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The Crown Lands and the Financial Dilemma in Stuart England*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 July 2014

Daniel W. Hollis III
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Extract

One of the few remaining points of agreement among Stuart scholars is that the Crown's political difficulties, especially the conduct of foreign affairs and wars, stemmed in large part from inadequate revenues. The Crown's “ordinary income”—so named by scholars but not by law or tradition—was eroded in the early seventeenth century by inflation, royal extravagance, and increased demands upon government. The bulk of the ordinary income came from the Crown lands whose traditional structures and management were unable to compensate for inflation. B. P. Wolffe has shown that medieval monarchs had never viewed Crown lands as a source of revenue in the same manner as parliamentary taxes or the customs. Rather, Crown lands were used primarily for the uneconomical purpose of providing royal bounty to political elites. Wallace MacCaffrey has argued that the royal clients in the bounty system shifted during the Tudor era from the feudal barons to an emerging state bureaucracy. Moreover, by the seventeenth century the list of clients grew again to include members of Parliament, especially the Commons which increasingly held the fate of royal finances in their hands. Finally, Linda Levy Peck has emphasized another profoundly entrenched English attitude, modeled after classical Roman authorities: the Crown must husband its resources against waste or corruption lest it become impoverished and the body politic decay. A monarch without ample treasure could command neither private (i.e., clients) nor public (i.e., national policy) authority.

Type
Research Article
Information
Albion , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , Fall 1994 , pp. 419 - 442
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference on British Studies 1994

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Footnotes

*

I am grateful for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this essay by Paul Hardacre, Ian Gentles, and Tim Harris.

References

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4 E.g., Coleman, D. C., The Economy of England, 1450-1750 (London, 1977), p. 190Google Scholar, states that the Crown land income had “become a virtually insignificant proportion of the total revenue by 1640,” while Russell, Conrad, Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629 (New York, 1979), p. 331CrossRefGoogle Scholar, gives 1628 as the date when Crown land income became immaterial. Reeve, L. J., Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule (New York, 1989), p. 205, supports RussellCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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7 Habakkuk, H. I., “The Land Settlement and the Restoration of Charles II,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (hereafter cited as TRHS), 5th ser., 28 (1978): 207CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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9 PRO E 317, LR 2/276-304, DL 32; DCO, Baynes Papers.

10 Prestwich, Menna, Cranfield; Politics and Profits under the Early Stuarts: The Career of Lionel Cranfield, Earl of Middlesex (London, 1966), pp. 28-30, 250, 339-40, 373Google Scholar; Dietz, F. C., English Public Finance, 1558-1641 (London, 1932), pp. 117-18, 192Google Scholar; Kerridge, Eric, “The Movement of Rent, 1540-1640,” Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 6 (August 1953): 31–33Google Scholar. Lawrence Stone blames much of the dilatory land policy on Lord Burghley. Yet, it is more accurate to place Burghley with other royal officials to understand that he represented the norm, and that collecting rents alone was a full-time task for Lord Treasurers reserving little opportunity to improve Crown income (Stone, , Family and Fortune: Studies in Aristocratic Finance in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries [Oxford, 1973], pp. 41, 135Google Scholar).

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15 Historical Manuscripts Commission (hereafter cited as HMC), Salisbury MSS, 27: 176. Cf. a 1612 proposal to disafforest, enclose and improve royal forests, chases, etc. to enhance Crown revenues in BL, Add. MS. 38444, ff. 4-6. Even Crown attempts to exploit royal demesne in the Forest of Dean had more political than financial implications when rights to administer the forest were farmed to political elites. See Sharp, Buchanan, In Contempt of All Authority: Rural Artisans and Riot in the West of England, 1586-1660 (Berkeley, 1980), pp. 190-91Google Scholar.

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21 Aylmer, , King's Servants, p. 164Google Scholar. See also, Tawney, R. H., Business and Politics: The Career of Sir Lionel Cranfield (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 85-86, 109–113Google Scholar.

22 PRO, E 317, Lincolnshire PS 33. On Windham, see Keeler, Mary F., The Long Parliament, 1640-41 (Philadelphia, 1954), pp. 395-96Google Scholar. Cf. a 1639 lease for 30 years to Andrew Pitcame, Groom of the Bedchamber at £3 per annum for the Twickenham tenements and fifty-three acres valued at £141 9s. per annum (PRO, E 317, Middlesex PS 96).

23 HMC, Salisbury MSS, 21: 201Google Scholar; Tawney, , Business and Politics, pp. 111-13Google Scholar.

24 PRO, E 317, Bedford PS 18, 23, Buckinghamshire PS 9, Essex PS 17, Kent PS 40. 46, Lincolnshire PS 42, Middlesex PS 6, 39, 86, Norfolk PS 10, 19, Northamptonshire PS 18, 20, 21, 26, 29, 41, 46, Surrey PS 13, 26, 27, 29, 56, 58, 61, 62, 67; LR 2/282/193 (Old Court, Kent), 291/176-179 (parcels, Northamptonshire). All but six of the leases were granted between 1610 and 1612. The old rent includes 67 of 69 leases. There was an additional lease in Lincolnshire without reported rental or improvement (E 317, Lincolnshire PS 41). Note that all properties were close to London.

25 HMC, Salisbury MSS, 21: 329Google Scholar, Cranfield Papers, 1: 223-24Google Scholar; CSPD, 1603-10, p. 595.

26 PRO, E 317, Yorkshire PS 49.

27 CSPD, 1625-26, p. 68; PRO, E 317, Dorset PS 6, E 121/2/24; BL, Add. MS. 21327, f. 61. Although the sale price in 1651 represented only 41/2 years' purchase, it was above the minimum 3 years' purchase for reversions of 21 years prescribed in the legislation (Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660, eds. Firth, C. H. and Rait, R. S., 3 vols. [London, 1911], 2: 177Google Scholar). Cf. the 13 years' purchase price of manors sold by Henry Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton under Charles 1 in Stone, , Family and Fortune, p. 231nGoogle Scholar. In January 1632, Bruce was granted the remaining two-thirds of Gillingham as a fee-farm rent (about 1,800 acres at £108 per annum); Edward Nicholas bought this portion in 1661 for £21,500 (PRO, E 317, Dorset PS 6, f. 5; Aylmer, , King's Servants, pp. 317-18Google Scholar).

28 PRO, E 317, Cornwall PS 8, 11, 16, 23, 32, 41, 53; DCO, Baynes Papers, Bundle 2, Cornwall PS New (Bucklawren). Cf. also Charles I's 1633 order to the Exchequer to allow the Earl of Mar the right to dispose of lands held ward of the Crown in Scotland (HMC, Mar & Kellie MSS, p. 191Google Scholar).

29 CSPD, 1631-33, p. 173; PRO, E 317, Surrey PS 33; Havran, Martin J., Caroline Courtier: The Life of Lord Cottington (London, 1973), pp. 105-06Google Scholar; Colvin, , King's Works, 4: 149Google Scholar.

30 Colvin, , King's Works, 4: 63, 67, 171, 273, 348Google Scholar; Stone, Lawrence, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Princeton, N. J., 1965), pp. 100, 289-92, 296, 427, 431-32, 434, 449Google Scholar.

31 Thomas, , “Leases in Reversion on the Crown's Lands,” pp. 67–69Google Scholar.

32 CSPD, 1611-1618, p. 45.

33 PRO, E 317, Northamptonshire PS 29, 46.

34 HMC, Seventh Report, p. 259Google ScholarPubMed. On Gibb as a procurer of royal grants for others as well as himself, see Peck, , Court Patronage, p. 44Google Scholar.

35 PRO, E 317, Durham PS 3.

36 Ibid., Kent PS 38. For other examples of unprofitable reversion sales under Charles I, see PRO, E 317, Middlesex PS 29, 54, 55, Northamptonshire PS 20, 46.

37 A proclamation early in Charles I's reign indicated an awareness that income from Crown lands was woefully inadequate, but it was against the background of an order to sell more fee-farm lands. See Stuart Royal Proclamations, eds. Larkin, J. F. and Hughes, P. L., 2 vols. (London, 1973-1983), 2: 102-05Google Scholar.

38 CSPD, 1547-1580, pp. 287, 702; Kitchin, C. J., “The Quest for Concealed Lands in the Reign of Elizabeth I,” TRHS, 5th ser., 24 (1974): 63–78Google Scholar; Thirsk, Joan, “The Crown as Projector on its own Estates, from Elizabeth I to Charles I,” in Estates of the English Crown, pp. 297-338, 346-48Google Scholar.

39 CSPD, 1611-18, pp. 126, 131, 137, 181, 219, 293, 388, 499, 534, 586, 589; Stuart Royal Proclamations, 1: 426-28Google Scholar; The Parliamentary Diary of Robert Bowyer, 1606-07, ed. Willson, D. H. (New York, 1931), pp. 106-07, 132-34Google Scholar; Stone, , Crisis of the Aristocracy, pp. 415-16Google Scholar; Thirsk, , “The Crown as Projector,” pp. 301-03, 323Google Scholar.

40 CSPD, 1623-25, p. 33. On Carleton's role as both an office seeker and broker for others, see Peck, Court Patronage, Chapter 3, and Barcroft, John H., “Carleton and Buckingham: The Quest for Office,” in Early Stuart Studies: Essays in Honor of David Harris Willson, ed. Reinmuth, Howard S. (Minneapolis, 1970), pp. 122-36Google Scholar.

41 Notes on the Debates in the House of Lords…by Robert Bowyer and Henry Elsing…1621, 1625, 1628, ed. Relf, F. H. (Camden Society, 3rd series, 1929), 42: 14Google Scholar; HMC, House of Lords MSS, 11 (Addenda, 1514-1714): 83–86Google Scholar.

42 Russell, Conrad, “The Parliamentary Career of John Pym, 1621-9,” in The English Commonwealth, 1547-1640: Essays in Politics and Society, eds. Clark, Peter, Smith, Alan G. R., Nicholas Tyacke (New York, 1979), pp. 148, 151-53Google Scholar.

43 Aylmer, , King's Servants, p. 164Google Scholar.

44 PRO, Exchequer, Augmentation Office, Miscellaneous Books (Trustees Journals), 314/52, 108; E 317, Berkshire PS 12, 13, 15, 21, 25, 30, 31, 32, 34, 44, Buckinghamshire PS 1, 4, 5, 7, 13, 15, 16, 18, Cambridgeshire PS 6, Cheshire PS 7, 9, 10A, 15, 16B, Cornwall PS 13, Cumberland PS 6, Derbyshire PS 12A, 13, 14A, 17, 27B, Devonshire PS 8, Dorset PS 3, 4, 21, Durham PS 4, Essex PS 20, Gloucestershire PS 15, 17, 18A, Hampshire PS 14, Herefordshire PS 13, 14, 17, Hertfordshire PS 6, 12, 17, Kent PS 11, 12, 13, 18, 24, 27, 32, 34, 40, 46, 47, 48, 53, 59, Lancashire PS 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22-27, Leicestershire PS 6, 8-11, 13, Lincolnshire PS 7A, 8, 11, 12, 24, 25, 28, 35, 37A, 38B, Middlesex PS 11, 13, 15, 23, 30, 35, 43, 44, 49, 61, 63, 64, 70, 73, 76, 78, 80, 94, Monmouthshire PS 4, 5, Norfolk PS 12, 15, Northamptonshire PS 24, 33, 42, 48, Nottinghamshire PS 16, 24, Oxfordshire PS 8, 9, 11, Shropshire PS 6, Somerset PS 14, 15, 34, 35, 36A, 41, Staffordshire PS 7, 40, 42, 44, Suffolk PS 10, Surrey PS 12, 35-37, 42, 48-50, 54, Sussex PS 20, 25, 28, 30, 33-35, 45, 50, 51, Warwickshire PS 6, 11, Westmorland PS 2, 4-6, Wiltshire PS 19, 24, 36, 37, 39, 45, Worcestershire PS 4, 6, Yorkshire PS 14, 17, 18, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 40, 42, 43, 44, 61; PRO, LR 2/276/67, 278/68, 280/18, 282/4, 288/29, 162, 290/159, 293/150, 295/9, 68, 299/295, 302/314, 352-55, 407, 433.

45 PRO, E 317, Cornwall PS 17, 21, 22, 24, 27-30, 33, 37, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 54.

46 PRO, LR 2/278/67.

47 See CSPD, 1611-1618, p. 43, where copyholders at Clitheroe, Lancashire were unwilling to compound for their lands; Allen, D. G. C., “The Rising in the West, 1628-1631,” Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 5, 1 (1952-1953): 76–85Google Scholar, for the local opposition to disafforestation and enclosure in three royal forests; Stuart Royal Proclamations, 1: 209-11, for an example of royal temporizing over copyhold compounding; Owen, G. Dyfnallt, Wales in the Reign of James I (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1988), pp. 172-80Google Scholar, for the Welsh frauds; and Russell, , Causes of the English Civil War, p. 172Google Scholar. See also Proceedings in Parliament 1610, ed. Foster, Elizabeth R., 2 vols. (New Haven, 1966), 1: 10nGoogle Scholar; HMC, Salisbury MSS, 21: 68Google Scholar.

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49 Kerridge, , “The Movement of Rent,” pp. 31–33Google Scholar; HMC, Seventh Report, p. 255Google ScholarPubMed, Salisbury MSS, 27: 176Google Scholar; PRO, E 317, Yorkshire PS 54; Stone, , Crisis of the Aristocracy, pp. 273-324, 405-16, 498Google Scholar; Stone, , Family and Fortune, p. 41Google Scholar; Hill, Christopher, Economic Problems of the Church from Archbishop Whitgift to the Long Parliament (Oxford, 1965), pp. 15-18, 32–35Google Scholar; Thomas, , “Leases of Crown Lands in the Reign of Elizabeth I,” pp. 79–81Google Scholar. Charles I supported Archbishop Laud's abortive efforts to increase the Church's landed revenue by, among others, eliminating leases for lives (Hill, , Economic Problems, pp. 310-16Google Scholar). For details on Ingram's career, see Upton, Anthony, Sir Arthur Ingram, c. 1565-1642 (London, 1961)Google Scholar.

50 Hoyle, , Estates of the English Crown, p. 16Google Scholar. Charles I's 1630 commission which investigated Elizabethan land sales found that the lands were sold far below market values. See John, John St., Observations on the Land Revenue of the Crown (2nd ed.; London, 1792), p. 131Google Scholar.

51 Hoyle, , Estates of the English Crown, p. 16Google Scholar. After the Corporation of London acquired Crown lands as security for loans in 1628, the lands in northern counties generally sold for thirty years' purchase so that their returns also were less profitable than apparent because of the antiquated rents. See Sewell, J. R., “A ‘Short View’ of some Northumberland Manors, 1629,” Northern History 14 (1978): 152-57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 Gardiner, S. R., The Personal Government of Charles I, 1628-1637, 2 vols. (London, 1877), 2: 348-49Google Scholar. The high year for sales was 1627-28 when the total was £94,296, while the high year for fines on new leases was 1631-32 when the total was £72,004.

53 Ibid., p. 344; Prestwich, , Cranfield, pp. 28, 339Google Scholar; Tawney, , Business and Politics, p. 93 note 4Google Scholar. The land income figures do not include fines for leases or land sales for the dates cited.

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55 Wolffe, , Royal Demesne, p. 40Google Scholar.

56 Ibid., pp. 38-40; Sharpe, , Faction and Parliament, p. 20Google Scholar; Rey, Maurice, Le domaine du roi et les finances extraordinaires sous Charles VI, 1388-1413 (Paris, 1965), pp. 41–73Google Scholar; Lublinskaya, A. D., French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-1629, trans. Pearce, B. (London, 1968), pp. 228-29, 295-96Google Scholar; Mousnier, Roland, The Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy, 1598-1789: Society and the State, trans. Pearce, B. (Chicago, 1979), pp. 652-53Google Scholar; Harriss, , “Medieval Doctrines,” pp. 73–103Google Scholar. Also, cf. Wolffe and Lublinskaya for the significant distinction between English “resumption” and the French “redemption” of royal lands.

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58 For an introduction to Crown-Parliament financial relations, see Russell, , “Parliament and the King's Finances,” pp. 91–116Google Scholar.

59 Parliamentary Debates in 1610, ed. Gardiner, S. R. (Camden Society, Old Series, 1861), 81: 11Google Scholar.

60 Reeve, , Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule, p. 133Google Scholar.

61 Debates in the House of Commons in 1625, ed. Gardiner, S. R. (Camden Society, New Series, 1873), 6: 111Google Scholar; Proceedings in Parliament 1625, eds. Jansson, Maija and Bidwell, William B. (New Haven, 1987), pp. 444, 450Google Scholar. Seymour's resumption idea was seconded by Sir Edward Coke and Sir John Eliot. See Sharpe, Kevin, “Parliamentary History, 1603-1629: In or Out of Perspective?,” in Faction and Parliament, p. 20Google Scholar, and Russell, , Parliaments and English Politics, p. 246Google Scholar. On Seymour, see Keeler, , Members of the Long Parliament, pp. 337-38Google Scholar.

62 For example, Windham, Whitmore, Fullarton, Cottington, Trevor, Walter, Button, Vane, Ingram, and Carleton cited above were M.P.s during the 1620s whose royal grants might have been jeopardized by resumption. See Return of the Names of Every Member Returned to Serve in Each Parliament, 2 vols. (London, 1878)Google Scholar. I am grateful to Paul Hardacre for this point.

63 CSPD, 1640-1641, p. 565.

64 Roberts, Clayton, “The Earl of Bedford and the Coming of the English Revolution,” Journal of Modern History 49 (December 1977): 607CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Russell, , “Parliament and the King's Finances,” pp. 111-13Google Scholar; Russell, Conrad, The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642 (New York, 1991), pp. 243, 252-55Google Scholar.

65 CSPD, 1641-43, p. 334.

66 Ibid., p. 365.

67 For the surveys, see Madge, Sidney J., The Domesday of Crown Lands (London, 1938), pp. 55-57, 133-40Google Scholar; Colvin, , King's Works, 4: 278Google Scholar; and Hollis, Daniel W. III, “The Model Survey of 1649,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 49 (November 1976): 299–301CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the Crown land sales, see especially Habakkuk, H. J., “Public Finance and the Sale of Confiscated Property during the Interregnum,” Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 15 (August 1962): 70–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “The Parliamentary Army and the Crown Lands,” Welsh History Review 3 (1967): 403-26; Gentles, Ian, “The Management of Crown Lands, 1649-1660,” Agricultural History Review 19, pt. 1 (1971): 25–41Google Scholar; idem, “The Sales of Crown Land during the English Revolution, 1649-1660, “ Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 26 (November 1973): 614-35. Crown confiscation of “rebel” lands during the war was more sweeping yet less productive than the parliamentary seizures. See Engberg, Jens, “Royalist Finances during the English Civil War, 1642-46,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 14, 2 (1966): 92–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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70 Ibid., 5: 23.

71 The Letter-book of John Mordaunt, ed. Coate, Mary (Camden Society, 3rd ser., 1945), 69: 146Google Scholar; Clarendon State Papers, eds. Scrope, R. and Monkhouse, T., 3 vols. (Oxford, 1767-1786), 3: 650Google Scholar; Cal. Clarendon SP, 4: 580Google Scholar; Habakkuk, H. J., “The Land Settlement and the Restoration of Charles II,” TRHS, 5th ser., 28 (1978): 204Google Scholar. See also Cal. Clarendon SP, 4: 587Google Scholar (Phillips to Hyde, 16 December 1659).

72 HMC, Fifth Report, Duke of Sutherland MSS, p. 206Google Scholar.

73 A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts…of the Late Lord Somers, ed. Scott, Walter, 13 vols. (Oxford, 1809-1815), 7: 465-69Google Scholar; Firth, C. H. and Davies, Godfrey, The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1940), 1: 197Google Scholar; Thirsk, Joan, “The Restoration Land Settlement,” Journal of Modern History 26 (December 1954): 319-20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

74 Calendar of Treasury Books, 1660-1718 (hereafter cited as Cal. Treasury Books), ed. Shaw, W. A., 32 vols. (London, 1904-1962), 7, pt. 3: 1544, 1552, 1573Google Scholar; CSPD, 1660-61, p. 608.

75 For Restoration reforms, see especially Tomlinson, Howard, “Financial and Administrative Developments in England, 1660-88,” in The Restored Monarchy, 1660-1688, ed. Jones, James R. (Totowa, N.J., 1979), pp. 94–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chandaman, C. D., The English Public Revenue, 1660-88 (Oxford, 1975)Google Scholar; and Roseveare, Henry, The Treasury, 1660-1870: The Foundations of Control (London, 1973), ch. 3Google Scholar.

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77 Cal. Clarendon SP, 4: 561Google Scholar.

78 St. John, Observations on the Land Revenue, pp. 136-37Google Scholar; Cal. Treasury Books, 8, pt. 3: 1573Google Scholar.

79 An Humble Representation of the Sad Condition of Many of the King's Party (London, 1661)Google Scholar.

80 PRO, Crown Estate Office (hereafter cited as CRES), Entry Books and Registers; Surveyor General's Books of Constats, 6/7/4; E 317, Buckinghamshire PS 12.

81 PRO, CRES 6/7/9-10; E 317, Middlesex PS 50.

82 Cal.Treasury Books, 2: 210, 385, 567, 595Google Scholar; CSPD, 1660-61, p. 289; Cal. Clarendon SP, 5: 47, 62Google Scholar. Other illustrations of Crown favors are cited in Davies, Godfrey and Crissey, M. H., “Corruption in Parliament, 1660-1677,” Huntington Library Quarterly 6 (October 1942-1943): 106-14Google Scholar.

83 Cal.Treasury Books, 2: 366Google ScholarPubMed; Calendar of Treasury Papers, 1556-1696, ed. Redington, J., 6 vols., (London, 1868-1889), 1: 341Google Scholar; St. John, , Observations on the Land Revenue, p. 352Google Scholar.

84 Chandaman, , Public Revenue, pp. 113-15Google Scholar.

85 Journals of the House of Commons, 29 May 1663, 12, 19 December 1667Google Scholar; St. John, Observations on the Land Revenue, pp. 139-42, 146-47, 150-51Google Scholar.

86 For a concise discussion of this point, see Clay, Christopher, “Landlords and Estate Management in England,” in The Agrarian History of England and Wales, 1640-1750, ed. Thirsk, Joan (London, 1985), pt. 2: 162-64Google Scholar.