Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-2pzkn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-28T13:48:01.771Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Global Evolution of Foreign Relations Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2021

Kevin L. Cope
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Law & Public Policy, University of Virginia, USA.
Pierre-Hugues Verdier
Affiliation:
John A. Ewald Jr. Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia, USA.
Mila Versteeg
Affiliation:
Professor of Law, University of Virginia, USA.

Abstract

The constitutional rules that govern how states engage with international law have profound implications for foreign affairs, yet we lack comprehensive data on the choices countries make and their motivations. We draw on an original dataset that covers 108 countries over a nearly two-hundred-year period to map countries’ foreign relations law choices and trace their evolution. We find that legal origins and colonial legacies continue to account for most foreign relations law choices. A small number of models emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Western Europe, subsequently spread through colonial channels, and usually survived decolonization. Departures from received models are rare and usually associated with major political shifts. Prominent political science accounts that emphasize how states design their foreign relations law strategically to enhance their international credibility or entrench democracy or human rights appear to have limited explanatory power over the bulk of foreign relations law today.

Type
Lead Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press for The American Society of International Law

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

The authors thank David Sloss and participants in the American Society of International Law International Law in Domestic Courts Interest Group Annual Workshop and the American Society of Comparative Law Annual Meeting for their comments on an earlier draft. We thank Alexis Ramirez and Apinop Atipiboonsin for excellent research assistance. We also thank the many researchers and librarians, at the University of Virginia and elsewhere, who prepared country memoranda and otherwise contributed to the collection and compilation of our data. All errors or omissions are ours.

References

1 See Belgium Walloons Block Key EU Ceta Trade Deal with Canada, BBC News (Oct. 24, 2016), at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37749236.

2 Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others, 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP) (S. Afr.). The government subsequently revoked its purported withdrawal.

3 2 BvR 859/15 (Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 5, 2020), at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html (English translation).

4 Bradley, Curtis A., What Is Foreign Relations Law?, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law 3 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019)Google Scholar. Foreign relations law as thus defined also encompasses other areas, such as executive powers, federalism in foreign affairs, regional integration, international immunities, and the use of military force. It is also worth noting that, especially outside the United States, scholars may recognize these issues without conceiving of them as a field or give that field another name. We do not believe these differences are material to our analysis. The issues covered in this Article are regarded as central by scholars who identify foreign relations law as a field, so we need not—and do not—take a view as to the field's precise scope. These issues are also widely recognized and studied across the world's legal systems, whether or not scholars identify foreign relations law as a distinct field.

5 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §102(2) (1986).

6 Existing efforts at comparison have consisted primarily of qualitative studies of a small number of well-documented—mostly Western—countries. See notes 64–65 infra and corresponding text.

7 We have previously presented analysis of a limited number of variables from an earlier iteration of this dataset. See Verdier, Pierre-Hugues & Versteeg, Mila, International Law in National Legal Systems: An Empirical Investigation, 109 AJIL 514, 515–17 (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 See Section II.B infra.

9 See Section II.A infra.

10 See Section II.C infra.

11 Madelaine Chiam, Monism and Dualism in International Law, in Oxford Bibliographies in International Law, at https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0168.xml (“It is conventional practice for international law textbooks and casebooks to include a chapter on the relationship between international and domestic law. Such chapters generally describe monism and dualism … and then critique the concepts as unhelpful.”).

12 Lori Fisler Damrosch & Sean D. Murphy, International Law: Cases and Materials 615 (7th ed. 2019).

13 Id.

14 See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Introduction, in International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion 1, 2–5 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011); The Fluid State: International Law and National Legal Systems (Hilary Charlesworth, Madelaine Chiam, Devika Hovell & George Williams eds., 2005); Francis G. Jacobs, Introduction, in The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law xxiv (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987); Chiam, supra note 11.

15 See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 14, at 3–4; David Sloss, Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts, in The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement 1, 6–7 (David Sloss ed., 2009).

16 See, e.g., Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International and National Law, in International Law 412 (Malcolm Evans ed., 4th ed. 2014).

17 James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law 80–81 (9th ed. 2019).

18 Id. at 59, 63.

19 See Paul Craig, Engagement and Disengagement with International Institutions: The U.K. Perspective, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law, supra note 4, at 394; Anthony Aust, United Kingdom, in The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement, supra note 15, at 476, 477.

20 See John Henry Merryman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America (3d ed. 2007).

21 See generally Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 8 (The Lawbook Exchange 2002 [1967]).

22 See Hans Kelsen, Sovereignty and International Law, 48 Geo. L.J. 627, 629 (1960).

23 See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 74 (1974); see also William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 489, 499 (1995); Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 839, 839 (2003); Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 442, 443 (Mathius Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); but see Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 111, 120 (1997).

24 See Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, supra note 20, at 2.

25 See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Schleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. Econ. 1193, 1193–97 (2002); Anu Bradford, Yun-chien Chang, Adam S. Chilton & Nuno Garoupa, Do Legal Origins Predict Legal Substance?, 64 J. L. & Econ. 207 (2021).

26 Compare Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity 7 (2010), with Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 Ind. L.J. 1133, 1160–61 (2014).

27 See Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The Diffusion of Constitutional Rights, 39 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 1, 14–16 (2014); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 1163, 1164 (2011); see also Charles O.H. Parkinson, Bills of Rights and Decolonization: The Emergence of Domestic Human Rights Instruments in Britain's Overseas Territories 19 (2007) (describing how the British Colonial Office drafted the Constitutions of its former colonies); Julian Go, A Globalizing Constitutionalism? Views from the Postcolony, 1945–2000, 18 Int'l Soc. 71, 74 (2003); Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & James Melton, Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul: Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1139, 1175–76 (2007).

28 The comparative law literature has long debated whether legal families are exogenous and static or more fluid and subject to change. See Nuno Garoupa & Mariana Pargendler, A Law and Economics Perspective on Legal Families, 7 Eur. J. Leg. Stud. 36 (2014).

29 Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, 110 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 657, 659 (2016); Zachary Elkins, James Melton & Tom Ginsburg, The Endurance of National Constitutions (2009).

30 See Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 1813, 1814 (2009).

31 Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 SCR 913, 920 (India).

32 See Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton & Katerina Linos, Dynamic Diffusion (manuscript on file with authors, 2021).

33 See John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and the Nation-State, 103 Am. J. Soc. 144, 154 (1997).

34 See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law 99–110 (2013); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Towards an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1749, 1760 (2003); Young S. Kim, Yong Suk Jang & Hokyu Hwang, Structural Expansion and the Costs of Global Isomorphism, 17 Int'l Soc. 481, 485–87 (2002).

35 See, e.g., John Boli, Human Rights or State Expansion? Cross-National Definitions of Constitutional Rights, 1870–1970, in Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual, 133, 138 (George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez & John Boli eds., 1987).

36 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 Duke L.J. 621, 642–46 (2004).

37 David John Frank, Ann Hironaka & Evan Schofer, The Nation-State and the Natural Environment Over the Twentieth Century, 65 Am. Soc. Rev. 96, 102–03 (2000).

38 Importantly, states do not necessarily internalize the values embodied in the global cultural models; they adopt the laws and institutions of the global script merely to pay lip service to the international community. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 725, 726 (2008).

39 See Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh & Zachary Elkins, Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 201, 235 (2008).

40 See Philip Allott, The Emerging Universal Legal System, in New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law 63 (Janne E. Nijmann & André Nollkaemper eds., 2007).

41 See generally David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932, 946–79 (2010).

42 U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2; see Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 Persp. Am. Hist. 233, 264 (1984); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1083, 1101–10 (1992); see also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 599, 616–19 (2008).

43 Federalist No. 64, at 415 (John Jay) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000); see Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 41, at 994; but see David H. Moore, Constitutional Commitment to International Law Compliance?, 102 Va. L. Rev. 367, 434–43 (2016) .

44 See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 97–107 (1984); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int'l Org. 427, 435–41 (1988); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 Int'l Org. 761, 764–68 (2001); Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. Leg. Stud. 189, 207–10 (2007).

45 See Antonio Cassese, Modern Constitutions and International Law, 192 Recueil des Cours 331, 352 (1985).

46 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AJIL 241, 252–69 (2008).

47 See Lisa L. Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation 13, 21–52 (2000).

48 See Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 83, 86 (2002); Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace 106–107 (2003); Curtis A. Bradley, Article II Treaties and Signaling Theory, in The Restatement and Beyond: The Past, Present, and Future of U.S. Foreign Relations Law 123, 140 (Paul B. Stephan & Sarah A. Cleveland eds., 2020).

49 The same logic also applies to withdrawal: requiring legislative permission to withdraw from treaties further heightens the credibility of treaty commitments.

50 Among U.S. scholars, much of the literature focuses on the president's ability to choose whether to ratify international agreements under Article II of the Constitution (which require a two-thirds vote of the Senate), congressional-executive agreements (which require a majority vote in both houses), or sole executive agreements (which do not require any congressional approval). See, e.g., John K. Setear, The President's Rational Choice of a Treaty's Preratification Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement, 31 J. Leg. Stud. S5 (2002); Lisa L. Martin, The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices, 35 Pres. Stud. Q. 440 (2005); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236 (2008); John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2011); Julian Nyarko, Giving the Treaty a Purpose: Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements, 113 AJIL 54 (2019). In that context, the signaling rationale described here has been criticized. See Bradley, supra note 48. In virtually all legal systems outside the United States in which legislative approval is required, however, the executive has much less discretion to choose alternative ratification pathways. See id. at 126–27, 140 (signaling theories are more relevant in choosing whether to involve the legislature at all in treaty ratification)

51 There are several potential objections and limitations to the signaling theory, even outside the unique U.S. context. For example, if the short-term benefits of defection are high, the executive may be willing to incur legislative approval costs even if she intends to defect. Even if the executive intends to comply and the signal is accurate, it does not reveal the preferences of her successors. Finally, because sending the signal is costly for the executive, she might refrain from concluding some treaties that would be beneficial for the country but whose private benefits for the executive are insufficient—a form of agency cost. A full examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. For our purposes, it suffices to note that the general prediction that emerges from the literature is that a desire for greater international credibility will be associated with more onerous legislative approval requirements.

52 It is worth noting that, even if they are not strategically selected, these foreign relations law choices might nevertheless enhance credibility. For example, a country that inherited these features may be able to enter into more treaties or obtain more favorable terms; its treaties may also prove more durable. Because this Article is concerned with the origins rather than the consequences of foreign relations law choices, investigating these effects is beyond its scope.

53 Studies have shown that democracies are less likely to go to war; that they conclude more trade agreements; and that democratic institutions facilitate international cooperation generally. See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 48, at 12; Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner & Peter B. Rosendorff, Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements, 56 Int'l Org. 477, 503–05 (2002).

54 See Cassese, supra note 45, at 352.

55 On Eastern Europe, see Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern European Constitutions?, 88 AJIL 427, 447 (1994). On Latin America, see, e.g., René Ureña, Domestic Application of International Law in Latin America, in The Oxford Handbook of Foreign Relations Law, supra note 4, at 566–67.

56 Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 Int'l Org. 217, 218 (2000).

57 See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 707, 726–36 (2006); Ginsburg, Chernykh & Elkins, supra note 39, at 205.

58 See, e.g., Donald S. Lutz, Toward A Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 355, 356 (1994); Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 29, at 658.

59 Manuel Eduardo Góngora-Mera, The Block of Constitutionality as the Doctrinal Pivot of a lus Commune, in Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America 236–238, 240–244 (Armin von Bogdandy, Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, Flavia Piovesan & Ximena Soley eds., 2017).

60 Ginsburg, Chernykh & Elkins, supra note 39, at 219.

61 See Verdier & Versteeg, supra note 7, at 518–21.

62 For evaluations of whether or not this presents a problem, see, e.g., Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 Eur. J. Int'l L. 907, 924–27 (2004); Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AJIL 596, 610–617 (1999); cf. John H. Jackson, The Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AJIL 310, 324 (1992) (emphasizing that the act of incorporation into domestic law in dualist systems serves as a democratic check on treaty-making).

63 Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236, 1271–74 (2008).

64 Ginsburg, Chernykh & Elkins, supra note 39, at 207–10.

65 See, e.g., International Law and Domestic Legal Systems, supra note 14.

66 See, e.g., National Treaty Law and Practice (Duncan B. Hollis, Merritt R. Blakeslee, Benjamin Ederington & American Society of International Law eds., 2005); The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement, supra note 15; Treaty Making: Expression of Consent by States to Be Bound by a Treaty (Council of Europe and British Institute of International and Comparative Law eds., 2001).

67 We thank the Comparative Constitutions Project for providing us access to its historical repository of constitutions.

68 The specific model we use is Item Response Theory (IRT). See Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman & Douglas Rivers, The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data, 98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 355, 356 (2004). Appendix II.B provides more information on our ideal point estimation procedure.

69 See, e.g., Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 357, 362 (1985).

70 Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 Pol. Analysis 134, 142 (2002).

71 Erik Voeten, Clashes in the Assembly, 54 Int'l Org. 185, 198–99 (2000).

72 Law & Versteeg, supra note 27, at 1205–10.

73 Martin & Quinn, supra note 70, at 146.

74 Voeten, supra note 71, at 203–06.

75 Keith T. Poole, Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting 14–15 (2005).

76 See also Law & Versteeg, supra note 27, at 1233–34.

77 While we ourselves do not assign different weights to the different issues, the estimation procedure allows different issues to influence the resulting policy points based on a variety of factors.

78 Appendix II.A provides more details on the dimensionality of the data.

79 Another tool to establish the meaning of the dimensions is to analyze the discrimination parameters produced by the ideal point estimation. Appendix II.B describes in more detail how to do so. The discrimination parameters for all variables that contribute to the policy points are also listed in Appendix II.B.

80 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, 2010, c. 25, § 20 (UK). Unlike legislative approval requirements in other jurisdictions, the Act does not require an affirmative vote as a condition for ratification of treaties. Instead, it codifies a preexisting convention known as the Ponsonby Rule, under which governments tabled treaties before Parliament at least twenty-one days before ratification. The Act goes further in a crucial respect: if the House of Commons votes against ratification, the government may not ratify the treaty, although it may resubmit at a subsequent time. Because the Act obligates the government to inform Parliament of pending treaties and makes it illegal to ratify a treaty in the face of a negative vote, we classify the United Kingdom among the countries with a binding parliamentary approval requirement post-2010, although we acknowledge that it is a borderline case.

81 Some countries that apply treaties directly are also positioned near the bottom of this dimension, because these countries do not apply CIL directly.

82 For more than two decades, U.S. scholars have debated whether CIL has the status of federal common law, which would imply superiority over the laws of individual U.S. states. For an overview of this debate, see Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System ch. 5 (3d ed. 2021). The variables on the status of CIL we use in this Article do not code the status of CIL relative to subnational legislation and therefore do not take a position on this question. They reflect what we take to be the most common view among courts and scholars: that CIL is in principle “part of our law” (The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)), may in some circumstances be applied directly, and is inferior to the Constitution and federal statutes.

83 This can be seen from the discrimination parameters listed in Appendix II.B.

84 We use data from Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. Econ. Lit. 285, 306–09 (2008).

85 We use 2012 data from the World Justice Project, see http://worldjusticeproject.org (2019).

86 We use data produced by Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, App. I (2009).

87 See notes 57–61 supra and surrounding text.

88 We use data from José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi & James Raymond Vreeland, Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited, 143 Public Choice 67 (2010).

89 The discussion in this Part describes the most salient developments in the foreign relations law choices documented by our data, selected to provide a broad historical account and to evaluate the theories described above. Unlike our quantitative analysis, it cannot cover all aspects of foreign relations law captured by our data for every country in each period; it thus inevitably reflects the authors’ judgments as to selection and organization.

90 See notes 42–44 supra and accompanying text.

91 U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10; Art. III, sec. 2, cl. 2.

92 Id. Art. VI, cl. 2.

93 See David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court: Continuity and Change 7 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).

94 See Jörg Kammerhofer, International Legal Positivism, in The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law 407, 411–12 (Anne Orford & Florian Hoffman eds., 2016).

95 See Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch, La Technique parlementaire des relations internationales, 56 Recueil des Cours 213, 233 n. 1 (1936); Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Droit international et droit constitutionnel, 38 Recueil des Cours 307, 357–59 (1931).

96 See Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Technique parlementaire, supra note 95, at 232–42.

97 See id. at 235.

98 Id. at 241.

99 Most of the May 22 decree was incorporated verbatim in the 1791 Constitution. The final provision, however, required legislative approved for all treaties. 1791 Constitution [Const.], tit. III, ch. IV, § III, Art. 3 (Fr.). The 1791 Polish constitution also required parliamentary approval for “final ratification of treaties of alliance and trade [and] any diplomatic acts and agreements involving the law of nations.” Konstytucja 3 maja [Constitution of 3 May], Art. VI (1791) (Pol.). Both constitutions were short-lived, and it was the 1790 Decree that proved most influential in nineteenth-century constitutionalism. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Technique parlementaire, supra note 95, at 240.

100 Subsequent French constitutions also made all treaties subject to legislative approval. 1793 Const., Arts. 55, 70 (Fr.); 1795 Const., Arts. 331, 333 (Fr.). The Consulate limited legislative approval to peace, alliance, and commercial treaties. 1799 Const., Art. 50 (Fr.), then eliminated it as it morphed into the Empire. 1801 Const., Art. 58 (Fr.); 1804 Const., Art. 41 (Fr). The 1814 Charter gave the king the exclusive power to “make treaties of peace, alliance and commerce.” 1814 Const., Art. 14 (Fr.). Even the reformed 1830 Charter did not grant the assembly a role in treaty-making. Thus, constitutional developments elsewhere in Europe shaped the evolution of treaty-making provisions.

101 Constitución Política de la Monarquía Española [Political Constitiution of the Spanish Monarchy], Arts. 131(7), 172 (1812) (Spain).

102 Constituição Política da Monarquia Portuguesa [Political Constitution of the Portuguese Monarchy], Art. 100 (1822) (Port.).

103 Constitución Política de la Monarquía Española [Political Constitiution of the Spanish Monarchy], Art. 172(4) (1812) (Spain).

104 Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands], Art. 58 (1815) (Neth.); Carta Constitucional da Monarquia Portuguesa [Constitutional Charter of the Portuguese Monarchy], Art. 75(8) (1826) (Port.).

105 Specifically, it required parliamentary approval for “treaties . . . that may burden the State, or individually bind the Belgians.” 1831 Const., Art. 68 (Belg.).

106 See Ruth D. Masters, International Law in National Courts: A Study of the Enforcement of International Law in German, Swiss, French and Belgian Courts 197–99 (1932).

107 According to Masters, supra note 106, at 128, Belgium's 1831 constitution was “considered to be a model for all constitutional governments.” Greece's 1844 constitution, the first to establish an effective constitutional monarchy in that country, adopted a similar provision. Σύνταγμα της Ελλάδας [Constitution of Greece], Art. 25 (1844) (Greece). In 1848, the Dutch constitutional provision on parliamentary approval was expanded to include treaties “that entail . . . any other provision or change pertaining to legal rights.” Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands], Art. 57 (1848) (Neth.). Piedmont-Sardinia's 1848 Statuto Albertino, which became the constitution of unified Italy in 1861, required approval of treaties “involving financial obligations or alterations of the territory of the state.” Statuto Fondamentale della Monarchia di Savoia (Fundamental Statute of the Monarchy of Savoy), Art. 5 (1848). The 1869 Spanish constitution added “those that may individually obligate Spaniards” (Art. 74(4)), which was also included in the 1876 constitution. Constitución Democrática de la Nación Española (1869), [Democratic Constitution of the Spanish Nation (1869)], Art. 74(4) (Spain). The 1875 fundamental laws of the French Third Republic, which remained in force until World War II, required parliamentary approval of territorial cessions and treaties of peace, commerce, and “those that engage the finances of the State, those that relate to the status of persons and to the property rights of the French abroad.” Loi constitutionelle du 16 juillet 1875 [Constitutional Law of 16 July 1875], Art. 8 (Fr.); see also Danmarks Riges Grundlov [Constitutional Act of the Realm of Denmark], Art. 23 (1849) (Den.); Constitution du Luxembourg [Constitution of Luxembourg], Art. 37 (1856) (Lux.). This model was adopted even in Central European empires whose regimes strenuously resisted constraints on executive power. Prussia's 1850 constitution provided that treaties required legislative assent “in so far as they are commercial treaties, or impose burdens on the State, or obligations on the individual subjects” (Verfassung für den Preußischen Staat [Constitution for the state of Prussia], Art. 48 (1850)), and the 1871 constitution of the German Empire provided that where treaties relate to matters that “belong in the domain of the Imperial legislation, the concurrence of the Bundesrat is required for their conclusion and the approval of the Reichstag is required for their validity.” Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches [Constitution of the German Empire], Art. 11 (1871) (Ger.). Austria-Hungary's 1867 imperial constitutional laws conferred on the Reichsrat power to approve “commercial treaties and … those political treaties which place a financial burden upon the empire or any part thereof, which place obligations upon individual citizens, or which have as a consequence a change in the territory of the kingdoms and countries represented in the Reichsrat.” Gesetz, wodurch das Grundgesetz über die Reichsvertretung vom 26. Februar 1861 abgeändert wird (Law Altering the Fundamental Law of February 26, 1861, Concerning Imperial Representation), § 11(a) (1867).

108 There were a few exceptions. Russia, Sweden, and Norway, for example, imposed no legislative approval requirement, while Portugal and Switzerland adopted provisions that, on their face, required legislative approval of all treaties. See Acto adicional de 1852 a Carta Constitucional da Monarquia [1852 Additional Act to the Constitutional Charter of the Monarchy], Art. 10 (Port.); Constitution fédérale, Sept. 12, 1848, FF 1 [Cst 1848], Art. 74(5) (Switz.).

109 See Masters, supra note 106, at 209 (France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland); Antonio Remiro Brotóns, The Spanish Constitution and International Law, 9 Spanish Y.B. Int'l L. 27, 53 (2003) (Spain); André Gonçalves Pereira, Novas considerações sobre a relevância do direito internacional na ordem interna portuguesa 41–42 (1969) (Portugal).

110 In some countries such as Belgium, this reasoning meant that only treaties that had received such approval could be treaties as laws, while others were mere royal decrees. See Masters, supra note 106, at 209. Other courts applied ratified treaties directly even where they fell outside the categories that required legislative approval.

111 See, e.g., id. (discussing cases from Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland).

112 See id. ; see Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 14/1896, (Greece); Natalino Ronzitti, Application of Customary International Law, in National Implementation of International Humanitarian Law 36 (Michael Bothe, Thomas Kurzidem & Peter Macalister-Smith eds., 1990) (Italy); Julio D. González Campos, Luis L. Sánchez Rodriguez & María Paz Andrés Sáenz de Santa María, Curso de derecho internacional publico 328 (4th ed. 2008) (Spain); Gonçalves Pereira, supra note 109 (Portugal).

113 Masters, supra note 106, at 214–21 (discussing a famous Belgian case regarding the validity of King Leopold II's marriage contract with the Archduchess of Austria).

114 There were a few significant exceptions. Italy followed a dualist system under which treaties were not directly applicable absent legislative implementation, although its courts applied CIL directly; Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway were strictly dualist and considered neither treaties nor CIL directly applicable.

115 See generally George Athan Billias, American Constitutionalism Heard Around the World 1776–1989: A Global Perspective (2009).

116 Constitución Política de la República Peruana [Political Constitution of the Peruvian Republic], Art. 60(7) (1823) (Peru). See also Constitución de la República de Colombia [Constitution of the Republic of Colombia], Art. 55(18) (1821) (Great Colom.). Colombia's 1832 constitution, adopted following Gran Colombia's dissolution, provided that one of Congress's exclusive powers was “[t]o give consent and approval to public treaties and conventions entered into by the Executive.” Constitución Política del Estado de Nueva Granada [Political Constitution of the State of New Granada], Art. 74(14) (1832) (Colom.). Likewise, Venezuela's 1830 constitution granted Congress the authority to “give or withhold its consent and approbation to the Treaties of Peace, Armistice, Amity, offensive and defensive Alliance, Neutrality, and Commerce, which may have been concluded by the Chief of the Republic.” See Constitución Política del Estado de Venezuela [Political Constitution of the State of Venezuela], Art. 87(11) (1830) (Venez.). Ecuador's first constitution required legislative approval only of “treaties of peace, partnership, friendship and trade.” Constitución del Estado del Ecuador [Constitution of the State of Ecuador], Art. 26(6) (1830) (Ecuador). This was soon replaced by more general language, giving Congress the power “to give its assent and approval to public treaties and agreements concluded by the Executive Power.” Constitución de la República del Ecuador [Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador], Art. 43(7) (1835) (Ecuador). Mexico's 1824 constitution granted its Congress power to “approve treaties of peace, alliance, friendship, federation and armed neutrality, and whatsoever other which the President of the United States may celebrate with foreign powers.” See Constitución Federal de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Federal Constitution of the United Mexican States], Art. 50(13) (1824) (Mex.). Chile's 1833 constitution provided that “Treaties, before ratification, must be presented for the approval of the Congress.” Constitución Política de la República de Chile [Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile], Art. 82(19) (1833) (Chile). Argentina's 1853 constitution, adopted after a long period of constitutional instability, granted the National Congress power “[t]o approve or reject the treaties concluded with any foreign nations.” Constitución de la Confederación Argentina [Constitution of the Argentine Confederation], Art. 64(19) (1853) (Arg.). The short-lived constitutions of 1819 and 1826 also required legislative approval of treaties. The major exception was Brazil, whose emperor had the power to “make treaties of offensive and defensive alliance, of aid and commerce, bringing them subsequently to the attention of the general assembly when the interests and security of the state permit it,” except for territorial modifications, which required approval. Constituição Política do Império do Brasil [Political Constitution of the Empire of Brazil], Art. 102(8) (1824) (Braz.). Thus, Brazil's imperial constitution followed the European conservative model (although during the 1831–40 regency all treaties were apparently subject to approval.) The 1891 republican constitution brought the country in line with its neighbors, giving Congress power to “[p]ass finally upon treaties and conventions with foreign nations.” Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil [Constitution of the United States of Brazil], Art. 34(12) (1891) (Braz.).

117 Constitución de la Confederación Argentina [Constitution of the Argentine Confederation], Art. 31 (1853) (Arg.).

118 Id. Art. 97. The Argentine Supreme Court soon held that while treaties were directly applicable, they were inferior to federal laws and therefore implementing legislation was required if a treaty was inconsistent with legislation. This remained the law until 1963, when it held that they had equal status. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 6/11/1963, “Martín & Cía. Ltda. S. A. c/ Administración General de Puertos s/ repetición de pago,” Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia [Fallos] (1963-257-99).

119 Constitución Federal de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Federal Constitution of the United Mexican States], Art. 97(6) (1857) (Mex.).

120 Constitución Política para la Confederación Granadina [Political Constitution for the Granadine Confederation], Art. 49(11) (1858) (Colom.); Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos de Colombia [Political Constitution of the United States of Colombia], Art. 71(8) (1863) (Colom.); Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil [Constitution of the United States of Brazil], Art. 59(3)(1)(a) (1891) (Braz.).

121 Until 1977, the Supreme Court continued to hold that treaties were superior to domestic laws. See S.T.F., Recurso Extraordinario No. 80,004 SE, Relator: Min. Xavier de Albuquerque, 01.06.1977, 83(3), Revista Trimestral de Jurisprudência [R.T.J.], 809 (Braz.).

122 Thus, in a 1924 case concerning diplomatic agents, the Colombian Supreme Court stated that “there should be taken into account the public treaties and, in the absence of such treaties, the most accepted rules of International Law.” Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], agosto, 1924, Informe de la Corte Suprema de Justicia al Congreso de la República en sus sesiones de 1924, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.], vol. 31, p. 30 (Colom.).

123 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos de Colombia [Political Constitution of the United States of Colombia], Art. 91 (1863) (Colom.).

124 See Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela], Art. 140 (1901) (Venez.); Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela], Art. 125 (1904) (Venez.); Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela], Art. 143 (1909) (Venez.).

125 British North America Act 1867, 30–31 Vict., c. 3., pmbl.

126 See, e.g., Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontario (Labour Conventions), [1937] A.C. 326 (legislative implementation requirement for treaties) (Can.); Chung Chi Cheung v. R., [1939] A.C. 160 (UK) (direct application of CIL if not inconsistent with statutes).

127 Spamann, supra note 30, at 1818.

128 See Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge, supra note 93, at 23–37.

129 Weimar Const., Art. 4 (1919) (Ger.).

130 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl No. 1/1920, Art. 9 (Austria).

131 Constitución de la República Española [Constitution of the Spanish Republic], Art. 7 (1931) (Spain). Even more ambiguously, Ireland's 1937 constitution stated that the country “accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other States.” Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 29(3) (Irl.).

132 Cassese, supra note 45, at 357.

133 See note 122 supra.

134 Cassese argues that on its face, Germany's 1919 constitution gives CIL the status of federal law and allows impeachment of cabinet members for its violation; but admits that both its drafting history and subsequent practice show that CIL continued to be treated as inferior to domestic law. See Cassese, supra note 45, at 358–59.

135 See Masters, supra note 106, at 51–65; Cassese, supra note 45, at 359.

136 It seems that even at the time of its adoption, Hugo Preuss, the constitution's drafter, and the Justice Department believed that this was the proper meaning of Article 4. See Cassese, supra note 45, at 358–59.

137 Although Article 5 mentioned custom, it was understood not to directly incorporate it. See Paul De Visscher, Les tendances internationales des constitutions modernes, 80 Recueil des Cours 512, 521 (1952); but see Cassese, supra note 45, at 360.

138 Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana [Constitution of the Republic of Italy], Art. 10(1) (1947) (It.); Nihonkoku Kenpō [Kenpo] [Constitution], Art. 98(2) (Japan); 1946 Const., pmbl. (Fr.).

139 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], Art. 25 (Ger.); see generally Volker Röben, Aussenverfassungsrecht [Constitutional Law for Foreign Affairs] (2007).

140 See Cassese, supra note 45, at 358, 396.

141 Constitución de la República Española [Constitution of the Spanish Republic], Art. 65 (1931) (Spain). The 1931 constitution also required the government to submit ILO conventions for approval and ratify them if approved; prohibited secret treaties; and prohibited declarations of war inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

142 Nihonkoku Kenpō [Kenpo] [Constitution], Art. 98(2) (Japan). It is noteworthy that Italy's post-war constitution maintained its traditional dualistic approach to treaties and that Germany's did not explicitly give direct effect to treaties; indeed, it was interpreted to establish a dualist regime, contrary to previous German practice.

143 1946 Const., Art. 26 (Fr.).

144 Japan's provision, although less clear on its face, was also read to give treaties supralegislative status.

145 France was not the first country with a constitutional court, a model pioneered by Kelsen in Austria's 1920 constitution and adopted in others, including by Germany in 1949. However, although many constitutional courts eventually asserted the power to review the constitutionality of treaties, these constitutions did not explicitly grant them that power, nor did they condition ratification on prior constitutional review.

146 1958 Const., Art. 54 (Fr.).

147 The Constitutional Council was a quasi-judicial institution composed of three appointees by each of the president of the Republic, the president of the National Assembly, and the president of the Senate. 1958 Const., Art. 56 (Fr.). Many countries—including France itself—eventually reformed such councils into constitutional courts. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, Separation of Powers, Treaty-Making, and Treaty Withdrawal: A Global Survey, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law, supra note 4, at 135, 152–54.

148 1946 Const., pmbl. (Fr.); Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana [Constitution of the Republic of Italy], Art. 11 (1947) (It.); Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], Art. 24 (Ger.).

149 See John Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 781, 782 (1989).

150 See Cassese, supra note 45, at 362–63.

151 See Gennady M. Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and International Law, 88 AJIL 451, 458 (1994); Lori Fisler Damrosch, International Human Rights Law in Soviet and American Courts, 100 Yale L.J. 2315, 2320 (1990); but see W. E. Butler, Soviet Law 344 (1983) (reporting that some Soviet scholars described the country's approach as monist but admitting that such classification is debatable).

152 For example, Poland's 1952 Soviet-style constitution omitted provisions giving direct effect to international law. See Zdzislaw Kedzia, The Place of Human Rights Treaties in the Polish Legal Order, 2 Eur. J. Int'l L. 133, 133 (1991). This led to heated debate among scholars. See Władysław Czapliński, International Law and Polish Domestic Law, in Constitutional Reform and International Law in Central and Eastern Europe, 15, 16 (Rein Müllerson, Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Mads Andenas eds., 1998). In general, the practice of incorporating treaties by legislation continued and courts did not apply treaties directly. Id.; see also Anna Wyrozumska, Direct Application of the Polish Constitution and International Treaties to Private Conduct, 25 Polish Y.B. Int'l L. 5, 17 (2001). Although a handful of court decisions from the 1960s to the 1980s hinted at direct application of treaties, this did not become the norm until after the Cold War. Id. Courts, however, occasionally applied immunities without legislative incorporation. China's 1954 constitution entrusted treaty-making to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and did not explicitly provide for the domestic legal status of treaties or CIL. Later, direct effect of treaties became the prevailing view. See Li Zhaojie, The Effect of Treaties in the Municipal Law of the People's Republic of China: Practice and Problems, 4 Asian Y.B. Int'l L. 185, 196 (1994). The same appears to be true of CIL. See 贾兵兵, 国际公法:理论与实践,第103页 [Jia Bingbing, Public International Law: Theory and Practice 103 (2009)].

153 In several countries, dissolution or suspension of the legislature nullified the requirement of legislative approval of treaties, e.g., in Brazil between 1937 and 1946.

154 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (2010).

155 Cassese, supra note 45, at 357.

156 See M.C. Mirow, Latin American Constitutions: The Constitution of Cádiz and Its Legacy in Spanish America (2015).

157 See State System Membership List, v2016, Correlates of War Project (2017), at https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership.

158 See, e.g., K. Thakore, India, in National Treaty Law and Practice, supra note 66, at 354 (India); Bianca Karim & Tirza Theunissen, Bangladesh, in International Law and Domestic Legal Systems, supra note 14, at 98; Singarasa v. Attorney General, 138 ILR 469 (2006) (Sup. Ct.) (Sri Lanka); Simon S.C. Tay, The Singapore Legal System and International Law: Influence or Interference, in The Singapore Legal System (Kevin Y.L. Tan ed., 2d ed. 1999); Government of the State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, [1963] 1 LNS 145 HC (Malaysia); Indus Automobile v. Central Bd. of Revenue, (1988) 40 PLD (SC) 99 (Pak.); Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Pakistan, 2002 SCMR 1694 SC (Pak.); Kenneth Good v. Attorney General, [2005] (2) BLR 337 (C.A.) (Botswana); Bojang v. The State, [1994] BLR 146 (H.C.) (Botswana); Charles Fombad, The Republic of Botswana: Introductory Note, in Oxford Constitutions of the World (online) (Botswana).

159 Babafemi Akinrinade, Nigeria, in International Law and Domestic Legal Systems, supra note 14, at 450, 455; see also Okunda v. Republic, 51 ILR 414 (1970) (Kenya); RM and Another v. Attorney General, [2006] eKLR (Kenya); Chacha Bhoke Murungu, The Place of International Law in Human Rights Litigation in Tanzania, in International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa 57, 59 (Magnus Killander ed., 2010); Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Role of International Law in the Protection of Human Rights Under the Malawian Constitution of 1995, 3 Afr. Y.B. Int'l L. 53 (1995); Thomas Trier Hansen, Implementation of International Human Rights Standards through the National Courts in Malawi, 46 J. Afr. L. 31 (2002); Chihana v. The Republic, M.S.C.A. Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1992, at https://malawilii.org/mw/judgment/supreme-court-appeal/1993/1 (Malawi); Henry Onoria, Uganda, in International Law and Domestic Legal Systems, supra note 14, at 600; Busingye Kabumba, The Application of International Law in the Ugandan Judicial System: A Critical Enquiry, in International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa, id., at 84; Michelo Hansungule, Domestication of International Human Rights Law in Zambia, in International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa, id., at 71. In the early years after attaining independence in 1979, Zimbabwe also combined a presidential system with a British dualist model. See Onkemetse Tshosa, National Law and International Human Rights Law: Cases of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe 60 (2001).

160 See Section V.B.3 infra. Another example of post-colonial persistence is the Philippines, whose 1935 constitution (which remained in effect after independence in 1946) provided, like the U.S. constitution, for Senate approval of treaties by a two-thirds majority. Despite the lack of a provision on the legal status of treaties, the Supreme Court held that “a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government . . . has the force and effect of law.” World Health Organization v. Aquino, 52 ILR 389, 394 (1972) (Sup. Ct.) (Phil.).

161 Although the Beninese constitutions of 1964 and 1977 omitted the provision giving direct effect and superiority to treaties (which was included in the 1960, 1968, and 1970 constitutions), it appears that Benin continuously followed a French-style monist approach. Horace Adjolohoun, Droits de l'homme et justice constitutionnelle en Afrique: Le modèle béninois 95–96 (2011). Likewise, although Rwanda's constitutions of 1962, 1978, and 1991 did not include any provision on the status of treaties, the country followed the same practice as other French-speaking African countries. Frederic Sebihuranda, Le droit international conventionnel à travers la constitution Rwandaise, 9 Revue Juridique du Rwanda 121, 126 (1985). The same was true of the Democratic Republic of Congo before its 1964 constitution incorporated a French-style treaty superiority provision. Vincent de Paul Lunda-Bululu, La conclusion des traités en droit constitutionnel zaïrois 185–86 (1984). Algeria's 1963 constitution did not expressly provide for the domestic status of treaties, but treaties were considered part of the domestic legal order and superior to statutes. Mohamed Abdelwahab Bekhechi, La Constitution Algérienne de 1976 et le droit international 217 (1989). Morocco's constitutions prior to 2011 made no reference to the hierarchy of law with respect to international agreements. Some case law supported the primacy of published treaties, although their precise hierarchical status was debated. See Mohammed Amine Benabdallah, Les Traités en droit marocain, 94 Revue marocaine d'administration locale et de développement 3 (2010). As part of the 1961 merger of British Cameroon into French Cameroon, a new constitution was adopted that abandoned the French-style provision on the status of treaties. This was the outcome of a compromise under which treaties would be automatically incorporated (as in the French tradition) but would be equal, not superior, to statutes (mimicking the British tradition for implemented treaties.) The scarce judicial decisions from that era suggest that ratified treaties were considered part of the domestic legal order even without a specific constitutional provision. See Alain Didier Olinga, Considérations sur les traités dans l'ordre juridique Camerounais, 8 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 283 (1996).

162 Cassese, supra note 45, at 366; see also Mohammed Bedjaoui, Towards A New International Economic Order 134 (1979) (noting that “the newly independent States refuse to consider themselves bound by various customary principles when these principles still express relationships of domination, inequality or privilege”); S. Prakash Sinha, Perspective of the Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International Law, 14 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 121, 122 (1965) (“With their emphasis on social change rather than on maintenance of status quo, these States have shown their tendency not to accept the body of customary international law as a whole.”). On the attitude of newly independent states to customary international law, see generally George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo & César Yip, Customary International Law and the Third World: Do Not Step on the Grass, 16 Chinese J. Int'l L. 251, 253–56 (2017) (reviewing the contemporary literature.)

163 See Babafemi, supra note 14, at 461; Chilenye Mwapi, International Treaties in Nigerian and Canadian Courts, 17 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 326, 354 (2011) (Nigeria); Ministry of Defence of the Government of the United Kingdom v. Ndegwa, 103 ILR 235 (1983) (Kenya); Beysne v. Romania, [2000] 2 EA 322 (Tanz.); Maluwa, supra note 159, at 69 (Malawi); Onoria, supra note 159, at 609 (Uganda); Tshosa, supra note 159, at 50 (Zimbabwe); Hansungule, supra note 159, at 72 (Zambia); Fombad, supra note 158 (Botswana); Gramophone Co. India Ltd. v. Pandey, (1984) 2 SCC 534 (India); USA v. Gammon Layton, 64 ILR 567 (1970) (High Ct.) (West Pak.); Qureshi v. USSR, 64 ILR 585 (1981) (Sup. Ct.) (Pak.); Unimarine v. Panama, (1977) 29 DLR (Sup. Ct.) 252 (Bangl.); C.L. Lim, Public International Law Before the Singapore and Malaysian Courts, 8 Sing. Y.B. Int'l L. 243, 245–53 (2004) (Singapore); Abdul Ghafur Hamid & Khin Maung Sein, Judicial Application of International Law in Malaysia, an Analysis, Malaysian Bar (Mar. 31, 2006), at http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/international_law/judicial_application_of_international_law_in_malaysia_an_analysis.html (Malaysia).

164 These cases often concerned state and diplomatic immunities. See, e.g., France v. Banque de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, 65 ILR 439 (1961) (Togo); Cour d'appel [CA] [Regional Court of Appeal] Dakar, July 31,1962, Arrêt No. 70 (Sen.); Amadou v. USAID, Apr. 18, 2002, Arrêt No. 02-90/SOC (Sup. Ct.) (Niger), reproduced in Dille Rabo, Communication de la Cour suprême du Niger, in Actes du colloque international sur « l'Application du droit international dans l'ordre juridique interne des Etats africains francophones » 240 (Association ouest-africaine des hautes juridictions francophones & Agence intergouvernementale de la Francophonie eds., 2003); Abdoulaye Soma, L'applicabilité des traités internationaux de protection des droits de l'homme dans le système constitutionnel du Burkina Faso, 16 Afr. Y.B. Int'l L. 313, 328–29 (2008) (Burkina Faso follows a monist approach heavily influenced by French practice); Ramiandrisoa v. The French State, 40 ILR 81 (1965) (Sup. Ct.) (Madag.); Mahe v. Agent Judiciaire du Trésor Français, 40 ILR 80 (1965) (Sup. Ct.) (Madag.); Cour d'appel du Burundi decision of Feb. 11, 1964, 1964 Revue juridique de droit écrit et coutumier du Rwanda et du Burundi 61 (Burundi); see also De Decker v. United States, (1957) 2 Pascirisie Belge 55 (Ct. App. Léopoldville) (Belgian Congo) (pre-independence case affirming application of CIL in Belgian Congo); Ferhat Horchani, La constitution tunisienne et les traités après la révision du 1er juin 2002, 50 Annuaire français de droit international 138 (2004) (CIL applies directly in Tunisia).

165 Const. (1935), Art. II, § 3 (Phil.). The Supreme Court held that if the principles embodied in a treaty represented “generally accepted principles of international law” those principles would be part of the law of the nation even though the Philippines was not a party to the treaty. Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. Rep. 171, 178 (S.C., Mar. 26, 1949); see generally John Trone, International Law as Domestic Law in the Philippines, 7 Int'l Trade & Bus. L. Ann. 265, 270 (2002).

166 See, e.g., Singarasa v. Attorney General, 138 ILR 469 (2006) (Sup. Ct.) (Sri Lanka), and comment. In Indonesia, courts have been reluctant to apply international law and its status remain unclear, although the Dutch-inherited notion that it has direct effect retains support by leading scholars and has never been explicitly repudiated by courts. See Simon Butt, The Position of International Law within the Indonesian Legal System, 28 Emory Int'l L. Rev 1 (2014).

167 See Mohammed Bedjaoui, Aspects internationaux de la Constitution algérienne, 23 Annuaire français de droit international 75, 84 (1977).

168 For a comprehensive list and further discussion, see Verdier & Versteeg, supra note 7.

169 Guillaume Pambou Tchivounda & Jean-Bernard Moussavou-Moussavou, Éléments de la pratique gabonaise en matière de traités internationaux 43 (1986).

170 See note 252 infra and accompanying text.

171 See, e.g., Constitution de la République du Sénégal du 26 août 1960 [Constitution of the Republic of Senegal of August 26, 1960], pmbl. (Sen.); Constitution du 14 avril 1961 [Constitution of Apr. 14, 1961], pmbl. (Togo); Constitution de la République du Dahomey [Constitution of the Republic of Dahomey], pmbl. (1964) (Benin).

172 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, Art. 2 (1960) (Ghana); see also Constitution du Mali [Constitution of the Republic of Mali], Art. 48 (1960) (Mali).

173 Constitution de Côte d'Ivoire du 3 novembre 1960 [Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire of Nov. 3, 1960], Arts. 69–70 (Côte d'Ivoire). See also Constitution de la République du Niger [Constitution of the Republic of Niger], Arts. 69–70 (1960) (Niger); Loi Constitutionnelle No. 18-60 du 28 novembre 1960 [Constitutional Law No. 18-60 of Nov. 28, 1960], Arts. 73–74 (Chad).

174 See, e.g., Conseil Constitutionnel du Sénégal, Decision No. 3/C/93, Dec. 16, 1993 (Senegal) (upholding a treaty aimed at unification of commercial law in Africa that created a new common court, on the ground that it was aimed at advancing African unity)

175 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century 21 (2012).

176 See generally Nic Cheeseman, Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform (2015).

177 The legislative approval requirement was suspended or abrogated in Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana (where such a requirement had been adopted in 1969), Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Togo.

178 For example, even though Gabon's 1961 constitution, which remained in force under Omar Bongo's single-party regime, required legislative approval of several categories of treaties, in practice the parliament's role was marginal. T. Ondo, Le rôle du parlement gabonais dans les relations internationales, 83 Revue de droit international et de droit comparé 354, 356 (2006).

179 In some of these countries, the constitution was suspended and/or the legislature dissolved for relatively short periods.

180 In the Philippines, a new constitution was adopted following Ferdinando Marcos's 1972 coup. The 1973 constitution required a majority of the National Assembly to ratify treaties but allowed the prime minister to bypass this requirement and “enter into international treaties or agreements as the national welfare and interest may require.” Const. (1973), Art. XIV, § 15 (Phil.). The legislature was never convened, and the president entered into and ratified treaties on his own authority. See Trone, supra note 165, at 270. Soon after consolidating his power and reinstating the Constitution of 1945 in Indonesia, President Sukarno sent a letter to the House of Representatives interpreting the requirement narrowly to cover only “important” agreements related to political matters.

181 The Philippines’ 1973 constitution took an unusual approach, setting a high bar for constitutional review of treaties: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc, and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members.” Const. (1973), Art. X, § 2(2) (Phil.).

182 Under the 1935 constitution, the Supreme Court had held that “a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government . . . has the force and effect of law.” World Health Organization v. Aquino, 52 ILR 389, 394 (1972) (Sup. Ct.) (Phil.). The 1973 constitution stated that “All treaties, executive agreements, and contracts entered into by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby recognized as legal, valid, and binding.” Const. (1973), Art. XVII, § 12 (Phil.). Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court held that a treaty concerning employment at U.S. bases was part of domestic law. Guerrero's Transport Services v. Blaylocks, 30 June 1976, G.R. No. L-41518, 71 SCRA 621, 629 (June 30, 1976) (Phil.). In Greece, Taiwan, and South Korea, the formal rule of direct effect of treaties appears to have continued uninterrupted under authoritarian regimes.

183 Gammon Layton, supra note 163; Qureshi, supra note 163.

184 The 1976 Algerian constitution demoted treaties from superior to equal status, as did Madagascar's 1975 constitution and the Republic of Congo's 1979 constitution, both adopted under authoritarian regimes; but Burundi's 1974 constitution did the opposite, as did Mali's 1974 one-party constitution. As noted, supra note 161, Cameroon abandoned treaty superiority in 1961 when it merged with British Cameroon. Nigeria's 1979 constitution codified the British doctrine depriving treaties of direct effect, but this only reaffirmed prior practice. Constitution of Nigeria (1979), § 12(1) (Nigeria).

185 S.T.F., Recurso Extraordinario No. 80,004 SE, Relator: Min. Xavier de Albuquerque, 01.06.1977, 83(3), Revista Trimestral de Jurisprudência [R.T.J.], 809 (Braz.). The case concerned a conflict between the 1930 Geneva Convention of Uniform Law of Bill of Exchanges and Promissory Notes and a later Brazilian statute.

186 During the early decades of the authoritarian Estado Novo regime, Portugal's courts appear to have adhered to the country's monist tradition. In 1971, a constitutional reform removed a reference to CIL, providing instead that “the norms of international law binding on the Portuguese State shall be carried out in its domestic activities provided that they are laid down in a treaty or other act approved by the National Assembly or by the Government, the text of which has been duly published.” See Constituição Política da República Portuguesa [Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic], Art. 4(1) (amend. 1971) (Port.). The intent appears to have been to exclude direct application of CIL (and its application outside Portugal itself) at a time when the country was involved in bloody conflicts in its overseas colonies.

187 The preamble to the 1942 Law on the Creation of the Spanish Cortes [Ley de 17 de julio de 1942 de creación de las Cortes Españolas (BOE 1942) (Spain)] stated that “the supreme power of laying down the basic measures of legislation continues to be invested in the Head of State.” The Cortes were not elected but comprised members appointed by the head of state and representatives of the government and various organizations. Under Article 14, “[b]efore the ratification of treaties on subjects with which the Cortes are competent to deal . . . its views shall be heard—either in Plenary Session or in Committee,” but no vote was required. José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, La estipulacion y la eficacia interna de los tratados en el derecho español, 17 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 39 (1964). The 1967 Organic Law of the State [Ley Orgánica del Estado (BOE 1967, 1) (Spain)] modified Article 14 to require that “[t]he ratification of international treaties or agreements that affect the full sovereignty or the territorial integrity of Spain shall be the object of a law approved by the Cortes in full session.”

188 Re Application of Spanish-Swiss Convention, 28 ILR 461, 462 (1958) (Spain). The Council of State's decisions were not legally binding, but its analysis appears to have been followed by courts. See Pastor Ridruejo, supra note 187, at 48–53. As late as the early 1970s, occasional court decisions held that treaties were not directly applicable, but that view does not appear to have been widely accepted. See Jorge Rodríguez-Zapata, Constitución, tratados internacionales y sistema de fuentes de derecho 270–71 (1976). Supreme Court decisions in the early 1970s confirmed treaty superiority. See Campos et al., supra note 112, at 341. In 1974, Art. 1–5 of the Civil Code was adopted, which confirmed the direct application of treaties.

189 According to Campos, et al., supra note 112, at 328, the lack of a provision regarding CIL in the fundamental laws of the state during that period cannot be interpreted as a rejection of the long-established tradition that universal CIL rules are part of domestic law. See also Rodríguez-Zapata, supra note 188, at 42–52. Supreme Court cases from that era refer to CIL rules, and in at least one case appear to apply CIL directly: S. Tribunal Supremo [T.S.], Jun. 19, 1967 (Repertorio Aranzadi de Jurisprudencia [R.J.], No. 3161) (Spain); see also S.T.S., Jan. 5, 1965 (R.J., No. 2) (Spain).

190 Konstitutsiia SSSR (1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution], Art. 29.

191 See Danilenko, supra note 151; Damrosch, supra note 151.

192 See Ustav SFR Jugoslavije od 1963 [Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1963], Art. 153; Ustav SFR Jugoslavije [Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], Art. 210 (1974).

193 See Kedzia, supra note 152, at 133 (arguing that the omission was due to the Socialist government's desire to distance itself from international law). According to Wyrozumska, “[f]or many years the treaties were applied almost solely through transposing acts of internal law or owing to express provisions referring to international treaties contained in some statutes.” Wyrozumska, supra note 152, at 17 (2001); see also Czapliński, supra note 152, at 17.

194 See Wyrozumska, supra note 152, at 17; Czapliński, supra note 152, at 16.

195 See Wyrozumska, supra note 152, at 17.

196 Id. The Supreme Court reversed its interpretation in a similar case in 1987. SN I PRZ 8/87 of Aug. 25, 1987 of the Supreme Court (Pol.).

197 The thirty-eighth amendment to the Indian constitution prohibited all judicial review of emergency actions. The Constitution (Thirty-Eighth Amendment) Act, 1975 (Ind.).

198 See Simmons, supra note 86.

199 See J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2414 (1991). A noteworthy parallel development was the rise of a distinctive body of EU law on treaty-making in areas of EU competence, the principal features of which are now codified in Articles 216–19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012 OJ (C 326) 47. See generally Ramses A. Wessel & Joris Larik, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2d ed. 2020); Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2d ed. 2011). The content and evolution of this regime are beyond the scope of this article.

200 Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], May 27, 1971, Pas. 1971, I, 886 (Belg.). The preceding year, a constitutional amendment including treaty superiority had failed for unrelated reasons, perhaps emboldening the court to adopt what one commentator called a “‘silent revision’ of the constitutional text.” See Joe Verhoeven, Belgium, in The Integration of International and European Community Law into the National Legal Order: A Study of the Practice in Europe 135–36 (Pierre Michel Eisemann ed., 1996) [hereinafter Integration of International Law].

201 Tullio Treves & Marco Frigessi di Rattalma, Italy, in Integration of International Law, supra note 200, at 394–97; see also Giuseppe Cataldi, Italy, in International Law and Domestic Legal Systems, supra note 14, at 329–30.

202 See Jochen A. Frowein & Karin Oellers-Frahm, Germany, in Integration of International Law, supra note 200, at 93–95. A similar solution prevails in Denmark, where pursuant to Article 20 of the Constitution EC law is given direct effect and supremacy over domestic statutes. See Frederik Harhoff, Denmark, in The Integration of International Law, supra note 200, at 170–73.

203 See Hazel Fox, Piers Gardner & Chanaka Wickremasinghe, United Kingdom, in Integration of International Law, supra note 200, at 514–15.

204 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Brakes that Failed: Constitutional Restriction of International Agreements in France, 45 Cornell Int'l L.J. 257 (2012).

205 Belgium adopted constitutional review in 1989. Portugal and Spain did so in new constitutions adopted in 1976 and 1978 with a view toward EC membership.

206 These restrictions proved to have bite: initial defeats of the Maastricht and Nice treaties in Denmark and Ireland required carve-outs to be negotiated for these countries, and the 2004 EU Constitutional Treaty was abandoned after being defeated in France and the Netherlands. Denmark's constitution requires a referendum for transfer of powers unless a parliamentary majority of five-sixths approves the treaty. The Irish Supreme Court's decision in Crotty v. An Taoiseach, [1987] IESC 4 [1987] IR 713 (Ir.), held that expansion of EC powers required a referendum. EU Parliament, Referendums on Treaty Matters 23 (2017). In the United Kingdom, the European Union Act 2011 required referenda for new EU treaties.

207 See, e.g., BVerfGE, 2 BvR 197/83, Oct. 22, 1986 (Ger.) [Solange II Case]; on similar cases in Italy, see Treves & Frigesi di Rattalma, supra note 202, at 395.

208 See, for example, recent German Constitutional Court cases reviewing the constitutionality of Germany's participation in ECB bond-buying programs. See BVerfG, supra note 3.

209 Constitución Española [Spanish Constitution], Art. 96(1) (1978) (Spain). The new Portuguese constitution provided for direct effect of treaties but did not explicitly give them supralegislative status, an innovation that was left for courts. According to Rui Manuel Moura Raimos, Portugal, in Integration of International Law, supra note 200, at 476–77, the majority of authors support the superiority of treaties and both the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court appear to follow that view. See, e.g., Tribunal Constitucional (TC) [Constitutional Court], Precedent No. 266/89 of 23-2-1989, Proceedings No. 290/88, DR 129 Series 2 of 6-6-1989, 5511 (Port.). The new Greek constitution, by contrast, explicitly enshrined the superiority of treaties. 1975 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] 28(1) (Greece). This was an innovation from prior law under which treaties were equal to statutes. See Alkis N. Papacostas, L'autorité des conventions internationales en Grèce, 15 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 361, 363–64 (1962).

210 Courts have continued to treat CIL as part of Spanish law. See José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo & Antonio Pastor Palomar, Public International Law Before Spanish Domestic Courts, in The Legal Practice in International Law and European Community Law: A Spanish Perspective 524 (Carlos Jiménez Piernas 2007). CIL rules appear to remain hierarchically inferior to domestic laws. In Portugal, the Constituição da República Portuguesa (Constitution of the Portuguese Republic), Article 8.1 of 1976 confirmed the direct effect of CIL rules, but did not address their hierarchical status. According to Ferreira de Almeida “[a]uthors, almost unanimously, ascribe a supra-legal value to general or ordinary international law.” Francisco Ferreira de Almeida, Portugal, in International Law and Domestic Legal Systems, supra note 14, at 508. The new Greek constitution confirmed the longstanding direct effect of CIL rules and stated that they prevail over “any contrary provision of the law.” 1975 Syn. 28(1) (Greece).

211 Constitución Española [Spanish Constitution], Art. 10(2) (1978) (Spain).

212 See 1975 Syn. 28 (Greece); Constitución Española [Spanish Constitution], Art. 93 (1978) (Spain). The 1976 Portuguese constitution did not expressly authorize conferral of powers on international organizations, but Article 164(j) required parliamentary approval of “treaties for the membership of Portugal in international organizations,” which until 1992 was read to authorize such delegations. See Constituição da República Portuguesa [Constitution of the Portuguese Republic], Art 164(j) (1976) (Port.).

213 Huntington, supra note 175, at 3–13.

214 See Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (2003); Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights xvii (1990).

215 See, e.g., Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (2018).

216 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man xi (1992).

217 See The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995); The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America (Alan Angell, Line Schjolden & Rachel Sieder eds., 2005); Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (2000); Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 169 (2004).

218 For example, the Soviet Union introduced the requirement in 1988. See Konstitutsiia SSSR (1988) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution], Art. 113(11). As another example, Romania required legislative approval by the General National Assembly as early as 1965. See Constituţia Republicii Socialiste România [Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Romania], Arts. 43(10), 43(21), 43(24) (1965) (Rom.).

219 Stein, supra note 55, at 429, 447 (documenting an “‘opening’ toward international law in post-Communist constitution making”).

220 The following Eastern European countries all became monist in the early 1990s and gave treaties superior status to ordinary legislation: Hungary in 1990; Bulgaria in 1991; Macedonia in 1991; Lithuania in 1992; Estonia in 1992; Russia in 1993; Belarus in 1994; Latvia in 1994; Azerbaijan in 1995; Kazakhstan in 1995; Georgia in 1995; Poland in 1997; and the Czech Republic in 2001.

221 The lone exception is Romania, which did not make treaties superior but equal to ordinary law in 1991 (although human rights treaties are superior). Constitutia Romaniei [Constitution of Romania], Art. 20.2 (1991) (Rom.).

222 The only exception is Latvia, which stipulates that treaties apply directly and are superior to ordinary law in an organic law.

223 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution], Art. 15(4) (Russ.); see also Azerbaycan Respublikasının Konstitusiyası (Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan), Art. 148(II), 151 (1995) (Azer.).

224 See, e.g., Wyrozumska, supra note 152, at 17 (describing pre-1952 Polish practice); see also Section V.C.2 supra.

225 See, e.g., Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution], Art. 15(4) (Russ.) (“universally recognized principles and norms of international law” shall be a component part of the legal system of the “Russian Federation”); Конституция Республики Беларусь 1994 Года [Constitution of the Republic of Belarus of 1994], Art. 8 (Belr.) (“The Republic of Belarus shall recognize the supremacy of the generally recognised principles of international law and shall ensure the compliance of laws therewith.”).

226 For example, it appears that CIL is applied directly by courts in Russia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. But not all courts have used CIL in the same manner. For example, the Constitutional Court of Hungary has decided that the constitutional provision that refers to “general principles of international law” includes CIL and jus cogens norms, and that this means that CIL is superior to ordinary treaties. See Nóra Chronowski, Tímea Drinóczi & Ildikó Ernszt, Hungary, in International Law and Domestic Legal Systems, supra note 14, at 262–63. The same is true for the Constitutional Court of Belarus. See Danilenko, supra note 151, at 59. In Russia, the Constitutional Court has interpreted a similar provision to mean that CIL applies directly but is inferior to ordinary law. See B.L. Zimnenko, International Law and the Russian Legal System 303 (William E. Butler trans. 2007). And in Poland, courts treat CIL as equal to domestic law. See Anna Wyrozumska, Poland, in International Law and Domestic Legal Systems, supra note 14, at 486; Z. Brodecki & M. Drobysz, The Reception of International Law in Poland, in The Reception of International Law in Central and Eastern Europe 229, 230 (Erik Franckx & Stefaan Smis eds., 2002). Other courts do not appear to apply CIL at all, such as in Azerbaijan, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, and Romania.

227 Constitución Política [Political Constitution], Art. 18 (1982) (Hond.).

228 See Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo X, Noviembre de 1999, Tesis P. LXXVII/99, Página 46 (Mex.); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] (National Supreme Court of Justice), 7/7/1992, “Ekmekdjian, Miguel Angel c/ Sofovich, Gerardo y otros. s/ Recurso de hecho,” Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [Fallos] (1992-315-II-1492) (Arg.).

229 See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Political Constitution of the United Mexican States], Art. 13 (1917) (Mex.); Constitución de la Nación Argentina [Constitution of the Argentine Nation], Art. 31 (1853) (Arg.)

230 Constitución Política de Colombia [Political Constitution of Colombia], Art. 93 (1991) (Colom.); Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela [Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela], Art. 23 (1999) (Venez.).

231 Constitución de la Nación Argentina [Constitution of the Argentine Nation], Art. 75(22) (amended 1994) (Arg.).

232 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil [Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil], Art. 5(2) (1988) (Braz.).

233 Mexico's constitutional provision was less explicit, but the Supreme Court has clarified that it means that human rights treaties have equal standing to the constitution. See Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN], Gaceta del Semanario Judicial de la Federación, Décima Época, libro 5, tomo I, Abril de 2014, Tesis P./J. 20/2014 (10a.), Página 202 (Mex.).

234 Tribunal Constitucional [TC] [Constitutional Court], 15 abril 2006, “Colegio de Abogados de Arequipa y otro,” Expediente No. 0025-2005-Pl/TC y 0026-2005-Pl/TC (Peru), partially citing Tribunal Constitucional [TC] [Constitutional Court], 8 Noviembre 2005, “Pedro Andrés Lizana Puelles,” Expediente No. 5854-2005-PA/TC (Peru). In Peru, the prior 1979 Constitution made treaties equal to the Constitution; yet the 1993 Constitution was silent on the matter.

235 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Agosto 6, 2014, Sentencia No. 004-14-SCN-CC (Ecuador).

236 See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court of Justice], 27 julio 2004, Expediente No. 2187-2003 (Gaceta Judicial, No. 7) (Hond.).

237 See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJ] [Supreme Court of Justice], 19/10/2009, “AA. Denuncia. Excepción de Inconstitucionalidad arts. 1, 3 y 4 de la Ley No. 15.848,” Sentencia No. 365/2009 (Uru.).

238 See, e.g., Manuel Eduardo Gongóra-Mera, The Block of Constitutionality as the Doctrinal Pivot of a lus Commune, in Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America, supra note 59, at 235.

239 Id.; see also Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Mayo 18, 1995, Sentencia C-225/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 4, p. 39) (Colom.) (per Justice Alejandro Martínez Caballero) (defining the constitutional block).

240 To illustrate, Benin (1990), Burkina Faso (1990), Burundi (2001), Chad (1889), DRC (1993), Republic of Congo (2002), Cote D'Ivoire (2000), Ethiopia (1995), Gabon (1990), Madagascar (1992), Mali (1992), Mozambique (2004), Niger (2002), Rwanda (2001), Togo (1992), and Uganda (1995) all added specific references to human rights treaties.

241 But there are some exceptions: Ustava České Republiky [Constitution of the Czech Republic], Article 10 (1992) made human rights treaties equal to the constitution ahead of its general acceptance of all treaties as superior to domestic law (which happened in 2001) and Russia's Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] Articles 46(3) and 55(1) of 1993 does the same thing.

242 Yonatan Lupu, Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, The Strength of Weak Review: National Courts, Interpretive Canons, and Human Rights Treaties, 63 Int'l Stud. Q. 507 (2019).

243 See Gennady M. Danilenko, Implementation of International Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice, 10 Eur. J. Int'l L. 51, 64 (1999).

244 Id. at 57.

245 Prosecutor General, Ruling on a Proposal to Adopt an Interpretative Decision, Case No 1/1997, Ruling No. 1, ILDC 611 (BG 1997) (Bulg.). See also Encheva v. Pazardzhik District Investigation Service, Cassation appeal, Judgment No. 719, Civil Case No. 2397/2001, ILDC 613 (BG 2002) (Bulg.).

246 See Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa & David Landau, Colombian Constitutional Law: Leading Cases 42 (2017).

247 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Abril 11, 2002, Sentencia C-251/02 (Colom.).

248 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia C-355/06 (Colom.).

249 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Enero 23, 2008, Sentencia C-030/08 (Colom.).

250 The only countries that did not give their courts such powers are Macedonia, Estonia (which does not have a constitutional court), and Montenegro (where treaties are equal to the constitution).

251 Prior to the 1990s, Senegal and Chad allowed only the president of the Republic to bring ex ante treaty review, while Mali, Niger, Chad, Congo (Republic), Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, and Rwanda gave this power also to the president of the National Assembly (in addition to the president of the Republic). Senegal started to expand standing requirements beginning 1978; Mali did so in 1992; Niger in 1996; Chad in 1989; and Congo (Republic) in 1992.

252 For a complete history: Patrick Daillier, Mathias Forteau & Alain Pellet, Droit International Public 172–76 (8th ed. 2009); but see Neuman, supra note 205 (arguing that judicial review of treaties has played a limited role in restraining the French executive).

253 BVerfG, 2 BvR 1390/12 (Sept. 12, 2012) (Ger.).

254 See, e.g., Bernadette Codjovi, Communication de la Cour Suprême du Bénin, in Actes du Colloque International sur « l'Application du droit international dans l'ordre juridique interne des états africains francophones » 131 (Association Ouest-Africaine des Hautes Juridictions Francophones ed., 2003); Ricardo Abello Galvis, La Corte Constitucional y el Derecho Internacional. Los tratados y el control previo de constitucionalidad 1992–2007, 7 Revista Socio-Jurídicos 305 (2005).

255 Doreen Lustig & Joseph Weiler, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World— Retrospective and Prospective, 16 Int'l J. Con. L. 315 (2018).

256 The only Latin American countries that have ex ante treaty review are Colombia (1991), Ecuador (1998), and Venezuela (1999) (while Costa Rica has the power for procedural questions only since 1989).

257 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, Art. 59(2) (1969) (Ghana). A 2001 amendment to Belize's constitution gave its Senate the power of “authorising the ratification . . . of any treaty by the Government of Belize.” The Constitution of Belize, Art. 61A (amended 2001) (Belize). After 1987, Zimbabwe's constitution incorporated a complex system that required parliamentary approval of some treaties. Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979, Art. 111B (1987) (Zim.). In 2013, a new constitution expanded that requirement to cover most treaties. Constitution of Zimbabwe, Art. 327(2) (2013) (Zim.). In 1987, Antigua and Barbuda adopted a parliamentary approval requirement for certain treaties. Ratification of Treaties Act, No. 1 (1987) (Ant. & Barb.).

258 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Art. 117(3) (Papau N.G.); Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, 2010, c. 25, § 20 (UK). Ireland's constitution has long required proposed treaties to be laid before the legislature but requires its approval only for those that “involv[e] a charge upon public funds.” Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 29(5)(2) (Irl.).

259 Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Arts. 63(e), 144 (1990) (Namib.).

260 S. Afr. Const., 1996, Arts. 231–32 (S. Afr.).

261 Constitution, Art. 2(6) (2010) (Kenya). The 2010 constitution also enshrines the direct effect of CIL. Id. Art. 2(5).

262 Constitution of Nigeria (1979), § 12(1) (Nigeria); see also Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, Art. 211(1) (1994) (Malawi). Ireland's constitution has long codified the same rule: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 29(6) (Irl.).

263 Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979, Art. 111 B(1) (Zim.). See Tiyanjana Maluwa, International Law in Post-colonial Africa (1999).

264 See Helfer, Laurence R., Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1832 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

265 Attorney General v. Joseph, Appeal No. CV 2, CCJ 1 (Nov. 8, 2006) (AJ); see Pollard, Duke E.E., Unincorporated Treaties and Small States, 33 Commonwealth L. Bull. 389 (2007)Google Scholar.

266 Determining the extent of these benefits is among the areas that are ripe for further empirical research.

267 See Putnam, supra note 44.

Supplementary material: File

Cope et al. supplementary material

Cope et al. supplementary material

Download Cope et al. supplementary material(File)
File 3.5 MB