Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-sjtt6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-03T21:48:28.018Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes: A Reappraisal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2017

Guenter Weissberg
Guenter Weissberg*
Affiliation:
Of the New York Bar
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In determining the location of a boundary, international as well as national tribunals have in the past been reluctant to place much evidentiary value on maps, regardless of their number or designation.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 57 , Issue 4 , October 1963 , pp. 781 - 803
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1963

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See 2 Int. Arb. Awards 829 at 853 (1949); 22 A.J.I.L. 867 at 891 (1928).

2 Although the line of the uti possidetis of 1821 was described as the only juridical line which could be established, Art. V of the convention added that, if the tribunal found that one or both parties had developed interests beyond that line, these should be taken into consideration. In consequence, the tribunal could modify the line and determine such territorial or other compensation as it regarded justified.

3 Guatemala-Honduras Boundary Arbitration: The Counter Case of Guatemala 285 (1932).

4 Guatemala-Honduras Special Boundary Tribunal, Opinion and Award 8 (1933).

5 Ibid. 80. See also Guatemala-Honduras Boundary Arbitration: The Counter Case of Guatemala 341-342, 486, 500 (1932); The Case of Honduras 43-47 (1932); Counter- Case of Honduras in Answer to the Case of Guatemala 129-134 (1932); Reply of Guatemala to the Counter Case of Honduras 151-171 (1932); Rejoinder of Honduras to Counter-Case of Guatemala 94-95 (1932).

6 Re Labrador Boundary, [1927] 43 T.L.R. 289 at 298-299. See also the oral arguments of Messrs. Watson, Taylor and Dickinson, Counsel for the United States, in the Alaska Boundary Tribunal Proceedings, 58th Cong., 2d Sess., Sen. Doe. No. 162 (1904), Vol. VI, p. 444; Vol. VII, pp. 591, 599-601; Vol. VII, pp. 850-851, 867-870,

7 2 Moore, , International Adjudications (Modern Ser.) 385 (1930)Google Scholar. See also 1 Moore, History and Digest of International Arbitrations 65 et seq. (1898).

8 This statement had also previously been quoted in the Canada-Newfoundland Boundary Dispute in the Labrador Peninsula. See Joint Appendix, Doc. No. 1430, Vol. VIII, pp. 3755-3756.

9 2 Moore, , International Adjudications (Modern Ser.) 27 (1930)Google Scholar. See also ibid. 91, 240-241; and 1 ibid. 289 (1929). For the argument of Mr. Sullivan, Agent for the United States, see 2 ibid. 165, 173. See, further, the comments of Severo Mallet- Prevost in the Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration (1897), in 2 The Counter-Case of the United States of Venezuela, No. 6, pp. 267, 268 (1898). And see Newcombe, J., in The King v. Price Bros. & Co. Ltd., [1925] 3 D.L.R. 595, 608-610.

10 Delimitation of the Polish-Czechoslovak Frontier (Question of Jaworzina), Dec. 6, 1923, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 8 (1923), pp. 32, 33.

In the Monastery of Saint-Naoum case, this Court had another occasion to deal with maps. Here an opinion was sought concerning the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, which had allotted the monastery to Albania on the basis of an interpretation placed on the Protocol of London of 1913. The Permanent Court found that the Conference did not err in holding that this part of the boundary had not been definitely determined in 1913, and added: “ A map which has been submitted to the Court and which is described as . . . the map annexed to the instructions given to the Austro-Hungarian Commissioners on the Albanian Frontier Delimitation Commission contains a frontier line leaving Saint-Naoum outside Albania. It is alleged that the map represents the decision of London. Even admitting, however, that the line marked on this map is that referred to at the end of the first paragraph of the decision of August 11th, 1913, it must be observed that this line . . . did not necessarily represent the Albanian frontier. Moreover the map in question is unsigned and its authentic character is not established.” P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 9 (1924), p. 21.

11 See also U. S. v. Texas, 162 IT. S. 1, 37-42 (1895), in which a unanimous Court, per Harlan, J., in interpreting the intentions of the parties, held that the reference to a certain meridian in Art. I l l of the Treaty of Feb. 22, 1819, between the United States and Spain, was to the correct astronomical location of the meridian, and not to the meridian as located on a map, incorporated in the treaty, which was one hundred miles in error of the true line.

See, further, the controversy between Russia and France on the one hand, and Britain and Austria on the other, as to whether a mistake in a map used during the negotiations of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 assigned a town named Bolgrad to Russia. Lord McNair has described this dispute as supporting the view that “ an assent to a treaty based upon an erroneous map would be no assent at all. ” McNair, Law of Treaties 132 (1938). And see the 1871 report on a boundary dispute between the United States and Canada, in which it is stated that if a report, prepared by the Boundary Commissioners appointed under the Treaty of Ghent, and a map are at “irreconcilablevariance,” the report “must prevail.” McNair, Law of Treaties 211 (1961). Finally, see The Island of Timor Case of 1914 in Scott, Hague Court Beports 354 et seq. (1916).

12 Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals 157, 259 (1939). And he continues: “ . . . maps can seldom, if ever, be taken as conclusive evidence in the determination of disputes which may arise concerning the location of the boundary.” ibid. 157.

13 Ibid. 261. See also the opinion of Mr, Justice Davis in Missouri v. Kentucky, 11 Wall. 385, 410-411 (1870). And see the Argentine-Chilean Boundary Arbitration, April 17, 1896, Eeport presented to the Tribunal appointed by Her Britannic Majesty's Government, Vol. II, p. 556 (1900).

14 Hyde, , “Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes,” 27 A.J.I.L. 311 at 315 (1933)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also 1 Hyde, , International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 496 (2nd ed., 1945)Google Scholar.

15 Ibid. 316 and 497, respectively. See also Sandifer, op. cit. 164.

16 [1953] I.C.J. Bep. 47 at 71; digested in 48 A.J.I.L. 316 et seq. (1954). Tor the text of the letter, see 1 I.C.J. Pleadings, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (United

17 1 I.C.J. Pleadings, United Kingdom/France at 115. See also 2 ibid, at 159.

18 Ibid, at 335

19 See [1953] I.C.J. Rep. 47 at 71. But see Judge Basdevant's dissent from this point of view, ibid, at 80+81.

20 2 I.C.J. Pleadings, United Kingdom/France at 169-170.

21 Ibid, at 201.

22 Ibid, at 285 (emphasis in original).

23 See the observations drawn in connection with a chart attached to the Fishery Convention of Aug. 2, 1839. 1 ibid, at 487-488; 2 ibid, at 237-238; [1953] I.C.J. Rep. 47 at 57-59.

24 [1953] I.C.J. Eep. 47 at 105. For a detailed analysis of this case see, inter alia, Hudson, “The Thirty-Second Year of the World Court,” 48 A.J.I.L. 1 at 6-12 (1954); Fitzmaurice, , “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54 Google Scholar: General Principles and Sources of Law,” 30 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 1 at 43-47, 55-56 (1953); idem, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Points of Substantive Law. Part I I , ” 32 ibid, at 20-76 (1955-56); Johnson, “The Minquiers and Bcrehos Case,” 3 Int. and Comp. Law Q. 189-216 (1954); Verzijl, “Territorial Controversies before the International Court of Justice,” 1 Nederlands Tijdsehrift voor Internationaal Eecht 234 at 356-364 (1954); Wade, “The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case,” 40 Grotius Society Transactions 97-109 (1954); Eoche, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (An Analysis of the Decision of the International Court of Justice) (1959), reviewed in 54 A.J.I.L. 721 (1960).

25 [1959] I.C.J. Eep. 209 at 214; digested in 53 A.J.I.L. 937 et seq. (1959). For a discussion of this case, see Leo Gross, “ T h e Jurisprudence of the World Court,” above, at p. 771; and “Verzijl, ” The International Court of Justice in 1959,“ 7 Nederlands Tijdsehrift voor Internationaal Becht 1 at 10-15 (1960)”.

26 [1959] I.C.J. Eep. 209 at 214

27 md. at 215.

28 Ibid, at 216

29 Ibid, at 220. See also ibid, at 216.

30 sojfttd. at 221. But see the dissenting view of Judge Sir Herseh Lauterpacht, ibid. at 231.

31 Ibid, at 225. See the dissenting opinions of Judges Armand-ITgon and Moreno (Juintana, ibid, at 241, 257-258, respectively.

32 Ibid, at 225-226

33 I.C.J. Pleadings, Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands) at 572. See also ibid, at 17, 317, 513, hereinafter cited as “I.C.J. Pleadings, Belgium/Netherlands.”

Compare the oral argument of Sir Eric Beckett in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case. In describing British base lines, which were at variance with those drawn by Norway, Sir Eric declared: “We believe that we could justify our facts on the Norwegian charts in the great majority of cases. . . . There is . . . clearly no sensible alternative to the use of charts officially used by the coastal State, and that is what”

34 Pleadings, Belgium/Netherlands at 582. See also ibid, at 551.

35 [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 209 at 247. See also ibid, at 246, 249. Contrast his view on the“ value ” of an 1826 map, ibid, at 246. For the statements of the parties concerning this material, see Pleadings, Belgium/Netherlands at 48-49, 367, 529, 286-287. See, further, ibid, at 41, 284, 364.

36 Compare the 1950 charge by Jordan that Israel had committed “aggression”in the Naharayim area. The complaint alleged that neither the text of the Armistice Agreement, nor the original maps signed at Shuneh, which were said to have formed the basis of those signed at Rhodes, referred to a demarcation line in this territory. It further stated that the only justification for Israel's action was a map attached to the Agreement. This map was described as unauthenticated and as showing a “fraudulently inserted, or inaccurate, line.” U.N. Doc. S/1824, par. 9.“Tamperingand ” erasures ” were said to have occurred during the transcription of the map from one scale to another, a transcription which had taken place in order to make it more convenient to attach a smaller map to the text. ibid. par. 10(d). The cablegram of the Jordanian Foreign Minister added: “ I t is an established principle that the text of the Armistice Agreement is more forceful than the map, for the text explains the map” Ibid. par. 13.

During the U.N. Security Council debate, Mr. Haikal of Jordan repeated the charge that the map was “inaccurate,” and was not binding on his government because it did not copy the armistice lines accurately, and was not properly signed. U.N. Security Council, 5th Tear, Official Records, 514th Meeting (Oct. 20, 1950), p. 5. Mr. Eban of Israel informed the Council that “ [a] 11 the relevant maps” since the demarcation, including the original Rhodes map and the revised map of June 22, 1949, which had become the master map and bore the signatures of the two parties, showed the territory on the Israeli side of the line. Ibid., 517th Meeting (Oct. 30, 1950), p. 5. He suggested that, even if the region was included “inadvertent[ly],” this “could not prevail against the clear, legal, military and political validity of the agreement and the maps which were finally signed. What matters is the eventual signature, not the process which led up to i t . ” Ibid., pp. 6-7. Eban further noted that the dispute did not involve an interpretation of the Agreement, for Israel stood on “ t h e text and the demarcation of the armistice documents themselves.” Ibid., pp. 7-8. The testimony of Dr. Bunche, the former Acting Mediator, revealed that only “overlays,” and not a map, were brought from Shuneh to Rhodes and that these were the basis for preparing the official maps. Dr. Bunche emphasized that the signing of the map prior to the Agreement was an unnecessary additional precaution, since the signing of the Agreement implied immediate and unqualified acceptance of all of its parts, including the maps. The map attached to the text was described as “entirely in order”; there were “ n o erasures on i t ” ; there was “ n o basis for questioning its authenticity in any way.” Ibid., 518th Meeting (Nov. 6, 1950), p. 12.

37 [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 209 at 254.

38 [1962] I.C.J. Eep. 6 at 16; digested in 56 A.J.I.L. 1033 et seq. (1962). See also Johnson, “International Court of Justice. Judgments of May 26, 1961, and June 15, 1962. The Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear,” 11 Int. and Comp. Law Q. 1183 et seq. (1962); Verzijl, “International Court of Justice—Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 9 ”Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Eecht 229 at 236-263 (1962).

39 [1962] I.C.J. Eep. 6 at 17.

40 Ibid, at 11

41 Ibid, at 15.

42 Ibid, at 21. See also the view of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his separate opinion. ibid, at 54-55.

43 Ibid, at 22.

44 1 I.C.J. Eejoinder of the Eoyal Government of Thailand at 47, par. 97 (Feb., 1962), hereinafter cited as “Rejoinder of Thailand.”

45 [1962] I.C.J. Hep. 6 at 23.

46 Compare Judge Sir Percy Spender's description of the preparation and distribution of the maps, ibid, at 125-127, and see Judge Wellington Koo 's analysis, ibid, at 83-85, pars. 18-21. See also the remarks of Mr. Dean Acheson, Counsel for Cambodia, in response to the explanation offered by Professor Henri Eolin, Advocate and Counsel for Thailand, in Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, Oral Proceedings, March 1 to 31, 1962, Distr. 62/50 at 319-320, hereinafter cited as “Oral Proceedings.” Thailand, in her rejoinder, pointed out that the note of the Minister of the Interior did not “mean that he accepted, or even that he had studied, every detail shown on the eleven maps.” Eejoinder of Thailand at 38, par. 73.

47 [1962] I.C.J. Eep. 6 at 26.

48 Hid. See also the separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ibid, at 57-59.

49 491 I.C.J. Réplique du Gouvernement du Boyaume du Cambodge, Memoire, at 31, pars. 50, 52 (Nov., 1961), hereinafter cited as “Beplique du Cambodge.”

50 Rejoinder of Thailand at 33, par. 63.

51 Ibid, at 35, par. 67. See also the oral argument and rejoinder of Sir Frank Soskice, Advocate and Counsel for Thailand. Oral Proceedings at 179-180, 184-186, 472-473.

52 [1962] I.C.J. Eep. 6 at 28. See Wellington Koo's dissent, ibid, at 89, par. 30.

53 Rejoinder of Thailand at 26, par. 68. And see Thailand's explanation of the map used during the 1941 Tokyo negotiations, a map on which Cambodia had also relied. ibid, at 35, par. 68, and Oral Proceedings at 180.

54 Oral Proceedings at 181.

55 Ibid.

56 wlbid. at 465.

57 Contrast Judge Wellington Koo 's dissenting opinion, ibid, at 89, par. 31.

58 Compare the protest delivered by the Honduran Charge’ d’Affaires to the IT. S. Secretary of State against a map, published in a 1934 issue of the National Geographic Magazine, which showed the Swan Islands as a XJ. S. possession. 4 TJ. S. Foreign Relations at 750-751 (1935). And see the British protest against Portuguese maps of Central Africa in 2 Smith, Great Britain and the Law of Nations at 8-9 (1935). For the more recent protests delivered by India against Chinese maps, see notes 70-72, 74, below.

59 [1962] I.C.J. Eep. 6 at 30. In striking down this contention, emphasis was also placed on a 1930 archeological tour of the Temple area by Prince Damrong, former Minister of the Interior, and at that time President of the Eoyal Institute of Siam.

60 Ibid, at 37.

61 While the majority did not use the term “estoppel” or “estopped,” but preferred to speak of “preclusion” or “precluded,” which was the terminology Judge Sir Percy Spender had employed in the Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on December 23, 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua), [I960] I.C.J. Eep. 192, this principle was carried further in the Temple Case. Compare also Sir Percy's separate opinion in the Arbitral Award Case, ibid, at 219-220, with his views in the Temple Case, [1962] I.C.J. Eep. 6 at 130-131, 142-146. And see Vice President Alfaro's separate opinion, ibid, at 39-51, as well as Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's and Judge Wellington Koo's construction, ibid, at 62-65 and 97, par. 47, respectively.

62 82J6td. at 33.

63 Hid. at 34. Contrast Wellington Koo's view that the“ map does not possess a treaty character.” ibid, at 80, par. 14. See also ibid, at 88, par. 27; 92, par. 36; and see Spender's dissent, ibid, at 118, 132-133.

Judge Moreno Quintana reiterated the stand he had taken in the Frontier Land Case. He remarked that “territorial sovereignty is not a matter to be treated lightly, especially when the legitimacy of its exercise is sought to be proved by means of an unauthenticated map,” and referred to “ [a] well-established rule,” embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, that in a discrepancy between the text of a boundary treaty and a map, the terms of the treaty govern. The jurist added that as “evidence” maps have only “ a complementary value which is in itself without legal effect.” This was said to be especially applicable to the maps submitted by Cambodia which had been drafted by “official Thai services” and which placed the Temple in Cambodia. Such maps did not appear conclusive, because they followed the Annex I map which was “ not authoritative” and did not show the watershed line. “ An error remains an error and cannot by repetition make good acts of later date that are based upon that error. That is the only significance that should be attached to the question of error in the present case, where it does not have the significance of vitiation of consent, the existence of which is possible in a legal instrument but not in a map.” Ibid, at 69, 70, 71.

64 Ibid, at 35 (emphasis supplied). See also Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's separate opinion, ibid, at 65-66, and see pp. 802-803 below.

65 [1962] I.C.J. Eep. 6 at 34. Sir Percy Spender could not agree that a “derogation ” from a treaty provision could be “disposed of . . . by treating the map, the line on which was to conform to the Treaty, as in law overriding i t . ” He regarded this not as “ treaty interpretation,” but a “ redrafting ” of the Treaty in accordance with “ a presumed intention”for which no evidence could be found and which was inconsistent with the terms of the Treaty. ibid, at 133-134. Indeed, in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties (Second Phase), Advisory Opinion of July 18, 1950, [1950] I.C.J. Eep. 221 at 229, the Court stated that it was its duty “ t o interpret . . . Treaties, not to revise them.”

66 [1962] I.C.J. Eep. 6 at 34. Wellington Koo found the argument based on stability as“strained and unreal.” ibid, at 98, par. 48.

67 Previously, the majority had held that Thailand could not challenge the map line because she had enjoyed the “benefit of a stable frontier” for half a century. Since France and Cambodia had relied on Thailand's acceptance, and since neither side could plead error, it was “ immaterial whether or not this reliance was based on a belief that the map was correct.” ibid, at 32.

Here it should be noted, however, that the Judgment did not determine the frontier in the disputed area with certainty and left the precise line of the watershed on the Preah Vihear promontory unclear. Indeed, the Court did not find it necessary “ to consider whether, at Preah Vihear, the line as mapped does in fact correspond to the true watershed line in this vicinity, or did so correspond in 1904-1908, or, if not, how the watershed line in fact runs,” ibid, at 35, and thus failed to pass on one of the Cambodian submissions, ibid, at 11. On the other hand, Sir Percy found it “hardly . . . possible . . . to pronounce in favour of the line of Annex I in the absence of a determination of the extent to which Annex I does or does not in fact conform to the stipulations contained in Article I of the Treaty itself.” Ibid, at 134. See also Wellington Koo's dissent, ibid, at 98-100, pars. 51-55.

Finally, see the conflicting reports and testimony of the witnesses and experts of the two sides. Annexes to Counter-Memorial of the Eoyal Government of Thailand, Annex No. 49 at 236-240 (Sept., 1961); 2 Eeplique du Cambodge, Annexes, Annex LXVIa at 69-71 (Nov., 1961); 2 Bejoinder of Thailand, Annexes, Annex No. 75a at 85-89 (Feb., 1962); Oral Proceedings at 212-298, 300-304.

68 “Notes . . . between . . . India and China, 1954-1959,” White Paper 55 at 57, par. 7, hereinafted cited as “White Paper No. I . ” The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Indian Embassy in Washington and to the Information Service of the Indian Consulate in New York for placing at his disposal the White Papers and the Eeport of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Eepublic of China on the Boundary Question.

69 “Notes . . . between . . . India and China, September-November 1959,” White Paper No. I I , p. 20, par. 4.

70 Ibid. 27 at 30. The Indian note of March 22, 1959, as well as other correspondence, also protested against Chinese maps, which Prime Minister Nehru described as giving “ a wrong borderline between the two countries.” According to the Indian Government, Premier Chou En-lai had stated in October, 1954, that these maps were “reproductions of old pre-liberation maps,“ which the Chinese People's Eepublic ”had had no time to revise,“ and left the “impression” that “revision” was “essentially a procedural issue, which would be made in due course.” The re-issuance of these maps was termed “embarrassing,” a “matter of great concern,” a “standing threat ” to India's “ integrity , ” and “not in accordance with long established usage as well as treaties.” See letters from Nehru to Chou, Dec. 14, 1958, and March 22, 1959, in White Paper No. I, pp. 49, par. 5, and 51, par. 13; 57, par. 8; note of Feb. 12, 1960, in "Notes . . . between . . . India and China, November 1959-March 1960," White Paper No. I l l , p. 92, par. 22; note of Sept. 10, 1959, in White Paper No. I I, p. 8. See also the notes of Aug. 21, 1958, White Paper No. I, p. 46, and Nov. 4, 1959, White Paper No. I I , p. 20, par. 4.

Subsequently, Chou En-lai asserted that the entire Sino-Indian boundary had never been delimited, and the Communist Government stated that, during the 1954 conversations, the Premier had explained that the maps followed old ones and that it would be inappropriate for China “ on its own” to alter the delineation, “before conducting surveys and consulting with the countries concerned.” Since Chou En-lai had remarked that the frontiers were undelimited, and Nehru was of the opinion that no boundary issues existed, there was “ a n obvious difference of views.” The note of December 26, 1959, added that the Communist leader had “clearly expressed his disagreement to any unilateral revision of maps,” while another, dated January 23, 1959, declared that the settlement of the boundary issue would also “ solve ” the “problem of drawing the boundary on the maps.” White Paper No. Ill , p. 75; White Paper No. I, p. 54. See also the note of Nov. 3, 1958, White Paper No. I, p. 47.

71 See note of Sept. 26, 1959, in White Paper No. I I , p. 42, par. 19. Insofar as the Ladakh area, for example, is concerned, China has claimed that her maps of the past “one to two hundred years” were “ i n the main . . . consistent,” while British and Indian maps revealed “ considerable contradictions and confusion,” although some were “close to the traditional customary line as shown on Chinese maps.”See note of Dec. 26, 1959, White Paper No. I l l , p. 68. See also notes of Sept. 8, 1959, White Paper No. I I , p. 28, and of April 3, 1960, “Notes . . . between . . . India and China, March 1960-November 1960,” White Paper No. IV, p. 12. India, .however, pointed out that “[e]ven official Chinese maps of the late nineteenth century showed a boundary approximating to our line,” and that, while official twentiethcentury Chinese maps “included large parts of our territory,” the 1917 Postal Map of China drew a boundary “more or less according to the traditional Indian alignment.”The “broad trend in recent Chinese maps has been to push the alignment deeper into Indian territory.”See notes of Sept. 26, 1959, White Paper No. I I , p. 37, par. 10, and of Feb. 12, 1960, White Paper No. I l l , p. 89, pars. 13 and 14. See also the note of Nov. 4, 1959, White Paper No. I I , p. 21, par. 7. And the “unofficial” maps of the Ladakh region, to which China had referred, were described as based on incomplete surveys, a contention which the Chinese regarded as “untenable.” See notes of Feb. 12, 1960, White Paper No. I l l , p. 86, par. 6, and of April 3, 1960, White Paper No. IV, p. 12. The Commufi? also stated that the 1917 map did not represent the “view of the Chinese people” but “only that of the imperialist elements.”ibid. 11.

72 The Indian officials also examined the 1954 conversations between Nehru and Chou En-lai and found that, at that time, the Chinese Premier had treated the Chinese maps “ as of little significance,” and that the Chinese side now termed the description of what had occurred a “distortion.” The Indians strongly objected to this assertion and remarked that even Chinese statements after 1954 “confirmed” the accuracy of the Indian standpoint. The Indian officials added that China had never given her “version of the boundary or disputed the definition” submitted by India. Claims to “ I n d i a n territory” and statements that “maps which had been earlier said to be reprints of erroneous ones” represented “valid claims,” were a matter of “astonishment” and “serious concern” to India. “Having failed, in the face of open declarations and direct communications by . . . India, to specify her claim or to protest . . . no doubt” was said to remain that ”under the accepted canons of international usage China must be held to have accepted and acquiesced in the Indian alignment and to be now estopped from raising claims to Indian territory.” Eeport of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Eepublic of China on the Boundary Question 272, 274 (1961). See also ibid. 99, and CE-163.

The Chinese officials declared that the Chinese Government had “repeatedly” stated that the Chinese maps were based on delineations of “pre-liberation maps,” and that only “ minute ” discrepancies existed, which “ i s only natural prior to a formal delimitation.” This was held not to prove the Indian assertions, but rather the “basic consistency of delineation in Chinese maps.” China had neither “acquiesced” in the “ allegation ” that the boundary had been delimited, nor in the alignment “now claimed” by India. The principle of estoppel was, in the words of the Chinese side, “ absurd . ” Ibid. CE-181, CE-165, 99.

73 Ibid. 162. See also ibid. 64, 120-121. The Chinese officials stated that old “authoritative” Chinese maps “are of great reference value,” but do not have such “precision as modern maps” in showing “the location of places and distances,” and that unofficial neutral maps cannot serve “as valid evidence.” ibid. CB-73, 74, CR-61. See also ibid. CE-180.

74 Ibid. 250, 252. On the other hand, the report of the Chinese officials noted that: “Some of the Chinese maps cited by the Indian side, including the so-called official maps . . . could not prove that China has accepted the boundary claimed by India.” ibid, at CE-181. China's revised informal English translation of the official Chinese text, however, read: “Similarly, nor can the Chinese maps cited by the Indian side, including so called official Chinese maps, prove that China has accepted the boundary claimed by India,” eliminating the word “some,” a change which caused India to lodge a protest. China rejected the view that the alteration was unwarranted by the Chinese text, which India, in turn, denied. See “Notes . . . between . . . India and China, November 1960-November 1961,” White Paper No. V, pp. 30, 36, 38.

75 Compare Johnson: “ . . . governments would, as a result of . . . [the Temple] case, be well advised to exercise a strict control over their technical departments, especially those concerned with survey work and map-making. . . . The Court, in interpreting the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904, would appear to have departed from the rule stated in Article 29 of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919, as follows: ‘In the case of any discrepancies between the text of the Treaty and this map or any other map which may be annexed, the text will be final’.” LQC, cit, note 38 above, at 1203

76 [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 6 at 33. Among other important subsequent events on which the majority relied was Prince Damrong's visit to the Temple in 1930. See note 59 above. But this episode, too, was among those which “confirmfed]” and “b[ore] out” the prior acceptance. ibid.

77 Ibid, at 65. Sir Gerald went on to say: “The question is one that must always depend on the interpretation of the treaty settlement, considered as a whole, in light of the circumstances in which it was arrived at. So considered in the present case, I agree with the Court that, in tiris particular instance, the question of interpretation must be resolved in favour of the map line.” ibid. 65-66.