1 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

2 Thirty statutes were described by the Court as similar to the Texas statute invalidated in Roe 410 U.S. at 118 & n.2, 93 S. Ct. at 709 & n.2, 35 L.Ed.2d at 157 & n.2, which made it a crime to perform any abortion other than one “procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother.” V. Ann. Tex. P.C. §§ 1191, 1194 (1925) (repealed in 1973). Another fourteen statutes were modelled, like the Georgia statute at issue in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 789, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973), on the American Law Institute Model Penal Code. See 410 U.S. at 140 n.37; 93 S. Ct. at 720 n.37; 35 L.Ed.2d at 169-70 n.37. Even those states which had repealed criminal penalties for abortion during early pregnancy retained some provisions which became impermissible under Roe. See, e.g., Alas. Stat. § 11.15.060 (1975); N.Y. Pen. Law § 125.05 (Supp. 1976); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 9.02.060-.070 (Supp. 1976).

3 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973).

4 Some new statutes contain provisions identical to those struck down in Doe. See, e.g., Burn’s Ann. Ind. Stat. § 10-108 (Supp. 1976) (requiring performance of all abortions in hospitals or licensed facilities); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-301 (1975) (residency requirement). Several legislatures also have expressed hostility to the Supreme Court decisions and have declared an intention to support constitutional amendments to overrule them, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-4, 143 (1974).

5 One such issue is the state’s affirmative duty to provide funds for abortions, whether through Medicaid or otherwise. See Butler, Right to Abortion Under Medicaid, 7 Clearinghse. Rev. 713 (1974); Note, Abortion on Demand in a Post-Roe Context: Must the State Pay the Bills?, 41 Ford. L. Rev. 921 (1973). Another concerns the use of aborted fetal tissue or the fetus in utero for purposes of medical research or experimentation. Some states now prohibit any “experimentation with aborted tissue,” except to preserve the life of the fetus or for pathological examination. See, e.g., Cal. H. & S. Code § 25956 (Supp. 1976); III. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 81-18 (Supp. 1976); Burn’s Ann. Ind. Stat. § 10-112 (Supp. 1976); Page’s Rev. Ohio Code Ann. § 2919.14 (Supp. 1976); Mont. Rev. Code § 94-5-617(3) (Supp. 1976). Others prohibit experimentation on live fetuses as well, except where necessary to preserve fetal life or health. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. 14:87.2 (1973); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-310 (Supp. 1975) (genetics testing permissible). For discussion of the questions raised by fetal experimentation, see Martin, Ethical Standards for Fetal Experimentation, 43 Ford. L. Rev. 547 (1975)Google Scholar; Note, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1191 (1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 An excellent general criticism of Roe and Doe is Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The decisions are defended in Heymann & Barzelay, , The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade audits Critics, 53 B.U. L. Rev. 765 (1973)Google Scholar, and Note, In Defense of Liberty: A Look at the Abortion Decisions, 61 Geo. L.J. 1559 (1973)Google Scholar.

7 E.g., III. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 81-13 (Supp. 1976); Vernon’s Ann. Mo. Stat. § 188.020 (Supp. 1976).

8 E.g., Burn’s Ann. Ind. Stat. § 10-107 (Supp. 1976); Mont. Rev. Code § 94-5-618 (Supp. 1976).

9 See Newsweek (Mar. 3, 1975). Dr. Edelin’s case well illustrates the enormous difficulty, both before and after abortion, of determining whether a fetus is in fact viable.

10 See Friedman, , The Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 92 (1974)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

11 410 U.S. at 160, 93 S. Ct. at 730, 35 L.Ed.2d at 181, citing L. Hellman & J. Pritchard, Williams Obstetrics 493 (14th ed. 1971).

12 Id.

13 See Altchek, , Editorial: Abortion Alert, 42 Obstet. Gynec. 452 (J973)Google Scholar.

14 E.g., Burn’s Ann. Ind. Stat. §§ 10-107, 108(c) (Supp. 1976); Mont. Rev. Code §§ 94-5-615, 618 (Supp. 1976); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-4,144, 147 (Supp. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-301 (1973).

15 E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.780 (Supp. 1976); Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann. 35 § 6602 (Supp. 1976); Utah Stat. Ann. § 76-7-302 (Supp. 1975).

16 E.g., Minn. Stat. § 145.411 (1974); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1975).

17 E.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. 442.250 (Supp. 1976); S.D. Comp. Laws § 34-23A-5 (Supp. 1975) (twenty-four weeks).

18 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-63, 92 S. Ct. 839, 843-44, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (vagrancy ordinance); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S. Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888, 890 (1939) (statute prohibiting being a “gangster”). See generally Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).

19 See J. Wharton, Criminal Law § 159 (1952) and cases cited therein. Examples are most numerous in the area of business regulation, such as misbranding of drugs, but the crime of negligent homicide also falls within this category.

20 Cf Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed. 2d 278 (1976) (recognizing immunity in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for policemen enforcing laws in good faith belief that they are constitutional); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (immunity of executive governmental officials).

21 The Pennsylvania statute was invalidated on this ground in Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534, 539 (M.D. Pa. 1975). See also Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1975).

22 410 U.S. at 155, 93 S. Ct. at 728, 35 L.Ed.2d at 178, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed.2d 1213 (1940).

23 See Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

24 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974), app. dism’d on other grounds, sub nom., Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903, 95 S.Ct. 819, 42 L.Ed.2d 832 (1975). In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, — U.S. — (1976), the United States Supreme Court upheld a Missouri statutory definition of “viability” which used no reference to any specific time period. Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted that “viability was a matter of medical judgment, skill and technical ability” and that the flexibility of the term should be preserved.

25 Minn. Stat. § 145.411(2) (Supp. 1976) provides:

“Viable” means able to live outside the womb even though artificial aid is required. During the second half of its gestation period a fetus shall be considered potentially “viable”.

Minn. Stat. § 145.412(3) prohibits abortions when the fetus is potentially viable, except where necessary to preserve the woman’s life or health.

26 3 78 F. Supp. at 1016. See also Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 636 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (viability decision must be left to doctors); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Mo. 1975), prob, jurisd. noted, 96 S. Ct. 31, 46 L.Ed.2d 36 (1975) (“We do not think it is properly the function of the legislature or the courts to fix viability at an inflexible point in gestation. . . . [T]he determination of whether a fetus is viable in a particular case must be left to the attending physician.”), — U.S. — (1976). But see Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534, 539 (M.D. Pa. 1975) and Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 569-71 (E.D. Pa. 1975) which held that if a statute defines viability without reference to a specific date in gestation, it is void for vagueness.

27 410 U.S. at 165 n. 67, 93 S.Ct. at 733, 35 L.Ed.2d at 184.

28 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. 458.22 (Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.740 (Supp. 1976); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 435.435 (1974); S.D. Comp. Laws § 34-23A-7 (Supp. 1975). The post-Roe Pennsylvania statute, PURDON’S PA. STAT. ANN. § (Supp. 1976), is typical:

[njo abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of pregnancy except:

* * * *

(3) with the written consent of the woman’s spouse, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother;

(4) with the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis of the woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age of 18 years, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of the woman.

29 530 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1975).

30 See Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REV. 305 (1974); Note, Parental Consent Requirements and the Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001 (1975); Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post-Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 252-53 (1974).

31 520 P.2d at 263. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968).

32 Teenage pregnancies result in comparatively high incidences of toxemia, infant and maternal mortality, and brain damage to the newborn child. Unwed minors face particularly difficult social and psychological conflicts in making the decision of whether to place the child for adoption or to keep it. If the former course of action is chosen, deep guilt feelings may be engendered; whereas, the latter course may limit greatly the mother’s opportunities for educational, vocational, and social development. In either event, the still prevalent stigma of unwed motherhood must be faced. See Note, The Minor’s Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, supra note 30, at 307-08.

33 530 P.2d at 264. State intervention under its parens patriae role in cases of medical neglect is authorized by statute in most states. But intervention in abortion cases is unlikely in view of general attitudes toward abortion and the understandable reticence of judges to assert their perception of the social and psychological, as well as medical, welfare of minors over those of the minors’ parents. See Note, The Minors Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, supra note 30, at 311. Furthermore, the delay involved in judicial proceedings normally increases the physical danger of abortion and, if the delay is significant, may eliminate altogether the availability of a legal abortion. In addition, minors are rarely either willing or financially able to litigate against their parents. Moreover, such litigation undoubtedly would weaken further the family relationship.

34 530 P.2d at 265-66. See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969). It is interesting to note that after Utah’s spousal and parental consent requirements were overturned in Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 1423, 35 L.Ed.2d 683 (1973), the state legislature enacted a statute providing that the physician need only notify the parent or guardian of an unmarried minor’s planned abortion. UTAH STAT. ANN. § 76-7-304 (Supp. 1975).

35 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 378 F. Supp. 1362, 1370 (E.D. Mo. 1975), prob, jurisd. noted, 95 S.Ct. 31, 46 L.Ed.2d 36 (1975), — U.S. — (1976), Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. J 975); Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975), prob, jurisd. noted, 96 S.Ct. 390 (1975), — U.S. — (1976); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5 Cir. 1975); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974) ; Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975).

36 See generally Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 Fam. L.Q. 343 (1972); Pilpel, Minors’ Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. REV. 462 (1971).

37 See Note, Parental Consent Requirements and the Privacy Rights of Minors: The o Contraceptive Controversy, supra note 30, at 1004. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 329.221 (Supp. 1975) (venereal disease); Kans. Stat. Ann. § 38-123 (1973) (matters relating to pregnancy); Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 135 (Supp. 1975) (no physician liability for general medical care).

38 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968).

39 390 U.S. 639, 88 S.Ct. at 1280, 20 L.Ed.2d at 203-04 (1968).

40 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975), prob, jurisd. noted, 96 S.Ct. 31, 46 L.Ed.2d 36 (1975), — U.S. — (1976). The United States Supreme Court held the Missouri parental consent statute unconstitutional.

41 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1924).

42 See 410 U.S. at 152-53, 93 S.Ct. at 726-27, 35 L.Ed.2d at 177.

43 4 06 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).

44 406 U.S. at 232-34, 92 S.Ct. at 1541-42, 32 L.Ed.2d at 34-36. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court said:

Pierce, of course, recognized that where nothing more than the general interest of the parent in the nurture and education of his children is involved, it is undisputed that the state acts “reasonably” and constitutionally in requiring education to age 16 ….

45 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: … nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ….

46 See Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 441 (1973); Note, Abortion and the Husband’s Consent, 13 J. Fam. L. 311 (1973-74); Note, Roe v. Wade: What Rights the Biological Father?, 1 Hast. Const. L.Q. 251 (1974); Sherain, Beyond Roe and Doe: The Rights of the Father, 50 N. D. LAW. 483 (1975).

47 The following cases have invalidated both paternal and parental consent requirements: Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973). Paternal consent provisions have been invalidated or not enforced in Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Ct. Ap. 1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 958, 94 S. Ct. 1486, 39 L.Ed.2d 573 (1974). On July 1, 1976, the United States Supreme Court, in reversing a lower court decision held paternal and parental consent requirements unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, — U.S. — (1976). See also Doe v. Bellin Mem. Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 758-59 (7th Cir. 1973) (putative father not indispensable party to action by mother to compel hospital to permit abortion).

48 See 410 U.S. at 153, 159,. 93 S. Ct. at 727, 730, 35 L.Ed.2d at 177, 180.

49 See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 N.D. Law. 349, 354-59 (1971); Annotation, Action for Death of Unborn Child, 15 A.L.R.2d 992 (1967).

50 The statutes of every state place a duty of support on a married father; any distinction between married and unmarried fathers on this issue violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1972).

51 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 35 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).

52 Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D. Fla. 1973), app. dism’d and cert, denied, 417 U.S. 279, 94 S.Ct. 2246, 41 L.Ed.2d 68 (1974), affd on remand 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).

53 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942).

54 See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1534, 1542-43, 1546-48 (1974).

55 3 93 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975), prob, jurisd. noted, 96 S.Ct. 390 (1975), — U.S. — (1976).

56 £.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.800(2) (Supp. 1976); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-4, 158-60 (1974).

57 See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. T. 22, § 1572 (Supp. 1974); Cal. H. & S. Code § 25955 (Supp. 1976); S.D. Comp. Laws §§ 34-23-12,-14 (Supp. 1976); Utah Stat. Ann. § 76-7-317 (Supp. 1975).

58 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-2151 (1974); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.800 (Supp.1976) ; N.Y. Civ. Rts. Code § 79-i (Supp. 1975).

59 See, e.g., Cal. H. & S. Code § 25955 (Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1299.33 (Supp. 1976); Page’s Rev. Ohio Code Ann. § 5105.55 (Supp. 1976).

60 See, e.g., Burn’s Ann. Ind. Stat. § 10-114 (Supp. 1976) (damages, reinstatement, or both); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-4, 159 (1974) (damages, attorney’s fees, and costs). The Nebraska statute provides:

Any person whose employment or position has been in any way altered, impaired, or terminated in violation of [this law] may sue in the district court for all consequential damages, lost wages, reasonable attorney’s fees incurred, and the cost of litigation.

61 III. STAT. ch. 38, § 91-201 (Supp. 1976) ($2000 minimum).

62 Id. The statute states that:

Any person, association, partnership, or corporation that discriminates against another person in any way, including, but not limited to, hiring, promotion, advancement, transfer, licensing, granting of hospital privileges or staff appointments, because of that person’s refusal to recommend, perform, or assist in the performance of an abortion, whether such abortion be a crime or not, shall be answerable in civil damages equal to three times the amount of proved damages, but in no case less than $2000.

63 4 1 0 U.S. at 154, 93 S.Ct. at 727, 35 L.Ed.2d at 177.

64 Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Hale Hospital, 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 907, 95 S.Ct. 825, 42 L.Ed.2d 837 (1975); cf. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973) (sterilization); McCabe v. Nassau Cty. Med. Ctr., 353 F.2d 698 (2nd Cir. 1971) (tubal ligation).

65 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974).

66 See NEWSWEEK 19, 23 (Mar. 3, 1975) (only 15% of abortions now performed are “late term”).

67 See L. Hellman & K. Pritchard, Williams’ Obstetrics 1024-27 (14th ed. 1971).

68 3 7 7 F. Supp. 673 (D. Neb. 1974).

69 Id. at 675-76. At least two other states have adopted similar restrictions on abortions at state teaching hospitals. See Ariz. Stat. Ann. § 15-730 (1970); Bagley v. Romney, No. C-50-73 (D. Utah, Mar. 20, 1973).

70 The first section of the post-7?of Nebraska abortion statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-4, 143 (Supp. 1976), provides:

The legislature hereby finds and declares: (1) that the following provisions were motivated by the legislative intrusion of the United States Supreme Court by virtue of its decision removing the protection afforded the unborn … [and] (2) that the members of the legislature expressly deplore the destruction of unborn human lives which has and will occur in Nebraska as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision on abortion….

71 See generally Sen. Doc. No. 31, The Federal Government’s Role in Providing Health Care to Citizens of the United States, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Havighurst, Regulation of Health Services and Facilities by “Certificate of Need”, 59 VA. L. Rev. 1143 (1973); W. Curran & E. Shapiro, Law, Medicine, and Forensic Science 604-05, 610-54 (2d ed. 1970). See also Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, 327 A.2d 448, 460 (N.J. 1974). Although the term commonly used is “state” action, a private entity can become subject to constitutional requirements through involvement with the federal government as well.

72 See id. at 460; Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert, denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).

73 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 6 L.Ed.2d 45, 50 (1961).

74 407 U.S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972).

75 Christhilf v. Annapolis Emerg. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass’n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).

76 O’Neill v. Grayson Cty. War. Mem. Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973); Chiafitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971); Sosa v. Bd. of Mgrs. of Vai Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971).

77 4 2 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (Supp. 1976). See generally 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1473, 1477.

78 Chrisman v. Sister of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), aff'd, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Ida. 1973), aff'd, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975).

79 See, e.g., Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 96 S.Ct. 433 (1975); Doe v. Bellin Mem. Hosp., 479 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1973); Allen v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Tex. 1973), app. dism'd, 490 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1974); Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr. 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, 3276 A.2d 448 (N J. 1974). See also Jackson Norton Children’s Hosp., Inc., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973) (dismissal of physician from staff); Ward v. St. Anthony’s Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973).

80 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1938) (company town). The doctrine is described in detail in Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 S.Ct. 1029 (1976).

81 The argument, however, has been rejected in two recent cases. Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 77-78 (9th Cir. 1975); Ham. v. Holy Rosary Hosp., 529 P.2d 361 (Mont. 1974).

82 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.34 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-2 (1972).

83 Vernon’s Ann. Mo. Stat. § 188.035 (Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.780. (Supp. 1976); see also Minn. Stat. § 145.412 (Supp. 1976). In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, — U.S. — (1976), this Missouri statutory provision was declared unconstitutional.

84 Vernon’s Ann. Mo. Stat. § 188.040 (Supp. 1976). See also Minn. Stat. § 145.415 (Supp. 1976). In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, — U.S. — (1976), this Missouri statutory provision was declared unconstitutional.

85 See 410 U.S. at 163, 93 S.Ct. 731, 35 L.Ed.2d 177.

86 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). Exceptions have been recognized in other contexts where there is a strong health or safety justification for immediate action. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger 8c Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed. 1088 (1950) (seizure of misbranded drugs). Exceptions have also been recog-nized where only property interests are involved and there is opportunity for a postdeprivation hearing. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974).

87 392 F. Supp. at 1371.

88 See, e.g., Burn’s Ann. Ind. Stat. § 10-108 (Supp. 1976), Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.070 (Supp. 1976), and Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.050 (Supp. 1976) which provide that the saline method may not be used after the first trimester. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, —o U.S. — (1976), this prohibition was declared unconstitutional.

89 See R. Benson, Handbook of Obstetrics and Gynecology 427-30 (4th ed. 1971); E. Taylor, Beck’s Obstetrical Practice 523-25 (9th ed. 1971).

90 it should be noted, however, that prohibitions against use of the saline method have been advocated on the basis of maternal health protection. To the extent that the state can establish (1) that maternal health normally is affected by the saline method, and (2) that alternative methods reasonably are available, there is no basis for invalidation of such statutes. See Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 637 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (holding saline method proscription invalid because a hysterotomy is more dangerous than the alternatives reasonably available and because the prostaglandin method is not used presently by any Kentucky physicians).

91 Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann. 35 § 6606 (Supp. 1976). See, e.g., Cal. H. & S. Code § 25995.5 (Supp. 1976); Burn’s Ann. Ind. Stat. § 10-111 (Supp. 1976); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-4, 162 (1974).

92 Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann. 35 § 6606 (Supp. 1976).

93 Although requirements have been struck down in Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534, 540 (M.D. Pa. 1975), and Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 576 (F.D. Pa. 1975), they were upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, — U.S. — (1976). In Danforth, the lower court found (1) that a legitimate state need for statistical information existed, and (2) that the reporting requirements imposed by the statute were not in excess of reporting requirements imposed for other similar procedures. 392 F. Supp. at 1372. See also Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 638 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974), app.dism’d on other grounds, sub nom. Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903, 95 S.Ct. 819, 42 L.Ed.2d 832 (1975) (by implication).

94 One that does so is Cal. H. & S. Code § 25958 (Supp. 1976). It appears that mere deletion of the woman’s street address should be insufficient to protect her identity. But see Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 638 (W.D. Ky. 1974).