1 David J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity 88–136 (2001); Stephen C. Neff, Justice Among Nations: A History of International Law 7 (2014).

2 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ REP. 3 (May 24) [hereinafter Tehran Hostages].

3 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 UNTS 95 [hereinafter VCDR]. It should be noted that the Tehran Hostages case also concerned claims under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 UNTS 261. The book under review refers chiefly to the rules under the earlier Convention.

4 Tehran Hostages, supra note 2, para. 86 (emphasis added).

5 VCDR, supra note 3, Art. 3.

6 Id., Art. 41.

7 For example, Gerald Fitzmaurice, British member of the International Law Commission at the time, noted that one of the functions of the diplomat is to address the external policy of the host state, and so the treaty should not prohibit the diplomat from doing so (p. 43).

8 See, e.g., [1957] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 46, paras. 75–82 (May 8, 1957), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1957_v1.pdf (discussion among ILC members Grigory Tunkin, Milan Bartos, Ahmed Matine-Daftary, F. V. García Amador, Thanet Khoman, Gerald Fitzmaurice, and Abdullah El-Erian).

9 Id., para. 74.

10 Citing Application Instituting Proceedings (Hond. v. Braz.), para. 5 (Int’l Ct. Justice Oct. 28, 2009).

11 See Certain Questions Concerning Diplomatic Relations (Hond. v. Braz.), Order, 2010 ICJ Rep. 303 (May 12) (removal of case from the registry list following applicant state's letter withdrawing application).

12 For example, the Tallinn Manual proposes (under its Rule 10 “Prohibition of Threat or Use of Force”) that the UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibition against threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state should apply to cyber operations. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 42–43 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). UN Charter Article 2(4) provides: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” UN Charter, Art. 2(4). The Tallinn Manual further identifies, as a “prohibited intervention,” cases of “manipulation by cyber means of elections or of public opinion on the eve of elections,” though noting that “it is clear that not every form of political or economic interference violates the non-intervention principle.” Tallinn Manual, supra, at 45.

13 Influencing and disrupting might be different objectives of interference. See Dana Priest, Ellen Nakashima & Tom Hamburger, U.S. Investigating Potential Covert Russian Plan to Disrupt November Elections, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 2016, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/intelligence-community-investigating-covert-russian-influence-operations-in-the-united-states/2016/09/04/aec27fa0-7156-11e6-8533-6b0b0ded0253_story.html.

14 Michael Wood, Non-Intervention (Non-interference in domestic affairs), in Encyclopedia Princetoniensis: Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination (Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber ed., 2016), at http://pesd.princeton.edu.

15 William Shakespeare, Henry v, act I, sc. 2.

16 Id.

17 Quoting Britain Backs Envoy, Agence France Presse, Dec. 13, 2010.

18 Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 ICJ REP. 266, 285 (Nov. 20) (emphasis added).

19 Id.

20 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJREP. 14, para. 190 (June 27).

21 As noted, UN Charter Article 2(4) provides: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” UN Charter, Art. 2(4). Under UN Charter Article 4(1), members are “peace-loving states.” Id., Art. 4(1) (emphasis added).

22 See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 4, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 84, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001). But see id., Art. 6, cmt. 4.

23 Yoram Dinstein, Book Review, 102 AJIL 918, 919 (2008) (reviewing Nikolas Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law (2007); and citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ REP. 226, para. 47 (July 8), and Guyana/Suriname, para. 439 (UN Law of the Sea Annex VII Arb. Trib. Sept. 17, 2007)).

24 Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ REP. 4 (Apr. 9).

25 Stürchler, supra note 23, at 68–72; see also Francis Grimal, Threats of Force: International Law and Strategy (2013); Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (2002); Romana Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AJIL 239, 263–64 (1988).

26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 46, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 343, 8 ILM 679 (1969) (“A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.”).

27 Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 ICJ REP. 303, para. 265 (Oct. 10).

28 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, GA Res. 36/103, annex (Dec. 9, 1981). Twenty-two (mostly Western) states voted against adoption. UN GAOR, 36th Sess., 91st plen. mtg., UN Doc. A/36/PV.91 (Dec. 9, 1981). Distinguishing intervention from interference generally has been fraught. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 AJIL 1 (1989).

29 Third Committee, Summary Record of the 59th Meeting, at 6, para. 18, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.59 (Nov. 28, 1989) (Romania).

30 See, e.g., Annex to Letter Dated 25 August 2011 from the Chargé d’Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Belarus to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,UN Doc. A/66/323 (Aug. 26, 2011) (noting protest by Belarus against “coercive economic measures” by the United States).

31 E.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to foreign-flagged passenger ships) (reported by Duncan B. Hollis, at 99 AJIL 881 (2005)); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Diss. Op. Van den Wyngaert, J. ad hoc, 2002 ICJ REP. 3, 137, para. 1 (Feb. 14) (“There is no evidence for the proposition that a State is under an obligation to grant immunity from criminal process to an incumbent Foreign Minister under customary international law.”); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, Sep. Op. Gros, J., 1970 ICJ REP. 3, 267, para. 5 (Feb. 5).

32 This annex is the first of three furnished in the book, the other two containing excerpts from the travaux préparatoires and adopted instruments.

33 See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission: Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 371–72, paras. 71–77, UN Doc. A/CN.4/16.

34 See, e.g., James Flett, Importing Other International Regimes into World Trade Organization Litigation, in Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation 261 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012).

35 See, e.g., James Crawford & Penelope Nevill, Relations Between International Courts and Tribunals: The ‘Regime Problem, ’ in id. at 235.

36 The expression minimum public order, associated particularly with the New Haven School, has been invoked in connection with most branches of international law, including the law of diplomatic relations. See, e.g., B. S. Murty, the International Law of Diplomacy: The Diplomatic Instrument and World Public Order 123 (1989) (citing Myres S. McDougal & F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (1961)).

37 Behrens includes a useful discussion of regional practice (p. 240) and concluding thoughts on the difficulty with encapsulating so many overlapping regimes in a treaty (p. 262).

38 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 588 (Dec. 17, 2015), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf. At the point in time when the investor had reincorporated itself in Hong Kong, which had an investment treaty with Australia favorable to the investor, Australia had not yet adopted the legislation that the investor challenged. Nevertheless, the timing of the move to Hong Kong constituted an abuse of rights because the door was already open to a claim by the “reasonable prospect” that a dispute would arise from such legislation being adopted.