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Control of Nonpoint Source Pollution Through Voluntary Incentive-Based Policies: An Application to Nitrate Contamination in New York

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 September 2016

Jeffrey M. Peterson  and
Richard N. Boisvert
Jeffrey M. Peterson
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics at Kansas State University
Richard N. Boisvert
Affiliation:
Department of Applied Economics and Management at Cornell University
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Abstract

A voluntary program is developed to achieve environmental goals through the self-interested choices of farmers under environmental risk and asymmetric information. Farmers behave to maximize expected net returns, and environmental quality standards are formulated through chance constraints. Because the government may not know each farmer's soil type, policy options must be self-selecting. The model is applied empirically to nitrate leaching and runoff from corn production in three New York regions. Asymmetric information between producers and the government would impose additional cost burdens on society, but these costs are modest in the context of other farm programs.

Type
Articles
Information
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , October 2001 , pp. 127 - 138
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 

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