1 Bonfils, in the edition of his work which was published on the eve of the first World War, observed that there were “ few subjects which have given rise to more controversies than that of the duty of non-intervention or the alleged right of intervention. AH jurists are agreed upon the seriousness of the act and of its consequences. But in their estimates of the juridical issue one can find only trouble and confusion“: Manuel de Droit International PiMic, 1912 (6th ed.), by Fauohille. Lawrence, in the seventh edition of his Principles of International Law, published in 1910, observed: “There are few questions in the whole range of International Law more difficult than those connected with the legality of intervention, and few have been treated in a more unsatisfactory manner. An appeal to the practice of states is useless; for not only have different states acted on different principles, but the action of the same state at one time has been irreconcilable with its action at another. On this subject history speaks with a medley of discordant voices, and the facts of international intercourse give no clue to the rules of International Law.“

2 Fauchille, Droit International Public, Vol. I, Pt. 1, Nos. 300 and ff., surveys the divergent views of a number of writers. C. C. Hyde gives to the term “ a somewhat narrow and technical signification,” restricting it to “the interference by a State in the domestic or foreign affairs of another in opposition to its will and serving by design or implication to impair its political independence“: International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, 1945 (second revised edition), Vol. I, p. 246. But compare his position in note 3, below.

3 Hyde, Vol. I, p. 278, regards the transfer by the United States of destroyers to Great Britain in 1940 as “participatory action” which must “in legal contemplation be regarded as constituting an instance of intervention.“ In respect to civil war W. E. Hall, International Law, 19—(7th ed., by Higgins), § 94, argued forcibly that aid to either party constitutes intervention. T. J. Lawrence, International Law, wrote to the same effect. Hyde also takes the same position, p. 253. Others maintain that aid given to a dejure government at its own request would not be intervention.

4 Hyde, p. 246, quotes the Clark Memorandum on the Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces as indicating the distinction between intervention and “interposition,“ but few others would accept the distinction as it is there made. Nor would the distinction made by Mr. Hughes at Havana in 1928 be acceptable, although it would be difficult to contest the logic of his argument: same, p. 251.

5 Pradier-Fodéréamong the older French writers was perhaps the most positive in his condemnation, regarding “independence” as an absolute right, not to be contradicted by another right: Traité de Droit International, Vol. I, p. 547. Fiore's condemnation is equally absolute: International Law Codified (Borchard's trans.), Title XVIII; but see below, note 49, where Fiore advocates “collective intervention.” Among modern writers see the Argentine jurist, Antokoletz, Tratado de Derecho Internacional Publico, Vol. I, p. 414, Podestá- Costa, Manual de Derecho Internacional Ptiblico, pp. 47-50, and the Brazilian jurist, Accioly, Traitéde Droit International, Vol. I, pp. 277 and ff. But many writers, e.g. Podestá-Costa, while condemning intervention in principle, admit the justification of it in certain extreme cases.

6 E. C. Stowell, International Law, 1931: “Intervention as thus employed in the relations between states may be broadly denned as the rightful use of force or the reliance thereon to constrain obedience to international law.“

7 For the United States the documentary material available for the earlier period in J. B. Moore's Digest is now brought down to date in G. Hackworth's Digest, 1940-1944.

8 The opinion of jurists is practically unanimous that to justify intervention there must be some wrongful conduct on the part of the state which is the object of intervention.

9 A number of the older jurists who condemn intervention in absolute terms do not distinguish between intervention accompanied by war and intervention effected by the use of armed force without resort to war. War was entered upon more lightly in those days.

10 The Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts forms an exception, provision being made that the agreement should not be applicable in case the debtor state refused to arbitrate the case or failed to carry out the award. It is of interest that when the question of non-intervention came up before the Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in 1936 the Argentine delegation was unwilling to accept the condition attached to the Hague Convention. See Accioly, Traiti de Droit International, Vol. I, p. 293.

11 See, for example, the numerous illustrations given by Grotius, De jvre belli ae pact's (trans, by Kelsey et al.) Book II, Chaps. I, XX; and by Vattel, Droit des Gens (trans, by Fenwkk), Book II, Chapter IV.

12 One has only to read Edmund Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution to realize that the fear of the radical principles of the Revolution was not confined to absolute monarchs and their entourage.

13 The military intervention of the Allied Powers in Russia in 1918 has frequently been referred to as a modem parallel to the threatened intervention of the Triple Alliance which brought forth the Monroe Doctrine. But in fact the two cases have nothing in common, the element of self-defense being so remote in the ease of the Triple Alliance as to be non-existent.Doubtless if the intervention of the Allied Powers in 1918 had gone no further than to prevent military supplies from falling into the hands of Germany and to protect the isolated Czecho-Slovak forces, the intervention would have been less open to criticism. See Hyde,Vol. I, pp. 264-270.

14 It is common with European and Latin American jurists to discuss the Monroe Doctrineunder the head of, or in connection with, the principle of non-intervention. English and American writers are more apt to classify the Doctrine under the head of the right of selfdefense,approaching it rather from the point of view of the intervening state than from thepoint of view of the state that is the object of intervention. Contrast in this respect Lawrence, Principles of International Law and Bonfils, Manuel de Droit International.

15 Walker's comment in 1893 reads curiously to-day: “The face’ of Europe has strangely changed since the Congress of Verona; and with the change the forces of intervening Powershave had no little to do. The world has had its fill of intervention, and is yet unsatisfied“: The Science of International Law, p. 151.

16 Calvo, the distinguished Chilean publicist, writing in 1870, observed: “The intervention … was fully justified from the point of view of the principles of international law: its motives were lawful, and the outcome not less so.” Droit International, § 103.

17 See Phillips, The Confederacy of Europe, for details of the numerous political-humanitarian interventions.

18 See Moore, Digest, Vol. V, § 874.

19 Intervention “in the interest of humanity” figured in all of the treatises. Resolutions of sympathy were adopted by national legislatures; but the sense of public responsibility in the different countries did not reach the point of demanding that governments risk individual action. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, pp. 51 and ff, and notes indicating the reaction of public opinion.

20 The documents appear at length in Moore, Digest, Vol. VT, §§ 906-910.

21 Mediation, as distinct from collective intervention, was, however, on more than one occasion attempted. For a survey of the diplomatic negotiations immediately preceding the conflict, see Rippy, Latin America in World Politics, Chap. X, “The European Powers and the Spanish-American War.“

22 See special message of President McKinley, April 11, 1898: V. S. Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 750.

23 M See Perkins, Hands Off, Chap. VT.

24 Hyde, Vol. I, p. 56, quotes statements of Secretary Root and General Wood justifying the obligation of protection assumed towards Cuba.

25 The distinguished Cuban jurist Bustamante considers it a mistake to describe as “intervention“ the circumstances which led to the recognition of the independence of Cuba: Droit International Public, Vol. I, p. 329. The Peruvian jurist Ulloa regards Cuba as having been a “practical protectorate” down to the time of the treaty of 1934: Dereeho Intemacional Publico, 19— (2nd ed.), p. 166.

26 Moore, Digest, Vol. Ill, p. 71; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 273.

27 The literature on the subject of the intervention is voluminous. S. F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States, p. 410, describes Dwight C. Miner's Fight for the Panama Route as'’ the most recent and authoritative monograph.” Bemis himself describes the intervention as “the one really black mark in the Latin American Policy of the United States,” a mark, however, which “has been rubbed off, after much grief, by the reparations treaty of 1921” (p. 151).

28 For the text of the decision, see M. O. Hudson, Cases on International Law, p. 1359 and Fenwick, Cases, p. 663.

29 Moore, Digest, Vol. VI, p. 596.

30 U.S. Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 334-335.

31 Bemis, p. 158: “This Dominican receivership does not appear to have awakened contemporaneously any appreciable resentment or distrust of other governments, even of the Latin American republics, although the press of France and Germany was caustic.” The story is well told in Perkins, Chap. VII (at p. 246): “In no one of the great states of Latin America was any official notice taken of the President's theory; in Brazil, in Chile, in Uruguay,and in Peru, the general tone of oomment was favorable.“

32 Hyde, Vol. I, pp. 161 and ff., summarizes the record.

33 See Bemis, Chap. X, “Woodrow Wilson and Mexico,” where Wilson's moral approach to the situation is clearly brought out.

34 Hyde, Vol. I, p. 75; Hackworth, Digest, Vol. I, p. 152, Vol. II, p. 329, and Vol. V, p. 446.

35 Hyde, Vol. I, p. 70; Hackworth, Digest, Vol. I, pp. 154 and ft*.

36 Hyde, Vol. I, p. 80. A good summary of the intervention is given in T. C. Jones, The Caribbean since 1900, Chap. XVI.

37 See Bemis, Chap. XIV: “The Rio Commission of Jurists and the Havana Pan American Conference,” giving a detailed story of the situation.

38 Same, p. 252; Hyde, Vol. I, p. 251.

39 For the text of the Anti-War Treaty, see International Conferences of American States, 1933-1940, p. 496. For comment on the Treaty, see Bemis, Chap. XV: “The Good Neighbor at Montevideo.

40 International Conferences, 1933-1940, p. 121.

41 Same, p. 123.

42 Same, p. 191. Condemnation of intervention, although in less extreme form, appears again in the Declaration of American Principles, adopted at the Eighth International Conference of American States, held at Lima in 1938: “The intervention of any state in the internal or external affairs of another is inadmissible.” The Preamble of the Act of Chapultepec, repeating the principle of non-intervention with a reference to the Montevideo and Buenos Aires agreements, speaks of the principle as incorporated into the international law of the American States.

43 Perhaps it is just as well, in the present state of international law, not to attempt too precise a definition of terms such as “intervention,” but to let them stand as general principles, to be interpreted by the agencies of the community as new circumstances present themselves.

44 International Conferences, 1938-1940, p. 188.

45 The protocol also provides that any question concerning its interpretation should be submitted to conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement; but this must be understood as governing relations between the parties to the controversy.

46 Inernational Conferences, 1938-1940, p. 160.

47 As to the point whether aid to a legitimate government is to be regarded as “intervention,“ see above, note 3.

48 For a study of the legal aspects of the case, see N. J. Padelford, “International Law and the Spanish Civil War,” in this Journal, Vol. 31 (1937), p. 226, and International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife, 1939.

49 The idea of “collective action,” in the sense of the action of the leading powers, is discussed in a number of the older works on international law. Hall, with his usual shrewdness and legal precision, thought that there was “fair reason for hoping that intervention by, or under the sanction of, the body of states on grounds forbidden to single states, may be useful and even beneficent. Still, from the point of view of law, it is always to be remembered that states so intervening are going beyond their legal powers“: International Law, § 95. By contrast Fiore, building a new law for the future, based upon his conception of a Magna Civitas, devoted a title (XIX) to the “Duties of Collective Intervention.“

50 International Conferences, 19SS-1940, p. 373.

51 For the text, see this Journal, Vol. 36 (1942), Supplement, p. 76.

52 See Spaeth, C. B. and Sanders, W., “The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense,” in this Journal, Vol. 38 (1944), p. 218.Google Scholar

53 Same, p. 226.

54 For the text of the recommendation, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. X, p. 20.

55 Same, p. 28. The Argentine member of the Committee was not a party to either resolution.

56 The Government of Uruguay, in its reply to the resolution of the Committee of Political Defense, observed that it could not consider the plan proposed as having the character of a rule of American international law since, if given a larger scope than that of an emergency war measure, it would be open to criticism as being based upon the principle of intervention “long ago extirpated from continental law.“

57 See preas release of July 26, 1944, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XI, p. 107, where it is said: “Efforts have been made to confuse the issue by charging that the poHcy followed by the American republics and their associates among the United Nations constitutes a departure from the normal rules and procedure with regard to recognition and amounts to intervention in the internal affairs of Argentina. This contention disregards completely the foundation on which the policy of non-recognition rests, namely, the defense and security of the hemisphere. Furthermore, it overlooks the fact that this policy was adopted after full and free consultation among the American republics, and that it is the logical outgrowth of the multilateral agreements which all of them accepted in order to make that defense effective. The American republics have expressly declared that this policy does not affect, and has nothing to do with, the ordinary rules and procedure for recognition in time of peace.“ To the same effect: C. G., Fenwick, “The Recognition of New Governments Instituted by Force,” in this Journal, Vol. 38 (1944), p. 448 Google Scholar, except that the article finds the refusal of recognition consistent with the rule that one of the conditions of recognition must be the fulfillment of international obligations.

58 See in this connection, Kunz, J. L., “The Position of Argentina,” in this Journal, Vol. 38 (1944), p . 436.Google Scholar

59 The Venezuelan memorandum, for example, in commenting upon the power of the Security Council to recommend, at any stage of a dispute, appropriate procedures or methods of settlement, observed that “it would seem expedient to indicate that the intervention of the Council would take place after the ordinary means of settlement had failed.” The Uruguayan memorandum, in commenting upon the power of the Security Council to take the measures necessary for the maintenance of peace in the event of a failure of the procedures of peaceful settlement between the parties, observed that “although the Government of Uruguay adheres to the principle of non-intervention, it considers collective intervention justified in the case of a state which constitutes a threat to the peace, it being the duty of the Organization to determine the modalities of such intervention“: Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace: Handbook for the Use of Delegates, Pan American Union, 1945, pp. 137, 140.

60 The use of the phrase “sovereign equality” in Chapter II of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was clearly not intended to prevent collective intervention, but rather to assure the members of the new organization that there was no plan of setting up a “super-state“: Recommendations and Reports of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, p. 137. The Brazilian jurist Accioly, in commenting upon and dismissing the suggestion that the League of Nations might have a right of intervention in regard to its members, speaks as follows: “Nevertheless, under a more advanced system of international organization, when the League of Nations might come to be a truly universal institution possessing the prestige it now lacks, there is no doubt that the mission of intervention should be confided to it in certain specified cases. That would be the way to avoid certain abuses and injustices that are so common to-day“; Traiti de Droit International Public, 1940, Vol. I, p. 299.

61 For the text of the Act, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XII, p. 339.

62 The Charter of the United Nations, now under preparation at San Francisco, contemplates a corresponding right of the international community as a whole to maintain certain agreed standards of conduct. Assuming that among these standards may be the principle of open channels of communication and information, a violation of the principle would become a matter of concern for the international community and would call for some form of collective intervention.