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Sex Discrimination as “Actuarial Equality”: A Rejoinder to Kimball

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

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Extract

Debate continues over the Supreme Court's decision in City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart. As most readers of this article already know, Manhart held illegal an annuity plan in which both sexes would receive equal periodic benefits after retirement although women made larger contributions while working. In collaboration with two colleagues, we defended the decision in another journal.* Although we tried to answer all of Manhart's critics, much of our attention was devoted to our colleague Spencer Kimball, who had published the most thorough and powerful of the attacks on Manhart. He has now published a reply.4 In the interests of having the main arguments on both sides summarized in the same journal, and of correcting misimpressions about the nature and extent of our argument, we offer this comment.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1981 

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References

1 435 U.S. 702 (1978).Google Scholar

2 Brilmayer, Lea, Hekeler, Richard W., Laycock, Douglas, & Sullivan, Teresa A., Sex Discrimination in Employer-sponsored Insurance Plans; A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 505 (1980).Google Scholar

3 Kimball, Spencer L., Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 A.B.F. Res. J. 83.Google Scholar

4 Kimball, Spencer L., Reprise on Manhart, 1980 A.B.F. Res. J. 915.Google Scholar

5 Brilmayer et al., supra note 2, at 508.Google Scholar

6 Id. at 508–23.Google Scholar

7 Id. at 508–11.Google Scholar

8 Id. at 511.Google Scholar

9 Id. at 522–23.Google Scholar

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16 Brilmayer et al., supra note 2, at 533–34.Google Scholar

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