1 Supporting the naturally integrated model are Court holdings which suggest that black-white student population ratios measure the adequacy of a school desegregation plan, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), and Court decisions which have found that intentional discrimination in one portion of a school district creates a presumption that there may be purposeful discrimination in other portions of the school district, Keys v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Supporting the possibly segregated model are Court holdings that demand proof of intentional discrimination even if racial imbalance is the natural and foreseeable consequence of school board action, Austin Indep. School Dist. v. U.S., 419 (1976) (mem.), and Court rulings that limit desegregation remedies to the demonstrable incremental effect of specified discriminatory conduct, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406 (1977).Google Scholar

2 With respect to housing, some social scientists argue that “socioeconomic differentials do not account for residential segregation; discrimination by agents in the housing market… as well as government regulations… are likely contributors.” Streitweisser & Goodman, A Survey of Recent Research on Race and Residential Location, 2 Population Research & Pol'y Rev. 253, 265 (1983). Other social scientists, however, conclude that the migration of whites from city to suburb is not a result of racial concerns but of lower tax rates, lower per capita school expenditures, and expanded employment opportunities. See id. at 262. See also Hearings on School Desegregation Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1981)(testi-mony of Gary Orfield). Another pertinent issue on which social scientists differ is the degree of white resistance to expansive school desegregation orders. Suggesting that the world is naturally integrated, some social science research indicates that comprehensive metropolitanwide desegregation remedies ultimately lead to decreases in white flight/residential segregation. See id. at 161 (statement of Gary Orfield). In contrast, suggesting that the world is possibly segregated, some social science research attributes white flight and social segregation to mandatory pupil transportation remedies. See id. at 205–12 (statement of David Armor).Google Scholar

3 See generally Devins & Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1243 (1984).Google Scholar

4 Although principally concerned with school desegregation litigation, Dimond devotes some attention to housing segregation cases (at 183–225). Since Dimond interweaves the issue of housing discrimination with his discussion of school desegregation, this essay will view the housing question as a subset of school desegregation.Google Scholar

5 See also D. Kirp. Just Schools (1982); J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakkc (1979).Google Scholar

6 418 U.S. 717 (1974); discussed in Dimond, at 21–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 406 (1977); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526 (1977). These eases are discussed in Dimond at 121–80, 343–94.Google Scholar

8 443 U.S. 449 (1979); discussed in Dimond at 229–79, 343–94.Google Scholar

9 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del. 1978), aff 'd 582 F.2d 750 (3d Or. 1978)(en banc), cert, denied. 46 U.S. 923 (1980); discussed in Dimond at 283–339.Google Scholar

10 Dimond served as co-counsel to plaintiffs in these school desegregation cases.Google Scholar

11 The district court found: “Residential segregation within the city and throughout the larger metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and of long-standing…. While the racially unrestricted choice of black persons and economic factors may have played some part in the development of this pattern of residential segregation, it is, in the main, the result of past and present practices and customs of racial discrimination, both public and private, which have and do restrict the housing [and educational] opportunities of black people” (quoted at 399).Google Scholar

12 The Court claimed that it could not resolve this issue since it had not been considered by the appellate court. But, as Jay Wilkinson recognized: “In failing to remand to [the] district court for findings on past housing practices or even to explain their relevance, the Supreme Court failed to address the foremost cause of metropolitan segregation.” J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke 223–24 (1979).Google Scholar

13 Several instances were cited where discriminatory housing practices combined with a neighborhood school policy “‘naturally, probably, and foreseeably’ resulted in segregation in the face of available desegregation alternatives” (at 62).Google Scholar

14 Dimond's depiction of other cases likewise reflects his perception that courts should undertake a comprehensive analysis of the condition of racial separation. In the Dayton case, Dimond lambastes District Judge Carl Rubin for failing to consider evidence of discrimination in public housing. Alternatively, District Judge Robert Duncan's Columbus ruling is applauded for its recognition that the “interaction of housing and the schools operates to promote segregation in each” (at 251). Finally, in the Delaware case, Dimond refers to the interdistrict remedy as “complete, effective, and equitable relief from the continuing color line in schooling” (at 334).Google Scholar

15 That school and housing discrimination may feed into each other is undeniable; neighborhood schools often reflect the racial composition of the surrounding residential area. Furthermore, although few court cases have explored the relationship of racial discrimination in education and housing, there are numerous decisions concerning discrimination in either housing or education. With respect to housing, before the mid-1960s, government condoned (and even encouraged) purposeful racial segregation in publicly assisted housing. See Hirsch, A., The Causes of Residential Segregation: A Historical Perspective (paper prepared for U.S. Commission on Civil Rights consultation/hearing on fair housing, Oct. 24, 1985). Since the enactment of fair housing legislation in 1968, numerous municipalities have been subjected to court orders for purposeful discrimination against minorities. 42 U.S.C. £ 3601–19 (1982). See, e.g., United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981). With respect to state-sponsored school segregation, numerous school systems throughout the nation have been found guilty of violating Brown v. Board of Education. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 5.Google Scholar

16 Lieberson & Carter, A Model for Inferring the Voluntary and Involuntary Causes of Residential Segregation, 19 Demography 511, 524 (1982).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 Mieszkowski & Syron, Economics Explanations for Housing Segregation, New Eng. Econ. Rev., March-April, 1978, at 33, 39. Other researchers, however, have found evidence of discrimination against blacks in housing price differentials and housing search costs. See, e.g., R. Lake, The New Suburbanites: Race and Housing in the Suburbs 172–73, 201–3 (1981).Google Scholar

18 Mieszkowski & Syron, supra note 17, at 35.Google Scholar

19 Farley, Bianchi, & Colastano, Barriers to the Racial Integration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit Case, 441 Annals 97 (1979).Google Scholar

20 Id. at 101.Google Scholar

21 Kirp, supra note 5. Kirp's study, however, also notes the hesitancy of some white communities to constructively address race relations.Google Scholar

22 See Devins, , Integration and Local Politics. 73 Pub. Interest 175 (1983).Google Scholar

23 Wolf, E., Trial and Erro 26 (1981).Google Scholar

24 Id. at 81.Google Scholar

25 Farley, Bianchi, & Colastano, supra note 19.Google Scholar

26 Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).Google Scholar

27 See, e.g. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).Google Scholar

28 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (recognizing right of parents to send their children to discriminatory private schools).Google Scholar

29 See, e.g., D. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (1977). Compare M. Rebel & A. Block, Educational Policymaking and the Courts: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism (1982).Google Scholar

30 See, e.g., W. Muir, Prayer in Schools (1967) (assessing compliance problems with school prayer decisions).Google Scholar

31 Despite Brown and a plethora of lawsuits filed in the wake of Brown, equal education opportunity advanced slowly from 1954 to 1964. With the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, great strides were made in the desegregation of southern systems. See Devins & Stedman, supra note 3, at 1245–58. This change came because these enactments authorized the executive to cut off newly expanded federal financial assistance to discriminatory school systems. Yet, once public opinion toward increasingly expansive desegregation decisions shifted. Congress repealed specific desegregation-related programs, thereby hampering efforts to attain equal education opportunity. See id. Moreover, the Reagan Justice Department is unwilling to pursue mandatory busing remedies. See Speech by William Bradford Reynolds Before the Delaware Bar Association, Feb. 1982, at 9.Google Scholar

32 See Daniels, , In Defense of Busing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983 (Magazine), at 34.Google Scholar

33 See Higgins, , Boston's Busing Disaster, New Republic, Feb. 28, 1983, at 16.Google Scholar

34 Bickel, A., The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 132 (1970).Google Scholar

35 Under, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1878. 1881 (1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

36 See Devins. The Trouble with Jaycees, 32 Cath. U.L. Rev. 901 (1985).Google Scholar