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National Economic Independence in the Light of the International Economic Conference1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 May 2017

Wallace McClure*
Affiliation:
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Extract

The wave of exaggerated nationalism which has pervaded the nations of the earth generally since the World War has been accompanied by seemingly serious efforts on the part of national governments to arrange for the production within their territorial limits of as many as possible of the articles which their peoples consume, often quite heedless of the cost of home as compared with external production. Such disregard of economic laws could scarcely have failed to aggravate the poverty in which the world was inevitably left in the wake of the war. Political leaders have seemed wholly unmindful of the essential truth of economics, namely, that destruction and waste, the accompaniments of war, cannot be indulged in without a lowering of economic standards, that those standards can only be raised by production, and that recovery is accomplished in the measure that production is achieved at the place and by the methods which make possible the largest output of consumable goods in proportion to the labor and raw material involved.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1927

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Footnotes

1

Based upon a lecture delivered by the writer at the Naval War College, Newport,Rhode Island, July 8, 1927.

References

2 For information on this subject see Report on Economic Work of the League of Nations,Document C. E. I. 41, prepared for the International Economic Conference.

3 The text has been published in pamphlet form, with discussion, by the Department of Commerce.

4 The Final Report of the World Economic Conference has been published in pamphlet form as Document C. E. I. 44 (1) by the League of Nations. The economic situation is discussed on pages 15, 16, and 17. The various statements and recommendations hereinafter described appear textually in subsequent pages of the report. The full text of the report is also published in The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations (Vol. VII, No.5), June 15, 1927, and as a special supplement to The Economist (London), May 28, 1927.

5 In addition to the Final Report, see Document C. E. I. 3, Memorandum on Production and Trade, prepared for the conference. The figures relating to foodstuffs do not include China. The official statement regarding the decrease of European trade indicates that it was, in 1925, 89 per cent or 90 per cent of its level in 1913. One of the delegates, Mr. Layton, editor of The Economist, is quoted as saying that trade in 1925 was 94 per cent of pre-war—‘ World Business at Geneva,’ a pamphlet distributed by McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Inc., p. 27.

6 On this point see infra, subdivision (8)

7 On this subject see the address ofMr.Robinson, Henry M. (United States) in the Verbatim Record of the Fifth Plenary Meeting, and Memorandum on Rationalisation in the United States, Document C. E. C. P.20 (1), by Mr. David F. Houston.Google Scholar

8 The Chairman of the American delegation in his report to the President says:‘ We recognize that there are certain physical and geographical conditions in particular situations that might make it desirable and economical for some form of international industrial agreements to be made; but we are apprehensive of the dangers of restricted output and the tendency to monopolistic exploitation. The resolution on cartels sets out most of the objections and points out that the success of cartels will be conditional on the character and policies of the management.

‘Early experience in the United States in agreements of a similar character resulted in restrictive legislation. Because of this and the conviction that governments would participate in cartels, our delegation felt that we could not by our actions approve internationalcartels and we took a definite position against international cartels with governmental participation.’ (The report has been mimeographed for limited distribution by the Department of State.)

9 See infra, subdivision (10), for the statement of the Conference bearing directly on theproblem of access to raw materials.

10 Outstanding among the non-participating countries were Argentina, Peru and Spain.The United States, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, and Mexico (the last by observers only, and not counted in reckoning the number of participating states) were represented on an equal footing with states members of the League.

11 E.g., the International Chamber of Commerce.

12 Though the members were, with a few exceptions, the appointees of their respective governments, they were not official spokesmen of governmental policy, and they in no way committed their governments. The agreement of the Russian delegation was to only stated ones of the resolutions. The Turkish delegation abstained from voting. See Final Report—Document C. B. I. 44 (1)—pp. 6, 49, 50.

13 United States Daily, June 24, 1927.

14 In an article entitled ‘ Some Lessons from the Economic Conference’(Foreign Affairs,October, 1927, p. 14), Mr. Henry M. Robinson, Chairman of the American Delegation, says that ‘ the age-old discussions of free trade versus protection and of the socialization of national resources were injected into the proceedings.’He adds: ‘ These discussions served their purpose, perhaps, in developing the fact that the rationalization of tariff schedules is a problem of more importance than the limiting of tariff levels, and that the socialization of resources is a problem of domestic rather than of international implications.’At another place he speaks of the conference having ‘ condemned the practice of artificially limiting the zexport of raw materials.’

15 If control of production, as in the case of the Stevenson Plan, is made effective through export duties or prohibitions, a discrepancy arises between the conclusions of this and the preceding paragraphs. If the control is justifiable and if the best means of enforcing it is through export duties, doubtless such exception should be admitted. If there is appreciable consumption within the producing area, corresponding measures should be taken to prevent discrimination as between the outside world and the consumers within that area.