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Case Nos. 2 BvR 2115/01, 2 BvR 2132/01, & 2 BvR 348/03.60 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 499 (2007)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz
Affiliation:
University of Bayreuth

Extract

Case Nos.2 BvR 2115/01, 2 BvR 2132/01, & 2 BvR 348/03.60 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 499 (2007). At <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de>.

Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany), September 19, 2006.

On September 19, 2006, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) held in jointly decided Case Nos. 2 BvR 2115/01, 2 BvR 2132/01, & 2 BvR 348/03 that a failure to provide consular information to foreign nationals pursuant to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) violates the guarantee of a fair trial as provided by the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). The result is in contrast to a recent U. S. Supreme Court decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a strikingly similar case.

The defendants, two nationals of Turkey and two of Serbia-Montenegro, were arrested in the course of different criminal investigations. They were informed of their rights as defendants as guaranteed by Germany's law of criminal procedure. The prosecuting authorities failed, however, to provide information on the defendants’ right to contact the consular staffs of their own countries in compliance with the VCCR. Three defendants were found guilty of murder and sentenced to lifetime imprisonment by the district court (Landgericht) of Braunschweig. The district court of Hamburg found the fourth defendant guilty of a robbery that resulted in the death of a victim, and sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment. Since the defendants refused to make statements, the criminal courts relied, inter alia, on the testimony of the police officers questioning the defendants after their various arrests. During the subsequent criminal proceedings, the defendants, presumably out of ignorance, made no attempt to invoke their consular rights, and the district courts seemed to be equally unaware of those rights.

Type
International Decisions
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2007

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References

1 Article 36(l)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), Apr. 24, 1963, 596 UNTS 261, provides:

[T]he competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph.

2 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Sept. 19, 2006, Case Nos. 2 BvR 2115/012, BvR 2132/01, & 2 BvR 348/03. At <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de=. For an approving review essay, see Tonio, Walter, Der Deutsche Strafprozess und das Völkerrecht 2007 Juristische Rundschau 99 (2007)Google Scholar. Compare Klaus, Kreß, Die verfassungsrechtliche Pflicht der deutschen Strafverfolgungsbehörden zur Berücksichtigung des Wiener Konsülarubereinkommens, 154 Goltdammer’s Archiv Fur Strafrecht 296 (2007)Google Scholar (approving), with Mehrdad, Payandeh, Die verfassungsrechtliche Stärkungder internationalen Gerichtsbarkeit, 45 Archiv Des VÖlkerrechts 244, 250℃57 (2007)Google Scholar (approving the result but critical of the legal reasoning).

3 Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006); see Curtis, A. Bradley, Case Report: Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 100 AJIL 882 (2006)Google Scholar; Mark, J. Kadish & Charles, C. Olson, Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon and Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The Supreme Court, The Right to Consul, and Remediation, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1185 (2006)Google Scholar.

4 StPO, Apr. 7, 1987, BGB1.I 1074, §136(1) (similar to a “Miranda” warning in the United States, requiring that the accused, prior to the first interrogation about the matter in question, be informed of the right to refuse to give evidence, the right to consult an advocate, and the right to apply for the examination of certain evidence).

5 LaGrand (FRG v. U.S.) 2001 ICJ Rep. 466, para. 42 (June 27); see William, J. Aceves, Case Report: LaGrand (Germany v. United States), 96 AJIL 210 (2002)Google Scholar; Martin, Mennecke & Christian, Tarns, The Right to Consular Assistance Under International Law: The LaGrand Case Before the International Court of Justice, 1999 German Y.B. Int’l L. 192 Google Scholar; John, Quigley, LaGrand: A Challenge to the U.S. Judiciary 27 Yale J. Int’l. L. 435 (2002)Google Scholar.

6 Bundesgerichtshof, Nov. 7, 2001, Case No. 5 StR 116/01, 23 Strafverteidiger 57 (2003).

7 Avena (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ Rep. 12 (Mar. 31); see Christopher, J. Le Mon, Post-Avena c>Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by United States Courts, 18 Leiden J. Int’l L. 215 (2005)Google Scholar; Dinah, L. Shelton, Case Report: Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 98 AJIL 559 (2004).Google Scholar

8 See Bemd, Grzeszick, RechtedesEinzelnen im Völkerrecht, 43 Archiv Des Volkerrechts 312, 318 (2005).Google Scholar

9 See Bundesverfassungsgericht, Oct. 14, 2004, 111 BVerfGE 307 (319).

10 Apr. 24, 1963, 596 UNTS 487.

11 See the similar argumentation of Le Mon, supra note 7, at 231.

12 See the leading Görgülü case, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Oct. 14, 2004, 111 BVerfGE 307 (323–30). The Court follows a complicated approach in which the constitutional principle that the judge is bound by statute and law to take into account the guarantees of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which are considered “part of a methodologically justifiable interpretation of the law.” Both a failure to consider a decision of the European Court and the “enforcement” of such a decision in a schematic way—contrary to established law—may violate fundamental rights in conjunction with the principle of the rule of law.

13 See Avena, para. 140; Annemarieke, Künzli, Exercising Diplomatic Protection, 66 Heidelberg J. Int’l L. 321, 338 (2006).Google Scholar

14 Article 36(2) provides:

The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.

15 Avena, para. 139. Compare Linda, E. Carter, Compliance with ICJ Provisional Measures and the Meaning of Review and Reconsideration Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 117, 133 (2003)Google Scholar (“a hearing and substantive consideration”).

16 Compare Avena, paras. 131,141: “The Court in the LaGrand case left to the United States the choice of means as to how review and reconsideration should be achieved, especially in the light of the procedural default rule.”

17 LaGrand, para. 125.

18 See the critical remarks by Cara, Drinan, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Private Enforcement in American Courts After LaGrand, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1303, 1307–14 (2002)Google Scholar; Le Mon, supra note 7, at 226–36; Katrin, Oellers–Frahm, Pacta sunt servanda—Gilt das auch für die USA? 26 EuropÄische Grundrechtezeitschrift 437, 437–49 (1999)Google Scholar; Andreas, Paulus, From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International Adjudication, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 783, 790, 80207 (2004)Google Scholar. For a concise history of VCCR claims in U.S. courts, see Sarah, M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1729, 1736–57 (2003).Google Scholar

19 Klaus, Kreß, Das Wiener Konsularrechtsübereinkommen und das nationale Strafprozessrecht 151 Goltdammer’s Archiv FÜr Strafrecht 691, 698701 (2004)Google Scholar.

20 Andreas, L. Paulus, Anmerkung, 23 Strafverteidiger 57, 58 (2003)Google Scholar; Christian, J. Tarns, Das LaGrand– Urteil, 42 Juristische Schulung 324, 326 (2002)Google Scholar. The wording alone is, of course, not sufficient to prove the existence of an individual right. It is necessary to examine the systematic and functional context of a treaty provision, and doing so substantially weakens a “progressive” interpretation of VCCR Article 36 as a provision that grants individual rights. See Grzeszick, supra note 8, at 320–26, 340–43; Christian, Hillgruber, Anmerkung 57 Juristenzeitung 94, 9597 (2002)Google Scholar. Compare Vasileios, Pergantis, Towards a “Humanization”of Diplomatic Protection? 66 Heidelberg J. Int’l L. 351, 388 (2006).Google Scholar

21 Kreß, supra note 19, at 699–700.

22 The most significant flaws in the Federal Court of Justice’s opinion are not its actual results but the Court’s method of interpretation and the opinion’s disturbing lack of professionalism in dealing with questions of international law; in particular, only superficial consideration is given to LaGrand.

23 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); Cookv. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 510 (1947); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marinieros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963); Menomee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968); Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assoc. 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); Palestine Liberation Organization v. United States, 695 F.Supp. 1456, 1464 (S.D.N.Y 1988). Compare Sandra Day, O’Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 35, 3841 (1996).Google Scholar

24 Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2683–84 (2006); Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).

25 See the critical remarks on the unclear meaning by Eckart, Klein, Anmerkung, 59 Juristenzeitung 1176, 1177 (2004)Google Scholar.

26 Stephanie, Baker, Germany v. United States in the International Court of Justice: An International Battle over the Interpretation of Article Thirty–six of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Provisional Measures Orders, 30 GA. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 277, 303 (2002).Google Scholar

27 See Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 565 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]t fails to address the question whether the ICJ has been granted the authority, by means of treaties to which the United States is a party, to interpret the rights conferred by the Vienna Convention.”); see also Le Mon, supra note 7, at 235; Ray, supra note 18, at 1767.

28 For a profound analysis see A. Mark, Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 Mich. J. Int’l L. 877 (2000).Google Scholar

29 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Oct. 14, 2004, 111 BVerfGE 307 (319).

30 The Constitutional Court makes this point explicitly in its landmark Görgülü case, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Oct. 14, 2004, 111 BVerfGE 307 (318).

31 Christoph, MÖllers, Gewaltengliederung 329 (2005).Google Scholar

32 The Federal Administrative Court’s adjudication, to which the Constitutional Court refers, made this exact point. Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Dec. 16, 1999, 110 BVerwGE 203 (210–12). That particular notion was simply lost in the Constitutional Court’s argumentation. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, Oct. 14, 2004, 111 BVerfGE 307 (319–24)Google ScholarPubMed.

33 Compare Georg, Ress, Supranationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und der Wandel der Staatlichkeit, 64 Heidelberg J. Int’l L. 621, 628, 630, 633 (2004).Google Scholar

34 F. Hoffmann–LaRoche Ltd. v. Epagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).

35 Anne–Marie, Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 191 (2003).Google Scholar

36 Compare Ian, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 6 (6th ed. 2003).Google Scholar

37 It is the irony of the case that the now quashed decision of the Federal Court of Jurisdiction has been cited as international state practice by the U.S. government in the Avena proceedings before the ICJ. Counter–memorial of the United States of America at 133–34 (Nov. 3, 2003), Avena (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ Rep. 12 (Mar. 31).

38 Compare also Kerstin, Odendahl, Werist “Hütterdes Völkerrechts”? 2007 Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts Der Gegenwart 1, 12–15, 21–22.Google Scholar She rightly argues that there was no “guardian of international law”—in particular, not the ICJ. Instead, there was a complex, diversified, and decentralized system of various “guardians.”

39 See Anne–Marie, Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. Int’l L. 1103 (2000).Google Scholar

40 Anne–Marie, Slaughter, The Real New World Order, Foreign Aff., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183, 188.Google Scholar

41 Id.

42 See Louis, Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 136–37 (2ded. 1996).Google Scholar

43 William, J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies 31 Vanderbilt J. Transnat’l L. 257, 314–24 (1998).Google Scholar

44 In commenting on the government’s position, the Court merely asserted that the informed ministries declined to present their views and that they proposed to quash the defendants’ claims. Since the Court usually reports broadly on the different point of view, a reasonable inference is that there had been no valuable correspondence.

45 Compare Bradley, supra note 3, at 888.

46 Compare the lucid opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sanchez–Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2684.