1 Falk, “International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War,” 75 Yale Law Review 1122, at 1155-1156 (1966); also reproduced in The Vietnam War and International Law 362, at 395-396 (R. A. Falk, editor, 1968).

2 Falk, “The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation,” 63 A.J.I.L. 415 (1969); subsequently referred to as “Falk.”

3 Falk, p. 415, asterisk.

4 Ibid.

5 Occasionally the two terms are used by Falk in the same phrase. Thus, for instance, on p. 420 he discusses the “responsibility of all liberation groups for any acts-of-terror kinds of responses.” On p. 442 he speaks of “provocative terror carried out by liberation movements.”

6 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed., 1962) defines “guerrilla” as “1. an irregular war carried on by small bodies of men acting independently; 2. one engaged in such warfare.” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1966) defines it as “1. a member of a small independent band of soldiers that harasses the enemy by surprise raids, attacks on communications and supply lines etc. 2. pertaining to such fighters or their technique of warfare.” Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary (1968) contains the following definition: “guerrilla, lit. small war, dim. of guerra, war. 1. irregular war carried out by independent bands; 2. a. one who carries on or assists in an irregular war or engages in irregular warfare in connection with a regular war, esp. a member of an independent band engaged in predatory excursions in wartime, b. a member of a military, detachment functioning in the rear of enemy lines, esp. guerrilla warfare.” According to Baxter, “[t]he word ‘guerrilla’ is most usefully applied in a legal context to armed hostilities by private persons or groups of persons who do not meet the qualifications established in … the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1949 or corresponding provisions of the earlier Conventions.” Baxter, “So-Called ‘Unprivileged’ Belligerency: Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs,” 28 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 323, at 333 (1951). See, to the same effect, Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 564 (1954): “In its legally relevant sense … the term ‘guerrilla’ should be limited to persons, whether formerly members of an organized force or not, who fight as isolated units behind the enemy lines not being subordinated to regular military forces or a regular government, or after these have ceased to exist, or lacking in some other respect the qualifications required for privileged combatants by … the Hague Regulations, and … by … the 1949 Prisoners of War Convention.” The “unprivileged” nature of guerrilla warfare, under the terms of the 1949 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, was recently confirmed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Mohamed Ali and Another v. Public Prosecutor ([1968] 3 All E.R. 488-497), where it upheld the convictions for murder, by the High Court of Singapore, and the subsequent dismissal of an appeal to the Federal Court of Malaysia, of two Indonesians who in 1965 had placed explosives in the building of the Australian High Commission in Singapore, thereby killing two girl secretaries. In the light of the dictionary meaning of this term and of the above-mentioned legal definitions, it is difficult to see why Falk regards it as a term used by those “who favor Israel's position.” If anything, this term is probably more favorable to the Arab side than the term “armed bands” which usually occurs in international treaties and various U.N. documents dealing with the “guerrilla” phenomenon. See notes 28, 33, 37 and 38 below.

7 Falk, p. 423.

8 Falk, p. 424.

9 Thus in a letter of Feb. 27, 1969, Michel Pierre d'Orléans, a former leader of the French anti-Nazi Resistance, wrote that he was “shocked to hear the Arabs compare our movement to their terrorist acts against unarmed civilians… . France and the rest of the European countries invaded by Nazi Germany never intended to liquidate Germany as the Arabs intend to liquidate Israel. We fought like men against the German army. We never murdered children or women. We never attacked planes carrying innocent passengers. Theirs is not a resistance movement. It is a cowardice.” Letter to the Editor, New York Times, March 6, 1969. For further references to this effect, see statement by Israel's representative at the Security Council's 1499th meeting of Aug. 14, 1969 (Doc. S/PV. 1499, pp. 28-32).

10 Cf. Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory 51 (1957): “Virtually all resistance groups [in Nazi-occupied Europe] operated with the full approval of their legitimate sovereign; most of them received material support in the form of air-drop of weapons, munitions, medical supplies, food, and often leaders, and in several instances the members of such groups were on the payroll of their lawful sovereign.”

11 We need not here go into the question whether the situation that has existed since 1948 between Israel and the Arab states is one of “war,” as is asserted by the Arabs, or merely one of “quasi-belligerency” or status mixtus that cannot be fitted into the general framework of dichotomy between “war” and “peace” (Falk, p. 434). Suffice it to say here that, according to any view, that situation is not one of “peace.”

12 Falk, p. 416.

13 Ibid., p. 429, referring to James Feron's report from Jerusalem, as published in the New York Times of Jan. 5, 1969, sec. 4, p. 1. Falk may have misconstrued General Bar-Lev's words, as reported by Feron. According to Feron, Bar-Lev stated that “not every large-scale operation is a reprisal” and then went on to say that the purpose of the Beirut raid was to encourage the Arab air companies and Arab governments “to take steps to keep the terrorist organizations from attacking our planes and other targets abroad.” Thus it appears that Bar-Lev regarded the Beirut raid as one of those large-scale operations which were not reprisals.

14 Doc. S/PV.1460, p. 23.

15 Falk, p. 430, note 38.

16 James Feron, ‘Israel Debates the Value of Those Raids Into Arabs Lands,” New York Times, May 4, 1969, sec. 4, p. 2.

17 See note 11 above.

18 It is not proposed to discuss here the question whether, in the light of the principle enunciated in Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State …“), states—and in particular U.N. Members—may still validly maintain that they are in a state of war with another state (whether or not a member of the U.N.). According to the prevailing view, such a claim must be regarded as incompatible with the Charter. See to this effect Feinberg, The Legality of a “State of War” after the Cessation of Hostilities 41-55 (1961), and the authorities cited there. See also E. Lauterpacht, “The Legal Irrelevance of the ‘State of War”,” 1968 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 58, at 63-65. For a different view see Baxter, “The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful Use of Force under the Charter,” ibid. 68, at 71 ff.

19 Bishop, International Law, Cases and Materials 744 (2nd ed., 1962); emphasis added. There are, to be sure, also reprisals in time of war. But “reprisals in time of peace should not be confused with reprisals in time of war. The latter are acts otherwise prohibited by the laws of war which can be taken exceptionally for the purpose of compelling the enemy to discontinue illegitimate acts of warfare.” Sørensen, ed., Manual of Public International Law 754 (1968). However, Falk's enumeration of the various requirements for a valid reprisal, as laid down in the well-known Naulilaa Arbitration (2 Int. Arb. Awards 1012 ff.), makes it abundantly clear, in spite of the fact that the Naulilaa Arbitration is not mentioned by him, that he analyzes the Beirut raid with reference to the conditions pertinent to peacetime reprisals.

20 Falk, p. 434.

21 Falk, p. 424.

22 Falk, p. 428.

23 Falk, p. 431, note 39.

24 Falk, p. 431.

25 1 Oppenheim's International Law 292-293 (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955).

26 Kelsen, Principles of International Law 205-206 (2nd rev. ed., Tucker, 1966). Cf. also Starke, who speaks of “the duty on a State to prevent within its borders political terrorist activities directed against another State.” Starke, An Introduction to International Law 96 (6th ed., 1967).

27 Reproduced in Doc. A/2211 of Oct. 3, 1952, which may be found in U.N. General Assembly, 7th Sess., Official Records, Annexes, Agenda Item 54, p. 17.

28 Ibid. 35.

29 See for instance Art. 2 (5) , Convention for the Definition of Aggression of July 3, 1933, 147 League of Nations Treaty Series 67, at 73.

30 Doc. A/C.6/L.332/Rev.l of Oct. 18, 1954. For selected draft definitions of aggression, see Stone, Aggression and World Order 201-205 (1958).

31 Res. 177 (II) of Nov. 21, 1947.

32 19511.L.C. Yearbook (II) 135; 45 A.J.I.L. Supp. 128 (1951).

33 1954 I.L.C. Yearbook (II) 150; 49 A.J.I.L. Supp. 22 (1955). On this aspect of the activities of armed bands, see also Stone, Aggression and World Order 3, 115, 135, 150,205-206,211 (1958).

34 Res. 2131 (XX) of Dec. 21, 1965; 60 A.J.I.L. 662 (1966). Referring to this Declaration, Falk points out that “[s]uch a contradiction between Assembly assertion and liberation practice helps discredit the guidance r6Ie of international norms… .” Falk, p. 424, note 28. This is undoubtedly true. But this contradiction does not, of itself, detract from the clarity of the norm.

35 Res. 290 (IV) on the Essentials of Peace.

36 1 O'Connell, International Law 329 (1965). On the legal status of General Assembly Declarations in general, see Asamoah, The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations (1966).

37 García-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign States 114 (1962).

38 Brownlie, “International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands,” 7 Int. and Comp. Law Q. 712, at 718 (1958). The same author also states that “[a]n examination of the State practice in disputes arising out of State complicity in, or toleration of, the activities of armed bands directed against other States shows conclusively that no State can now claim that such behaviour is lawful. The illegality may be expressed in terms of charges of aggression, intervention, interference in internal affairs, violation of territorial integrity and political independence, or a violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter.” Loc. cit. 734.

39 Falk, p. 416.

40 Falk, pp. 420-421.

41 In view of past Lebanese denials of responsibility for Lebanon-based anti-Israel guerrilla activities, it appears worth drawing attention to the endorsement, on Aug. 26, 1969, by the Arab League's Council of Foreign Ministers, of a “step-up in guerrilla activity against Israel,” and of a call to Arab nations to extend “all necessary financial and military aid to the Palestine revolution,” because “ ‘the path of force’ is the only way remaining to the Arab countries.” New York Times, Aug. 27, 1969. While it is too early to appraise the practical significance of this decision by the Arab Foreign Ministers, it would seem that its very acceptance, with the participation of Lebanon, will make it difficult for the latter to deny in the future governmental involvement in, and indeed, encouragement and support of, Lebanon-based guerrilla activities against Israel.

42 It is noteworthy that during the Security Council deliberations following the Beirut raid, Lebanon did not acknowledge the emanation of anti-Israel guerrilla activities from its territory. Yet on July 1, 1969, the Beirut daily Al-Hayat quoted Lebanese President Helou as saying that “Lebanon had stressed in the Security Council that there were no saboteur bases on its territory in order to obtain a condemnation of Israel by the Council.” Similarly, former Lebanese Minister Raymond Edde declared that “the [former] Prime Minister Abdalla el-Yaffi, refused to expel … [the saboteurs] by force. There was no way of raising the issue in the open since Lebanon had submitted a complaint against Israel to the Security Council in which Lebanon insisted that there were no saboteurs in Lebanon.” Al-Hayat, July 12, 1969. For a possible explanation of the divergences of opinion between President Helou and Mr. Edde (both Christians) on the one hand and former Premier Yaffi (a Moslem) on the other, see note 50 below.

43 Falk, pp. 425-426.

44 For a different view of Jordan's ability to curb anti-Israel guerrilla activities on her territory, see New York Times editorial of Aug. 13, 1969: “[Jordanian King] Hussein's assurances that terrorist and sabotage raids across the Jordan River would cease brought Israeli agreement to withhold further attacks [on the Ghor Canal irrigation project]. But after a truce of almost six weeks, during which the canal was repaired, not only guerrilla raids but attacks by the Jordanian Army resumed. “The truce indicated that the Jordan Government could restrain the guerrillas when it wanted to.”

45 Sørensen, ed., op. cit. 254.

46 Brownlie, loc. ctt. 734.

47 1949 I.L.C. Yearbook 287-288; 44 A.J.I.L. Supp. 16-18 (1950).

48 Gacía-Mora, op. cit. 30.

49 D. A. Schmidt reporting from Beirut, New York Times, April 24, 1969.

50 D. A. Schmidt reporting from Beirut, ibid., May 1, 1969. See also Schmidt's report published in the New York Times of June 21, 1969, where Mr. Pierre Gemayel, leader of the right-wing phalangist party in Lebanon, is quoted as saying that members of the “Saiqah” guerrilla organization—to which most of the guerrillas stationed on Lebanese territory belonged—were “politically motivated commandos representing the [Syrian] Baath Party.” A revealing insight into this aspect of the Lebanon-based guerrilla activities is offered by the Evans-Novak column (Washington Post, May 19, 1969), where it is stated that “it has now been established beyond doubt that some Syrian-trained commandos in southern Lebanon are actually regular Syrian Army soldiers in commando uniforms… . Ostensibly, the Syrian-trained commandos, called Al Saiqa, are in the rugged Mount I, Hermon area to harass Israel from a refuge within Lebanon… . But in fact, Al Saiqa ! commandos … seeded with camouflaged Syrian regulars, are now serving a double and highly insidious purpose—both to harass Israel and to create dangerous political tensions, possibly civil war, within Lebanon itself. Syria has long had a covetous eye on Lebanon, a nation … carved out of ancient Syrian territory as a home for Christian Arabs… . [There is a] rising suspicion in Beirut … that Syria's real purpose is 1 to destroy Lebanon… . If the Syrian controlled Al Saiqa continues to refuse to give ‘ … assurances [not to attack Israel across the border] … the only recourse would be for Israel to mount a major attack in the Mount Hermon area blocking the infiltration | routes between Syria and Lebanon. Thus the security of vulnerable Lebanon with its I half-Christian, half-Moslem population, may ironically depend on its willingness to halt : Syrian infiltration in the Mount Hermon area. But even that prospect carries heavy risks for Lebanon, because it might lead to serious Moslem uprisings within Lebanon I itself, or even civil war, stimulated by Syria.” This view of the wider domestic and inter-Arab ramifications of the guerrilla issue in f. Lebanon is also confirmed by D. A. Schmidt, in his report from Beirut dated Sept. 7, 1969 (New York Times, Sept. 8, 1969): “The delicate religious and political balance in this half-Christian, half-Moslem Arab country is severely threatened by external forces… . Palestinian guerrillas encamped in the southern part of the country have declared that they will not leave… . Neighboring Syria continues to foster the presence of the guerrillas in Lebanon, in spite of Lebanese protests, by permitting them to cross the border into southern Lebanon and by sending in supplies.”

51 D. A. Schmidt reporting from Beirut, New York Times, April 25, 1969. See also Schmidt, ibid., June 21, 1969, stating that, according to authoritative sources in Beirut, “Arab commandos were withdrawing from Lebanon… . The Lebanese have been concerned that commando operations might provoke Israel to the point of attacking Lebanon.

52 Le Monde, July 4, 1969; emphasis added.

53 James Feron, ‘Israel Debates the Value of Those Raids Into Arab Lands,” New York Times, May 4, 1969, sec. 4, p. 2.

54 In fact, Lebanon is not alone in its recent attempts to restrain guerrilla activities from its territory. According to Time magazine of June 13, 1969, “many Jordanians and some of the older Palestinian refugees are increasingly wary of the fedayeen presence, mainly because they fear Israeli retaliation for guerrilla raids. All of the Arab States close to Israel, in fact seem agreed that the fedayeen should be curbed to some degree… . Algeria, too far away from Israel to worry about retaliation, … blithely and comfortably continue[s] to back a go-for-broke effort” Cf. also Newsweek magazine of June 30, 1969: “What makes the guerrillas unwelcome in the countries that give them shelter is the Israeli custom of retaliating violently against Arab nations which permit raids across their borders… .”

55 Falk, p. 426.

56 Falk, p. 433.

57 Ibid. 57 a The clashes between the Lebanese Army and the guerrillas that took place in October and November, 1969, and more particularly the attitude adopted by the pro-Soviet Arab regimes on that matter, have further confirmed the suspicion that the guerrillas are being used by those states (most conspicuously by Syria) as a tool to undermine the pro-Western regime of Lebanon. Cf. note 50 above.

58 Falk, p. 434.

59 Falk, p. 431.

60 Falk, p. 432.

61 New York Times, Jan. 5, 1969, sec. 4, p. 1.

62 Doc. S/8585 of May 15, 1968.

63 Ibid.; emphasis added.

64 Doc. S/8637 of June 15, 1968.

65 Doc. S/8891 of Nov. 6, 1968; emphasis added.

66 New York Times, Dec. 27, 1968; emphasis added.

67 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit. 298; emphasis added.

68 Falk, p. 433.

69 Falk, p. 430, note 38.

70 Falk, pp. 432-433.

71 Falk, p. 439, note 65.

72 Falk, p. 441, note 70.

73 Doc. S/PV. 1460, p. 23.

74 According to the New York Times of Dec. 27, 1968, “the two suspects were questioned by [Greek] Deputy Premier Stylianos Patakos who had hurried to the airport. They told him that they were Arab commandos with ‘orders to destroy an Israeli plane and to kill Jews'.”

75 Falk, p. 420.

76 New York Times, Jan. 5, 1969, sec. 4, p. 1; referred to by Falk on p. 415, note 1.

77 See, however, a contrary view expressed by Warren Z. Harvey in a letter to the Editor of the New York Times of Jan. 6, 1969: “The Israel commando action can be unconditionally condemned only by a society that is so mesmerized by its idolatry for machines that it cannot see the ethical distinction between human beings and property; [we understand] … the indiscriminate detonation of bombs in crowded centers of Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem, but we are profoundly grieved by the demolition of thirteen (replaceable and partially insured) machines. Accordingly, any distinction between an attack on a plane full of passengers and one on empty planes is considered scholastic. We have solemnly condemned the Israelis for blowing up our gods; but the true abomination is not their deicide but our idolatry.”

78 Falk, p. 443.

79 Falk, p. 440.

80 The Pope's reaction to the Beirut raid was in marked contrast to his silence following Arab guerrilla attacks on Israeli civilian targets, including the Athens attack on the El Al airliner. This silence was noted with some bitterness in Israel. Thus, the Jerusalem Post wrote on Jan. 3, 1969, editorially: “In the general outcry abroad that followed the Israeli action at Beirut airport, the voice of Pope Paul VI was heard three times. He first sent a message to the President of Lebanon expressing his shock and extending his Apostolic blessing to the people of Lebanon, half of them Christians. In his New Year's broadcast he also made reference to the situation in the Middle East, and lastly, he gave an unprecedented interview to a leading Italian newspaper, in which he termed the Beirut raid a “black day.’ … “[W]e voice our regret at the attitude now expressed by the Pope in the Arab- Israeli dispute, a position which appears to be completely one-sided… . [T]he strange silence of Rome at the time of the Nazi Holocaust would seem to be maintained whenever Jewish lives are at stake, whether in the Arab states, or behind the iron curtain or when Israelis are killed in their own country or on foreign soil.” Some 4 weeks later Pope Paul did raise his voice in protest against the execution and subsequent public display in Baghdad and Basra, on Jan. 27, 1969, of 14 persons, 9 of whom were Jews.

81 In absolute numbers, the United Arab Republic has almost twice as many Christians as Lebanon. However, whereas the 1.5 million Christians in the U.A.R. represent only about 5% of that country's total population, Lebanon's 800,000 Christians constitute about 50% of the total population in that country. Moreover, whereas only 120,000 of the Christians in the U.A.R. owe allegiance to Rome in one way or another, the Maronites—who acknowledge Roman supremacy—constitute the majority among Lebanon's Christians. See Statesman's Yearbook 1968-9, ed. by Steinberg, pp. 1223 and 1580.

82 This policy of non-recognition of Israel also found expression during Pope Paul's visit to the Holy Land in January, 1964. In addressing President Shazar of Israel who welcomed him in Megiddo on his crossing over to Israel, the Pope thanked “the authorities” for their assistance (New York Times, Jan. 6, 1964), carefully avoiding any reference to the state of Israel and its government. The Pope's caution becomes even more evident by a comparison of the messages sent by him on the conclusion of his visit, to King Hussein and President Shazar, respectively. In his message to King Hussein the Pope invoked “upon your person, the royal family and upon the beloved people of the Kingdom of Jordan the richest graces and favors of Almighty God.” New York Times, Jan. 7, 1964. In the other message, addressed to “President Shazar, Tel-Aviv” (without specifying what President Shazar was presiding over) the Pope stated that “we have been touched by the welcome we have received on the part of the various authorities.” Ibid. It would be interesting to explore the reasons for the Vatican's attitude towards the state of Israel since its inception. Such examination, however, would clearly go beyond the scope of this paper.

83 Falk, p. 438. Elsewhere in his article Falk mentions “the French explanation of their refusal to supply arms to Israel, initially as a consequence of Israel's initiation of force in June 1967 …” (p. 426, note 32, based on the New York Times of Jan. 8, 1969). Cf. the statement made by Israeli Premier Eshkol to the Knesset (Israel's Parliament) on Jan. 14, 1969: “On June 3, 1967, France imposed a partial embargo which officially applied to all the States in the Middle East involved in the conflict In fact, the embargo was activated mainly in order to detain the Mirage planes earmarked for Israel, to be precise, before the Six Day War, and not—as is now being alleged—at the end of the war.” (Jerusalem Post, Jan. 15, 1969.) See also The Christian Science Monitor of July 11, 1969: ”… General de Gaulle imposed an embargo on fifty Mirage 5's on June 2, 1967, just before the outbreak of the June war… .” (Emphasis added.)

84 Falk, p. 419.

85 This seems to be implicitly admitted also by Falk, for he regards as one of the convincing explanations for Israel's restraint after the Baghdad hangings of January, 1969, “the apparently influential diplomatic protests received by Iraq from many parts of the world, including the Pope… .” Falk, p. 419. Note: The Iraqis have since repeated this performance several times.

86 See notes 52-55 above.

87 Falk, p. 420.

88 Ibid. This change is clearly discernible in a New York Times editorial of Aug. 13, 1969, which deals with Lebanon's complaint of the previous day concerning Israeli air raids against Lebanon-based Arab guerrillas. It is asserted there that “the Security Council meeting today to discuss Israel's raids against Arab guerrillas on Lebanese soil will be another exercise in futility if it limits itself to Beirut's complaint. The pattern everywhere is much the same. The Arabs are on the offensive. Guerrilla raids across the border into Israel or artillery attacks by the armies of the Arab states lead to Israeli reprisals by ground commandos or fighter-bombers… . This complex situation obviously cannot be controlled by more one-sided Security Council criticism of Israeli air raids. President Nasser's strategy is to keep the border war going in an effort to force an Israeli withdrawal without serious negotiations. The Security Council must address itself to the Arab guerrilla initiatives as well as to the Israeli reprisals.” Another pertinent example is the reaction to the Israeli raid into Egypt, across the Gulf of Suez, of Sept. 9, 1969. Commenting on that raid the New York Times of Sept. 10, 1969, observed editorially that “in the absence of a strong, even-minded United Nations intervention for peace, Israel's raid across the Gulf of Suez into Egypt yesterday was an inevitable step… . The Arabs have been asking for such a blow with their mounting guerrilla assaults against Israel's borders and beyond, with Egypt's continuing harassment across the ‘cease-fire’ line and with the recent belligerent call of Arab leaders from Cairo for ‘the massing of all Arab forces for the battle’ against Israel. No nation could long ignore such overt threats to its security.”

89 Falk, p. 440.

90 Ibid. It will be recalled that elsewhere in his article Falk calls the situation in the Middle East one of “quasi belligerency” (p. 434), and expresses the need for overcoming “the dichotomy between war and peace.” (P. 435.)

91 Falk, p. 441.

92 Ibid.

93 Falk, p. 442.

94 Falk, p. 435, note 55.

95 For the full text of the resolution see Security Council, 22nd Year, Official Records, Resolutions and Decisions, 1967, p. 8 (Doc. S/INF/22/Rev. 2); reprinted in 62 A.J.I.L. 482 (1968).

96 Cf. Halderman, The United Nations and the Rule of Law 65-89 (1966); Gross, “Voting in the Security Council: Abstention in the Post-1965 Amendment Phase and Its Impact on Article 25 of the Charter,” 62 A.J.I.L. 315-334 (1968); Stone, No Peace- No War in the Middle East 23-24 (1969), and the authorities cited there.

97 Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967, p . 253 (1968).

98 Ibid. 254.

99 Doc. S/8253. This draft resolution was not put to the vote in the Council.

100 Lall, op. cit. 260.

101 Doc. S/PV.1382, p. 28. A similar view was expressed by Mr. Kuznetsov on behalf of the Soviet Union, ibid. 62.

102 Doc. S/PV.1382, p. 28.

103 ibid. 32.

104 lbid. 51.

105 The corresponding passage in the French text of the resolution speaks of “retrait des forces israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit.” Stone has drawn attention to the possible inconsistency on this point between the English and French versions (Stone, No Peace—No War in the Middle East 25 (1969)). Yet it has to be remembered that the original draft of the resolution was prepared by the United Kingdom Delegation in English. Moreover, the reference in the resolution to “secure and recognized boundaries” (Art. 1(ii)) and to “the establishment of demilitarized zones” (Art. 2 (c)) , when added to the just-described history of the withdrawal clause, would also seem to indicate that the Security Council's resolution should not be construed as advocating a return to the armistice demarcation lines of June 4, 1967. Cf. Lapidoth, “The Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967 on the Middle East,” 15 Gesher (No. 58, March, 1969), p. 8, at p. 14 (in Hebrew). It should also be borne in mind that in June and July, 1967, both the Security Council and the General Assembly repeatedly rejected draft resolutions which, if accepted, would have called for the restoration of the pre-June, 1967, armistice demarcation lines. In an analogous context, with regard to the problem of interpreting plurilingual treaties (i.e., treaties having more than one authentic text), the International Law Commission, in preparing Art. 29 of its draft articles on the law of treaties, “examined whether it should be specified that there is a legal presumption in favour of the … language version in which the treaty was drafted. It felt, however, that this might be going too far, since much might depend on the circumstances of each case… .” (Commentary on Article 29 of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, I.L.C. Reports on the second part of its 17th Sess. (January, 1966) and on its 18th Sess. (May-July 1966), Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1, p. 56.) The article under consideration has now become Art. 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 of May 23, 1969, p. 17). It might also be mentioned in this connection that in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, the F.C.I.J., in its judgment of Aug. 30, 1924, mentioned among the considerations that prompted it, in analyzing certain provisions of the Palestine Mandate, to give preference to its English version (as against the French version), that “the original draft of this instrument was probably made in English.” P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 2, p. 19. See also Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals,” 37 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 72, at 98-106 (1961).

106 Doc. S/PV.1377, pp. 38-40.

107 Stone, No Peace—No War in the Middle East 28 (1969); emphasis in original.

108 Falk, p. 436, note 57.

109 Falk, Law, Morality and War in the Contemporary World 19 (1963); emphasis in original.

110 Falk, pp. 435-436.

111 Falk, p. 436, note 56.

112 This aspect of the problem is aptly described by Charles W. Yost, now the chief U. S. Representative to the U.N., in his article “The Arab-Israeli War: How It Began” (46 Foreign Affairs 304, at 304-305 (1968)): “In October [1966] two particularly serious incidents in which several Israelis were killed caused Israel to appeal, as it often had before, to the U.N. Security Council. However, a relatively mild resolution proposed incidents, was, as on previous occasions, vetoed by the Soviet Union in the supposed interest of its Arab friends.” Yost rightly concludes that the first link in the chain of events that led to the Six Day War “were the El Fatah raids, organized from Syria, involving the ‘Pales-tine Liberation Army', subjecting peaceful Israeli villages to recurrent jeopardy and terror, building up through months from October [1966] to May [1967], unpunished and, because of the Soviet veto, even uncensured by the U.N. Security Council.” Ibid. 318. Similarly, Bernard Lewis states: “The Russians were involved in the [Middle East] crisis [of 1967] from the start… . One contribution … distinctively their own, was their unswerving support for the Arab states in any and every encounter, irrespective of circumstances. A good example of this is the recurrent problem of clashes on the Syrian-Israeli border. Most observers— and governments—were content to treat each incident on its own merits and to blame one side or the other as seemed appropriate. But the Soviet Government invariably supported the Syrians, even when they were palpably in the wrong, and on several occasions even used its veto in the Security Council to save the Syrians from a mildly critical resolution. On November 3, 1966, the veto was applied against an inoffensive resolution sponsored, among others, by two African states—a remarkable indication of how far the Soviet Government was prepared to go in support of its Arab protégés. “This kind of action would in itself have led Arab governments to form a high … assessment of Soviet willingness to stand by them in a crisis.” Lewis, “The Arab-Israeli War: The Consequences of Defeat,” ibid. 321, at 321-322.

113 A case in point is the Soviet attitude in the Council in May, 1967. When, following the massive build-up of U.A.R. armed forces in Sinai, the withdrawal of UNEF, and the closing by the U.A.R. of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli vessels, Canada and Denmark on May 24, 1967, introduced a draft resolution which would have expressed “full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to pacify the situation” and would have requested “all Member States to refrain from any steps which might worsen the situation” (Doc. S/7905), the Soviet representative, Mr. Fedorenko, said that he saw no sufficient grounds for such a hasty convening of the Security Council and the artificially dramatic climate fostered by the representatives of the Western Powers (S/PV. 1341, p. 6). In this he was supported by Mr. El-Kony on behalf of the U.A.R. (S/PV. 1342, pp. 37-40). As a result, the Danish-Canadian draft was not put to the vote. For a more general discussion of Soviet policies blocking effective Security Council action, see Halderman, op. cit. 231-232.

114 Lewis rightly points out that what Israel learned from her experience is that “[t]he- Soviet veto in the Security Council is always available to the Arabs, even on the most trivial matters; the combination of the Communist bloc and the quaintly named ‘nonaligned’ states in the General Assembly is sufficient to prevent any solution acceptable to Israel, if not to enforce one acceptable to the Arabs. ‘If the Arabs table a resolution, tomorrow that the earth is flat,’ said … Israeli [Foreign] Minister [Abba Eban], ‘they parcan count on at least 40 votes.'” Lewis, he. cit. 331. This explains, according to Lewis, Israel's “mistrust of ‘United Nations auspices.'” Commenting on the Security Council's resolution of July 3, 1969, which censured Israel for its policies regarding Jerusalem, the London Times stated: “Israel['s] … objection that the United Nations attitude is one-sided is valid. The sheer numerical strength in the United Nations of the Arabs and other third-world countries favourable to them, not to mention the communist block, means that there will always be an anti-Israel majority there. It is perfectly clear, for instance, that the continuing fighting across the Suez Canal is entirely the fault of the Egyptians, but a United Nations vote is unlikely ever to condemn … [the U.A.R.]… . If … [Israel's policy on Jerusalem] is a provocation, and illegal, then so are the daily bombardments across the Canal, and the United Nations should either condemn both equally or neither.” The Times, editorial, July 5, 1969. And following the condemnation of Israel by the Security Council on Aug. 26, 1969, for Israeli air raids of Aug. 11, 1969, of sites on the northern slopes of Mount Hermon, six miles inside Lebanese territory, that were described by Israel as guerrilla encampments, the New York Times observed editorially on Aug. 28, 1969, that “[t]he United Nations Security Council has once again demonstrated its one-sidedness and dramatized its ineffectiveness on the most explosive immediate problem confronting the world. The Council's resolution, specifically condemning Israeli reprisals against Lebanon but delivering only an indirect slap at the escalating Arab guerrilla attacks on Israel, will not help to check the alarming drift toward a new Middle East war… . [I]ts failure specifically to condemn the guerrillas will only confirm Israel in the conviction that it can never expect fair treatment from the Council and will spread further the fear that United Nations machinery has become all but useless in this conflict.”

115 Falk, p. 435.

116 This aspect of the problem was stressed in a letter dated March 13, 1969, from the Israeli representative to the President of the Security Council (Doc. S/9076 of March 13, 1969). Stone has rightly characterized Algeria's r61e in the Security Council in charging Israel with cease-fire breaches and drafting condemnation and “sanctions” proposals as “legally curious.” Stone, No Peace—No War in the Middle East 7 (1969). Algeria, incidentally, is also a member of the 35-member U.N. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, set up pursuant to General Assembly Res. 2330 (XXII) of Dec. 18, 1967. Other members of the Special Committee include Iraq, whose representative is Chairman of the Special Committee, Sudan, Syria and the United Arab Republic (Docs. A/7061 and A/7185/Rev. 1, p. 2). The Committee's composition is dictated, to be sure, inter alia, by considerations of “equitable geographical representation.” (Operative par. 2 of Res. 2330(XXII).) Yet this principle surely would not have been violated if Chad, for instance, had been appointed to the regional seat, rather than Algeria. 116 The U.N.'s disregard of its own Charter became even more obvious with the election of Syria, on Oct. 20, 1969, as one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council for the years 1970-1971. As the New York Times pointed out editorially on Oct. 17, 1969: “Even at the time of the selection [of Syria by the Afro-Asian bloc some months ago, as a candidate for a Security Council seat] Syria was a poor choice because of the Syrian Government's continuing rejection of the Security Council's Middle East resolution of November 22, 1967. Since the Asian caucus, Syria has even more blatantly defied the international community with its barbaric detention of two Israeli passengers seized from an American plane that was hijacked to Damascus last August by Arab guerrillas. “It is difficult to see how U.N. delegates from civilized countries elsewhere in the world can in good conscience endorse this year's Asian candidate. The Charter requires that in selecting non-permanent Security Council members ‘due regard … [be] specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization …’ Under this criterion, Syria in no way deserves a Security Council seat.” Thus, if the U.N. really wanted to pass, to use Falk's language, a “wider judgment” against a state defying the Nov. 22, 1967, Security Council resolution on the Middle East, the most obvious target for a such a wider judgment would have been Syria, which expressly refused to accept that resolution and has not even agreed to receive on its territory Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, Secretary General U Thant's Special Representative appointed under the terms of that resolution. However, rather than passing a welldeserved “wider judgment” against Syria, 101 Members of the U.N. General Assembly instead elected that country to the Security Council.

117 The Security Council, as constituted in 1968, included two Members (Algeria and Pakistan) which do not recognize Israel, and four others (China, Hungary, India and the Soviet Union) which do not maintain diplomatic relations with her. The only change in this respect between the 1968 and 1969 composition of the Council is the substitution of Spain (which does not recognize Israel) for India. Given the wellknown attitude of France, since 1967, on the Arab-Israel conflict, it becomes clear that, even without the use of the Soviet veto, it is technically impossible for any resolution favorable to Israel to receive the requisite nine votes in the Council.

118 Feinberg, “Israel's Growing Lack of Faith in the UN Security Council,” Jerusalem Post, March 13, 1969.

119 Cheng, General Principles of Law 273 ff. (1953).

120 Commenting on Israel's condemnation by the Security Council for the Beirut raid, the Washington Post observed editorially on Jan. 1, 1969, that the Council's resolution “put the United Nations itself in a position of severe compromise and may even have set back the quest for a peaceful settlement. There was really only one reason why Israel was censured: not because it was guilty but because it was small and, in this instance, diplomatically defenseless. Even if other States participating had the elemental fairness to condemn the Athens assault, the Soviet veto would have blocked a censure move. It was illuminating to watch the representatives of the two great powers each of which has recently put half a million troops into a foreign country, passing stern judgment on Israel's hour-long penetration by a handful of soldiers.”

121 Falk, pp. 417 and 435.

122 Doc. S/PV.1461, p. 12. Similarly, when the Security Council discussed Lebanon's complaint of Aug. 11, 1969, concerning Israeli air raids on Lebanese villages in the Mount Hermon area (Docs. S/9383 of Aug. 11, 1969, and S/9385 of Aug. 12, 1969), the Lebanese representative again stated that “[i]f Israel had any valid reason for complaint it should have brought its complaint to the attention of the Security Council and not waited until Lebanon submitted its complaint.” Doc. S/PV.1501 of Aug. 15, 1969, p. 21. He further observed that “none of … [the twenty-one Lebanon-based attacks against Israel that had been launched, according to the Israeli representative between July 11 and August 11, 1969] had been the subject of any letter of complaint addressed to the President of the Security Council or to the Secretary-General prior to our debate.” Doc. S/PV.1502 of Aug. 18, 1969, pp. 18-20.

123 Quoted from the full transcript of Mr. Eban's press conference of Jan. 2, 1969, as released by the Israel Government Press Office.

124 Falk, p. 443.

125 Ibid.

126 James Reston, “The Rise of Anarchy in International Relations,” New York Times, Sept. 10, 1969, p. 40; emphasis added.

127 Falk, p. 443.

128 Falk, p. 439.