1 Published in English as. Justice in a Time of War: The True Story Behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (2004) (reviewed in 99 AJIL 720 (2005) by Patricia Wald).

2 Reviewed in 99 AJIL 523 (2005) by Jenny, Martinez.Google Scholar

3 Created by the UN Security Council in 1994, the ICTR is set to close its doors in 2008.

4 The registrar serves as the Tribunal’s chief administrator and top diplomat.

5 Before that, Cruvellier reported on the war in Sierra Leone and on the conflicts in the Great Lakes region. He also is the cofounder of International Justice Tribune (which replaced Diplomatic Judiciaire), an online news service covering war crimes trials.

6 Moghalu expands his inquiry on the conflicting intersection of criminal justice and politics in Global Justice: The Politics of War Crimes Trials (2006).

7 E.g., International Law and International Relations: An International Organization Reader (Beth, Simmons & Richard, Steinberg eds., 2007)Google Scholar; Steven, Roach, Politicizing the International Criminal Court: The Convergence of Politics, Ethics, and Law (2006)Google Scholar; International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice (Thomas, Biersteker et al. eds., 2006)Google Scholar; The Politics of International Law (Christian, Reus-Smit ed., 2004)Google Scholar. See also, for example, the newly launched Journal of International Law and International Relations.

8 This expression is borrowed from Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation (forthcoming 2008).

9 In Barayagwiza the ICTR appeals chamber dismissed the charges because the defendant had been held for almost two years before being informed of those charges. Outraged by the decision, Rwanda’s government suspended cooperation with the Tribunal. The prosecutor requested the appeals chamber to “review” its decision; acting with unusual speed, the chamber reversed it. The other two issues—the removal by the UN Security Council of Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte and the possible prosecution of the victorious former rebels—are linked, at least in the minds of the many observers and Del Ponte herself. They believe that she was removed as a result of a diplomatic campaign by the Rwandan (and U.S.) government because of her investigation of the then insurgents. See Paix et châtiment (2007) by Florence Hartmann, a former spokesperson for Del Ponte.

10 This claim is a misrepresentation because the new elite consists mostly of former refugees and exiles. The actual victims were the Tutsi living within Rwanda at the time. The survivors among them are also victimized in today’s Rwanda, where they are economically and politically marginalized by the returnees.

11 See Alan J. Kuperman’s Provoking Genocide: A Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, 6 J. Genocide Res. 61 (2004), and Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention, 4 Ethnopolitics 149 (2005).

12 In the first weeks of the massacre, when the Security Council discussed sending a larger peacekeeping force to Rwanda with a broader mandate to protect civilians, the Rwandese Patriotic Front declared that “it is categorically opposed to the proposed U.N. intervention force and will not under any circumstances cooperate in its setting up and operation.” See Rwandese Patriotic Front Press Release, Statement by the Political Bureau of the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Proposed Deployment of a U.N. Intervention Force in Rwanda (Apr. 30, 1994), at <http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw29.pdf>.

13 On the flawed parallel between the Nazi Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide, see further Mahmood, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (2001)Google Scholar; Ian, Spears, There Were No Angels, 65 Rev. POL. 462 (2003)Google Scholar (review of When Victims Become Killers); Rene, Lemarchand, Hate Crimes: Race and Retribution in Rwanda, 9 Transition 114 (2000).Google Scholar

14 Gerry, Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 Albany L. Rev. 801, 803 (1997).Google Scholar

15 Hannah, Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963).Google Scholar

16 See his earlier article Image and Reality of War Crimes justice: External Perceptions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Fletcher J. World Aff., Summer/Fall 2002, at 21.

17 As early as 1995, Rwanda expert Filip Reyntjens, who later would serve as a prosecution witness in genocide trials in Arusha and elsewhere, published the results of his own investigation into the attack, including said serial numbers. Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda: Trois jours qui ont fait Basculer L’histoire 2 1–50 (1995).

18 According to an official census by Rwanda’s Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports, 937, 000 individuals were massacred between April and July 1994. See “RWANDA: Census Finds 937, 000 Died in Genocide” (Apr. 2, 2004), at <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=49384>.

19 Even for the authors of the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999), the simple fact that the aircraft was shot down remained an unspeakable truth. In Annex I (“Chronology of Events”) the report states: “April 6: At approximately 20.30, Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, who were returning from a regional summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were killed in a plane crash just outside the Kigali airport.”

20 A former ICTR investigator alleges that then Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour ordered him to end his investigation into the circumstances of the airplane crash after informing her that it was the work of a cell directed by Paul Kagame. See La vérité n’apas été dévoilée sur le Rwanda, an interview article with the former ICTR investigator in the French newspaper Libération of March 18, 2004, at 11. See also the diaries of a former lieutenant in the rebel army describing his own role and the role of Kagame in the assassination of the two presidents. Abdul Joshua Ruzibiza, Rwanda: L’histoire Secrete 23 7–52 (2005).

21 On November 20, 2006, the French newspaper Le Monde published Rwanda: le juge Bruguière recommande des poursuites contre le président Kagamé, which presented the results of French antiterrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière’s investigation into the downing of the aircraft (whose crew was French). He recommended the prosecution of Kagame for his role in the assassination of his predecessor.

22 As reported on November 29, 2006, by Hirondelle News Agency, at <http://www.hirondellenews.com>. The article is reprinted at <http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/warcrimeswatch/archives/wcpw_vo102issue08.html>.

23 Immi, Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13 Eur. J Int’l L. 561, 591 (2002)Google Scholar (emphasis added). See also Carlos Santiago, Nino, Radical Evil on Trial viii (1996)Google Scholar, pointing to the difficulty of responding to radical evil with the ordinary measures that are usually applied to common criminals. On the limits of criminal trials to redress the Rwandan genocide specifically, see Mark, Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, in 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1221, 1277–92 (2000).Google Scholar