No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
The Wilhelmina: an Adventure in the Assertion and Exercise of American Trading Rights during the World War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2017
Extract
Trading in grains was light, price fluctuations small, on the St. Louis Merchants Exchange during the Saturday session, January 23, 1915. The brokers, as they stood in small groups around the sample bins and the quotation boards, had opportunity to discuss the sensational venture on which one of their Exchange members had embarked. The newspapers that morning carried the story that the W. L. Green Commission Company, one of the oldest and most respected firms on the Exchange, had the day before shipped a cargo of foodstuffs on board the steamship Wilhelmina from New York, bound for Hamburg. This was reported to be the first food shipment from America to Germany since the war began, and would furnish a test case involving the British “blockade”.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © American Society of International Law 1940
References
1 Mr. Marshall Hall to Mr. W. T. Brooking, in Jan. 23,1915. Wilhelmina Correspondence.
2 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Jan. 23, 1915, 3:3. See also the memorandum from Ambassador von Bemstorff to the Secretary of State, Apr. 4,1915, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supp., p. 157.
3 The North American Export Grain Association to the Secretary of State, Aug. 12, 1914. Ibid., 1914, Supp., p. 304.
4 Armour and Co. to the Secretary of State, Dec. 1, 1914. Ibid., p. 349 ff.
5 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Jan. 23, 1915, 3:3.
6 If this first shipment went through, the St. Louis firm would have reestablished its German business, with the likelihood of gaining in the future, for reasons that will appear later, a near monopoly of the imperial market. Mr. W. T. Brooking to Mr. Marshall Hall, Feb. 19, 1915. Wilhelmina Correspondence.
7 Mr. Marshall Hall to Mr. Norvin R. Lindheim, in Feb. 6, 1915. Ibid.
8 W. L. Green Commission Company to the Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1915. Ibid.
9 The Secretary of State to the W. L. Green Commission Company, Jan. 12, 1915. Ibid.
10 The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador, Jan. 7, 1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 301.
11 Memorandum of value of cargo on board S.S. Wilhelmina. Wilhelmina Correspondence.
12 Mr. W. T. Brooking to Mr. Hall, Jan. 25, 1915. Wilhelmina Correspondence.
13 The New York Times, Jan. 27, 1915, 2:6.
14 Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State, Jan. 27, 1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 317.
15 Mr. Lindheim to Mr. Hall, Feb. 4, 1915. Wilhelmina Correspondence.
16 Wilhelmina Brief: Schedule C, Wilhelmina Correspondence.
17 The German Ambassador to the Secretary of State, Jan. 28, 1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 317.
18 Norvin R. Lindheim to Marshall Hall, Jan. 30, 1915. Wilhelmina Correspondence.
19 Mr. Hall to Mr. Lindheim, Feb. 1, 1915. Wilhelmina Correspondence.
20 Idem, Feb. 2, 1915. Ibid.
21 Mr. Lindheim to Mr. Hall, Feb. 4, 1915. Ibid.
22 The New York Times, Feb. 3, 1915, 1:7.
23 The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador, Jan. 7, 1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 301.
24 The New York Times, Feb. 3,1915, 3:1. The legal status of grain and flour following the British announcement is not entirely clear. Since all grain and flour going to Germany and Austria, directly or indirectly (so read the announcement), would be seized and confiscated, without inquiry as to the port in which the cargoes would be unloaded or the civilian or military uses to which they would be put, the treatment of these categories of foodstuffs would appear to be that usually reserved for absolute contraband. On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey in a note of Feb. 4 (as did the unofficial British announcement of Feb. 2), referred to grain and flour bound for German ports as conditional contraband, open to condemnation in prize court, since the Federal Council decree of Jan. 25 had caused these supplies “to be compulsorily consigned to the enemy government.” Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 320. Further, the British contraband list of Dec. 23, 1914, in effect during January-February, 1915, carried foodstuffs officially as conditional contraband. Ibid., 1914, Supp., p. 270. But the British contraband schedule of Apr. 13, 1916, abolished the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, automatically making foodstuffs absolute contraband. Ibid., 1916, Supp., p. 386.
25 Ambassador von Bernstorff to the Secretary of State, Feb. 7, 1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 96.
26 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Feb. 14, 1915, I, 1:6.
27 The German Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Germany, Feb. 16, 1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 113.
28 The most extensive and authoritative discussion of this problem is found in The German Submarine War, 1914–1918, by R. H. Gibson and Maurice Prendergast (London, 1931). The authors, well-known English naval critics, in Chapter II of their important work, take up the question: “When did the idea of a war on commerce, waged by submarines, first present itself to the Germans?” Their conclusion appears to be that Germany had made no preparations for employing submarines against enemy commerce prior to the outbreak of the war in 1914. The German Naval Prize Regulations, in harmony with international law, provided that captured vessels could be sunk only if it was impossible to bring them into port, and then only after passengers and crew had been placed in safety.
During the fall and winter of 1914 there occurred a number of sinkings of enemy merchant vessels by German submarines. On Oct. 20, 1914, Commander Feldkirchner in U-17, stopped and scuttled the steamer Glitra. Likewise, on Oct. 26, off Cape Grisnez, the French steamer Amiral Ganteaume, laden with Belgian refugees, was torpedoed with the loss of 40 lives in the panic that ensued. But it appears that these were isolated acts of lawlessness by German submarine commanders, not in line with any settled admiralty policy. When Feldkirchner returned to his base in U-17, he feared a reprimand for the Glitra incident. Instead, his action was formally approved, and a submarine warfare on British shipping began to be advocated in German admiralty circles. On Dec. 23, 1914, Admiral von Tirpitz, in an interview with the American newspaper correspondent, Mr. Karl von Wiegand, sent up the famous submarine “trial balloon.” It was not until Feb. 4, 1915, on the occasion of the Kaiser’s inspection of the fleet at Wilhelmshaven, that he was persuaded, against his serious misgivings, to sign the submarine order against merchant shipping.
The facts then seem to be that the German U-boat warfare against commerce was not planned prior to the war’s outbreak; that the first sinkings of merchant vessels before February, 1915, did not correspond to a definite policy of the German Government; finally, that the German Government did not embark on its unrestricted submarine warfare until England had practiced and openly announced its starvation blockade.
29 The New York Times, Feb. 11, 1915, 2:4.
30 Memorandum re cargo on S.S. Wilhelmina, p. 3. Wilhelmina Correspondence.
31 The New York Times, Feb. 11, 1915, 2:4.
32 The British Prime Minister to the American Ambassador, Apr. 8, 1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 363.
33 Mr. Brooking to the W. L. Green Commission Company, Feb. 2, 1915, Wilhelmina Correspondence. This was likely the same stormy weather that almost wrecked the Wilhelmina.
34 Mr. Brooking to the W. L. Green Commission Company, Feb. 2, 1915. Ibid.
35 Mr. Brooking to Mr. Hall, Feb. 19, 1915, Wilhelmina Correspondence. Mr. Brooking was very favorably impressed by the evidences of Germany’s military and industrial efficiency. Trains, he explained, were running on schedule, food was cheap and fairly plentiful, and Germany still had immense reserves of man power. Asking Mr. Gerard if he thought Germany could win the war, he received the reply: “Don’t ask me how Germany could win, but how could she possibly lose.”
There is no specific corroboration in Ambassador Gerard’s correspondence of this interview with Mr. Brooking. But we know from his letters to Colonel House that the statement attributed to him represented Gerard’s convictions as to the outcome of the war. On Feb. 15, 1915, he wrote to House as follows: “Make no mistake, they (the Germans) will win on land and probably get a separate peace from Russia, then get the same from France or overwhelm it, and put a large force in Egypt, and perhaps completely blockade England.” Seymour, Charles, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston, 1926), Vol. I, p. 376 Google Scholar. Throughout October and November of the same year he continued to express to House his belief in an ultimate German victory. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 81.
36 Mr. Brooking to Mr. Hall, Feb. 20, 1915, Wilhelmina Correspondence. The manager of the Zeeland line in Flushing gave Brooking a tip about crossing on one of the company’s cargo boats. Near midnight on Feb. 20 Brooking stole aboard the Königin Wilhelmina (strange coincidence in names!). When in the morning the captain discovered and berated him, Brooking took the ship’s master down into his own bar for a few drinks and slipped him a “ten spot” for good measure. It was much to the Dutchman’s surprise that he was able to get Brooking through the customs when they reached England. (Information from conversation with Mr. Brooking.)
37 Great Britain put forward in her note of Feb. 10, 1915, in reply to the American protest of Dec. 28, 1914, against the seizure of American cargoes bound for neutral European ports, an argument which, either by design or oversight, she failed to use in her communications of Feb. 19 and March 13 regarding the Wilhelmina case, which involved the direct trade in conditional contraband with Germany. The contention was that “the distinction between the civil population and the armed forces “ in Germany had disappeared, since so large a proportion of the people were taking part, directly or indirectly, in the war. Accordingly, the British held, the distinction between foodstuffs destined for the civil population and those for the enemy government or its military and naval forces had broken down. As Professor Philip C. Jessup points out in his work on Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law (Vol. IV, p. 60), this is the same argument used by the British Government in 1793 in its controversy with the United States. It is impossible to say how effective the American Government considered the contention that the “totalitarian” war waged by Germany justified the abolition of the category of conditional contraband. Nor do we know the relative persuasiveness of the other British arguments. In a note of April 4,1915, Ambassador von Bernstorff, after stating that the United States Government had not succeeded in securing the release of the Wilhelmina’s cargo, rather undiplomatically concluded: “The Imperial Embassy must therefore assume that the United States Government acquiesces in the violations of international law by Great Britain.” Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 157. The Ambassador was rather bluntly informed by the Secretary of State that the American Government “has at no time and in no manner yielded any one of its rights as a neutral to any one of the present belligerents.” Ibid., p. 160.
38 The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador, Feb. 19, 1915. Ibid., p. 335.
39 The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador, Feb. 19,1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 336.
40 “Ibid.
41 The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador, March 13,1915. Ibid., p. 142.
42 Ibid.
43 Ray Stannard Baker in his biography of Woodrow Wilson points out that as early as Sept. 28, 1914, Ambassador Page had yielded the right for which the United States was contending in the Wilhelmina case. Grey reports Page as saying that the United States had “no desire to press the case of people who traded deliberately and directly with Germany.” Baker, Ray Stannard, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, Vol. 5 (Garden City, 1935), p. 209 Google Scholar. See also Foreign Relations, 1914, Supp., p. 237.
44 The implication that the position taken by the Wilhelmina’s counsel was the State Department’s position is, I think, a valid one. Mr. Brooking, in a letter from London (Apr. 1, 1915) to the W. L. Green Commission Company, said that “The State Department is doing all possible to help us except making absolute demands.” In the State Department the case was in the special care of the Solicitor, Cone Johnson, well known for his staunch advocacy of American rights against British pretensions.
45 Brief prepared by Mr. Lindheim and ex-Senator Towne, Wilhelmina Correspondence. Although the Wilhelmina brief uses this reference to Secretary Hay’s circular letter of June 10, 1904, as a quotation, it is really only a rough summary of the second paragraph of that letter. See Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 3.
46 Wilhelmina Correspondence: Wilhelmina Brief. Also quoted in Foreign Relations, 1914, Supp., p. 374.
47 Notice of the repeal appeared in the New York Times, Feb. 7, 1915, 1:2. The war grain company and the central purchasing company were private purchasing and distributing syndicates. The municipalities were local administrative bodies, elected by the in habitants of the communes, and entirely distinct from the central government and the military and naval authorities. Legal Brief, Wilhelmina Correspondence. See also Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 106.
48 Ibid., p. 323.
49 Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State, Feb. 12,1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 102. Later, the German Government, under pressure from the military and naval heads, raised the “ante” to food plus key raw materials. See ibid., p. 110. The State Department rejected Gerard’s suggestion of a threatened embargo on arms. Ibid., p. 129.
50 The Secretary of State to Ambassador Page, Feb. 20, 1915. Ibid., p. 119.
51 Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State, March 4, 1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 132.
52 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1915, Vol. LXIX, p. 938.
53 Ibid., Vol. LXX, pp. 599-600.
54 Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State, Apr. 8, 1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supp., p. 363.
55 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 14, 1916, 11:7. Lord Mersey on July 13, 1916, awarded the W. L. Green Commission Company approximately $390,000. The award was on the basis of the value of the cargo at Hamburg prices plus certain damage items due to the detention of the ship by the British, such as legal fees, loss of freight on return trip from Hamburg, etc.
56 Count von Bernstorff, Johann, My Three Years in America (New York, 1920), pp. 91–92 Google Scholar.
57 Dr. Heinrich Friedrich Albert. Officially, purchasing agent in the United States for the German Food Administration, Mr. Albert behind the scenes had charge of all German financial and economic activities in America. See Viereck, George Sylvester, Spreading Germs of Hate (London, 1931), p. 50 Google Scholar.
58 Viereck, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
59 Probably the John Simon whom The New York Times reporter found in charge of the office of the Southern Products Trading Co. at 60 Beaver St. The New York Times, Jan. 23, 1915, 2:2.
60 Mr. Marshall Hall to Mr. W. T. Brooking, in Jan. 20, 1915; also, Mr. Norvin R. Lindheim to Mr. Marshall Hall, Feb. 25, 1915. Wilhelmina Correspondence. In 1920 Kaufmann and Lindheim were charged with having made a false statement regarding the ownership of the “Evening Mail” during the war. At the trial German activities of various sorts were brought to light, and it was established that the $250,000 which John Simon had loaned to the W. L. Green Commission Company had been advanced to him by the German Government, or at least he had been guaranteed against loss in connection with the loan. Letter from A. G. Hays to author, Oct. 18,1939.
61 Conversation of the author with Mr. W. T. Brooking. Mr. Brooking stated that it was his opinion that Dr. Albert had guaranteed the insurance companies against loss.
62 Mr. Brooking denied that Dr. Albert had reaped the profits on the Wilhelmina shipment, as Count von Bernstorff implies in his account of the incident. If von Bernstorff is correct, what inducement was there for the W. L. Green Commission Company to undertake a shipment which conceivably could cause them serious loss of business among French and English sympathizers in the United States?
63 The choice of ex-Senator Towne of Minnesota, a friend of Secretary Bryan, and well acquainted in the Senate, as Washington counsel in the case, shows evidence of a design to appeal to the midwestern community.
64 Annual Statement of the Trade and Commerce of St. Louis for the Year 1915, Reported to the Merchants Exchange of St. Louis, p. 2.
65 W. J. Stone, in Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives; Joshua W. Alexander, in Chairman of the House Committee on Commerce and Fisheries.
66 May wheat at Chicago touched $1.651/2 on Feb. 3, 1915.
67 The reaction of Mr. Marshall Hall himself to the German decree was perhaps typical of American opinion. In a letter of Feb. 1, 1915, to Mr. Norvin R. Lindheim, he states: “Without pretending to know anything about how this matter stands on a legal basis and speaking as a business man, and judging from the comments made by other disinterested people whose judgment I respect highly, the situation seems to me to have been entirely changed by the German Federal Council order taking over all private German stocks of foodstuffs. ... I ... do not think the public opinion will at all concede under present conditions that it would be a probable thing that such shipment would be kept out of the hands of a Government which had assumed absolute unconditional charge of all foodstuffs in the Empire.” Mr. Hall to Mr. Lindheim, Feb. 1, 1915. Wilhelmina Correspondence.
The subsequent German explanation that the decree did not apply to imported foodstuffs, and that the provision of Art. 45 restricting the sale of imported foodstuffs had been repealed, failed to erase from the public mind in the United States the first impression, gained from English sources, that the German Government had made all foodstuffs in the Empire available for its armed forces.