1 See Hans Kelsen’s early observations on the nature of the United Nations mechanisms for safeguarding the international peace in Collective Security and Collective Self–Defense Under the Charter of the United Nations, 42 AJIL 783 (1948).

2 See, e.g., Lincoln, Bloomfield, International Military Forces: The Question Of Peacekeeping In An Armed And Disarmed World (1964)Google Scholar; Derek, Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study Of United Nations Practice (1964)Google Scholar; Neil, Briscoe, Britain And Un Peacekeeping, 194867 (2003)Google Scholar; The Evolution Of Un Peacekeeping: Case Studies And Comparative Analysis (William, J. Durch ed., 1993)Google Scholar; Rosalyn, Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents And Commentary (4 vols., 1969–1981)Google Scholar; Alan, James, Peacekeeping In International Politics (1993)Google Scholar; Anthony, Parsons, From Cold War To Hot Peace: Un Interventions, 1947–1995 (1995)Google Scholar; Marrack, Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 69 Int’l Aff. 451 (1993).Google Scholar

3 See Hans, Kelsen, The Law Of The United Nations: A Critical Analysis Of Its Fundamental Problems 756 (1950)Google Scholar, for an exposition of this rather more provocative interpretation.

4 Yoram Dinstein has characterized Kelsen’s view as one held by a minority of legal scholars. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression And Self–Defence 305 (4th ed. 2005). Notably, however, when the debate was revisited briefly after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel suggested that states were obligated to respond to the Security Council’s call to contribute forces for Council–authorized enforcement actions. Thomas, M. Franck & Faiza, Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: “The Old Order Changeth,” 85 AJIL 63, 65 (1991).Google Scholar

5 Two early examples of such operations were the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Israel–Palestine, and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

6 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 ICJ Rep. 151, 167 (July 20); see also Dinstein, supra note 4, at 304–09 (concisely describing the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement). After the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in response to the Suez crisis of 1956, some came to consider “impartiality” to be a third principle of early peacekeeping. See Report of the Secretary–General, Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force, UN GAOR, 13th Sess., Annexes, a.i. 65, at 8, 28–29, para. 160, UN Doc. A/3943 (1958).

7 See, e.g., Dan, Ciobanu, The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peace–Keeping Operations, in United Nations Peace–Keeping: Legal Essays 15, 29–41 (Cassese, A. ed., 1978).Google Scholar

8 See Paul, F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping 28 (1993).Google Scholar

9 See, e.g., Adam, Roberts & Benedict, Kingsbury, Presiding Over A Divided World: Changing Un Roles, 1945–1993 (1994)Google Scholar; Norrie, Macqueen, The United Nations Since 1945: Peacekeeping And The Cold War (1999).Google Scholar

10 See, e.g., Danesh, Sarooshi, The United Nations And The Development Of Collective Security: The Delegation By The Un Security Council Of Its Chapter VII Powers (1999)Google Scholar; Kelsen, supra note 1.

11 1 Evan Luard, A History Of The United Nations: The Years Of Western Domination, 1945–1955, at 87–90 (1982)Google Scholar. For the quoted phrase, see id. at 89.

12 A. Mark, Weisburd, Use Of Force: The Practice Of States Since World War II, at 118 (1997)Google Scholar. Weisburd’s categorization of differing instances of the use of force since the Second World War constitutes an important attempt to characterize these cases with common denominators.

13 S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., para. 5 (1948), quoted in 43 AJIL 634 (1949).

14 He observed:

Memorandum from George, F. Kennan to George, C. Marshall (May 7, 1948), [1948] 1 Foreign Relations Of The United States [hereinafter FRUS]: General: The United Nations 339 (1975).Google Scholar

15 Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Dep’t of State, Armed Forces to Be Furnished Under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter (June 29, 1948), id. at 359.

16 Id. at 360.

17 Two important works on the independence movement that discuss the UN role are Alistair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence And The United Nations (1960), and Robert, J. Mcmahon, Colonialism And Cold War: The United States And The Struggle For Indonesian Independence, 1945–1949 (1981).Google Scholar

18 Jawaharlal Nehru, then deputy president of the Executive Council of the Indian Interim Government, had cabled the Indian high commissioner in London alluding to the possibility of such an appeal. See [1947] 6 FRUS: The Far East 985 n.54 (1972).

19 Aide–mémoire, British Embassy to U.S. Dep’t of State (July 24, 1947), id. at 988.

20 The associate chief of the State Department’s Division of Northern European Affairs, John H. Morgan, “was confident that it would be impossible to show that international peace was threatened by the Netherlands military action in Indonesia which continued to be a purely internal matter.” Memorandum of Conversation by the Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (July 24, 1947), id. at 987.

21 Taylor, supra note 17, at 49 (quoting Australian government). For an account of the lead–up to the presentation of the issue to the Security Council by the Australian and Indian representatives, see id. at 49–50.

22 Despite his desire to work with the United States, the Australian ambassador actually had directly conveyed to U.S. officials his government’s intention to seek Chapter VII enforcement action to stop the violence in Indonesia. See Memorandum of Conversation by Assistant Secretary of State Norman Armour (July 30, 1947), [1947] 6 FRUS, supra note 18, at 997–98.

23 Weisburd, supra note 12, at 69–70, for instance, has argued that the reasons why a threat to the peace was not found in cases like Indonesia remain somewhat ambiguous.

24 McMahon argues that U.S. inclinations to rebuild the Netherlands and retain it as a Western ally against Soviet expansionism were partly offset by a reluctance to oppose the anti–imperialist sentiments that drove the Indonesian independence movement, resulting in the adoption of a sort of compromise policy. See McMahon, supra note 17, at 305, 310–13.

25 Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Dep’t of State, Paper on United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia (Mar. 29, 1949), [1949] 7 FRUS 1128 & n.2,1131 (1976) (later distributed to National Security Council as an information paper labeled NSC 51, July 1, 1949).

26 Taylor, supra note 17, at 430.

27 Innumerable accounts have documented the founding of the state of Israel in the wake of the UN partition plan. For treatments of the early years of UNTSO, see Nathan, Pelcovits, The Long Armistice: Un Peacekeeping And The Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1948–1960 (1993)Google Scholar; Sydney, D. Bailey, Palestine, 1947–9, in 2 How Wars End: The United Nations And The Termination Of Armed Conflict, 1946–1964, at 151 (1982)Google Scholar; Rosalyn, Higgins, The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 1949–, in 1 United Nations Peacekeeping: The Middle East 1 (1969).Google Scholar

28 It was only in July 1948, two months after the outbreak of the war, that the Security Council passed Resolution 54, finding a “threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39.” SC Res. 54, para. 1 (July 15, 1948); Dinstein, supra note 4, at 252.

29 See, e.g., Michael, J. Cohen, Palestine And The Great Powers, 1945–1948 (1982)Google Scholar; Bruce, J. Evensen, Truman, Palestine, And The Press: Shaping Conventional Wisdom At The Beginning Of The Cold War (l992)Google Scholar; Peter, Hahn, Caught In The Middle East: U.S. Policy Toward The Arab Israeli Conflict, 1945–1961 (2004)Google Scholar; Ritchie, Ovendale, Britain, The United States, And The End Of The Palestine Mandate, 1942–1948 (1989).Google Scholar

30 Memorandum from A. J. McFarland to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (June 21, 1946), Documents on the Recognition of the State of Israel, Harry S. Truman Library, available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/israel/large/docs.php=.

31 Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine (Jan. 19, 1948)Google Scholar, [1948] 5 FRUS: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa 546 (1976).

32 Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman and to the Cabinet (Mar. 5, 1948), id. at 678. The document was actually drafted by Assistant Director of the Executive Secretariat William J. McWilliams.

33 Editorial note on the outcome of the March 5 meeting of the Security Council, id. at 685.

34 SC Res. 42 (Mar. 5, 1948).

35 Warren Austin to Marshall (Mar. 13, 1948), [1948] 5 FRUS, supra note 31, at 714.

36 Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Mar. 18, 1948), id. at 740. The final statement by Austin contained minor changes and is available in UN SCOR, 3d Sess., Mar. 3–31, 1948, 270th mtg., at 142–43, UN Doc. S/PV.270 (1948).

37 There is considerable disagreement over the source of this policy shift. See the lengthy editorial note in [ 1948] 5 FRUS, supra note 31, at 744–47.

38 Telegram from Austin to Marshall (Mar. 17, 1948), id. at 735.

39 Austin to Marshall, telegram 332 (Mar. 25, 1948), id. at 760 n.1 (editors’ footnote to telegram 332 quoting memorandum).

40 See Hahn, supra note 29, at 52–53.

41 Evensen, supra note 29, at 135–36; Ovendale, supra note 29, at 267. The document estimating the necessary force level is the draft report by the staff of the National Security Council (Feb. 17, 1948), PPS Files, Lot 64F563, Harry S. Truman Library.

42 The history of the outbreak of hostilities in Kashmir is covered concisely in Sumantara Bose, Kashmir: Roots Of Conflict, Paths To Peace 30–36 (1993).

43 The literature on the UNMOGIP operation eventually launched in Kashmir is somewhat mixed in its assessments of the mission’s fortunes. Early accounts include some favorable assessments, including 2 Higgins, supra note 2, ASIA (1970); Joseph, Korbel, Danger In Kashmir (1954)Google Scholar; David, Wainhouse et al.; International Peacekeeping At The Crossroads (1973)Google Scholar; Sylvain, Lourié, The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, 9 Int’l Org. 19 (1955)Google Scholar. Other works like James, supra note 2, and Alistair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1864–1990(1991), have been less laudatory about the mission’s effectiveness.

44 Robert, Wirsing, India, Pakistan, And The Kashmir Dispute 23738 (1994).Google Scholar

45 CIA Report on India–Pakistan, Section V: Strategic Considerations Affecting US Security (Sept. 16, 1948), President’s Secretary’s Files, Harry S. Truman Library.

46 Marshall to Austin (Jan. 14, 1948), [1948] 5 FRUS, supra note 31, at 280.

47 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Feb. 27, 1948), id. at 306–07.

48 UN SCOR, 3d Sess., Jan. 6–Feb. 4, 1948, 237th mtg., at 287, UN Doc. S/PV.237 (1948).

49 John C. Ross to Austin (July 23, 1948), [1948] 1 FRUS, supra note 14, at 366.

50 As Cold War historian Bruce Kuniholm put it, “The United Nations had no funds and no mechanisms for dealing with the problem at hand. The international organization was slow and subject to delay. The Soviets could always veto its decisions. The United States alone would have to take whatever action was needed . … … …” Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins Of The Cold War In The Near East: Great Power Conflict And Diplomacy In Iran, Turkey, And Greece 413 (1980).

51 The State Department’s paranoia about any cooperation with the Soviet Union in terms of joint UN actions is evident in documents like Policy Planning Staff, supra note 15, at 359–62.

52 See McMahon, supra note 17, at 313–14.

53 The Charter stipulates that Chapter VII enforcement actions are not subject to Article 2(7)’s prohibition on interference in the internal affairs of member states. UN Charter Art. 2(7).

54 When the UN General Assembly finally adopted a definition of “aggression” in 1974, it notably absolved wars of national liberation from that characterization, perhaps validating Weisburd’s logic about categories of military action that were effectively “immune” to enforcement action. See GA Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 142, UN Doc. A/9619 (1974). See also the discussion of the self–determination principle in Thomas, H. Lee, International Law, International Relations Theory, and Preemptive War: The Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today, 67 L. & Contemp. Probs. 147 (2004).Google Scholar

55 Thomas, M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AJIL 809, 818 (1970).Google Scholar

56 See Franck & Patel, supra note 4, at 65 (quoting 12 UNCIO Docs., Doc. 881, III/3/46, at 502, 513 (June 10, 1945)).

57 See Bohlen’s minutes of the Roosevelt–Stalin meeting (Nov. 1, 1943), 1943 FRUS: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 552–55 (1961).

58 See John Gerard, Ruggie, Contingencies, Constraints, and Collective Security: Perspectives on UN Involvement in International Disputes, 28 Int’l Org. 493, 49395 (1974)Google Scholar. Similarly, Alexander George seems to agree that Roosevelt intended the Four Policemen to keep the peace throughout the world, without its division into separate spheres of influence. See Alexander, L. George, Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy, in American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays 320, 328 (G. John, Ikenberry ed., 5th ed. 2002 Google Scholar). But others maintain that Roosevelt himself never specified quite how the system would work. See Georg, Schild, The Roosevelt Administration and the United Nations: Re–creation or Rejection of the League Experience? 158 World Aff. 26 (1995).Google Scholar