.g. Buttfield vs. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470), and is a part of the arsenal of judicial obscurantism whereby the legislation against child labor was overthrown in Hammer vs. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251. In connection with the instant case see also the Chief Justice's opinion in United Mine Workers of Am. vs. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, at pp. 407–412.

¹³ Penn. R. Co. vs. U. S. Railroad Labor Bd., 260 U. S. 718.

¹⁴ The New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184.

¹⁵ Nashville, C & St. L. R. vs. Tenn., 262 U. S. 318.

¹⁶ 261 U. S. 525.

¹⁷ 40 Stat. L. 960.

¹⁸ 198 U. S. 45.

¹⁹ 243 U. S. 426.

²⁰ 208 U. S. 412 see also Riley vs. Mass., 232 U. S. 671; Miller vs. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373; and Bosley vs. McLaughlin, 236 U. S. 385.

²¹ Both Bunting vs. Ore., supra, and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S. 332 bear out J. Sutherland's contention on this point.

²² 123 U. S. 623.

²³ 169 U. S. 366, sustaining a Utah statute which restricted the hours of labor in mines and smelters.

²⁴ 236 U. S. 14, overturning a Kansas statute which forbade employers to require their employees to agree not to join a labor union.

²⁵ The opinion contains a number of points which do not seem to bear very directly upon the constitutional question. As a good Calvinist, J. Sutherland holds that “Morality rests upon other considerations than wages…. if women require a minimum wage to preserve their morals, men require it to preserve their honesty”—all of which must be admitted to be pretty good debating, whether it was good law before his Honor spoke, or not.

²⁶ 262 U. S. 100.

²⁷ “After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, the exportation thereof from the United States and all territories subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.”

²⁸ See especially Street vs. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 254 U. S. 88. This conditional immunity extends also to liquor acquired by inheritance or bequest since the amendment went into effect. In this connection it should be noted that liquors brought into our waters by a foreign merchantman are ordinarily lawfully acquired under the laws of the country of the vessel's flag. Perhaps it would have been better for the court to hold that “transportation,” at least as to such liquors, is not simply “carrying about,” but carrying about with the immediate intention of effecting a transfer. This idea is certainly hinted in the Street Case supra, but was abandoned in Anchor Line vs. Aldridge, 259 U. S. 80. It should also be pointed out that the Court's view of what constitutes an “importation” in the case at bar represents a wide departure from Chief Justice Marshall's view in Brown vs. Md., 12 Wheat. 419.

²⁹ 260 U. S. 377. See also Fox vs. Ohio, 5 How. 410; U. S. vs. Marigold, 9 How. 560; and McKelvey vs. U. S. in the next note.

³⁰ The following cases involving questions of national power demand only brief reference: Gain accruing to a stockholder by the reorganization of a corporation is sufficiently segregated to permit its taxation as “income” by a dividend in liquidation of the original company, Cullinan vs. Walker, 262 U. S. 134, citing U. S. vs. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156; and Rochefeiler vs. U. S., ibid. 176. Although a penalty cannot be imposed in the guise of a tax, without notice or hearing, for the alleged sale of intoxicating liquors, Regal Drug Co. vs. Wardell, 260 U. S. 386 citing Lipke vs. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557; failure to list outlawed goods in a manifest may be penalized, U. S. vs. Sischo, 262 U. S. 165; as may also the purchase of narcotic liquors except under conditions designed to make the revenue laws effective, U. S. vs. Wong Sing, citing U. S. vs. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86. The power of Congress to govern through rates may not be defeated by a contract between shipper and carrier whereby goods destined for points outside a state are consigned to intermediate points, B. & O. S. W. R. Co. vs. Settle, 260 U. S. 166; nor its power to regulate the use of passes in interstate commerce be in anywise controlled or limited by state laws, Kansas City So. R. Co. vs. Van Zant, 260 U. S. 459. Congress may in time of war authorize the President to modify private contracts, leaving the parties free as between themselves to accept, and this power extends to contracts to which the government itself is party, Russell Motor Car Co. vs. U. S. 261 U. S. 514. The priority given the United States by Revised Statutes, 3466, in the assets of insolvent debtors cannot be impaired by state law, United States vs. Okla, 261 U. S. 253, citing United States vs. Fisher, 2 Crauch 308, and other cases. Congress may penalize obstruction of free passage over public lands of the United States, although the same acts of personal violence fall also within the police power of the state, McKelvey vs. U. S. 260 U. S. 353, citing Moore vs. Gee, 14 How. 13. Congress had the power within a territory of the United States to grant the beds of nonnavigable rivers to private owners, and the vested rights thus created cannot be divested by a declaration by the state formed from the territory that the river is navigable, Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. vs. U. S. 260 U. S. 77, citing Snively vs. Bowlby, 152, U. S. 1.

³¹ Kline vs. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226. This is contradictory of Justice Story's argument in Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, that Congress was under constitutional obligation to vest in courts of the United States all of the jurisdiction delimited by Article III, Sec. 2.

³² Keller vs. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428. Such jurisdiction is conferable on the district courts by virtue of Congress' “dual authority over the District,” citing Butterworth vs. U. S. 112 U. S. 50; and United States vs. Duell, 172 U. S. 576.

³³ Brownlow vs. Schwartz, 261 U. S. 216.

³⁴ Kline vs. Burke Construction Co., supra, citing Covell vs. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176, where it is said further: “These courts do not belong to the same system so far as their jurisdiction is concurrent; and although they coexist in the same space, they are independent, and have no common superior.” If this means that Congress' power under the necessary and proper clause in relation to the judicial powers of the United States is restricted by “the principle of forbearance,” it is obviously in conflict with Cohens vs. Va., 6 Wheaton, 264; nor does the Ponzi Case, 258 U. S. 254, cited by Justice Sutherland in this connection, suggest the contrary. See also United States vs. Okla., note 30 supra.

³⁵ Page Co. vs. MacDonald, 261 U. S. 446. Conversely, books and papers in possession of a bankruptcy court cannot be taken therefrom by subpoena of a state court, except upon consent of the federal court, Dier. vs. Banton, 262 U. S. 147, citing Ponzi vs. Fessenden, supra.

³⁶ St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. vs. Ark. 260 U. S. 346.

³⁷ So. Utah Mines & Smelters vs. Beaver County, 262 U. S. 325.

³⁸ Graham vs. Dupont, 262 U. S. 234, citing Lipke vs. Lederer and Regal Drug Co. vs. Wardell, note 30 supra. The opinion also condones evasion of Sec. 3224 by moot cases instituted by stockholders against corporations to restrain the latter from paying taxes alleged to be unconstitutional, instances being Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 157 U. S. 429, and Brushaber vs. Un. Pac. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1.

³⁹ Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. La. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 260 U. S. 212; Okla. Nat. Gas Co. & Russell, 261 U. S. 290. But pending an appeal to a state supreme court regarding the constitutionality of rates, a public service corporation is entitled to a temporary injunction from the United States district court, proceeding in accordance with Sec. 266, ibid.: and see also Prendergast vs. N. Y. Telephone Co., 262 U. S. 43.

⁴⁰ Riddle vs. Dycke, 262 U. S. 333. Three other cases demand only passing notice: Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. vs. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479, enforcing the principle of the exclusiveness of the admiralty jurisdiction as laid down in the Jensen Case, 244 U. S. 205; Pusey & Jones Co. vs. Hanssen, reiterating the doctrine of Scott vs. Neely, 140 U. S. 106 that a remedial right to proceed in a federal court sitting in equity may not be enlarged by state statute; and Toledo Scale Co. vs. Computing Co., 261 U. S. 399, which holds that, “to justify punishment as for contempt of court of a defeated party to a suit, who merely undertakes to enjoin in another court the successful party to prosecuting his decree to payment, the circumstances of disrespect to the court entering the decree should be unusual.”

⁴¹ United States vs. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341; and Vogelstein Co. vs. U. S. 262 U. S. 337. See also, to same effect, Seaboard Air Line Co. vs. U. S. 261 U. S. 299.

⁴² Duesenberg Motors Corp. vs. U. S., 260 U. S. 115.

⁴³ Omnia Com'l Co. vs. U. S., 261 U. S. 502. See also Price Fire & Water Proofing Co. vs. U. S., 261 U. S. 179.

⁴⁴ Portsmouth Land & Hotel Co; vs. U. S., 260 U. S. 327. There was a strong dissent, based on a different version of the facts. The case may turn out to be a notable one in the extension it suggests of “contracts implied in fact” on which the United States consents to be sued under the act, Sec. 24 of the Judicial Code, Par. 20.

⁴⁵ Houston Coal Co. vs. U. S., 262 U. S. 361, interpreting Sec. 10 of the Act of August 10, 1917, 40 Stat. L. 276.

⁴⁶ Re Fuller, 262 U. S. 91; Dier vs. Banton, 262 U. S. 147. These cases only apply results recently arrived at. See this Review, vol. 16, pp. 228–229.

⁴⁷ Essgee Co. vs. U. S., 262 U. S. 151, citing Hale vs. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43; and Wilson vs. U. S., 221 U. S. 361.

⁴⁸ Collins vs. Loisel, 262 U. S. 426. “Protection against unjustifiable vexation and harassment incident to repeated arrests for the same alleged offense must ordinarily be sought, not in constitutional limitations—but in a high sense of responsibility on the part of the public officials charged with duties in this connection,” ibid.

⁴⁹ United States vs. Statoff, 260 U. S. 477, citing Ogden vs. Blackledge, 2 Cranch 272; and Koshkonong vs. Burton, 104 U. S. 668.

⁵⁰ See United States vs. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. Crew Levick Co. vs. Penn., 245 U. S. 292; Peck & Co. vs. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165.

⁵¹ Spalding & Bros. vs. Edwards 262 U. S. 66.

⁵² Ramsay Co. vs. Associated Billposters, 260 U. S. 501.

⁵³ Hart vs. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U. S. 271.

⁵⁴ United States vs. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371.

⁵⁵ Keogh vs. Chic. & N. W. R. Co. 260 U. S. 156.

⁵⁶ Federal Trade Com'n vs. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463.

⁵⁷ Federal Trade Com'n vs. Curtis Pub. Co., 260 U. S. 568.

⁵⁸ Davis vs. Green, 260 U. S. 349.

⁵⁹ Ozawa vs. U. S., 260 U. S. 178.

⁶⁰ United States vs. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U. S. 204. The opinion contains an interesting excursus into the ethnological field.

⁶¹ Tulsidas vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 262 U. S. 258.

⁶² McKee vs. Gratz, 260 U. S. 137.

⁶³ United States vs. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94.

⁶⁴ Am. Bank & Trust Co. vs. Fed'l Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 262 U. S. 643.

⁶⁵ 262 U. S. 522.

⁶⁶ 94 U. S. 113.

⁶⁷ 233 U. S. 389.

⁶⁸ “He may withdraw hie grant by discontinuing the use; but so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control.”

⁶⁹ In this connection Chief Justice Taft quotes the following passage from the state court's opinion: “The defendant's plant is a small one … yet the plant manufactures food products … and if it should cease to operate, that source of supply would be cut off.” This seems to signify, however, not that the state claimed the power under the act to prevent the owner from ceasing to operate if he found himself losing money, but only the right to intervene in an industrial dispute with a view to preventing such dispute from causing a suspension of operations. It should be added that the Chief Justice does not appear to draw an argument from the comparative insignificance of the business involved in this case; nor could he justly, granting the general validity of act; see Powell vs. Penn., 127 U. S. 678; and Muller vs. Ore., 208 U. S. 412.

⁷⁰ Meyer vs. Neb., 262 U. S. 390; Bartels vs. la., 262 U. S. 404.

⁷¹ 169 U. S. 466.

⁷² Willcox vs. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 41, 52; also, to same effect, Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 454.

⁷³ 262 U. S. 276.

⁷⁴ 262 U. S. 679.

⁷⁵ 262 U. S. 625.

⁷⁶ Ga. R'y & Power Co. vs. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432. But such contract rates may not be extended to new territory by enlarging the area of the municipality; nor may the burdens of the company under the contract be increased without its consent, in the matter of issuing transfers. The instant case, and Ga. R'y & Power Co. vs. College Park, 262 U. S. 441.

⁷⁷ Ark. Nat. Gas Co. vs. Ark R. Com'n, 261 U. S. 379, citing Union Dry Goods Co. vs. Ga. Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U. S. 372; and Producers Trans. Co. vs. R. Com'n, 251 U. S. 228.

⁷⁸ Ortega Co. vs. Triay, 260 U. S. 103.

⁷⁹ Wichita R. & Light Co. vs. Publ. Util. Com'n of Kan., 260 U. S. 48. This seems to be new law so far as the Supreme Court is concerned.

⁸⁰ Boston vs. Jackson, 260 U. S. 309.

⁸¹ Paducah vs. Paducah R'y Co., 261 U. S. 267.

⁸² 260 U. S. 393.

⁸³ 13 N. Y. 391.

⁸⁴ 123 U. S. 623.

⁸⁵ 261 U. S. 186.

⁸⁶ 237 U. S. 309.

⁸⁷ Chic. & N. W. R'y Co. vs. Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35. See also Southern R. Co. vs. Clift, 260 U. S. 316.

⁸⁸ Nat'l Un. Fire Ins. Co. vs. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71.

⁸⁹ St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. vs. Ark., 260 U. S. 346.

⁹⁰ 165 U. S. 578.

⁹¹ Minn. Com'l Men's Assoc. vs. Benn, 261 U. S. 140. The case seems to stand for the proposition that the “doing of business” by such a company within a state involves the maintenance of an agent there.

⁹² Douglas vs. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, citing Dent vs. W. Va., 129 U. S. 114; but the act conferring such authority on a board of examiners must be interpreted not to grant arbitrary powers, Yick Wo. vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.

⁹³ Bratton vs. Chandler, 260 U. S. 110.

⁹⁴ Madera Sugar Pine Co. vs. Indust'l Accident Com'n, 262 U. S. 499. A number of cases reiterative of conventional results are omitted.

⁹⁵ Ky. Fin. Corp. vs. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U. S. 544. Article IV, Sec. 2, Par. 1, reads as follows: “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” That a corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has long been recognized. See Santa Clara County vs. So. Pac. R. Co., 118 U. S. 394. It is not, however, a “citizen” within the meaning of the above quoted article. See Blake vs. McClung, 172 U. S. 239.

⁹⁶ 262 U. S. 182, citing East Hartford vs. Hart. Bridge Co., 10 How. 511; Mt. Pleasant vs. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514; Hunter vs. Pittsburg, 207 U. S. 161. Sec. People vs. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, in which the late Judge Cooley endeavored to call into being such an “inherent” right. See also Eaton, Amasa M. on “The Right to Local Self-Government,” in the Harvard Law Review, vol. 13. 441, 570, 638CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and vol. 14, 20, 116.

⁹⁷ Hodges vs. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600, citing Penn. vs. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co., 18 How. 421; Clinton Bridge Case, 10 Wall. 454; United States vs. Klein, 13 Wall, 128; McCullough vs. Va., 172 U. S. 102.

⁹⁸ Southern R'y Co. vs. Watts, 260 U. S. 519; also, to same effect, Sioux City Bridge Co. vs. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441.

⁹⁹ Thomas vs. Kan. City So. R'y Co., 261 U. S. 481.

¹⁰⁰ Milheim vs. Moffat Tunnel Improv. Dist., 262 U. S. 710, citing many railway cases.

¹⁰¹ Rindge Co. vs. County of Los Angeles 262 U. S. 700. A few cases which illustrate familiar doctrine are omitted.

¹⁰² 262 U. S. 553.

¹⁰³ 221 U. S. 229.

¹⁰⁴ 247 U. S. 251.

¹⁰⁵ 135 U. S. 100.

¹⁰⁶ 260 U. S. 245.

¹⁰⁷ 262 U. S. 172.

¹⁰⁸ See Board of Trade vs. Olsen, supra; also Brown vs. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, where the supervisory power of Congress over certain state taxes is recognized.

¹⁰⁹ Champlain Realty Co. vs. Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366.

¹¹⁰ Sonneborn vs. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506.

¹¹¹ See note 108 supra.

¹¹² Askren vs. Continental Oil Co., 252 U. S. 444; Bowman vs. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642. For comment, see this Review, vol. 15, 67; and vol. 16, 239.

¹¹³ 261 U. S. 449.

¹¹⁴ The principal one is Woodruff vs. Parham, 8 Wall, 123, of which C. J. Taft remarks in the Sonneborn Case: It “has never been overruled, but has often been approved and followed.” There it was held that the terms “imports” and “exports” in Art. I, Sec. 10, are confined to foreign commerce. It would appear that the court has not even yet entirely extricated itself from the difficulties into which it strayed in the Cont. Oil Co. Gases and Standard Oil Co. vs. Graves, 249 U. S. 389. There is an essential contradiction between the holding in the Phipps Case, supra, and the Sonneborn Case, of later date, its designation alone affording no reason for condemning an otherwise valid tax.

¹¹⁵ Pullman Co. vs. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330. Cf. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. vs. Tex., 210 U. S. 217.

¹¹⁶ Southern R'y Co. vs. Watts, 260 U. S. 519.

¹¹⁷ Atlantic Coast Line R. vs. Daughton, 262 U. S. 413, citing Shaffer vs. Carter, 252 U. S. 37.

¹¹⁸ St. Louis-San Francisco R'y Co. vs. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 261 U. S. 369.

¹¹⁹ Davis vs. Farmer's Coöp. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312.

¹²⁰ Columbia R'y, Gas & Elec. Co. vs. S. C., 261 U. S. 236, citing N. O. Waterw'ks Co. & La. Sugar Ref. Co., 125 U. S. 18; Central Land Co. vs. Laidlaw, 159 U. S. 103; Bacon vs. Tex., 163 U. S. 163 U. S. 207.

¹²¹ Same case.

¹²² Conley vs. Barton, 260 U. S. 677.

¹²³ Bankers Trust Co. vs. Blodgett, 260 U. S. 647.

¹²⁴ New York vs. Law, … U. S.….

¹²⁵ Farmers and Merchants' Bank vs. Fed'l Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649.

¹²⁶ First Nat'l Bank of San Jose vs. Calif., 260 U. S. 366. The principle here announced, if applied generally to national instrumentalities, would secure to the states the right to tax national bonds, with the assent of Congress, by “general and undiscriminating” laws. This is undoubtedly the sound view of the matter. See especially Osborn vs. Bank of the U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; and Farmers' and M. Bank vs. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29.