1 Outstanding pioneering efforts are found in Sloan, ‘ ‘ The Binding Force of a 'Recommendation’ of the General Assembly of the United Nations,” 25 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 1 (1948), and Johnson, “The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations,” 32 ibid. 97 (1955-1956).

2 E.g., Bailey, “Making International Law in the United Nations,” 1967 Proceedings, American Society Int. Law 233; Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (1963); AsamoahZZZZ, , The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966);Google Scholar and the papers given at the 1965 meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1965 Proceedings, American Society Int. Law 108-139.

3 The data used in this article were produced as part of a computerized study of General Assembly resolutions being carried on by the author. See 62 A.J.I.L. 143 (1968). A note of thanks is due to Ronald Webster and the staff of the University Computation Center for their assistance in assembling this material.

4 An enumeration of the most-cited resolutions, in terms of both total citations and average number of citations per session, appears below.

5 A proposal by the Philippine Delegation at the United Nations Conference on International Organization that the Assembly be given legislative power was defeated overwhelmingly. Doc. 507, II/2/22, 9 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 70 (1945); cf. Doc. 571, 11/2/ 27, ibid. 80-81 (1945).

6 U.N. Charter, Arts. 98, 66, 87, and 22, respectively. One authority has suggested that the primary legal significance of General Assembly resolutions arises not from the content of the resolutions themselves, but from the ability of the Assembly, by the “executive” activities of establishing committRes of investigation and peace forces, to bring about some compliance with international law. See Skubiszewski, “The General Assembly of the United Nations and Its Power to Influence National Action,” 1964 Proceedings, American Society Int. Law 153.

7 U. N. Charter, Art. 17.

8 U.N. Charter, Art. 4, par. 2.

9 U.N. Charter, Art. 6.

10 This theory of the importance of the practice of the General Assembly and the Security Council is the underlying rationale for the excellent work by Eosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (1963).

11 Ibid. 17-20.

12 Res. 273(111).

13 Res. 1631 (XIV).

14 Res. 1872 (S-IV).

15 An eminent authority has recently concluded: “As a practical matter, it would seem extremely unlikely that any major enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter would be taken with all the permanent members abstaining… . If such cases do arise in the future, the permanent members must be deemed to be aware of the consequences in the light of the previous interpretation which they originated and which they have applied consistently since the establishment of the United Nations with respect to voluntary abstentions on their part under Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter. That practice has been acquiesced in by other Members of the Organization, and can now be considered a firm part of the constitutional law of the United Nations.'' Stavropoulos, “The Practice of Voluntary Abstention by Permanent Members of the Security Council under Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations,” 61 A.J.I.L. 736, at 752 (1967).

16 Sloan, note 1 above, at 7-14, demonstrates rather convincingly that the word “recommend” was widely used before the drafting of the U.N. Charter to represent a higher degree of obligation than its “natural” meaning would indicate. His analysis leaves the question of its actual significance largely unanswered, however.

17 U.N. Charter, Arts. 10-14.

18 An excellent analysis of the broad problem is presented in Schachter, “Towards a Theory of International Obligation,” 8 Virginia Journal Int. Law 300 (1968).

19 The problem could be approached as one of estoppel, which is a generally accepted international law doctrine. MacGibbon, “Estoppel in International Law,” 7 Int. and Comp. Law Q. 468 (1958). But an examination of the requisites of a “promissory estoppel” leads to the same problem described in the text. The principle underlying estoppel is the foreseeable creation of a reasonable expectation that a party will behave in a manner consistent with its assertions, followed by action by another in reliance upon that expectation which will result in injury to the acting party if the asserting party is permitted to ignore his own assertions. Invoking the doctrine of estoppel raises, but does nqt answer, the crucial question of how and to what extent a General Assembly vote creates the required expectation.

20 This is not to say that votes in the General Assembly cannot be relied upon because they are “politically” motivated. A state which, for whatever reason, openly supported a resolution in which it did not believe, should not be permitted to use that fact as a defense to an obligation built upon its public expression of support for the resolution, any more than a party to a treaty can avoid that obligation by demonstrating an ulterior motive for adherence. ” T r u e ” motive on the part of the state voting for a resolution is not the missing element here, but reasonable basis for relying upon the public expression embodied in that vote.

21 The analysis that follows was inspired in large part by the oral argument presented by Ernest A. Gross on behalf of Ethiopia and Liberia in the South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. Eep. 6. The relevant portions are reprinted in Palk and Mendlovitz, The United Nations 79 (1966), Vol. I l l of the Strategy of World Order series.

22 See Separate Opinion of Sir Percy Spender, Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Eep. 151, at 184-197.

23 “The signed text is, with rare exceptions, the sole and most recent expression of the common will of the parties.” Huber, 44 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International 199 (1952).

24 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. No. A/6309, 61 A.J.I.L. 263 (1967).

25 See comments by Eosenne in 1 I.L.C. Yearbook (1966) 187, par. 25.

26 Art. 4, Draft Articles, note 24 above.

27 The literature on the flexibility that must be permitted when interpreting a constitutive treaty is voluminous. See, for example, Separation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. Eep. 174; Dissenting Opinion of JudgeJessup in South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. Eep. 6, at 352-353; Pollux, “The Interpretation of the Charter,” 23 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 54 (1946); McDougal and Gardner, “The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival,” 60 Yale Law J. 258 (1951); Gordon, “The World Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties,” 59 A.J.I.L. 794 (1965).

28 C. Engel, “Procedures for De Facto Bevision of the Charter,” 1965 Proceedings, American Society Int. Law 109-111.

29 1 Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law 25-27 (8th ed., 1955); Brierly, The Law of Nations 59-62 (6th ed., 1963); see Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law 28-42 (1964).

30 Bin Cheng, in “United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: ‘Instant’ International Customary Law?” 5 Indian Journal Int. Law 23 (1965), says (p. 36) that ’ ‘ there need … be no usage at all in the sense of repeated practice, provided that the opinio juris of the States concerned can be clearly established.” He concludes that ” 8 . Provided that the intention is expressed articulately and without ambiguity, there appears to be no reason why an Assembly resolution may not be used as a means for identifying the existence and contents of a new opinio juris.” (P. 46.)

31 A Memorandum by the Office of Legal Affairs, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.610 (1962), stated that ” 3 . In United Nations practice, a declaration is a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated, such as the Declaration on Human Bights. A recommendation is less formal. ” 4 . Apart from the distinction just indicated, there is probably no difference between a ‘recommendation’ or a ‘declaration’ in United Nations practice as far as strict legal principle is concerned. A ‘declaration’ or a ‘recommendation’ is adopted by resolution of a United Nations organ. As such it cannot be made binding upon Member States, in the sense that a treaty or convention is binding upon the parties to it, purely by the device of terming it a ‘declaration’ rather than a ‘recommendation'. However, in view of the greater solemnity and significance of a ‘declaration', it may be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong expectation that Members of the international community will abide by it. Consequently, in so far as the expectationis gradually justified oy State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States. ” 5 . In conclusion, it may be said that in United Nations practice, a ‘declaration’ is a solemn instrument resorted to only in very rare cases relating to matters of major and lasting importance where maximum compliance is expected.” (Emphasis added.) This concept can be substantially extended by taking into account past practice which conforms to the principles set forth in the resolution, as well as subsequent practice.

32 2 Moore, Digest of International Law 231-240 (1906).

33 See Ebb, International Business Transactions 76-78 (1964). It may be that, whatever the actual nature of the facts, it is usually what the states thought took place that is crucial. But what happens to the customary rule when in a subsequent case a state points out that “the Emperor has no clothes“? Are either the actual events or the perceived outcomes customary law?

34 Wolfke, note 29 above, at 157-165.

35 See Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I. C. J. Eep. 138-139.

36 I. C. J. Statute, Art. 38, par. (c).

37 W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law 196-200 (1964).

38 It was in part this doctrine which provided the rationale for the decision in Diversion of Waters from the Eiver Meuse, [1937] P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 70, at 24-25, 73-80.

39 U. N. Administrative Tribunal Case, [1954] I.C.J. Eep. 47, at 53.

40 See Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind 106, 120-167 (1958).

41 Rosenne, The International Court of Justice 423 (1957).

42 I.C.J. Statute, Art. 59.

43 See, e.g., Eea. 1884 (XVIII) on the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, the comments of Ambassador Stevenson before the First Committee of the General Assembly (reprinted in 49 Dept. of State Bulletin 753-754 (1963)), the statement by Ambassador Fedorenko at the 1244th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, Oct. 17, 1963, at which the resolution was approved, and Bin Cheng, note 30 above.

44 See Schachter, “Law and the Process of Decision in the Political Organs of the United Nations,” 99 Hague Academy, Becueil des Cours 171-200 (1958, I I ).

45 See Moschzisker, “Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort,” 37 Harvard Law Rev. 409 (1924); Cross, “Stare Decisis in Contemporary England,” 82 Law Q. Eev. 203 (1966); and the materials collected in Fryer and Orentlicher, Legal Method and Legal System 469-503 (1967).

46 See, on the development of stare decisis in the United States, Kempin, ‘ ‘ Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Tears, 1800-1850,” 3 Am. J. Legal History 28 (1959).

47 See, e.g., the Security Council debate on the appointment of a subcommittee on Laos, 14 U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Meetings 847-848 (1959), and the General Assembly debate of the scope of the “important question” provision of Art. 18, 11 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records 1153-1166 (1957), both reprinted in Sohn, Cases on United Nations Law (2nd ed., 1967).

48 For example, the widely cited and widely disobeyed Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), requiring school integration, is the law of the land in the United States as far as lawyers, if not sociologists, are concerned.

49 For convenience, the resolutions are listed here in chronological order:

50 The proportion of resolutions produced by the various committRes of the General Assembly over the first 21 sessions is as follows:

* After several years of existence as the Ad Hoc Political Committee, this committee was given permanent status as the Special Political Committee.

51 The absence of any resolutions from the Sixth Committee on this list is intriguing. Perhaps it can best be explained by the fact that one of its primary responsibilities is the development of the more traditional areas of international law, such as the law of the sea and diplomatic intercourse, by the more traditional means of preparing conventions for formal consideration. As a result it has involved itself in the least controversial rather than the most controversial areas of international law.

52 Res. 449(V): Question of South West Africa; Res. 749(VIII): Question of South West Africa.

53 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. Eep. 128.

54 Res. 194(111): Palestine—Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator, par. 7.

55 Res. 194(111), par. 11.

56 Res. 2105(XX), par. 5.

57 lbid., par. 10.

58 Both Res. 1654(XVI) and Res. 1810(XVII) are titled: “The Situation with Eegard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.“

59 Discussion of the program of the Human Rights Commission can be found in articles by Hendrick, 18 Dept. of State Bulletin 195 (1948), and 19 ibid. 159 (1948), and by Simsarian, 20 ibid. 18 (1949), 21 ibid. 3 (1949), 42 A.J.I.L. 879 (1948), 43 ibid. 779 j (1949), 45 ibid. 170 (1951) and 46 ibid. 710 (1952). See also Brunson MacChesney, “International Protection of Human Eights in the United Nations,” 47 Northwestern U. Law Eev. 198 (1952-1953).

60 Kunz, “The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights,” 43 A.J.I.L. 316, at 322 (1949). The International Covenants on Human Rights do not seem to bear out that expectation, but they are many years overdue.

61 The full paragraph is as follows: “Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of ; achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition ^ and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the * peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.” I For full text of Declaration see 43 A.J.I.L. Supp. 127 (1949).

62 Statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, 19 Dept. of State Bulletin 751 (1948). See also 62 A.J.I.L. 918 at 920 (1968).

63 Cf. the statements of the delegates from Belgium, Trance, Lebanon, and Uruguay, U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Official Records, Third Comm., pp. 32, 35, 51, 61, 64, 199-200; and ibid., Plenary Meetings, pp. 860, 862, 866, 880, 887, 933-934. For a more detailed treatment, see Sohn, ” A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Eights,” Commission To Study the Organization of Peace: The United Nations and Human Bights 60-72 (1968).

64 H. Lauterpacht, “The Universal Declaration of Human Eights,” 25 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 354 (1948), at 376: “At the time when this article is being written it is not yet clear whether the Declaration will become a stepping-stone to a true Bill of Eights—that is what is meant by a covenant and provisions for implementation—or whether it will become a factor in causing the postponement or abandonment of the main instrument for which it was intended to pave the way. For although the Declaration can claim no legal authority and, probably, only inconsiderable moral authority, that circumstance does not deprive it altogether of significance or potential effect. Somewhat paradoxically, the realization of the ineffectiveness of the Declaration per se must tend to quicken the pace of less nominal measures for the protection of human rights.“

65 U.N. Doc. A/PV.183 (1948).

66 U.N. Doc. A/PV.182, at 176 (1948).

67 A tabulation of the votes can be found in 1948 Year Book on Human Eights 465.

68 See Res. 285(111), and 3 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Comm. 718-781 (1948), reprinted in abridged form in Sohn, Cases and Materials on United Nations Law 670-691 (1st ed., 1956).

69 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.l/3/Add. 1 (1947).

70 Hendrick, “An International Bill of Human Eights,” 18 Dept. of State Bulletin 195, at 198 (1948).

71 Res. 1514(XT), par. 7: “7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Bights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.''

72 A discussion of Bes. 1514 (XV) appears below.

73 Res. 424(V): Freedom of Information: Interference with Eadio Signals.

74 Res . 1937(XVIII): “World Campaign for Universal Literacy.

75 The number of citations in these sessions was as follows:

76 Examples are the International Covenants on Civil and Political Eights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Eights, Res. 2200(XXI); the Declaration on the Eights of the Child, Res. 1386 (XIV) ; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Eacial Discrimination, Res. 2106 (XX) ; and the Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Res. 1921(XVTII).

77 Res. 1514 (XV) : Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; Res. 2022(XX), 2023(XX), 2107(XX), and 2238(XXI), dealing with Ehodesia, Aden, Portuguese Territories, and Oman, respectively; Res. 446(V) and 1538 (XV), on information about human rights and the United Nations in non-selfgoverning territories; and Res. 644(VII) and 2144(XXI) on racial discrimination in non-self-governing territories.

78 Res. 721(VIII), 820(IX), 1598(XV), and 1663(XVI). Res. 2144(XXI), although i t deals with apartheid policies generally, makes specific reference to South Africa, South “West Africa, and Ehodesia.

79 Res. 265(111), 395(V), 511(VI), 615(VII), 719(VIII), 1179(XII), 1302(XIII), 1597(XV), and 1662(XVI).

80 Res. 1142(Xn), 1360(XIV), 1565(XV), 1567(XV), 1568(XV), and 2145(XXI).

81 Res. 1353(XIV), 1723(XVI), and 2079(XX).

82 The resolutions, by article cited, are: Art. 1 (Res. 2106(XX)) t; Art. 2 (Res. 446(V)); Art. 4 (Res. 1841 (XVII)) *t; Art. 13 (Res. 285(111)); Art. 14(2) (Res. 428(V), 429(V))t; Art. 15 (Res. 1040(XI)) *t; Art. 16 (Res. 285(111), 1763 (XVII),*t 2018(XX))t; Art. 19 (Res. 424(V),*t 633(VII), 1313(XIII)); Art. 26 (Res. 1779(XVII), 1937(XVIII)).

83 The simultaneous existence and effectiveness of several overlapping treaties is not unusual. See, for example, the list of treaties on white slave traffic and on narcotic drugs in the List of Signatures, Eatiflcations, Accessions, etc. of Multilateral Treaties in Bespect of which the Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions, U.N. Doc. 8T/LEG/SEE.D/1 (1968).

84 A short summary of the history of the negotiations can be found in Sohn, United Nations Law 694-699 (1st ed., 1956).

85 [1950] I.C.J. Eep. 128; 44 A.J.I.L. 757 (1950).

86 The relevant portions of Res. 749(VIII) are the following paragraphs:

“The General Assembly,

“Having accepted, by resolution 449 A (V) of 13 December 1950 and by resolution 570 (VI) of 19 January 1952, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice with respect to South West Africa,

“Recalling that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice with respect to the Territory of South West Africa sets forth, inter alia, that:

’ ‘ (a) The Territory of South West Africa is a Territory under the international Mandate assumed by the Union of South Africa on 17 December 1920,

” (b) The Union of South Africa acting alone has not the competence to modify the international status of the Territory of South West Africa, and that the comptence to determine and modify the international status of the Territory rests with the Union of South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations,

” (c) The Union of South Africa continues to have the international obligations stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Mandate for South West Africa as well as the obligation to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of that Territory, the supervisory functions to be exercised by the United Nations to which the annual reports and the petitions are to be submitted;

“Considering that, in accordance with the opinion of the International Court of Justice, the Union of South Africa is under an obligation to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court as provided by Article 37 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, by Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations and by article 7 of the Mandate for South West Africa,

“10. Considers that without United Nations supervision the inhabitants of the Territory are deprived of the international supervision envisaged by the Covenant of the League of Nations:

“11. Believes that it would not fulfill its obligation towards the inhabitants of South West Africa if it were not to assume the supervisory responsibilities with regard to the Territory of South West Africa which were former exercised by the League pf Nations;

“The General Assembly,

“Having accepted, by resolution 449 A (V) of 13 December 1950, the advisory opinion of 11 July 1950 of the International Court of Justice concerning South West Africa, inter alia, to the effect that:

” (a) While ‘the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter do not impose on the Union of South Africa a legal obligation to place the Territory under the TrustReship System', they ‘are applicable to the Territory of South West Africa in the sense that they provide a means by which the Territory may be brought under the TrustReship System',

” (b) ‘… the Union of South Africa acting alone has not the competence to modify the international status of the Territory of South West Africa,’ and ‘ … the competence to determine and modify the international status of the Territory rests with the Union of South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations',

“2. Reasserts that the normal way of modifying the international status of the Territory would be to place it under the TrustReship System by means of a TrustReship Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter.“

87 Res. 449(A) (V), seventh preambular paragraph: ’ ‘ Considering that it is incumbent upon the Government of the Union of South Africa to promote to the utmost in the administration of the Territory the material and moral well-being and social progress of its inhabitants as a sacred trust of civilization, subject to the existing Mandate, and to give effect to the obligations which it assumed under the Mandate.“

88 [1950] I.C.J. Eep. 128 at 136-137.

89 ma. at 141.

90 Ibid, at 140.

91 Bes. 449 (V) and 749 (VIII) also give the impression that they are repeating the language of previous resolutions in making this statement. But the resolutions passed before the I.C.J. Advisory Opinion have no linguistic similarity to this provision, and they have no normative quality. Instead they simply recommend that South West Africa be placed under the TrustReship System.

92 Res. 935-939, 942(X), 1057-1058(XI), 1138-1139(XII), 1244(XIII), 1356-1358 (XIV), 1563 (XV), and 1703 (XVI).

93 Res. 851(IX), 941(X), 1054(XI), 1140(XII), 1245(XIII), and 1360(XIV).

94 Res. 1061 (XI).

95 Bes. 852(IX), 940(X), 1055(XI), 1141(XII), 1246(XIII), and 1359(XIV). All but Res. 940 (X) expressly refer to Res. 449 (V) as accepting the I.C.J. Opinion.

96 South “West Africa—Voting Procedure, Advisory Opinion, [1955] I.C.J. Eep. 67, 49 A.J.I.L. 565 (1955); Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, [1956] I.C.J. Eep. 23, 50 A.J.I.L. 954 (1956).

97 A summary of the history of Bes. 1514 (XV) can be found in 1960 U.N. Yearbook 44-50. The nine states abstaining were Australia, Belgium, Dominican Eepublic, France, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States.

98 The full text of these paragraphs is as follows: ” 1 . The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. ” 2 . All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. ” 3 . Inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. ” 4 . All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected. ” 5 . Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the people.8 of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom. ” 6 . Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. “7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Eights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and Tespect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.“

99 Goodrich and Hambro, The Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents 410 (2d ed., 1949).

100 Ibid, at 95-96.

101 See Sohn, Cases on United Nations Law 772-790, 804-812 (1st ed., 1956), for a review of the General Assembly's action in this field.

102 Res.1514(XV) citations were distributed among the sessions as follows:

The lack of citations in the 19th Session is of course an outgrowth of the TJ.N. financing crisis, which prevented voting on any controversial questions.

103 Because some resolutions contain more than one such reference, there are only 24 resolutions in which this type of citation occurs.

104 Explicit reference to a particular paragraph can be found in Res. 1654 (XVI) (pars. 4 and 6), 1747(XVI) (par. 5), and 1955(XVIII) (par. 5). Quotation of a specific paragraph is found in Res. 1603(XV) (pars. 1 and 5), 1650(XVI) (par. 4), 1654(XVI) (par. 5), and 1951(XVIII) (par. 5).

105 Res. 2074 (XX), Question of South “West Africa, Dee. 17, 1965. Another typical case can be found in Res. 1951 (XVIII), Question of Fiji, Dec. 11, 1963, par. 1: ” 1 . Affirms the inalienable right of the people of Fiji to self-determination and national independence in conformity with the provisions of General Assembly Besolution 1514 (XV).“

106 Such paraphrases can be found in the following resolutions: Pax. 2: 1807(XVII), 1913(XVIII), 1949(XVIII), 1951(XVIII), 2012(XX), 2068(XX), 2145(XXI), 2151 ( X X I ) , 2183(XXI), 2185(XXI), 2227(XXI), 2228(XXI), 2229(XXI), 2230(XXI), 2238(XXI). Par. 4: 1807 (XVII). Par. 5: 1596(XV), 1697(XVI), 1807(XVII), 1913(XVIII), 2229(XXI), 2238(XXI) [Cf. 1747(XVI), 1760(XVII)]. Par. 6: 2074(XX), 2232(XXI).

107 See discussion of this resolution below.

108 Skubiszewski, ‘ ‘ The General Assembly of the United Nations and Its Power to Influence National Action,” 1964 Proceedings, American Society Int. Law 153, at 157-158.

109 France, South Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The representative of Portugal announced that its delegation would not participate in the voting on this resolution.

110 A brief discussion of the history of this resolution can be found in 1961 U.N. Yearbook 44-51, 55-56.

111 Par. 4.

112 Only Res. 1846 (XVII) cites Res. 1654 (XVI) without also referring to Res. 1514 (XV). Res. 1846 (XVII) is concerned with the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, and simply notes that information gathered by it was forwarded to the Special Committee.

113 Aden (Res. 1949(XVIII)); Angola (Res. 1819 (XVII)); Basutoland, Swasiland, and Bechuanaland (Res. 1817(XVII), 1954(XVIII), 2063(XX)); British Guiana (Res. 1955(XVIII), 2071(XX)); Fiji (Res. 1951 (XVIII), 2068(XX)); (Island Colonies) (Res. 2069(XX), 2232(XXI)); Nyasaland (Res. 1818(XVII)); Ehodesia (Res. 1745(XVI)); Zanzibar (Res. 1811(XVI)).

114 Four resolutions deal with relations with the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Res. 1700(XVI), 1846(XVII), 1847(XVII) and 1970 (XVIII). Res. 1702 (XVI) covers relations with the Committee on South West Africa, and Res. 2106B(XX) covers relations with the Committee on the Elimination of Eacial Discrimination which will be established under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Eacial Discrimination.

115 Res. 1810 (XVII): The Situation with Eegard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (this resolution enlarged by 7 the membership of the Special Committee to 24); Res. 1956 (XVIII): The Situation with Eegard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; Res. 2105(XX): Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; and Res. 2189(XXI): Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.