2 International Labor Office, The Exploitation of Foreign Labor by Germany (Studies and Reports, Series C, No. 25), Montreal, 1945 (in the following pages cited as Report).

3 See lists of bilateral Government agreements containing provisions on recruitment of bodies of workers, on supervision over contracts of employment of migratory workers, and on individual migration for employment, International Labor Office, The International Labor Code 1939, Montreal, 1941, cited hereafter as Code, p. 526, n. 1, p. 523, n. 2, and p. 527, n. 1.

4 The International Emigration Commission, appointed by the Governing Body of the I.L.O. and consisting of government, employers’, and workers’ delegates from 18 countries, formulated in 1921 a number of detailed resolutions concerning standards of emigration and immigration policy. Several International Labor Conferences adopted Conventions and Recommendations dealing with this subject. The session of 1939 adopted a Convention and Recommendations containing rules for the protection of migrants and defining the role which the governments of the sending and the receiving countries ought to assume in regulating migration: Code, pp. 519 ff. For general studies on migration laws and movements see: International Labor Office, Studies and Reports, Series O, Nos. 1–4, Geneva, 1925–1929. On migration for employment see same series, No. 5, “The Migration of Workers: Recruitment, Placing, and Conditions of Labor” (1926); on migration for settlement, No. 7, “Technical and Financial International Cooperation with regard to Migration for Settlement” (1938). For lists of articles on migration published in the International Labor Review see Code p. 519, n. 1, p. 520, n. 2, and p. 522, n. 1.

5 The completion of the scheme took more than a decade. The most important agreements signed by Greece and Turkey during that period included the Agreement of Athens (Dec. 1, 1926) concerning the simplification of the administration of the population transfer, the Agreement of Ankara (June 10, 1930) delegating to the neutral members of the Mixed Commission the right to decide upon matters upon which the two governments were unable to agree, and the Agreement of Dec. 9, 1933, providing for the liquidation of the Mixed Commission. The latter submitted a final report on its work on Oct. 19, 1934.

6 Such population transfers differ in two points from those here considered: they involve permanent migration for settlement, and not temporary migration for employment.

The fact that it is, above all, the purpose which determines the legality or illegality, under the law of nations, of the transportation of persons from one country to another, can be seen, e.g., from the international arrangements endeavoring to prevent that women (and children) even with their free consent, be transported from one country to another for immoral purposes. (Cf. International Agreement for the suppression of the white slave traffic, signed at Paris, March 18, 1904 (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1, pp. 85 ff.); International Convention of May 4, 1910 ( Martens-Triepel, , Nouveau Becueil Général de Traités, 3c série, Tome VII, pp. 252 ff.)Google Scholar; and International Convention of Sept. 30,1921 (ibid., Tome XVIII, pp. 758 ff.), especially Art. 7.)

7 As Sir Arnold McNair, D. (“Municipal Effects of Belligerent Occupation,” in The Law Quart. Rev., Jan. 1941, p. 33) saidGoogle Scholar, following Dana in his edition of Wheaton’s, International Law (1866)Google Scholar, the term belligerent occupation is much more precise than the term military occupation.

8 The term was used in order to include non-citizens over whom a state claims jurisdiction by virtue of domicile: Pearce Higgins, A. , The Hague Peace Conferences, Cambridge, 1909, p. 266, n. 1.Google Scholar

9 The Austro-Hungarian delegation, backed by the Russian delegation, wanted to insert after the word “to take part” the words “as combattants.” This would have completely changed the meaning of the new provision by suggesting that a belligerent should be permitted to compel enemy citizens to give assistance in the operations of war against their country, except actual military service: Proceedings of the Hague Conferences, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1921, pp. 106–127, 240. See also de Bustamente y Sirren, A. S., La Seconde Conférence de la Paix (transl. by Scelle, G. ), Paris 1909, p. 256 Google Scholar.

10 The amendment was added to Art. 23 of the Regulations. Art. 44 of the 1907 version contains provisions not connected with the topic of the present study.

11 Prior to the amendment some writers considered the Convention and the Regulations as a lex imperfecta and erroneously even doubted their obligatory character. Such doubts were dissipated by the amendment: “The change in Art. 3 (1907) is important; a sanction is now provided for the Regulations. . . . This would appear to determine the obligatory character of the Regulations”: A. Pearce Higgins, work cited, p. 260.

12 Report of Capt. Crozier, , quoted in Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Peace Conferences and their Official Reports, New York, 1916, p. 49 Google Scholar.

13 He continued: “The alleged right of the victor to be master (verfügen) over the life and death and the personal liberty of the vanquished, is contrary to the rights of man and the natural limitations of all state prerogatives and, therefore, also contrary to all war prerogatives “: Das Moderne Kriegsrecht der civilisierten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt, Nördlingen, 1866, p. 13. This latter sentence was left out of the 1872 edition, and following it, in the French edition ( Le droit international codifii, trans, by Lardy, M. L. , Paris, 1899, p. 330)Google Scholar.

14 Actes et documents de la 2iéme Conférence Internationale de Paix, Vol. III, pp. 108–110. French edition ( Le droit internationale codifié, trans, by Lardy, M. L. , Paris, 1899, p. 330)Google Scholar.

15 Report, pp. 283–4.

16 Bulletin officiel des lois et arrêtés pour le territoire Beige occupé, No. 213, May 20, 1916, quoted in J. Pirenne et Vauthier, M. , La Legislation et l’ Administration Allemandes en Belgigue, Paris-New Haven 1925, p. 193.Google Scholar

17 Fernand Passelecq, , Les Déportations Beiges à la Lumière des Documents Allemands, Paris 1917, p. 4 Google Scholar.

18 von Köhler, L. , Die Staatsverwaltung der besetzten Gebiete, Band I: Belgien, Stuttgart- New Haven, 1927, p. 152 Google Scholar.

19 Art. 1 read: “Persons who are able to work may be subjected to forced labor even outside their domicile if, on account of gambling, drunkenness, idleness, lack of work, or laziness, they are compelled to have recourse to the assistance of others for their own subsistence or for the subsistence of their dependents.” J. Pirenne-M. Vauthier, work cited, p. 188.

20 Cri d’alarme des évêques Beiges à l’opinion publique, daté Malines, Nov. 7,1916, quoted in Passelecq, p. 93.

21 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, , International Law, 5th ed., London 1935, p. 353.Google Scholar

22 Quoted in same, pp. 362, 382.

23 Umbreit-Lorenz, , Der Krieg und die Arbeitsverhältnisse, Berlin-New Haven 1928, p. 123 Google Scholar; Report, p. 285.

24 Hackworth, G. H. , Digest of International Law, Vol. VI, Washington, D. C., 1943, p. 399.Google Scholar

25 Passelecq, , Déportation et Travail Forcé des Ouvriers et de la Population Civile de la Belgique Occupée, 1916–1918, Paris, 1928, p. 389 Google Scholar. For a fuller discussion of the actions of the neutrals, see same, pp. 286–308; for texts of other declarations of protest: pp. 93–103, 309–367, 380–383.

26 This Journal, Vol. XI, No. 1 Jan., 1917, p. 106, and Garner, J. W. , International Law and the World War, New York, 1920, Vol. II, p. 183 Google Scholar.

27 Prof. Ernest Nys, of the University of Bruxelles, statement of Nov. 6, 1916, quoted in Passelecq, p. 234.

28 Report, pp. 71–81.

29 Compte rendu de la Xème Confér. Internal, de la Croix Rouge, Geneva 1921, quoted in Werner, G. , Les Prisonniers de Guerre, Académie de Droit International, Reeueil des Cours, 1928, Tome 21, p. 34.Google Scholar

30 Belgian Chamber of Representatives, session of July 14, 1927. Documents Legislatifs, Chambre des Représentants, No. 336. Passelecq, pp. 416–433.

31 For numerical estimates, Report, pp. 264–267.

32 Report, in general.

33 Passelecq, p. 397.

34 Mémoire sur les dommages de guerre, subis par la Belgique, Ch. VI, part 1, entitled Rémunération aux deportés, quoted in the case of Jutes-Hector Loriaux o. Etat allemand, in Recueil des décisions des tribunaux mixtes, Paris, 1924–25, Vol. V, p. 684.

35 Report, pp. 61, 54–64, 264–267.

36 As late as April 21, 1945, Reich Minister Goebbels exhorted the factory guards “immediately to arrest rebellious foreign workers or, better still, to render them harmless” (Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau, Apr. 22, 1945).

37 Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Oct. 1944, p. 780.

38 After the first war the “Allied Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties” urged the creation of an Allied tribunal for the trial, amongst others, of “the crime of forced labor in mines where persons of more than one (non- German) nationality were forced to work”: Bulletin of International News, London, Feb. 3, 1945, p. 98.

39 Report, in general.

40 The Congressional report on German concentration camps of May 16, 1945, stated that the surviving population of the Buchenwald camp, as of April 16, 1945, was about 20,000 of whom 1,800 were Germans, the others foreigners, namely 4,380 Russians, 3,800 Poles, 2,900 Frenchmen, 2,105 Czechs, etc. (Atrocities and other Conditions in Concentration Camps in Germany, Report of the Committee requested by Gen. Eisenhower, D. D., in The Congress of the U. S., 79th Congr., 1st Sess., Doc. No. 47, Washington, D. C, 1945, p. 6)Google Scholar. The present paper was completed before the Nuremberg trial; much additional information on the treatment of deported labor has been brought to light there.

41 Report, p. 255. See: Executive Office of the President, War Refugee Board, Report on German Extermination Camps, Washington, D. C, Nov., 1944, pp. 1–40.

A directive of the Main Economic Board of the SS, dated Dec. 28, 1942, pointed out that of 136,000 prisoners sent to 16 concentration camps between June and November 1942, no fewer than 70,610 died and 9,267 were executed during this six-months period (News from Europe, London, July 24,1945, p. 1). The proportion of foreigners is not given in that document, but a clue can be found in Gestapo reports, discovered by Allied troops during the last stages of the war, showing that during the first six months of 1944 the Gestapo arrested about 205,000 persons in the (pre-1938) “Old Reich” and 105,000 in the rest of “Greater Germany”; of the 205,000 arrests in the “Old Reich,” 146,000 (71.2%) were for “labor evasion and slowdown” (Tribune, London, Apr. 27, 1945, p. 3). It is safe to assume that the majority of these 146,000 were foreign workers and that in the outlying territories their percentage was even higher than in Germany proper.

Statistics on the death rate among the deportees are not yet available. But it is indicative that in 1914–1918, according to official Belgian investigations, 2.5% of the Belgians deported to Germany had died “during the course of deportation,” lasting on the average seven months: Passelecq, p. 398. This corresponds to a yearly death rate of 4.25% which is higher than that of the armed forces of the belligerents.

42 Report, pp. 118–136.

43 On the applicability of this doctrine see Lauterpaeht, Legal Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict, New York, 1941, pp. 139–147, where Prof. Lauterpaeht concedes that the doctrine ex injuria jus non oritur cannot be said to apply in international relations without qualification. However, there is no doubt that the trend is toward its wider application in international law, particularly in so far as the legal position of an aggressor state is concerned. See, for example, Art. 2 of the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression of the Research in International Law (Harvard Law School); “A State does not acquire rights or relieve itself of duties by becoming an aggressor. In particular, . . .(d) An aggressor does not have the rights which under international law would accrue to a military occupant in time of war in respect of property titles, taxes, requests, contributions, or forced loans, in territory held in military occupation, (e) An agressor does not have the rights which under international law would accrue to belligerent forces in invaded territory.” In the same spirit, Art. 5 (b) of the Neutrality Draft Convention No. 2 of the Research in International Law declares: “A law-breaking State cannot pass title to any property or levy taxes, requisitions or contributions within any territory which it holds in military occupation.” Principles of this character were repeatedly declared to govern the attitude of the United States with respect to faits accomplis created by or resulting from aggressions and other acts of law-breaking States; they follow from the Stimson doctrine. (See this Journal, Vol. 26 (1932), p. 342.)

44 In fact it is interesting to note that, as a propagandist gesture, the Germans sent the Labor Front contributions of some foreign groups to the German-dominated “Labor Fronts “ that had been established in their respective countries (Report, p. 123).

45 While it is a rule of almost universal application that the power of the state, acting through its governmental agencies to tax its citizens, is absolute and unlimited as to persons and property and that every person within the jurisdiction of the state, whether a citizen or not, is subject to this power, yet, as said in Endicott, Johnson & Co. v. Multnomah County, 96 Or. 679, at 1109,1110: “A tax imposed without jurisdiction over other persons or property is void.” Winston Bros. Co. el al. v. State Tax Commission et al., 62 P. (2d) 7, 10 (Sup. Ct. Oreg., 1936).

46 St. Louis v. The Ferry Co., Wallace 423, 430. Cf. Beale, J. H., “The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State,” in 36 Harvard Law Review (1923), 243:”Google Scholar The sovereign cannot confer legal jurisdiction on his courts or his legislature when he has no such jurisdiction according to the principles of international law.”

47 Jurisdiction following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law,” this Journal, Vol. XXVIII (1934), p. 231.

In 1929, in its “restatement of the conflict of laws” the American Law Institute proposed the following new provision: “Sec. 83A. Individual Involuntarily within the State. A state cannot exercise jurisdiction through the courts over an individual brought into the state by force against his will wrongfully or by act of God until he has had a reasonable opportunity to leave the state”: quoted in “Jurisdiction Over PersonB Brought into a State by Force or Fraud,” in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 39 (1930), p. 895). See also cases cited by Dickinson, p. 235, n. 12, and p. 239, n. 23.

48 Hyde, C. C. , International Law, 2nd rev. ed., Boston, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 665 Google Scholar (almost identical in first ed., Boston 1922, Vol. 1, p. 362).

49 Ernst Isay, , Internationales Finanzrecht: Eine Untersuchung über die äusseren Grenzen der staatlichen Finanzgewalt, Stuttgart 1934, p. 48 Google Scholar. Isay remarks that the equivalence theory can already be found in Grotius. He quotes Helfferich (in Schönberg, Allgemeine Steuerlehre, Vol. III) to the effect that the taxation of foreigners can only be justified if conceived as a remuneration (Entgelt) for the protection afforded to their persons and their assets (p. 48).

50 Stothfang, W. , in Hamburger Fremderiblatt, March 4, 1944 Google Scholar, quoted in Report, p. 37.

51 Legal Effects of War, 2nd ed., Cambridge 1944, p. 320, note.

52 For provisions concerning social insurance see Report, pp. 218–230.

53 K. Loewenstein, “Demise of the French Constitution of 1875,” in American Political Science Review, Vol. 34, No. 5 (Oct. 1940), p. 894, held that the proceedings “were carried out with a full, and even excessive, sense of legality, and in complete accordance with the requirements of the Constitution which they destroyed.” Koessler, M. , “Vichy’s Sham Constitutionality,” in American Political Science Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Feb. 1945), p. 86 Google Scholar, took the opposite view because “the ratification by the (French) nation which the Enabling Act itself required before it was to become operative, was never made.” Other writers also deny the legality for various reasons: see literature quoted in Koessler’s article.

54 The jury d’honneur was composed of M. Cassin, Vice Pres. of the Conseil d’Etat, Vice Admir. Thierry d’Argenlieu, and M. Saillant, Pres. of the Conseil National de la Résistance (Combat., March 18/19, 1945; Aurore, March 20, 1945; Ordre, Apr. 6, 1945).

55 Moore’s definition, quoted by Hyde, p. 148. On November 8,1942, Canada severed relations with Vichy because there no longer existed in France any Government with “effective independent existence.” Three days later, German troops occupied the hitherto “unoccupied” part of metropolitan France whereupon recognition was withdrawn also by the other United Nations which had previously accorded it. Most French-German deportation agreements were signed after these events.

56 “The requirement that contracts shall be in conformity with law invalidates, or at least renders voidable, all agreements which are at variance with the fundamental principles of international law and their undisputed applications” ( Hall, , International Law, 8th ed., 1924, p. 382 Google Scholar); “It is a unanimously recognized customary rule of international law that obligations which are at variance with universally recognized principles of International Law cannot be the object of a treaty” (Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, Vol. 1, p. 706). International law denounces “as internationally illegal agreements which are concluded for the purpose of, and with a view to causing the performance of acts which it proscribes. . . . The obligation of a State to respect the terms of an agreement with another . . . may not come into being if the international society regards the arrangement as gravely injurious to its interests and contemptuous of what its law of nations is deemed to require. . . . In theory, any agreement which purports to do violence to the underlying principles of international law, must, to that extent, be regarded by the family of nations as internationally invalid” (Hyde, pp. 1374–5). See also Shotwell, , The Great Decision, New York, 1944, p. 202 Google Scholar. For a lucid discussion of the legal position of Czechoslovakia under German domination, see Taborsky, E. , The Czechoslovak Cause, London, 1944 Google Scholar.

57 Passelecq, pp. 106, 169, 195/6, 279, 359; J. Pirenne-Vauthier, p. 56.

58 On April 5, 1922, the Belgian worker Jules-Hector Loriaux brought test action against Germany before the Belgian-German Mixed Arbitration Tribunal set up under Art. 304 of the Treaty of Versailles. He claimed to have been subjected together with other Belgians “à des véritables tortures “ in order to sign a labor contract and, owing to the maltreatment, to be permanently incapacitated for work. The Tribunal (decision of June 3,1924) declared itself incompetent to decide upon the claim insofar as it was based on a forced labor contract because the contract was “based primarily on violence systematically exercised on a whole portion of the civilian population”; such acts of violence constitute “the gravest violation of the law of nations”; but indemnification for the wrong suffered by the claimant was covered by the German reparation payments pursuant to No. 8 of Annex I to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles (Recueil des décisions des Tribunaux Mixtes, Vol. IV, p. 686). In other cases (which did not refer to deportees) the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals had defined their jurisdiction more broadly, notably the French-German tribunal in Société Vinicole de Champagne c. Consorts de Mumm, decision of March 4, 1921, Recueil, Vol. 1, p. 23, and the Belgian-German tribunal in Milaire v. Etat Allemand, decision of Jan. 13,1923, Recueil, Vol. II, p. 715. In July 1925 the German Government agreed with a federation representing former Belgian deportees to pay them a lump sum indemnification of 24 million francs, subject to the approval of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal: The Times, London, July 14, 1925, quoted in Toynbee, A. J. , Survey of International Affairs, 1924, London, 1926, p. 401 Google Scholar. Also Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, p. 352.

59 Report, p. 115.

60 His work must have “no direct connection with the operations of the war. In particular, it is forbidden to employ prisoners in the manufacture or transport of arms or munitions of any kind, or on the transport of material destined for combatant units “ (Art. 31, 1).

61 The Convention knows only the following ways of “ending the captivity”: a) direct repatriation during hostilities; b) accommodation (l’hospitalisation) during hostilities; c) liberation and repatriation after conclusion of an armistice or of peace; d) “liberation on parole” as provided for in Art. 10–12 of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907.

62 Garner, J. W., in this Journal, Vol. XXVI (1932), pp. 808/9 Google Scholar. See also Heinemann Dos, F. W. Kriegsgefangenenrechi im Landkriege nach modemer völkerrechtiicher Auffassung, Krefeld 1931, pp. 50, 53 Google Scholar.

63 Art. 6 (1) Hague Regulations. Regarding required standards of food, quarters, and clothing of prisoners of war, see Art. 7. It must also be pointed out that “the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established between civilised nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience” (general clause in the preamble to the Hague Convention) apply fully to captives whose legal position is governed not by the Geneva Convention but only by the Hague Convention.

64 “Without the achievements of the years 1933–1938 we should hardly have been in a position to wage this war in so powerful and manly a fashion as we have done “ (declaration of the head of the German Labor Front, Dr.Robert Ley, , Nov. 30, 1944, Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau, Nov. 30, 1944)Google Scholar.

65 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, Vol. II, p. 460/1.

66 The preamble to the Charter of the Military International Tribunal appropriately points out that “the United Nations have from time to time made declarations of their intention that war criminals shall be brought to justice.” These declarations were not limited to war crimes in the technical sense, but referred generally to “barbaric crimes,” “atrocities which have violated every tenet of Christian faith,” “unheard-of crimes,” “barren horror,” etc. See Churchill-Roosevelt declaration of Oct. 25,1941, Declaration on behalf of the Governments of eight Occupied Countries and on behalf of the Free French National Committee, London, Jan. 13, 1942, note of Mr. Molotov of Apr. 27, 1942, Declarations by Mr. Roosevelt of Oct. 7,1942, and of the United States Government of Aug. 29,1943, Moscow Declaration of Oct. 30, 1943, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Bulletin of International News, 1942, pp. 50, 961, Information Bulletin of Embassy of USSR, Washington, D. C, Apr. 27, 1942, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. IX, p. 150), etc.

66a British policy in regard to German prisoners of war held in Great Britain was described as follows by the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Lawson: “Only prisoners of war who are on medical grounds permanently unfit for employment are now being returned to Germany; members of the SS. and suspected war criminals are excluded from such repatriation”: Hansard, Oct. 16, 1945, col. 974.

It is not generally known that Germany kept Russian prisoners of war and internees for several years after the end of World War I. In 1921 the International Labor Office received protests concerning their treatment in the German internment camps from a Committee of Members of the Russian Constituent Assembly, the International Federation of Trade Unions, and a group of prisoners in the Lichtenhorst camp. With the approval of the German Government a representative of the International Labor Office visited the German camps of Wünsdorf, Cottbus, Lichtenhorst and Zelle, in February, 1922, inquired into the living and working conditions of the inmates, and made suggestions concerning measures for their relief. Johnston, G. A., International Social Progress, London, 1924, pp. 220–1 Google Scholar. 87 “Subjugation” is not always used in an identical sense but the disagreement is merely terminological. In accordance with Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, Vol. II, p. 470, subjugation is here meant to describe the situation which follows conquest. McNair uses the term somewhat differently when he states: “International law recognizes three stages which normally occur in the process of conquest: (a) invasion; (b) occupation; and (c) transfer of sovereignty by means of a treaty of cession, or as a result of subjugation without cession.” (“ Municipal Effects of Belligerent Occupation” in Law Quarterly Review, Jan. 1941, p. 34.)

68 The situation created by Germany’s subjugation differs fundamentally from the situation created by an armistice. An armistice merely suspends hostilities. If either party seriously violates the armistice the other party has “the right to denounce it and even in case of urgency, to recommence hostilities at once,” i.e. without formal denunciation. Under the armistice of Nov. 11, 1918, the German Government in June 1919 actually considered denouncing the armistice and resuming the war. Now, Germany cannot “denounce” the surrender. If it were to resume hostilities its armed forces would not enjoy the protection of the laws and customs of war but could be treated as criminals.

69 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, Vol. II, pp. 345, 348. “The legal justification (Rechtsgrund) of the occupatio bellica lies in the mere fact that the territory is occupied: the occupant takes the territory into possession, not on the basis of a legal title but on the basis of his power.” Bamberger, O. , Occupatio Bellica im Landkrieg, Freiburg i.B., 1909, p. 13.Google Scholar

70 “The power of the occupant is of a precarious nature and may, therefore, come to an end at any time. A minor battle, nay an unfavorable skirmish can suffice to force him to leave the occupied territory” ( Cybichowski, S. , Das Völkerrechtliche Okkupationsrecht inZeitschrift für Völkerrecht, 1936, p. 297)Google Scholar. At the first Hague Conference the German delegate, Col. von Schwarzkopf, attempted to have this provision eliminated from the Regulations, arguing that an interruption of the occupation due, e.g., to a temporary success of a “rebellion,” should not be permitted to curtail the territorial jurisdiction of the occupant (Protocols, Vol. III, p. 117).

71 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, Vol. II, p. 278, defines “occupation and administration of the enemy territory “ as one of the methods—the other being the defeat of the enemy armed forces—for the achievement of “the purpose of war, namely, the overpowering of the enemy.”

72 Statement on the signing of the War Crimes Agreement of Aug. 8,1945: The New York Times, Aug. 9, 1945.

73 It may be noted that during the Ruhr occupation leading German jurists, backed by the Reich Government and the German Supreme Court, asserted that a collision existed between the moral duty of German citizens to obey instructions of the Reich Government to sabotage the French efforts to exact reparations, and the demands made by the French occupation authorities under the Treaty of Versailles. This dilemma, it was asserted, could rightfully be solved by obeying the Reich Government, rather than the occupying power. The doctrine was upheld before French military courts, e.g., in the trial against Fritz Thyssen and other leaders of the Rhenish Westphalian coal industry accused of having sabotaged the supply of “reparation coal,” and in a similar trial against directors and workers of the Krupp Works in Essen. Finger, A. , Der Krupp Prozess, Stuttgart, 1923, p. 6 Google Scholar.

74 Hedwig Wachenheim, , “The Use of German Labor for Reconstruction,” in American Labor Conference News Letter of May 22, 1945 Google Scholar, published by the American Labor Conference on International Affairs, New York, N. Y.

75 See also testimony of Mr. Bernard M. Baruch before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on June 22, 1945:

“Mr. Baruch: . . . [Germany’s] principal payment will have to be in labor. All the countries seem to want it so, and I would let them have it.

“The Chairman (Sen. Elbert D. Thomas): Mr. Baruch, can we avoid, in using labor reparations, labor slavery?

“Mr. Baruch: . . . I do not think that anyone has in mind the establishment of slave labor; I do not suppose the United Nations will undertake anything of that kind.” (Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, 79th Congress, First Session, pursuant to Senate Resolutions 107 (78th Congress) and Senate Resolutions 146 (79th Congress) authorizing a study of war mobilization problems. Part 1, June 22, 1945, Washington, D. C, 1945, p. 14).