1 See, e.g., Milanovic, Marko, Kosovo Advisory Opinion Preview, EJIL: Talk! (July 14, 2010), at http:/lwww.ejiltalk.org/kosovo-advisory-opinion-preview Google Scholar.

2 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Int’l Ct. Justice July 22, 2010) [hereinafter Kosovo Opinion]. Documents of the International Court of Justice referred to in this essay are available on the Court’s Web site, http://www.icj-cij.org/.

3 For details, see Marko Divac, Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 879 (2005)Google Scholar.

4 If anything, the Court retreated from that position. See Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 80 (interpreting its analysis of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GARes. 2625 (XXV), annex (Oct. 24, 1970), in Military and Paramilitary Activities in an Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 101–03, paras. 191–93 (June 27)). The Court’s discussion, see id., para. 81, of the practice of the UN Security Council reaches no findings on the legal effects of its resolutions.

5 SC Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999); Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 58.

6 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 62.

7 Id., paras. 67–76.

8 GA Res. 63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008); Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 1.

9 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, paras. 49–56.

10 Id., paras. 109, 119.

11 Id., para. 122. Richard Falk’s analysis of the Court’s opinion on these points appears in this Agora at Falk, Richard, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: Conflict Resolution and Precedent, 105 AJIL 50, 50–52 (2011)Google Scholar.

12 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 85; see also id., para. 88. The Court’s statement in paragraph 85, “Resolution 1244 (1999) was expressly adopted by the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and therefore clearly imposes international legal obligations,” should not be misunderstood. A Security Council resolution does not need to be adopted under Chapter VII to have binding legal effect, and can contain language that does not create binding effect. See Divac Öberg, supra note 3, at 884–85.

13 For details on the Court’s past treatment of these issues, see Divac Öberg, supra note 3, at 890–92.

14 See id. at 886–87; see also Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, paras. 24, 29.

15 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 49.

16 Id., paras. 52, 103.

17 Id., para. 52.

18 Id., para. 54 (relying on a statement made in a different context in Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 ICJ Rep. 151, 157 (July 20) [hereinafter Certain Expenses]).

19 Id., paras. 102–09. Judges Tomka, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna, and Yusuf contested the majority on this point, but not because they thought that the Court was bound by the determination of the General Assembly. Id., Declaration Tomka, J., paras. 10–21; Sep. Op. Sepúlveda-Amor, J., paras. 23–32; Diss. Op. Bennouna, J., paras. 27–35; Sep. Op. Yusuf, J., paras. 20–21. Only Judge Koroma found that “[t]he Court does not have the power to reformulate the question—implicitly or explicitly—to such an extent that it answers a question about an entity other than the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo.” Id., Diss. Op. Koroma, J., para. 3.

20 Id., paras. 113–21 (majority opinion).

21 This situation is to be distinguished from the direction and influence inherent in choosing what questions to ask the Court and how to phrase them.

22 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 53.

23 For a cautionary tale, see Therese, O’Donnell, Naming and Shaming: The Sorry Tale of Security Council Resolution 1530 (2004), 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 945 (2007)Google Scholar.

24 See Divac Öberg, supra note 3, at 884–85.

25 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 94 (citation omitted). But see infra notes 73, 74.

26 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 115.

27 Id., para. 101.

28 Id., paras. 115, 117. See also, in a different context, id., para. 94, and, for the General Assembly, para. 53.

29 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ REP. 16, 53, para. 114 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia].

30 See Divac Oberg, supra note 3, at 885 (on establishing Council’s intent); Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 117.

31 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 115 (noting that there was “no indication” in Resolution 1244 that the Council had “intended to impose, beyond that, a specific obligation to act or a prohibition from acting, addressed to such other actors” (emphasis added)).

32 The actors in question were the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups, as well as “all concerned,” including the international security presence, KFOR. Id.

33 Id, para. 116.

34 Id.

35 Id., paras. 118–19. It is not entirely clear what other interpretive tools the Court used to establish on whom Resolution 1244 made demands, or what weight it gave those tools.

36 Note, however, that the Court gave the authors of the declaration of independence some sort of standing before it. See id., paras. 3–4, 6, 8–11, 13–14.

37 Id., para. 116; see also Kalala, Tshibangu, Les Résolutions de L’ONU et les destinataires non étatiques (2009)Google Scholar; Maria-Lydia, Bolani, Security Council Sanctions on Non-state Entities and Individuals, 56 Revue Hellénique de droit international 401, 407–23 (2003)Google Scholar; Jean-Luc, Florent, Les destinataires non étatiques des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité , in Société Française pour le droit international, Colloque du Mans: Le sujet en droit international 107 (2005)Google Scholar.

38 See Bolani, supra note 37, at 429–30; Florent, supra note 37, at 115.

39 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174, 182–83 (Apr. 11); see Dinstein, Yoram, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 286–87 (4th ed. 2005)Google Scholar; Kalala, supra note 37, at 74–75, 119–21, 128–29; Bolani, supra note 37, at 430–38; Dahmane, Farid W., Les mesures prises par le Conseil de Sécurité centre les entités non-étatiques, 11 Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 227 (1999)Google Scholar; P. H., Kooijmans, The Security Council and Non-state Entities as Party to a Conflict , in International Law: Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Eric Suy 333 (Wellens, Karel ed., 1998)Google Scholar (all reaching the same conclusion); see also Frowein, Jochen A. & Krisch, Nico, Introduction to Chapter VII, in The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 701, 715–16 (Simma, Bruno ed., 2d ed. 2002)Google Scholar; LaGrange, Evelyne & Eise, Pierre M. mann, Article 41 , in La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire, Article Par Article 1195, 1202–03, 1215–16 (Jean-Pierre, Cot et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005)Google Scholar.

40 See Divac Öberg, supra note 3, at 894–95.

41 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 37.

42 Id., para. 91 (quoting SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, op. para. 19).

43 Id.

44 Id, para. 111.

45 One notes in particular in this regard its finding that Resolution 1244 did not preclude the issuance of the declaration of independence because the two instruments operated on different levels. Id., para. 114. Judge Koroma, on the other hand, found that “the unilateral declaration of independence is an attempt to bring to an end the international presence in Kosovo established by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), a result which could only be effected by the Security Council itself.” Diss. Op. Koroma, J., supra note 19, para. 11; see also id:, para. 17.

46 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 91; see also Sep. Op. Sepulveda-Amor, J., supra note 19, para. 22.

47 Erika de, Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council 251 (2004)Google Scholar.

48 See Divac Öberg, supra note 3, at 888–90; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), paras. 444–45 (Int’l Ct. Justice Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Bosnia Genocide case]. The Court implicitly found that the Security Council had validly created the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or it would have been a legal nullity that could not possibly qualify as an “international penal tribunal” under Article VI of the Genocide Convention.

49 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 37; see also id., para. 58. Paragraph 42 of the opinion should not be read to mean that, by adopting Resolution 377A (V) (Nov. 3, 1950) (“Uniting for Peace”), the General Assembly empowered itself in any way, since a body cannot confer any power that it does not possess, hence cannot empower itself. Certain Expenses, supra note 18, at 163–65, shows that Resolution 377A was based on powers conferred on the General Assembly by the UN Charter.

50 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, op. paras. 7, 10.

51 Id., op. paras. 10–11; Sarooshi, Danesh, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of Its Chapter VII Powers 51–53, 123–24 (1999)Google Scholar; Wet, Erikade, The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Establishment and Functioning of EULEX, 103 AJIL 83, 87–90 (2009)Google Scholar.

52 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, op. para. 11(b), (i).

53 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 97; see also id., paras. 60–62.

54 Id., paras. 58–62, 88–92, 97, 106.

55 Sarooshi, supra note 51, at 20, 42, 50–55.

56 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954ICJ Rep. 47, 61 (July 13); Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1973 ICJ REP. 166, 172–75, paras. 16–23 (July 12); Bosnia Genocide case, supra note 48; Sarooshi, supra note 51, at 7 - 8, 11–13, 92–98; Stahn, Carsten, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq And Beyond 425–27 (2008)Google Scholar.

57 Sarooshi, supra note 51, at 16–19, 51–53.

58 Stahn, supra note 56, at 415–46, 450–51; Bothe, Michael & Marauhn, Thilo, UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, Legality and Limitations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration , in Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment 217, 230–35 (Tomuschat, Christian ed., 2001)Google Scholar; de Wet, supra note 51, at 87; Frowein, Jochen A. & Krisch, Nico, Article 41 , in The Charter of the United Nations, supra note 39, at 735, 744 Google Scholar; Zimmermann, Andreas & Stahn, Carsten, Yugoslav Territory, United Nations Trusteeship or Sovereign State? Reflections on the Current and Future Legal Status of Kosovo, 70 Nordic J. Int’l L. 423, 436–41 (2001)Google Scholar; see also Sarooshi, supra note 51, at 59–62.

59 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 85.

60 Id, paras. 91, 93.

61 See Bothe & Marauhn, supra note 58, at 224–28, 241; Zimmermann & Stahn, supra note 58, at 438–41.

62 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, pmbl., op. para. 5, & Annex 2, para. 3.

63 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 58.

64 The Kosovo opinion has at the very least created a precedent that would enable the Court to find later that the territorial state’s consent is not required. In favor of the position that it is not required, see Stahn, supra note 56, at 421; Stahn, Carsten, The United Nations Transitional Administration in Kosovo and East Timor: A First Analysis, 2001 Max Planck Y.B. UN L. 105, 138–39, available at http://www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/news.cfm Google Scholar. See also Sarooshi, supra note 51, at 62.

65 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, pmbl., op. paras. 10–11, Annex 1, 4th, 6th principles, & Annex 2, paras. 5, 8; Stahn, supra note 56, at 428, 454–55, 463–65; Bothe & Marauhn, supra note 58, at 236; Stahn, supra note 64, at 118–20, 143–44; Zimmermann & Stahn, supra note 58, at 442–44.

66 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, paras. 89, 95, 98–100, 104, 114 (in particular).

67 Id., para. 98 (emphasis added).

68 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, op. para. 19.

69 UN Charter Art. 27(3); see Stahn, supra note 56, Preface at xxix-1 (paperback 2010).

70 Stahn, Carsten, Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Government, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 531, 541–42 (2001)Google Scholar; see also DE WET, supra note 47, at 182–87; Sarooshi, supra note 51, at 16–19; Stahn, supra note 56, at 420; Divac Oberg, supra note 3, at 884–85.

71 Namibia, supra note 29, at 52, para. 110; see also DE WET, supra note 47, at 191–95.

72 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, supra note 4; Kosovo Opinion, supra note 2, para. 80.

73 E.g., Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.), Preliminary Objections, 2004 ICJ REP. 279, 310–11, paras. 78-79 (Dec. 15). For a critical overview of the Court's treatment of the status at the United Nations of successive incarnations of Serbia, see Blum, Yehuda Z., Was Yugoslavia a Member of the United Nations in the Years 1992–2000? 101 AJIL 800 (2007)Google Scholar.

74 One should not conclude that the Court found that any legal effects of Resolution 1244 were binding on a nonmember state, see Namibia, supra note 29, at 56, para. 126; Divac Oberg, supra note 3, at 885, for the following reasons: the membership issue had apparently not been raised by any participants in the proceedings; the Court explicitly stated that Security Council resolutions could bind "all Member States," see supra note 25 and corresponding text; and to answer the question before it, the Court needed to examine the effects of Resolution 1244 on the authors of the declaration of independence at the time of the declaration, which was after Serbia resumed membership in the United Nations.